Fee for delegates making voteable dilution proposals: How high should it be?

[fluxer555]

I think what might happen is that the DAC will become self-sustaining, where we would most likely vote out all high-pay delegates, and the rate at which fees are burned outpaces the rate of pay inflation.

[matt608]

Hug? Since when are delegates supposed to pay a fee besides registration fee, which is pretty tiny:

  "delegate_reg_fee": "14.09802 BTSX",

Sorry, I thought that's what this thread was discussing? I must have misunderstood

I've realised that I've made the error here of thinking that 'technical delegates' and  'business delegates' (what I've been calling 'dilution requests') will be separated.  In the linked thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9452.90 this is discussed at length.  It doesn't look like a decision was reached, has that decision been made?  There will still just be 1 type of delegate and paid 100% by dilution as proposed in BM's opening post in that thread, or is it still up for discussion?

Yea I don't think that was ever changed, so there will only be one type of delegate pay: by dilution. Transaction fees will be burnt 100%. The delegate types are simply describing their function, not their pay form.

As for the fees, the original proposal was 100 blocks worth I believe, which BM quickly upped to 7 days after feedback from Arhag and others including myself.

So there will never come a time when transaction fees directly pay for delegates?  I was under the impression the dilution was temporary, it was just going to be there for however long it took to  to 'bootstrap' the DAC up to a level of profitability to be able to pay delegates entirely by transaction fees.  But then with 100% burning of transaction fees, eventually that burn rate could outpace the dilution rate, so overall deflation could eventually occur.

[fluxer555]

If my math is correct, that's 29,940.5941 BTS.

((7days * 24hours * 60minutes * 6rounds) / 101delegates) * 50BTS

[monsterer]

As for the fees, the original proposal was 100 blocks worth I believe, which BM quickly upped to 7 days after feedback from Arhag and others including myself.

How much is that in total?

[svk]

Hug? Since when are delegates supposed to pay a fee besides registration fee, which is pretty tiny:

  "delegate_reg_fee": "14.09802 BTSX",

Sorry, I thought that's what this thread was discussing? I must have misunderstood

I've realised that I've made the error here of thinking that 'technical delegates' and  'business delegates' (what I've been calling 'dilution requests') will be separated.  In the linked thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9452.90 this is discussed at length.  It doesn't look like a decision was reached, has that decision been made?  There will still just be 1 type of delegate and paid 100% by dilution as proposed in BM's opening post in that thread, or is it still up for discussion?

Yea I don't think that was ever changed, so there will only be one type of delegate pay: by dilution. Transaction fees will be burnt 100%. The delegate types are simply describing their function, not their pay form.

As for the fees, the original proposal was 100 blocks worth I believe, which BM quickly upped to 7 days after feedback from Arhag and others including myself.

[xeroc]

take a look at this:
http://digitalgaia.io/backbone.html

[matt608]

Hug? Since when are delegates supposed to pay a fee besides registration fee, which is pretty tiny:

  "delegate_reg_fee": "14.09802 BTSX",

Sorry, I thought that's what this thread was discussing? I must have misunderstood

I've realised that I've made the error here of thinking that 'technical delegates' and  'business delegates' (what I've been calling 'dilution requests') will be separated.  In the linked thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9452.90 this is discussed at length.  It doesn't look like a decision was reached, has that decision been made?  There will still just be 1 type of delegate and paid 100% by dilution as proposed in BM's opening post in that thread, or is it still up for discussion?

I would be in favour of separating the roles... unless there's another big thread on this I should read?

[svk]

so DDOSing is not an issue IMHO

maybe campaign trash talk bashing .. but not DDOS

Here is one such exploit:

Enumerate all nodes on the network by following connections from the client. Delegates have to be online to produce blocks, so you'll be able to gather their IP addresses along with everyone elses.

Then, simply run through that list, DDOS bursting at each IP address and watch every single delegate for stats dropping. You will be able to find a map from IP to delegate with quite a high probability with enough DDOS probes.

edit: might cost a lot if you don't own a botnet, but the risk is there.

This is a little off-topic but I'm very interested in the DDOS attack vector and what we might do to prevent it.

I know one method proposed by Emski I think would be to have your delegate connect only to nodes controlled by yourself, and disable peer advertising on those nodes. That seems to me like it could work, but it would also be very expensive.

Another option in the client is to refuse incoming connections, would this thwart a DDOS attack? Unfortunately this option doesn't seem very stable, at least every time I've tried I ended up going to 0 connections and losing sync with the network.

[Method-X]

so DDOSing is not an issue IMHO

maybe campaign trash talk bashing .. but not DDOS

Here is one such exploit:

Enumerate all nodes on the network by following connections from the client. Delegates have to be online to produce blocks, so you'll be able to gather their IP addresses along with everyone elses.

Then, simply run through that list, DDOS bursting at each IP address and watch every single delegate for stats dropping. You will be able to find a map from IP to delegate with quite a high probability with enough DDOS probes.

edit: might cost a lot if you don't own a botnet, but the risk is there.

So how do we prevent DDOSing? Arent Bitcoins mining pools subject to the same thing?

[monsterer]

so DDOSing is not an issue IMHO

maybe campaign trash talk bashing .. but not DDOS

Here is one such exploit:

Enumerate all nodes on the network by following connections from the client. Delegates have to be online to produce blocks, so you'll be able to gather their IP addresses along with everyone elses.

Then, simply run through that list, DDOS bursting at each IP address and watch every single delegate for stats dropping. You will be able to find a map from IP to delegate with quite a high probability with enough DDOS probes.

edit: might cost a lot if you don't own a botnet, but the risk is there.

[xeroc]

Or, is getting DDOSed out of existance by other delegate candidates with something to gain.

DDOSing a delegate is not so easy because you can hide it's IP where every you want .. either in a VPN to the seed nodes or any other trusted nodes .. or you put all of it into tor (if latency allows it)

so DDOSing is not an issue IMHO

maybe campaign trash talk bashing .. but not DDOS

[monsterer]

A delegate unable to stay in for 2 weeks is still campaigning or isn't serious about getting and keeping the job.

Or, is getting DDOSed out of existance by other delegate candidates with something to gain.

[bytemaster]

A delegate unable to stay in for 2 weeks is still campaigning or isn't serious about getting and keeping the job. 

[monsterer]

though I don't see why we should have such a high fee ... would give those couple thousand delegates already registered a HUGE advantage .. not sure if I would like that to happen

I think existing delegates have to re-register to apply for greater than 3% pay rate anyway?

Even so, it could make for a risky proposition for a potential new delegate.

edit: IMO this up front payment should be returnable in the event the delegate gets voted out before 100 blocks.

[xeroc]

Sorry, I thought that's what this thread was discussing? I must have misunderstood

You are right... I was wrong .. was confused by the quote .. sorry ..

You have a valid point!
registering an expensive delegate and than not being voted in to achieve a ROI could happen that way ..
though I don't see why we should have such a high fee ... would give those couple thousand delegates already registered a HUGE advantage .. not sure if I would like that to happen

[monsterer]

Hug? Since when are delegates supposed to pay a fee besides registration fee, which is pretty tiny:

  "delegate_reg_fee": "14.09802 BTSX",

Sorry, I thought that's what this thread was discussing? I must have misunderstood

[xeroc]

I think that exposes delegates to a form of DOS; here is the problem:

* Delegate pays 5000 BTS fee
* Gets voted out before 100 blocks, due to DDOS, or other directed attack
* Suffers unrecoverable loss

?

Hug? Since when are delegates supposed to pay a fee besides registration fee, which is pretty tiny:

  "delegate_reg_fee": "14.09802 BTSX",

[monsterer]

Rune Ander is actually spot on with BM's original proposal for this:

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9452

100 x 50BTS = 5000 BTS

Edit: Mixed up the names

I think that exposes delegates to a form of DOS; here is the problem:

* Delegate pays 5000 BTS fee
* Gets voted out before 100 blocks, due to DDOS, or other directed attack
* Suffers unrecoverable loss

?

[matt608]

Rune Ander is actually spot on with BM's original proposal for this:

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9452

100 x 50BTS = 5000 BTS


Edit: Mixed up the names

Ok.. I missed that thread.  Reading it.

[Rune]

Rune Ander is actually spot on with BM's original proposal for this:

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9452

100 x 50BTS = 5000 BTS


Edit: Mixed up the names

That seems pretty fair.

In the long run I'd like to see some system where delegate pay is "vested" for something like 2 weeks, and if a delegate is downvoted a lot by stakeholders rather than just getting bumped out by another delegate voted in, then they lose the vested pay. That would make it a lot more expensive to pull off some weird delegate scam. If it happens accidentally then stakeholders can just vote the delegate back for another two weeks, or another delegate can use funds that would otherwise be burned to compensate.

Obviously such a system would have to be highly sofisticated and carefully implemented.

[Ander]

Rune Ander is actually spot on with BM's original proposal for this:

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9452

100 x 50BTS = 5000 BTS


Edit: Mixed up the names

DIdnt know bytemaster proposed that arleady...

Yes, I think this is good.  100x your block pay to propose a high pay delegate should prevent spam.

[fluxer555]

Rune Ander is actually spot on with BM's original proposal for this:

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9452

100 x 50BTS = 5000 BTS


Edit: Mixed up the names

[Rune]

I'm pretty sure it's supposed to be 2 weeks pay to register a delegate? I think I've read that before.

[Ander]

How about this:

The cost to propose a delegate is 1 day of delegate pay.

Thus, to propose a 100% pay delegate, its around 5000 BTS.

For a 10% pay delegate, its only 500 BTS.  (I think we need to allow these partial pay delegates to be proposed at a reasonable cost.  After all, in the future when BTS is worth a lot more, I think most delegates wont actually be max pay delegates, because max pay will be a TON).

[Mysto]

- the fewer voteable dilution proposals (higher stakeholder confidence/certainty)
- the better the quality of the proposals
- the lower the level of freakout by stakeholders as at least some would have been exposed to the proposal many times on the forum and developed some trust towards the delegate during the preliminary proposal feedback process.
 - the higher the deflation from fee-burning!

-Let the stakeholders directly decide how many vote-able dilution proposals they want.
-Let the market decide the quality of the proposals (the better the proposal the more likely people will vote for it)
-You don't need a fee to do that. Right now many people have stepped forward and ask the community if their proposal was a good one.
-The fees-burned wouldn't even have an impact imo. But lets say they are big enough to have an impact, the delegate would probably want to dilute more to make up for the fee so it really wouldn't matter.


Edit:

Also maybe proposal makers should be required to run a delegate for at least 1 month before making an official voteable proposal.   That helps build trust and commitment to BTS by creating an intellectual overhead and proves they are capable of the basic delegate tasks.

Good idea, that could help us with the back up delegate problem. But again I don't think it should be a rule.

[matt608]

Will there need to be a fee for delegates making officially voteable dilution proposals?  How high should it be? 

Prospective delegates who want dilution could propose their idea unofficially on the forums and get an idea of whether it is likely to be voted in or not and use community feedback to refine the idea. Then they could write it up and officially propose it, costing a fee, maybe quite a large one.

The stakeholders could easily get overwhelmed by too many voting decisions.  Too many proposals have already been seen in the forum to cause confusion, stress, and bearishness.  If there's a fee to make an official voteable dilution proposal it would have the following benefits:

The higher the fee:

- the fewer voteable dilution proposals (higher stakeholder confidence/certainty)
- the better the quality of the proposals
- the lower the level of freakout by stakeholders as at least some would have been exposed to the proposal many times on the forum and developed some trust towards the delegate during the preliminary proposal feedback process.
 - the higher the deflation from fee-burning!

Burning of fees from dilution proposals could add a decent income stream to the DAC.  I'd say it should be a few hundred USD worth of BTS per official voteable proposal, maybe more?

If the fee is $300USD worth of BTS, stakeholders who are greatly in favour of the proposal from the pre-liminary discussions could easily donate to pay the fee to put it up for vote.  If the proposal is good enough it should easily be able to gather $300 of donations from its supporters before going up to vote.

Also maybe proposal makers should be required to run a delegate for at least 1 month before making an official voteable proposal.   That helps build trust and commitment to BTS by creating an intellectual overhead and proves they are capable of the basic delegate tasks.