BM需要反省，他目前的设计思想会导致我们的投资归零

[Musewhale]

算了吧，与虎谋皮，或者想同流合污？哈哈。

所以我建议至少请一名金融顾问。

批准
着BM立即办理

退一步，有华尔街背景的人加盟，对后期推广很有帮助。

需要有战略性投资者

要是高盛或者纽交所等愿意加入并将之奉为下一代交易所模板，我愿意捐献90%的XTS   

  想快点发财

[mmlmmlmml]

算了吧，与虎谋皮，或者想同流合污？哈哈。

所以我建议至少请一名金融顾问。

批准
着BM立即办理

退一步，有华尔街背景的人加盟，对后期推广很有帮助。

需要有战略性投资者

要是高盛或者纽交所等愿意加入并将之奉为下一代交易所模板，我愿意捐献90%的XTS   

[Musewhale]

所以我建议至少请一名金融顾问。

批准
着BM立即办理

退一步，有华尔街背景的人加盟，对后期推广很有帮助。

需要有战略性投资者

要是高盛或者纽交所等愿意加入并将之奉为下一代交易所模板，我愿意捐献90%的XTS   

[btsfans]

3i先出来做市


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[00091lacer]

没看懂这个方案怎么有效。

假如当前市场价是1个XTS 换1USD。
我牺牲1%的XTS应该就可以操纵价格到500USD/XTS。
如果我还剩下1%XTS，这些XTS换成美元价格就翻了500倍，这种市场操纵谁敢陪着玩？

对手单不可以做空你吗？

最主要关键是盘太小容易被人操控。如果某个与BTSX竞争市场的对手，只要用足够的钱单方面恶意做空，就可以玩残BTSX。

[gyhy]

所以我建议至少请一名金融顾问。

批准
着BM立即办理

退一步，有华尔街背景的人加盟，对后期推广很有帮助。

需要有战略性投资者

[ebit]

所以我建议至少请一名金融顾问。

批准
着BM立即办理

退一步，有华尔街背景的人加盟，对后期推广很有帮助。

[btsfans]

没看懂这个方案怎么有效。

假如当前市场价是1个XTS 换1USD。
我牺牲1%的XTS应该就可以操纵价格到500USD/XTS。
如果我还剩下1%XTS，这些XTS换成美元价格就翻了500倍，这种市场操纵谁敢陪着玩？

对手单不可以做空你吗？

[btsfans]

楼主嗑药了 鉴定完毕

[gyhy]

bm自修金融，stan对银行方面也很熟悉

[Musewhale]

没看懂这个方案怎么有效。

假如当前市场价是1个XTS 换1USD。
我牺牲1%的XTS应该就可以操纵价格到500USD/XTS。
如果我还剩下1%XTS，这些XTS换成美元价格就翻了500倍，这种市场操纵谁敢陪着玩？

没事，慢慢陪他玩
下次大不了再搞残废一次
很多想法都是先只能在自己的思路里模拟
而每个人的思维是有局限性的
所以我们需要事实来证明
到时候你证明给他看就行了

我觉得3I确实要邀请一位有丰富金融从业经验的人进来进行把关
毕竟就算程序员再厉害，懂的初步的金融知识也是不够的，需要大量的实战经验的人协助设计，这样可以事半功倍
毕竟3I的目光远大，大格局必须要有大人物来站场啊，现在我们几个屌丝在家关着门闭门造车也不行啊

[Musewhale]

所以我建议至少请一名金融顾问。

批准
着BM立即办理

[sfinder]

没看懂这个方案怎么有效。

假如当前市场价是1个XTS 换1USD。
我牺牲1%的XTS应该就可以操纵价格到500USD/XTS。
如果我还剩下1%XTS，这些XTS换成美元价格就翻了500倍，这种市场操纵谁敢陪着玩？

我也觉得他需要好好睡几天觉。头脑里都是浆糊

[alt]

没看懂这个方案怎么有效。

假如当前市场价是1个XTS 换1USD。
我牺牲1%的XTS应该就可以操纵价格到500USD/XTS。
如果我还剩下1%XTS，这些XTS换成美元价格就翻了500倍，这种市场操纵谁敢陪着玩？

[sfinder]

BM出方案了。。。。。

still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


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Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.    Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. 

+ 1

Lets look at this very closely because it is very easy to confuse yourself when it comes to thinking about markets (happens to me a lot and I have a good grasp on it).   I write this to "think out loud" so I may have something wrong.

Before any trading can occur there must be at least X% (say 1%) of the XTS sitting in unmatched shorts & asks.  Lets also assume that this 1% does not belong to the attacker because the attacker would have no victims if it all belonged to him. 

Primary goal of the attack:
1) Create a large amount of BitUSD with very little XTS backing it which will be unresolvable and break the peg until someone eats the loss.
2) To be successful the attacker must be on both sides of the trade (collecting a large USD balance, and an equal short position).
3) To achieve this the attacker must eliminate all other asks on the book that are not their own.

To execute the attack:
1) You must sell 1 XTS for 10000 USD (a very high ask if it were real USD)
2) This means you must place bids to match every ask at 1, 10, 100, 1000 USD per XTS
3) To places these bids means you must short USD at lower and lower prices
4) As you short USD at lower and lower prices you are creating more and more USD backed by less and less XTS.
5) At the end of the day you have a lot of people who long USD while you are short USD at a very low value.
*** Critical Point:  Does the rest of the market run out of money before you do ********
6) Eventually you run out of money and can no longer fight off the hoards of people selling XTS for USD
7) The value of USD starts rising absent your manipulation until your short position is blown.
Those who were buying USD while you were shorting knew at the time of purchase that USD wasn't pegged to the dollar and they bought knowing their max return would be 2x on their XTS.   So these buyers of USD gladly sell their USD at a 2x profit even if it is below the dollar peg.
9) The market will continue to correct until all of the attackers USD has been covered and his collateral lost.
10) The peg is restored and all is well.

Some things to note:
1) During the attack many legitimate shorts will start covering to lock in their profits and thus make it more difficult to maintain the attack
2) During the attack many savvy users will start buying USD at the huge discount.  If BitUSD is currently 10% of real USD then you buy it because you know it has collateral worth 20% of real USD backing it.  Sure you don't get to realize a 10x gain when it returns to market peg, but you still get a free 2x gain on the return to market peg.  For this reason, BitUSD is a solid buy any time it is below parity and profit can be made by selling BitUSD for XTS even below market peg if you bought it at an even lower point.

What this means is that only the attacker's short positions get blown out, and everyone else still profits.   In this case I consider an attacker anyone who shorts BitUSD when BitUSD is already below USD value. 

So the attacker has to clear the order book of all orders but their own, create a large short against their own ASK so they end up being LONG and SHORT a significant amount of USD.       To execute this attack requires:

1) Enough XTS to buy out all existing asks while having enough XTS to keep the market open, so lets call that 2% of XTS
2) The ability to execute your attack faster than the rest of the market participants can enter to take your money.
       - shorts entering to cover at a profit
       - asks entering to buy USD cheap

I think that the 2% attack threshold is only viable if the rest of the network is idle, in practice I suspect that the market depth could be 10% and would grow as the attacker attempted to push down USD. 

Lastly I would like to submit one last fail-safe feature:  Delegates
  To execute any attack requires delegates to include your transactions in the first place and for regular users to propagate your transactions.  For this reason an attacker would have to connect directly to a delegate that will include their transaction because it is unlikely to propagate among regular users.   If there are good delegates then the market can function with little opportunity to attack.