Author Topic: How to make payroll without multiple delegates per developer  (Read 9740 times)

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Offline bytemaster

I think you are misunderstanding my intentions.  My intentions are for developers to be well compensated and error on the side of over compensation.  The penny pinchers I was referring to are those who are trying to nickel and dime developers and demanding excessive accountability to the point of hindering productivity.

I have no problem with developers keeping 100% pay and not burning surplus if they can convince shareholders to keep them voted in.
I have no problem with developers asking for additional delegate slots if one slot doesn't pay enough.
I have provided complete transparency on the bonus each developer received so that people would not overcompensate developers with a large bonus + paid position. 
I had no problem advancing you the funds to register your paid delegate nor trusting you with a no-strings-attached bonus

I think everyone values you and you will have no problem maintaining a good income while you have support of the community.

I am against any kind of commitment to vote for you.  People have a right to vote how they think is best when they think it.

For the latest updates checkout my blog: http://bytemaster.bitshares.org
Anything said on these forums does not constitute an intent to create a legal obligation or contract between myself and anyone else.   These are merely my opinions and I reserve the right to change them at any time.

Offline NewMine

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Already happening 6 months sooner than I predicted.

Offline theoretical

Core developers have a large enough stake that they now get "automatic bonuses"  if the value of that stake goes up as a result of their efforts.   The incentives are aligned. 

Assume for the moment I did have a large stake.  Then I have two choices:

(a) Leave and watch my stake grow x% based on the efforts of other developers
(b) Stay and watch my stake grow y% based on the efforts of myself and other developers combined

My effective salary is then (y-x)% times my stake, plus income from any delegate(s) I operate.

I am not sure that (y-x)% is large enough even if my stake is large.
BTS- theoretical / PTS- PZxpdC8RqWsdU3pVJeobZY7JFKVPfNpy5z / BTC- 1NfGejohzoVGffAD1CnCRgo9vApjCU2viY / the delegate formerly known as drltc / Nothing said on these forums is intended to be legally binding / All opinions are my own unless otherwise noted / Take action due to my posts at your own risk

Offline theoretical

I am sorry, but this kind of legalistic penny pinching will kill BTS and hurt morale.   

So wait.  How exactly will paying people a fair salary for their efforts hurt morale?

Nothing is "legalistic" about OP proposal; it does not involve the real world legal system in any way, shape or form.  It's using the BTS tools of decentralized shareholder consensus and user-issued assets to create a market-based solution to the practical problem of compensating developers adequately for their time while maintaining a strong level of decentralization in the delegate slate, without any hardfork.

As for "penny pinching":  You want to refuse to inflate BTS to adequately pay developers, when the DAC has the ability to do so while remaining below the hard-coded supply envelope.  I'd say that is penny pinching.

BTS- theoretical / PTS- PZxpdC8RqWsdU3pVJeobZY7JFKVPfNpy5z / BTC- 1NfGejohzoVGffAD1CnCRgo9vApjCU2viY / the delegate formerly known as drltc / Nothing said on these forums is intended to be legally binding / All opinions are my own unless otherwise noted / Take action due to my posts at your own risk

Offline theoretical

Core developers have a large enough stake that they now get "automatic bonuses"  if the value of that stake goes up as a result of their efforts.   The incentives are aligned. 

I think I had at most ~100K genesis block BTS.  I believed in the product so I shorted the hell out of USD -- but that turned out to be almost exactly when the exchange rate was at its peak.  I got margin called when I was in the process of moving to Virginia -- something you wanted me to do -- and didn't have time to check the markets every day.

I had to ask you for AGS funds just to get enough BTS to register my 100% delegate.

I'll have to consume a substantial portion of my 1M BTS bonus to eat over the next couple months.

If I had a guarantee that I'd be able to run a one hundred percent delegate indefinitely, then I would be able to include the NPV of a 100% delegate's future earnings in my compensation.  However, you've publicly stated that you want developers to burn any delegate income in excess of a market salary, and I assume shareholders will side with you -- I'd have no way to keep them from reneging on any promise they make now not to fire my delegate if I continue to operate at 100% after BTS value goes to the moon.

This argument does not apply to me.
BTS- theoretical / PTS- PZxpdC8RqWsdU3pVJeobZY7JFKVPfNpy5z / BTC- 1NfGejohzoVGffAD1CnCRgo9vApjCU2viY / the delegate formerly known as drltc / Nothing said on these forums is intended to be legally binding / All opinions are my own unless otherwise noted / Take action due to my posts at your own risk

Offline bytemaster

I am sorry, but this kind of legalistic penny pinching will kill BTS and hurt morale.   

Core developers have a large enough stake that they now get "automatic bonuses"  if the value of that stake goes up as a result of their efforts.   The incentives are aligned. 

I am very much against the idea of "selling your time" or "buying time".   If these guys are only working for a paycheck then we would get crap work out of them.   If they are working for more than a paycheck then we will get far more value out of them.   

Lets not remove incentive for efficiency.  Lets not begrudge someone profits earned as a result of taking great risk.
For the latest updates checkout my blog: http://bytemaster.bitshares.org
Anything said on these forums does not constitute an intent to create a legal obligation or contract between myself and anyone else.   These are merely my opinions and I reserve the right to change them at any time.

Offline theoretical

Stan / bytemaster should publish a budget spreadsheet of how much BitUSD they think is necessary to run core operations for the quarter / year, broken down by TITAN account.

Then, every day a script sends an IOU UIA to each account for each dollar of shortfall between their budget and what they were able to earn directly from the DAC with their delegate(s).

For the paranoid, public information can allow a script to audit that the IOU issuance matches the budget.  The IOU UIA can be issued by a multisig address signed by multiple trusted community members running independent copies of the script.

Then we get one or more new 100% delegate(s) who promise to use their newly created BTS (minus reasonable commission / expenses) to buy BitUSD, then create a buy wall at 1 IOU / BitUSD.  Burning any IOU they obtain (or returning them to the issuer address, I think burning UIA is actually not implemented; see https://github.com/BitShares/bitshares/issues/883 ).

Since the IOU is a UIA, there is no centralization issue simply letting bytemaster inflate as many IOU shares as he wants to and distribute them as he sees fit.  If the shareholders agree that bytemaster's budget is fair and transparent, then they will elect 100% delegates to give the IOU a market valuation backed by the power of the BTS printing press.  If the shareholders don't like the budget, they can simply kick out the delegates that support this scheme.
BTS- theoretical / PTS- PZxpdC8RqWsdU3pVJeobZY7JFKVPfNpy5z / BTC- 1NfGejohzoVGffAD1CnCRgo9vApjCU2viY / the delegate formerly known as drltc / Nothing said on these forums is intended to be legally binding / All opinions are my own unless otherwise noted / Take action due to my posts at your own risk