There's a shortage of attention, and asking people to vote on 101 positions is already significant. The delegates actually running the network should be voted out if they aren't trustworthy anyway, so why is it a problem for them to handle payment to non-technical contributors?
I think it would be easier for the voters if they had straightforward proposals that they could approve or disapprove which did things like hiring a worker at a pay rate of X BitUSD, or firing a worker. Approving up to 110 delegates with varying pay rate percentages that give them varying value of money depending on the price of BTS, making sure they burn the appropriate amount, making sure they pay the worker the delegate is representing, judging the delegates on the combined metric of their performance as a worker (e.g. are they good at marketing or developing) as well as their performance as a block producer (e.g. are they creating blocks on time, are they publishing price feeds) is what makes voting extra confusing for stakeholders in my opinion. If we separate out the roles, I think voting would be easier.
Let me give you an example. Toast is awesome, but for some reason he is still not publish price feeds (why is that toast?). If I was judging him solely on being a block producer, I might want to vote him out for not publishing price feeds. But because I want him paid to keep develop awesome software for BitShares, I am willing to tolerate the fact that he isn't publishing price feeds.
Let's take another (hypothetical) example. Imagine a scenario where all of the best people to be paid by the blockchain to work on improving the DAC happened to live in the same country, say the US. I am not comfortable with all of the delegates being from a single jurisdiction. So do I compromise the worker performance for the sake of decentralization, or do I compromise decentralization of the blockchain for the sake of picking the ideal people to work on improving the DAC?
So in my opinion the role of the delegates should at most be to produce blocks, provide price feeds (although ideally I would separate out this role as well), and put binding proposals up on the blockchain for a vote by the stakeholders. The last requirement would be a new one which allows the blockchain to adapt (hire/fire workers, change salaries, change other parameters in the blockchain) with enough
support by the stakeholders (the definition of enough
would depend on the actual topic the proposal is about). The delegates would still use other means (off-chain polls/voting with BTS stake, unofficial polls and other discussion on forums) to decide which proposals the community might be interested in. The delegates would have no power alone to pass the proposal since it would only be ratified if the quorum of stakeholder approval was reached. They would merely act as the method (and I suppose filter / check & balance) to bring the binding proposals into the blockchain to be either approved or disapproved by the stakeholders.