Author Topic: Poll: PTS & AGS allocation expectations for main upcoming DAC's  (Read 6252 times)

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Offline Empirical1

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I was personally in favour of 40/40 for PTS & AGS for these 3 DAC's assuming there is no significant outside development/Partnerships - BitShares Music? ...

But I do like the idea of 10/10 & 80 via delegates over 10 yrs, some thoughts though - 

- It seems like the minimum deal for PTS so will be perceived poorly at first (Even though shareholders can elect to give themselves the remaining equity.)
- Given how much funding businesses need in the real world we don't have to set aside that much.
- After a few years most of the development comes from third parties creating products that interact with it.
- It will come across as inflationary
- I know it was just a suggestion for these three DAC's, but I think it's not a model partners can work with, if they give themselves 10%. It will be 10/10/10 70 and then they will control 33% of the first year equity which is perhaps a security and manipulation risk.
- It may feel like you're required to trust the delegates even more.

So I think it may be something to aim towards for future DAC's depending on how it works with a smaller delegate allocation.

A) I like 20/20/60  20/20 given to AGS & PTS

With a 10 year plan allocating the remaining 60% via the delegates - 

Year 1  Year 2   Y3     Y4    Y5     Y6     Y7    Y8     Y9    Y10
 
20%     10%      8%    6%   4%   4%    2%   2%   2%  2%


At least AGS & PTS are assured of 40% of total equity of these DAC's & +-67% of 1st year equity - Leaving a large 33% of available first year equity to be used on marketing/development/Sharedrops/voted back to shareholders.

B) If there is a main partner

20/20/10  & the same format as 'A' (But 1% less via delegates Year 3-8 , and remove year 9&10th year funding.)

(* I would also suggest the first year equity release wait 30-60 days of year 1 to kick in, so delegates and shareholders can find their feet in the new DAC and so that shareholders can be properly campaigned to by & vet potential delegates - The third party releasing the DAC as well as hype of launch should be enough to push it forward for the first 30 days.)

« Last Edit: July 09, 2014, 05:31:32 pm by Empirical1 »

Offline mf-tzo

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I understand that but...
There are different categories here..
1)the ones who understood ags from the beggining and switched prior to 28th snapshot all their pts to ags and got 3 times more btsx
1a) some of them are holders and believers and are not trading now since they expect much more bigger market cap
1b)some of them are short term traders and are dropping now their btsx since they make profits

2) those who thought that having pts is the best thing to have and where buying irrespective of the price before and after the snapshot (I belong here and I know some others as well)

3) those that are currently learn all these

4) those that have no idea still what we are talking about...

Category 1 can certainly make profits
Category 2 in order to make profits expect now that bitshares x is at least 30-40 mil market cap. I switched to ags after the snapshot, gave away pts liquidity in the hope to be in category 1 in the next snapshots since I didn't care about short term liquidity in the first place..
Category 3 have today the possibility to buy pts at cheaper levels than category 2. So anyone who believes that market cap will be 30 mil plus can still invest without having blocked his funds for 6 months now.
Category 4 may be the luckiest (ignorance is blessing) or the most unlucky since by the time they understand what bitshares x will represent, market cap could be +500 mil...

Having said all that I understand and obviously agree that pts holders should get the chance to participate in future snapshots..what is most important between pts-ags allocation for the future is who holds what...if people who donated in ags dump their new shares every time there is a new distribution killing the price then we have a problem..if the majority of ags (which I hope is the case) is held by i3 who want their Dacs to succeed and will most probably will not dump their shares then we are on the right track for great things to come..

I like nxt.. It has a lot of potential but I think it will fail because people holding the majority of nxts are weak hands..they pumped their price with very good marketing and gave very big expectations and within 2 weeks the price fell by c40%..there where some scandals also with respective members etc..they are weak. Pts has been very stable and this community has some very strong hands here..






« Last Edit: July 09, 2014, 04:34:36 pm by Zeus »

Offline Empirical1

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Personally I would prefer if 100% are distributed to ags shareholders and lets do the distribution afterwards by selling them on the open market.. Ags shareholders are much more committed to the whole Dacs projects than anyone else even pts shareholders, since ags shareholders have given away all the liquidity and have absorbed the more opportunity costs than anyone else...

But the price of AGS reflected those lost opportunity costs and illiquidity.

Both play a role as when you release a new snapshot people can buy in through PTS. Rather than a new snapshot only getting the kind of distribution NXT did. PTS makes it the 1000+ PTS holders + whoever likes that specific snapshot + the 1000+ in AGS.

The problem with AGS is there's no way for new people access IPO's so it makes it as closed & elite as the current financial system without PTS.

Offline mf-tzo

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Personally I would prefer if 100% are distributed to ags shareholders and lets do the distribution afterwards by selling them on the open market.. Ags shareholders are much more committed to the whole Dacs projects than anyone else even pts shareholders, since ags shareholders have given away all the liquidity and have absorbed the more opportunity costs than anyone else...

Offline luckybit

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Well I want it to be 40 ags 40 pts and the remaining to other communities and devs. Otherwise I doubt I will break even...

I know that most probably will be much less than that..

Who are going to be the initial users? If the main demographic is us then we should be getting the majority of the shares until other communities join with us.

It doesn't make sense to throw shares at communities that don't even know Bitshares XT exists.
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Offline mf-tzo

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Well I want it to be 40 ags 40 pts and the remaining to other communities and devs. Otherwise I doubt I will break even...

I know that most probably will be much less than that..

Offline Empirical1

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Is this poll what do you think the allocation will be or what allocation you want it to be?

The poll is 'What you think it will be'

But in the thread you can talk about what you want it to be/should be and why etc.

Offline mf-tzo

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Is this poll what do you think the allocation will be or what allocation you want it to be?

Offline luckybit

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The BitShares position is not to commit to a minimum of more than 10%, which is fine, so I'm just trying to guage where the community is at with regards to what they see being the average PTS & AGS allocation for the three DAC's listed in title that will be allocated in the coming months.   

I'm also interested in your reason for what you think is an optimal distribution and why (brief)

In The Ten Natural Laws of the Crypto Equity Universe, (http://bitshares.org/10-natural-laws-of-the-crypto-asset-universe/) I once opined that maneuvering to leave your competitors no room to one-up your DAC would force developers to choose 50/50 PTS/AGS.  End of Story.

But that was before BitShares ShareDrop Theory (http://bitshares.org/bitshares-airdrop-theory/) identified that what a developer needs to do is target all the demographics that matter to her DAC.  PTS and AGS are merely the best demographics, but they are not the only demographics that make sense.  Targeting users of your predecessors, or competitors makes a lot of sense.  I now view all 200+ altcoins as nothing but demographic constituencies that I might want to consider when launching a DAC.  Which is the best mailing list?

But that was before BitShares Delegate Theory  (http://bitshares.org/intro-to-delegated-proof-of-stake/) advocated putting some of the shares into the hands of elected delegates who would be responsive to the shareholders.  This gives a DAC the invaluable ability to adapt over time to changing conditions while decentralizing the decision making - but only to vetted people who are considered trustworthy and responsible by most owners.

But that was before...  who knows?  This field is developing rapidly and Darwinian Market Forces will determine the ultimate winners.

I agree with this way of thinking about it. I think for the delegate idea to work we need a way to track reputation though. Right now it's really difficult to determine exactly what the role of a delegate is, or what the reputation should be.

I also don't see why you cannot have a group/firm of people act as a delegate which would potentially solve a lot of concerns. Suppose a group of people form a corporation either legally or on the Ethereum blockchain which by design is then elected to be a delegate of Bitshares?

I have no way to know how this is going to work but it could get interesting. If the corporation were set up right we wouldn't have to trust the delegate as an individual but instead a legal corporation could serve in the same function. If untrustworthy individuals happen to work for the corporation then they could be fired or resign but the corporation itself would still be trusted to serve as a delegate.

You could also set up a non-profit as a delegate or a cooperative. This would work perhaps even better than a corporation. So perhaps a delegate cooperative in the real world which elects itself as a delegate on Bitshares?
« Last Edit: July 08, 2014, 10:06:11 am by luckybit »
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Offline Agent86

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I think we can set a threshold for delegates to receive "dilution pay"... Anyone with 51% approval gets the pay, while the top 101 regardless of approval level can produce blocks.   This may accomplish what you want.
This could be some improvement, especially for those skeptical of the distribution model; it's more clear that these delegates have enough support.  It would make me think twice about approving delegates I otherwise like but want to keep below 50%.  I would still like us to try however we can to do it the right way. I don't think this is it; we can do better.

Offline bytemaster

I think we can set a threshold for delegates to receive "dilution pay"... Anyone with 51% approval gets the pay, while the top 101 regardless of approval level can produce blocks.   This may accomplish what you want.
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Offline Agent86

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The optimal system for security may be to have 101 unique delegates all around the world but the optimal investment decision could involve directing a lot of this new equity they receive to development. Thereby in your opinion resulting in potentially security compromising clusters, like in the extreme - A developer controlling over 50% of the delegates.

But if we decided on 101 unique delegates all around the world, but now needed 5 delegates worth of equity to be released to Toast for .p2p development. Would we,

A) Fire 5 delegates originally based in Guatamala, The North Pole, Mt. Everest, The Amazon Jungle  & The Sahara Desert. Instead giving Toast control of five delegates?

Or would we

B) Vote for those 5 delegates that could still be based in Guatamala, The North Pole, Mt. Everest, The Amazon Jungle  & The Sahara Desert who send all of the equity they are released to the Toast development fund, with Toast simply confirming on a regular basis that he's received it? 

Maintaining high security is in the best interests of the company so shareholders will choose options that maximise the best investment decisions with minimal compromise to security imo.

You agree with shareholders directing equity. But how would you do it? I think we'd have to find a decentralised trusted group of people to administer it according to our wishes. But that's pretty much what the 101 delegates system is. So I think introducing any secondary system to do the exact job the delegates can do is sub-optimal. Tweaking the delegate system and maybe putting in some tracking controls, automations and limits etc. will be best.

I'm not saying I agree 10/10/80 will be optimal, I'm still processing my own thoughts on it. But in general the concept is quite brilliant and inspired in my opinion. (Like for example in the first year we obviously trust the developers who released the product so I think we should direct a portion to them in the allocation model for maintenance & development without the need to go through/complicate the delegate system at the start.)
My idea is to have a separate class "DAC advocates" or whatever you want to call them.  The simplest way I can think of is anyone can run as a DAC advocate and propose their own salary and what they will do with it.  If they get more than 50% of stake to vote for them they get it.

50% might seem like a high burden but I think it is an achievable and necessary high burden.  It's more achievable when you allow people to "abstain" from voting on advocates, that way their stake doesn't count for or against any advocates.  It shouldn't generally be encouraged to abstain but could be a good option for some people who trust the rest of the stakeholders to make the right choices.

This makes the process of assigning funds soooo much easier for shareholders to understand and make informed decisions and will be much less wasteful imo.

Offline Empirical1

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You have now turned what should be a simple process into an excruciatingly complex process by mixing 2 naturally separate roles and combining them.  I now must analyze the spending habits of tons of delegates and combine that info with my various levels of trust and faith in their abilities to perform a simple task of running delegates to write blocks.  It will cause voters (shareholders) to disengage, tune out, and only approve a couple delegates at a time, and ultimately lose faith in the institution.

I think it engages shareholders MUCH more.

As long as the system drip feeds the equity, the risk is low.

DAC's are businesses selling products & services, so they will need centralised advertising campaigns etc. imo. So I can see DAC's having a marketing delegate which may even end up being a full service agency that gets their budget released via the blockchain and if the shareholders don't like the job they're doing, they will be fired. I can see them having a Charity delegate. A couple of Developers as delegates Etc. (Though most of the delegates elected will probably be the ones giving the equity back to shareholders most of the time.)

I think it's potentially great, like personally I think airdropping equity is generally a bad idea, if I'm right and that when you have a competitive product/service the money is better spent on traditional advertising to let customers know about it and make it accessible and convenient for them, then that should quickly be realised by self interested shareholders & they should move towards voting to direct equity in the best interest of the company when one or another approach is shown not to work. (For example if I saw oh wow airdropping to Y did generate a lot of free advertising, new support & the share price wasn't effected then I would even change my mind and vote for airdropping more of the equity.)

So basically whatever is the best model, this kind of approach gives the DAC the best opportunity to find it imo.
Empirical, I think if you looked at my post history you would see I've been a big proponent of letting shareholders direct equity for a long time; I'm well aware of the merits.  My problem is that tying this function to being a delegate is a very inefficient way for shareholders to have their will done.  If shareholders want to fund a core dev, let them simply make a decision about that.  Don't make them try to find which delegates are currently giving some percentage of funds to core development along with deciding if these delegates have reliable network statistics and are trusted community members, and now maybe they need to somehow set alerts to find out if any of their delegates has changed their priorities/fund allocation.  The shareholders might think we should be aggressively reinvesting in development above all else but that doesn't mean they want to let a developer control over 50% of delegates.  The two things are separate.

The optimal system for security may be to have 101 unique delegates all around the world but the optimal investment decision could involve directing a lot of this new equity they receive to development. Thereby in your opinion resulting in potentially security compromising clusters, like in the extreme - A developer controlling over 50% of the delegates.

But if we decided on 101 unique delegates all around the world, but now needed 5 delegates worth of equity to be released to Toast for .p2p development. Would we,

A) Fire 5 delegates originally based in Guatamala, The North Pole, Mt. Everest, The Amazon Jungle  & The Sahara Desert. Instead giving Toast control of five delegates?

Or would we

B) Vote for those 5 delegates that could still be based in Guatamala, The North Pole, Mt. Everest, The Amazon Jungle  & The Sahara Desert who send all of the equity they are released to the Toast development fund, with Toast simply confirming on a regular basis that he's received it? 

Maintaining high security is in the best interests of the company so shareholders will choose options that maximise the best investment decisions with minimal compromise to security imo.

You agree with shareholders directing equity. But how would you do it? I think we'd have to find a decentralised trusted group of people to administer it according to our wishes. But that's pretty much what the 101 delegates system is. So I think introducing any secondary system to do the exact job the delegates can do is sub-optimal. Tweaking the delegate system and maybe putting in some tracking controls, automations and limits etc. will be best.

I'm not saying I agree 10/10/80 will be optimal, I'm still processing my own thoughts on it. But in general the concept is quite brilliant and inspired in my opinion. (Like for example in the first year we obviously trust the developers who released the product so I think we should direct a portion to them in the allocation model for maintenance & development without the need to go through/complicate the delegate system at the start.)
« Last Edit: July 07, 2014, 01:33:04 pm by Empirical1 »

Offline xeroc

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In The Ten Natural Laws of the Crypto Equity Universe, (http://bitshares.org/10-natural-laws-of-the-crypto-asset-universe/) I once opined that maneuvering to leave your competitors no room to one-up your DAC would force developers to choose 50/50 PTS/AGS.  End of Story.

But that was before BitShares ShareDrop Theory (http://bitshares.org/bitshares-airdrop-theory/) identified that what a developer needs to do is target all the demographics that matter to her DAC.  PTS and AGS are merely the best demographics, but they are not the only demographics that make sense.  Targeting users of your predecessors, or competitors makes a lot of sense.  I now view all 200+ altcoins as nothing but demographic constituencies that I might want to consider when launching a DAC.  Which is the best mailing list?

But that was before BitShares Delegate Theory  (http://bitshares.org/intro-to-delegated-proof-of-stake/) advocated putting some of the shares into the hands of elected delegates who would be responsive to the shareholders.  This gives a DAC the invaluable ability to adapt over time to changing conditions while decentralizing the decision making - but only to vetted people who are considered trustworthy and responsible by most owners.

But that was before...  who knows?  This field is developing rapidly and Darwinian Market Forces will determine the ultimate winners.
Very nice history lesson :)

However, I am not so sure if users really search through the delegate candidates (which might be up to several thousands) and decide for their favorit. However, they don't need to .. thx to approval voting ... hmm .. I really can't decide ..

Offline Agent86

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You have now turned what should be a simple process into an excruciatingly complex process by mixing 2 naturally separate roles and combining them.  I now must analyze the spending habits of tons of delegates and combine that info with my various levels of trust and faith in their abilities to perform a simple task of running delegates to write blocks.  It will cause voters (shareholders) to disengage, tune out, and only approve a couple delegates at a time, and ultimately lose faith in the institution.

I think it engages shareholders MUCH more.

As long as the system drip feeds the equity, the risk is low.

DAC's are businesses selling products & services, so they will need centralised advertising campaigns etc. imo. So I can see DAC's having a marketing delegate which may even end up being a full service agency that gets their budget released via the blockchain and if the shareholders don't like the job they're doing, they will be fired. I can see them having a Charity delegate. A couple of Developers as delegates Etc. (Though most of the delegates elected will probably be the ones giving the equity back to shareholders most of the time.)

I think it's potentially great, like personally I think airdropping equity is generally a bad idea, if I'm right and that when you have a competitive product/service the money is better spent on traditional advertising to let customers know about it and make it accessible and convenient for them, then that should quickly be realised by self interested shareholders & they should move towards voting to direct equity in the best interest of the company when one or another approach is shown not to work. (For example if I saw oh wow airdropping to Y did generate a lot of free advertising, new support & the share price wasn't effected then I would even change my mind and vote for airdropping more of the equity.)

So basically whatever is the best model, this kind of approach gives the DAC the best opportunity to find it imo.
Empirical, I think if you looked at my post history you would see I've been a big proponent of letting shareholders direct equity for a long time; I'm well aware of the merits.  My problem is that tying this function to being a delegate is a very inefficient way for shareholders to have their will done.  If shareholders want to fund a core dev, let them simply make a decision about that.  Don't make them try to find which delegates are currently giving some percentage of funds to core development along with deciding if these delegates have reliable network statistics and are trusted community members, and now maybe they need to somehow set alerts to find out if any of their delegates has changed their priorities/fund allocation.  The shareholders might think we should be aggressively reinvesting in development above all else but that doesn't mean they want to let a developer control over 50% of delegates.  The two things are separate.