Author Topic: Question re protections for privatised Smartcoin providers  (Read 1045 times)

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Offline starspirit

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From https://bitshares.org/technology/delegated-proof-of-stake-consensus/

Delegates are elected in a manner similar to witnesses. A delegate becomes a co-signer on a special account that has the privilege of proposing changes to the network parameters. This account is known as the genesis account. These parameters include everything from transaction fees, to block sizes, witness pay, and block intervals. After the majority of delegates have approved a proposed change, the stakeholders are granted a 2 week review period during which they may vote out delegates and nullify the proposed changes.

This design was chosen to ensure that delegates technically have no direct power and that all changes to the network parameters are ultimately approved by the stakeholders. This is done to protect the delegates against regulations that may apply to managers or administrators of cryptocurrencies. Under DPOS, we can truly say that the administrative authority rests in the hands of the users, rather than either the delegates or witnesses.


I was wondering how similar principles might apply to Smartcoins, or if that's even possible. Ideally we would want failing Smartcoin markets to be able to be closed or modified by the users, rather than keep indefinitely expanding the number of copies and variations that exist, with a string of zombie markets in our wake. It may be for example, that a poor parameter set was chosen, an inadvertent effect is created that eventually compromises the market, or the market just never gets much momentum or interest.

But this raises some of the following questions, just as a starting point:

- If nobody has ultimate power over a particular Smartcoin market, would anybody apart from shorts (via global settlement) ever be able to shut it down if it is failing?
- What if the shorts are not incentivised to shut a failing market if they are a beneficiary of it?
- Could the provider make proposals for changes to the parameters or operation of a market? If so, how could a consensus be found between longs and shorts, who may have conflicting interests, or even be missing?

Just a starting point.
« Last Edit: June 19, 2015, 02:45:32 am by starspirit »