Author Topic: [Documents] Whitepapers & Broschures  (Read 24688 times)

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Offline Agent86

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Short sellers are typically bullish on the direction of BTS vs. the market pegged asset. 

I suggest saying a short position is a "bullish position" rather than refer to the short-seller's motivation. A bullish outlook is true of naked short-sellers, but not necessarily hedged short-sellers. And the type of short-seller that dominates will depend on where demand for the bitAsset is coming from.

For example, when demand for bitAsset/BTS increases, it must be met by short-sellers who are bullish BTS. However, when demand for bitAsset/fiat increases, it can be met by a neutral arbitrager willing to create a simultaneous long and short in the bitAsset, who will then sell the bitAsset for fiat at a premium to the peg.

I feel like you're over-analyzing here. I also don't know what the advantage of a "simultaneous long and short" is in this context.  If people are paying more for bitAssets with fiat than the internal exchange would indicate then just buy bitAssets on the internal exchange and sell them, why go short at the same time?  makes no sense.

Value Risk:

Market pegged assets maintain their price parity due to being backed by collateral that has an established real world value.  When the value of the collateral falls, the system is designed to react by driving the internal asset exchange to match the new real world exchange rate and trigger margin calls as necessary.  However, there exists a possibility that the underlying asset used for collateral (BTS) drops in value so quickly the market pegged assets become under-collateralized.  Often termed a "black swan event," this sudden and dramatic crash of BTS value could prevent the system from adjusting in time.  In this event, the full amount of collateral is no longer sufficient to purchase the market pegged asset back at the new real exchange rate.  In such an event, assets may trade below their face value.  It is possible the market could recover if BTS regained value.  It is also possible the market would need to be "reset" and asset holders forced to settle for BTS collateral worth less than the intended face value of their assets.

What does "real world value" mean?
it means it has an established exchange rate with real USD (or similarly accepted store of value).

I didn't think it was too ambiguous but if you have a suggestion of how to re-write the sentence in a way that isn't unneccesarily wordy or awkward I'd definitely consider changing it.


The risk of imperfect pegging is not mentioned, and that is a key one.
What do you mean risk of "imperfect pegging"?

I explained that if the asset became under-collateralized it can cause the peg to not track.  I also explained that the price feed doesn't dictate the exchange rate at any instant and that the exchange rate tends toward parity in the long run.  I could probably stress that short term market movements, spreads, and fees charged by exchanges all effect the potential cost of conversion into and out of market pegged assets.


There is also the risk that, because BTS is not itself a highly liquid market, it could be manipulated to affect certain outcomes in the bitAsset market via the price feeds. I'm not sure if that fits under the "Value" risk banner, or somewhere else.
"affect certain outcomes" what outcomes? and how do those outcomes affect bitAsset holders?

I stated market manipulation is possible but other than if it causes a quick revaluation of BTS that left bitAssets under-collateralized (black swan event, already discussed) how else would it affect market pegged asset holders?


A separate risk is that the yield is variable, and depends on...(no formula)

I don't consider this a risk.  I never said yield was guaranteed, it could be zero.  As a side note, I'd be happy if we didn't offer yield at all (bond market is a better system)


A more detailed paper was requested but keeping it short to not confuse people and only give them what they need for a basic but solid understanding also makes sense. So why not make two papers? One that would be equal to this and one that would be this one plus the extended stuff. One for each target group.

i like this idea

I agree, because most future bitAsset users will never need to know the inner workings of a bitAsset/BTS market, as they will only deal with bitAsset/fiat/crypto.

I don't want to make a long paper just to make a long paper.  People have limited time and attention and it's best to convey the message efficiently.  My feeling is that the core market peg mechanism may not require a huge paper to explain.  People may need to think it over one way or another, but you don't want to add a bunch of superfluous stuff.  Of course if there are critical things to add it should be added


Offline cass

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i'll prepare the Whitepaper pdf when content is ready! Let me also know if any info GFX is needed for BitAsset Whitepaper… thx
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Offline xeroc

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Just a quick info: If you want it to be formated like the yellow paper PDF of etherum .. using LaTeX .. I can assist .. not sure if we need a pdf though ..

Offline starspirit

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Short sellers are typically bullish on the direction of BTS vs. the market pegged asset. 

I suggest saying a short position is a "bullish position" rather than refer to the short-seller's motivation. A bullish outlook is true of naked short-sellers, but not necessarily hedged short-sellers. And the type of short-seller that dominates will depend on where demand for the bitAsset is coming from.

For example, when demand for bitAsset/BTS increases, it must be met by short-sellers who are bullish BTS. However, when demand for bitAsset/fiat increases, it can be met by a neutral arbitrager willing to create a simultaneous long and short in the bitAsset, who will then sell the bitAsset for fiat at a premium to the peg.


Value Risk:

Market pegged assets maintain their price parity due to being backed by collateral that has an established real world value.  When the value of the collateral falls, the system is designed to react by driving the internal asset exchange to match the new real world exchange rate and trigger margin calls as necessary.  However, there exists a possibility that the underlying asset used for collateral (BTS) drops in value so quickly the market pegged assets become under-collateralized.  Often termed a "black swan event," this sudden and dramatic crash of BTS value could prevent the system from adjusting in time.  In this event, the full amount of collateral is no longer sufficient to purchase the market pegged asset back at the new real exchange rate.  In such an event, assets may trade below their face value.  It is possible the market could recover if BTS regained value.  It is also possible the market would need to be "reset" and asset holders forced to settle for BTS collateral worth less than the intended face value of their assets.

What does "real world value" mean?

The risk of imperfect pegging is not mentioned, and that is a key one.

There is also the risk that, because BTS is not itself a highly liquid market, it could be manipulated to affect certain outcomes in the bitAsset market via the price feeds. I'm not sure if that fits under the "Value" risk banner, or somewhere else.

A separate risk is that the yield is variable, and depends on...(no formula)


A more detailed paper was requested but keeping it short to not confuse people and only give them what they need for a basic but solid understanding also makes sense. So why not make two papers? One that would be equal to this and one that would be this one plus the extended stuff. One for each target group.

i like this idea

I agree, because most future bitAsset users will never need to know the inner workings of a bitAsset/BTS market, as they will only deal with bitAsset/fiat/crypto.

Offline hpenvy

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A more detailed paper was requested but keeping it short to not confuse people and only give them what they need for a basic but solid understanding also makes sense. So why not make two papers? One that would be equal to this and one that would be this one plus the extended stuff. One for each target group.

i like this idea

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Offline cass

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A more detailed paper was requested but keeping it short to not confuse people and only give them what they need for a basic but solid understanding also makes sense. So why not make two papers? One that would be equal to this and one that would be this one plus the extended stuff. One for each target group.

i like this idea
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Offline santaclause102

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Ok, that all makes sense.

Thank you for your work! I think that a good whitepaper is essential because it can help heaps to convince reputable and knowledgeable individuals and institutions that are trusted by the masses.

A more detailed paper was requested but keeping it short to not confuse people and only give them what they need for a basic but solid understanding also makes sense. So why not make two papers? One that would be equal to this and one that would be this one plus the extended stuff. One for each target group.

 

Offline Agent86

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Delulo, thanks for the feedback and for reading it!!!

The holy grail if persuasive writing is combining simplicity with precision (and understatement imo) and this write up is pretty good at that.

Feedback:

I woudn't know where the following points to:  "The delegate election process is covered in detail in documentation on the BitShares' "DPOS" consensus algorithm."
Yea we should probably have info on DPOS nearby.

Really miner but in this sentence you loose a bit the clear language: "Short sellers are typically bullish on the direction of BTS vs. the market pegged asset." "typically" and "vs" are not very precise terms. Suggestion: According to the market rules short sellers are meant to be bullish on the direction on the price of BTS compared to the the market pegged asset.
I don't know, I like the original wording better but of course these things are subject to individual preference so maybe I can change it.
For the following comments: Here is how I see it: Asset: general term of any asset. Market pegged asset: overall category of what we call bitAssets. Underlying asset: specific asset that is underlying a certain bitAsset.

"If the market value of BTS rises with respect to the asset" <- "underlying asset" would be more clear.
I agree on the need for consistency, although I don't think using "underlying asset" this way is clear..

"can buy back the asset" I'd say "bitAsset" here since it is the bitAsset that is bought back not the asset itself.

"If the price of the asset rises a lot" ->  "If the price of the asset rises a lot compared to BTS" just to be more clear and explicit.
I got rid of any reference to "bitAssets",  I don't really like the term bitAsset because to me it seems like a generic term for a digital asset and could be confusing to say only market pegged assets are "bitAssets."  So I tried to refer to bitAssets as market pegged assets or asset for short if I thought it was clear.  Maybe we can adopt the abbreviation "MPAs"??

I also meant to not refer to BTS as an asset at all but I did use the phrase "underlying asset used for collateral (BTS)" once which I can change.

"However, there exists a possibility that the value of the underlying asset used for collateral (BTS) drops in value so quickly that the market pegged assets become under-collateralized.  In this event, the full amount of collateral is no longer sufficient to purchase the market pegged asset back at the new real exchange rate." I think there is something missing here namely this (if I understood it right): If BTS falls too fast the margin calls can not automatically buy back enough BitUSD since there just might not be enough new BitUSD shorts or normal BitUSD sellers.
Is there an estimate how fast it would have to fall for the bitasset to not be fully collateralized (? And are there other factors than the speed at which it falls that determine the risk that BitUSD would only partly collateralized? For example liquidity/size of the market for a certain bitAsset: I can't see how that would play in here except that is makes the bitasset markets less volatile in the first place. 
I agree that this sentence isn't as clear as it could be.  I still wouldn't want to give an estimate for how fast BTS would have to fall for assets to be under-collateralized because it depends on how fast new short sellers react and enter the market.

And something else I would like to understand: The short seller puts up collateral worth 2x the bitassets that were shorted then the buyer buys it from him which gives the short seller 1x the value of the bitasset shorted back as liquid BTS. So in the end there are is 2x collateral that is actually not liquid and can act as collateral (for margin calls). Am I wrong here?
Yea, you are wrong here.  The short seller doesn't get any "liquid BTS" from the sale; it all goes to collateral.

Offline santaclause102

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The holy grail if persuasive writing is combining simplicity with precision (and understatement imo) and this write up is pretty good at that.

Feedback:

I woudn't know where the following points to:  "The delegate election process is covered in detail in documentation on the BitShares' "DPOS" consensus algorithm."

Really miner but in this sentence you loose a bit the clear language: "Short sellers are typically bullish on the direction of BTS vs. the market pegged asset." "typically" and "vs" are not very precise terms. Suggestion: According to the market rules short sellers are meant to be bullish on the direction on the price of BTS compared to the the market pegged asset.

For the following comments: Here is how I see it: Asset: general term of any asset. Market pegged asset: overall category of what we call bitAssets. Underlying asset: specific asset that is underlying a certain bitAsset.

"If the market value of BTS rises with respect to the asset" <- "underlying asset" would be more clear.

"can buy back the asset" I'd say "bitAsset" here since it is the bitAsset that is bought back not the asset itself.

"If the price of the asset rises a lot" ->  "If the price of the asset rises a lot compared to BTS" just to be more clear and explicit.

"rules of the program" -> software or software program or the software client instead of program would be more clear imo.

The order matching mechanisms could be a little bit extended. I understood it but had to think quite a while about it. Here is how I described it for myself: When a sell order is bigger than the buy orders at or above the price of the sell order then all those buy orders get filled and the seller pays the price he entered with all orders that get filled although the buy orders only receive what they entered - the rest is paid as fees.     

"However, there exists a possibility that the value of the underlying asset used for collateral (BTS) drops in value so quickly that the market pegged assets become under-collateralized.  In this event, the full amount of collateral is no longer sufficient to purchase the market pegged asset back at the new real exchange rate." I think there is something missing here namely this (if I understood it right): If BTS falls too fast the margin calls can not automatically buy back enough BitUSD since there just might not be enough new BitUSD shorts or normal BitUSD sellers.
Is there an estimate how fast it would have to fall for the bitasset to not be fully collateralized (? And are there other factors than the speed at which it falls that determine the risk that BitUSD would only partly collateralized? For example liquidity/size of the market for a certain bitAsset: I can't see how that would play in here except that is makes the bitasset markets less volatile in the first place. 

And something else I would like to understand: The short seller puts up collateral worth 2x the bitassets that were shorted then the buyer buys it from him which gives the short seller 1x the value of the bitasset shorted back as liquid BTS. So in the end there are is 2x collateral that is actually not liquid and can act as collateral (for margin calls). Am I wrong here?

Offline Agent86

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I would add to risk section that BTS price may be subject to speculative manipulation attack, so long as it pick up the pace of sufficient liquidity.
Maybe you could clarify the attack you are talking about, such as who is being attacked and the method, so I know what you mean.  Keep in mind the risks outlined are specific to market pegged assets while the volatility risk of BTS is fully acknowledged.

Offline Anotheracc

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I would add to risk section that BTS price may be subject to speculative manipulation attack, so long as it pick up the pace of sufficient liquidity.

Offline Agent86

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Here is an updated and slightly more polished version.  Even though some things are not fully delved into like the formula for distributing yield, I think you could end up just confusing people and turning them off by adding every detail or scenario and I also don't want it to seem too "salesy".

BitShares Market Pegged Assets

BitShares market pegged assets are a new type of freely traded digital asset whose value is meant to track the value of a common asset such as the U.S. dollar or gold.   BitShares uses an advanced decentralized consensus ledger that takes some cues from Bitcoin.  While Bitcoin has demonstrated many useful properties as a currency, its price volatility makes it risky to hold and difficult to use for everyday pricing and payments.  A currency with the properties and advantages of Bitcoin that maintains price parity with a globally adopted currency such as the US dollar has high utility for convenient and censorship resistant commerce.  The purpose of this introduction to market pegged assets is to explain how this price parity is achieved.

Bitcoin and similar crypto-currencies enable value storage and exchange over the internet that is beyond the control or censorship of a centralized party.  Demand for this utility has driven up the price of crypto-currencies.  Bitshares uses an analogous blockchain based core token simply called BitShares that is traded with the abbreviation "BTS" on well-known crypto-currency exchanges.

Market Mechanism

Market pegged assets are created on the BitShares blockchain using a similar method to a contract for difference.  The open source BitShares software program implements a decentralized internal marketplace for these assets and enforces the market rules.  A BTS holder may use her BTS to place a buy order on the internal market for her asset of choice.  Market pegged assets are created when a buyer is matched with a "short seller" of the asset.  The short seller takes on the obligation of buying back the asset in the future and must maintain collateral sufficient to repurchase the asset at current market rates.  This creates systemic demand for the asset.

"BitUSD" is the name of the BitShares market pegged asset that tracks the US dollar and we will use this as an example.  In order to ensure that the internal market participants trading bitUSD for BTS have the opportunity to settle at the real USD to BTS exchange rate, the external exchange rate is fed into the system by a network of independent "delegates."  Delegates are elected by BTS holders to run the network, process transactions, and provide exchange rate information.  This external exchange rate information is often called a "price feed."  The delegate election process is covered in detail in documentation on the BitShares' "DPOS" consensus algorithm.  Delegates typically combine price information from multiple sources such as exchanges to generate a price feed and update it regularly. The system takes a median of all price feeds so that manipulation of the price information would be very difficult by any single delegate or party without massive collusion.

It is important to understand how the price feed is used to regulate the internal market.  It does not directly control the market or the sale price between buyers and sellers of market pegged assets.  It functions to regulate creation and destruction of market pegged assets in a way that pushes the market price toward the long term expected exchange rate (parity with the dollar).  While the internal exchange rate of bitUSD to BTS has no restriction, new "short sales" are prevented from executing below the median price feed.  Short selling is the process by which new bitUSD is brought into existence and the rule that short sales are not executed below the real exchange rate prevents new bitUSD creation when price is below parity with the dollar.  New bitUSD is created only when demand for bitUSD is at parity with the dollar or above.

When a short seller buys back bitUSD and covers their position they repay their obligation and can recover their collateral BTS.  At this time they are taking bitUSD out of circulation and reducing the total supply.  The current BitShares market rules force short sellers to cover their position within 30 days of opening the short position.  This means that the full amount of outstanding bitUSD must be purchased off the market every 30 days.  BitUSD holders are not required to sell; therefore short sellers covering their positions are eventually forced to purchase from newly opened short sales at or above the exchange rate.   This is effectively a guarantee to any bitUSD holder that they can sell bitUSD for the dollar equivalent of BTS within any 30 day period.

Short sellers are typically bullish on the direction of BTS vs. the market pegged asset.  If the market value of BTS rises with respect to the asset the short seller can buy back the asset for significantly less BTS than they originally sold it for and profit from the transaction.  If BTS value falls in relation to the market pegged asset, the short seller must buy back the asset at a loss.  If the price of the asset rises a lot, a short may face a "margin call" where the rules of the program use the posted collateral to automatically buy back the asset from the market to repay the obligation.  A margin call is triggered in the current BitShares system whenever the value of the collateral falls to less than two times what is required to cover the obligation.

Order Matching

Market orders and other signed transactions on the BitShares blockchain are grouped into 10 second blocks by delegates.  When buy and sell orders on the internal BitShares' market are matched, the highest buy orders are matched with the lowest sell orders and any BTS contained in the overlap are destroyed so that each party gets exactly what they paid for.  The reason for this is twofold.  Firstly, it prevents high frequency trading that attempts to insert an order between two placed orders to profit from the overlap, this is sometimes called "front running".  It also makes it very costly for a large buyer or seller to quickly move the market by placing a large order far from the current market rate.  Doing so would require the buyer or seller to pay the more expensive rate and lose any overlap with all orders their order is matched with.  The destruction of BTS from the overlap of orders creates value for BTS holders as a whole by making the token more scarce.  When there is significant demand to short sell assets at the price feed rate, the current BitShares system allows short sellers to offer interest to asset holders in exchange for priority in order matching.  In this way, holders of market pegged assets can also collect an additional yield on their savings.

Risk

The implementation of market pegged assets in the BitShares system is designed to minimize risk of loss to asset holders.  Short positions are opened with collateral valued at three times the face value of the asset.  The initial collateral is comprised of the BTS paid by the buyer for the asset and twice this amount of BTS contributed by the short seller.   The collateral requirements and margin triggers were chosen conservatively to protect the holders of market pegged assets from volatility of the underlying collateral.   Forcing short positions to cover every 30 days provides additional assurance of short term liquidity.  Control over the price feed is distributed among over 50 separately elected delegates who compile information from multiple exchange sources.  Despite such precautions, it is important to carefully explore risks of using the system.  Risks can be broadly categorized as value risk, counterparty risk, or systemic risk.

Value Risk:

Market pegged assets maintain their price parity due to being backed by collateral that has an established real world value.  When the value of the collateral falls, the system is designed to react by driving the internal asset exchange to match the new real world exchange rate and trigger margin calls as necessary.  However, there exists a possibility that the underlying asset used for collateral (BTS) drops in value so quickly the market pegged assets become under-collateralized.  Often termed a "black swan event," this sudden and dramatic crash of BTS value could prevent the system from adjusting in time.  In this event, the full amount of collateral is no longer sufficient to purchase the market pegged asset back at the new real exchange rate.  In such an event, assets may trade below their face value.  It is possible the market could recover if BTS regained value.  It is also possible the market would need to be "reset" and asset holders forced to settle for BTS collateral worth less than the intended face value of their assets.

Counterparty risk:

Unlike many attempts to create a digital asset that tracks the dollar, market pegged asset are not an "I owe you" issued by any entity.  For this reason, it does not rely on a specific counterparty to honor its value.  Although manipulation risk occurs in any market, it is minimized by the open source and auditable nature of the BitShares system and carefully considered market rules.  Some counterparty risk exists when buying market pegged assets on an external public exchange. The exchange must be trusted with customer funds for the time period they are deposited.  It is not recommended that digital assets are stored on an exchange long term.

Systemic risk:

Systemic risk is a catch-all for other risks required to utilize the system.  The primary risk is individuals are responsible for protecting the cryptographic private keys that sign transactions proving ownership of assets.  These keys must be protected from theft or loss.  This risk can be greatly reduced and virtually eliminated by following best practices.  Systemic risk also includes the possibility of an overlooked fatal flaw in the open source software or the possibility of large scale failure of global network infrastructure.

Outlook

BitShares market pegged assets are a viable open source alternative to the incumbent banking system.  While certain risks have been outlined, no system is without risk.  The current banking system allows private funds to be frozen or confiscated without consent, such as by court order.  Banks and financial institutions are susceptible to insolvency.  The availability and quality of banking service varies greatly throughout the world.  BitShares brings publically auditable open source banking to anyone with access to the internet.  Market pegged assets allow savers and spenders to choose preferred asset types.  This brings flexibility and ease of use to the open source banking experience.

Offline bytemaster

Look at the liquidity guarantee from an active market:  on average 1/30 of the BitUSD supply has to be covered every day.  At a 1 million USD supply you should be able to sell $33,000 per day at the feed price.   
For the latest updates checkout my blog: http://bytemaster.bitshares.org
Anything said on these forums does not constitute an intent to create a legal obligation or contract between myself and anyone else.   These are merely my opinions and I reserve the right to change them at any time.

Offline Agent86

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Additional feedback for the white paper... it isn't as through as I would like.  Here are some topics that need explored.

1) Variance on the price feed, update frequency.
2) Relationship between Volume & Price.  If you sell $1M worth of BitUSD and get $1M worth of BTS at the price feed... then dump it on an exchange with $200K / day volume you will end up with less than $1M worth of real USD.   Thus we can say that BitAssets are pegged to the nominal price and their value is subject to the liquidity of BTS. 

3) We need a BitAssets for Dummies overview that highlights the following key facts:
    a) Price Feed is sourced / vetted by N exchanges and 50+ delegates
    b) 100% of all BitUSD may be sold for BTS at the Price Feed within 30 days.
    c) Price Feed is always within ~1% of the real feed
    d) BitUSD pays yield from interest paid by those who borrowed to create it and transaction fees.
    e) Worst case BitUSD is worth 3x the number of BTS you paid for it (100% of collateral paid to BitUSD holder)

4) There are some scenerios that need to be covered:
    a) What happens if there are not enough orders on the book to fill a margin call?
    b) What happens if the price falls by 80% over a week
    c) What is the maximum volatility of Bitcoin in a single 24 hour period? 
     

 
I can expand on things.  Perhaps it may make sense to separate out the core concept from detailed discussion of parameters of the current implementation?

I was hoping to write something that someone new to the concept could read and feel like they can trust that it works.  I want to avoid information overload, but I know some people want every implementation detail.

I noticed you added the clarifying statement:
"Stated another way, if the value of BTS falls by 33% from the time the short position is entered, then a margin call will occur.  The value of BTS would have to fall by 66% before the collateral would be insufficient.   These rules are extremely conservative compared to any traditional banking practice and is designed to protect the system even in the most extreme volatility."

I still had the margin call level listed as 1.5x but this describes the new 2x collateral rule so I should make it consistent.  I also never really went into the detail that seller puts up 2x collateral and is matched with 1x from the buyer for a total of 3x starting collateral so I think I would need to clarify this.

Cass, I will do an update.

Offline cass

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let me know if it's ready to create a branded suit for...
« Last Edit: November 25, 2014, 06:21:51 pm by cass »
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