still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
a (unlocked) >>> blockchain_market_order_book USD XTS
BIDS (* Short Order) | ASKS
TOTAL QUANTITY PRICE | PRICE QUANTITY TOTAL COLLATERAL
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100,000,000.0000 USD 200,000.00000 XTS 500. USD / XTS*| 1.23 USD / XTS 5,768.48683 XTS 7,095.2388 USD
10,000.0000 USD 10,000.00000 XTS 1. USD / XTS*| 5. USD / XTS 5,635.83215 XTS 28,179.1607 USD
10,000.0000 USD 20,000.00000 XTS 0.5 USD / XTS*| 7. USD / XTS 42.00000 XTS 294.0000 USD
3,900.0000 USD 260,000.00000 XTS 0.015 USD / XTS*| 8. USD / XTS 23.47369 XTS 187.7895 USD
| 8. USD / XTS 30.00000 XTS 240.0000 USD
| 9. USD / XTS 10.00000 XTS 90.0000 USD
| 9.5 USD / XTS 1,000.00000 XTS 9,500.0000 USD
| 10.1 USD / XTS 20.00000 XTS 202.0000 USD
| 10.2 USD / XTS 2.00000 XTS 20.4000 USD
| 11. USD / XTS 30.00000 XTS 330.0000 USD
| 15. USD / XTS 100,000.00000 XTS 1,500,000.0000 USD
| 500. USD / XTS 200,000.00000 XTS 100,000,000.0000 USD
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| MARGIN
| CALL PRICE QUANTITY TOTAL COLLATERAL
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| 5.33333333333333333 USD / XTS 2.81250 XTS1,844,674,407,370,895.1618 USD 3.75000 XTS
| 5.33332788529704396 USD / XTS 0.61184 XTS1,844,674,407,370,942.1091 USD 0.81579 XTS
| 3.55555407407407407 USD / XTS 67.50000 XTS 239.9999 USD 90.00000 XTS
| 3.55554962962962962 USD / XTS 16.87500 XTS 59.9999 USD 22.50000 XTS
| 3.55554950218602307 USD / XTS 3.67105 XTS 13.0526 USD 4.89474 XTS
| 3.55554511348600093 USD / XTS 14.68419 XTS 52.2103 USD 19.57892 XTS
| 3.33333333333333333 USD / XTS 64.28571 XTS 214.2857 USD 85.71428 XTS
| 3.33333332111111103 USD / XTS 2,727.27271 XTS 9,090.9090 USD 3,636.36362 XTS
| 3.33333331557777765 USD / XTS 3,754.69335 XTS 12,515.6444 USD 5,006.25780 XTS
| 0.81999998503293482 USD / XTS 6,347.26975 XTS 5,204.7611 USD 8,463.02634 XTS
| 0.01 USD / XTS 1,050.00000 XTS 10.5000 USD 1,400.00000 XTS
But how to identify attack or normal trade?still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
BTC or other huge coins like LTC\NXT whales refuse to withdraw from the historical stage, they use the money in their deep pocket to buy 1% XTS, then attack it to death,just to protect their stake in their coins.
By giving up the worth of 1% XTS,the whales could benefit more from their coins by killing a strong rival.
>>> wallet_account_transaction_history
RECEIVED BLOCK FROM TO AMOUNT FEE MEMO BALANCE ID
=========================================================================================================================================================================================
...
2014-07-17T01:20:11 912 bitcoiners bitcoiners 500.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS 37,472.30684 XTS 8143a93
default (unlocked) >>> blockchain_get_transaction 8143a93
null
So as far as I can tell there are no transactions being made in this chain at all. They are accepted and not pending but all blocks look empty from here.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
2014-07-17T06:44:50 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-Fu6kwjtG 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 100 XTS @ 10 USD cc2f930
2014-07-17T06:46:08 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-78uDffJU 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 100 XTS @ 10 USD efdad3d
2014-07-17T06:46:28 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-D8JRt1dd 1,000.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 1000 XTS @ 100 USD b40a4a0
2014-07-17T06:50:47 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-Cdu36eNu 700.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 700 XTS @ 0.0163086 USD aae010f
2014-07-17T06:53:14 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-CTuUY6bL 700.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 700 XTS @ 5 USD 29b9b69
2014-07-17T06:53:59 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-AP7vDi9q 1,000.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 1000 XTS @ 90 USD 8d04a6d
2014-07-17T06:54:21 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-LVpgB5qP 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 100 XTS @ 8 USD 5accbd3
2014-07-17T06:54:40 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-CCbBjaaM 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 100 XTS @ 7 USD a87177f
2014-07-17T07:01:17 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-7YPmdTtN 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 100 XTS @ 7 CNY 5853bf8
2014-07-17T07:01:24 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-BLTrMkjd 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 100 XTS @ 8 CNY a24db75
2014-07-17T07:01:30 DUPLICATE calyaux ORDER-EPrCyxoT 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS sell 100 XT
whats the meaning of "duplicate" ?
git submodule update
xxx:bitshares_toolkit x$ git submodule update
fatal: reference is not a tree: d539f9d42d6283c1739bf2bfbdd3b367263372f8
Unable to checkout 'd539f9d42d6283c1739bf2bfbdd3b367263372f8' in submodule path 'programs/web_wallet'
when compiling new binaries i get this error when trying to update submodulesCode: [Select]git submodule update
Code: [Select]xxx:bitshares_toolkit x$ git submodule update
fatal: reference is not a tree: d539f9d42d6283c1739bf2bfbdd3b367263372f8
Unable to checkout 'd539f9d42d6283c1739bf2bfbdd3b367263372f8' in submodule path 'programs/web_wallet'
Any ideas?
cd programs/web_wallet
git reset --hard origin/master
git checkout master
cd ../../
blockchain_list_delegates 1 200
ID NAME (* next in line) APPROVAL PRODUCED MISSED RELIABILITY PAY RATE PAY BALANCE LAST BLOCK
============================================================================================================================
31 init30 0.0000000001 % 49 0 100.00 % 100 % 0.00274 XTS 4127
83 init82 0.0000000001 % 48 0 100.00 % 100 % 0.00269 XTS 4063
...
68 init67 0.0000000001 % 42 0 100.00 % 100 % 0.00227 XTS 3955
22 init21 * 0.0000000001 % 41 0 100.00 % 100 % 0.00225 XTS 4012
1 init0 0.0000000000 % 0 42 0.00 % 100 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
4 init3 0.0000000000 % 0 44 0.00 % 100 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
5 init4 0.0000000000 % 0 44 0.00 % 100 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
6 init5 0.0000000000 % 0 46 0.00 % 100 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
7 init6 0.0000000000 % 0 44 0.00 % 100 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
104 alexxy 0.0000000000 % 0 0 N/A 100 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
169 fox 0.0000000000 % 0 0 N/A 100 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
298 hackfisher-test 0.0000000000 % 0 0 N/A 50 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
299 bitcoiners 0.0000000000 % 0 0 N/A 1 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
300 bits 0.0000000000 % 0 0 N/A 1 % 0.00000 XTS NONE
...
get_info
{
"blockchain_head_block_num": 4295,
"blockchain_head_block_age": "2 seconds old",
"blockchain_head_block_timestamp": "20140717T111410",
"blockchain_average_delegate_participation": 96.19047619047619,
...
}
still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
Arrrg. I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low. There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network. :o Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. :-\
still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
Arrrg. I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low. There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network. :o Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. :-\
still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
Arrrg. I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low. There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network. :o Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. :-\
Would appreciate some funds for delegate registration.
XTS64BxdfP2svYcvHdeJK6dpeisMqsEKmfJct9cYaFAPtxyUtjXEe
As far as I know this dry run is already dead. Last I checked no transactions were going through. Unless anyone else knows anything different?
still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
Arrrg. I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low. There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network. :o Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. :-\
You are wrong. The point is that even at the current market cap which is approximately 20-30 mil you would have to spend 200k or 300k on acquiring shares before you could attack the network (in the future it will be much more expensive). And if you had that many shares, it would be WAY more profitable to INCREASE the value of the network than to destroy it by having some kind of attack on it.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Would appreciate some funds for delegate registration.
XTS64BxdfP2svYcvHdeJK6dpeisMqsEKmfJct9cYaFAPtxyUtjXEe
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-07-17T13:53:18 5200 spartako-w itnom 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS 63bd94d
Bid Depth: 253,164.55696 XTS Ask Depth: 252,091.65001 XTS
Last Error: insufficient collateral (37004)
Details:
37004 insufficient_collateral: insufficient collateral
bid_order 0.00000 XTS 100. CNY / XTS 0.0009 CNY 0.0000 CNY N/A XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv
default (unlocked) >>> wallet_market_cancel_order XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv
31005 insufficient_funds: insufficient funds
{"amount":-4349999,"current_bid->balance":9}
th_a market_operations.cpp:35 evaluate
{"*this":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}}
th_a market_operations.cpp:60 evaluate
{"op":{"type":"bid_op_type","data":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}}}
th_a operation_factory.hpp:52 evaluate
{"trx":{"expiration":"20140717T155945","delegate_slate_id":null,"operations":[{"type":"bid_op_type","data":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}},{"type":"deposit_op_type","data":{"amount":4349999,"condition":{"asset_id":14,"delegate_slate_id":0,"type":"withdraw_signature_type","data":{"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv","memo":null}}}},{"type":"withdraw_op_type","data":{"balance_id":"XTSDtmByRShgZqeHZpCcpdvyuC7CR9Wiic1C","amount":10000,"claim_input_data":""}}],"signatures":["207361eb388718318ac6241a923cf7c2f7e82b8ef5035ab7cce8f314bc45e04abb5a316fe0f0e0d03b499070e72d9dcc1e8b48b7f767473d5599f7ddb446f59d00","1fb073d5ef0290b7688477910f1ca4511d21b26f8207a58deb6feb0d3ad56466e599bb6eaebde9823e3de92f21b285c23189856208b68bb8ba9f36d6ff73c1f81f"]}}
th_a transaction_evaluation_state.cpp:218 evaluate
{"trx":{"expiration":"20140717T155945","delegate_slate_id":null,"operations":[{"type":"bid_op_type","data":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}},{"type":"deposit_op_type","data":{"amount":4349999,"condition":{"asset_id":14,"delegate_slate_id":0,"type":"withdraw_signature_type","data":{"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv","memo":null}}}},{"type":"withdraw_op_type","data":{"balance_id":"XTSDtmByRShgZqeHZpCcpdvyuC7CR9Wiic1C","amount":10000,"claim_input_data":""}}],"signatures":["207361eb388718318ac6241a923cf7c2f7e82b8ef5035ab7cce8f314bc45e04abb5a316fe0f0e0d03b499070e72d9dcc1e8b48b7f767473d5599f7ddb446f59d00","1fb073d5ef0290b7688477910f1ca4511d21b26f8207a58deb6feb0d3ad56466e599bb6eaebde9823e3de92f21b285c23189856208b68bb8ba9f36d6ff73c1f81f"]}}
th_a chain_database.cpp:1562 evaluate_transaction
{"trx":{"expiration":"20140717T155945","delegate_slate_id":null,"operations":[{"type":"bid_op_type","data":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}},{"type":"deposit_op_type","data":{"amount":4349999,"condition":{"asset_id":14,"delegate_slate_id":0,"type":"withdraw_signature_type","data":{"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv","memo":null}}}},{"type":"withdraw_op_type","data":{"balance_id":"XTSDtmByRShgZqeHZpCcpdvyuC7CR9Wiic1C","amount":10000,"claim_input_data":""}}],"signatures":["207361eb388718318ac6241a923cf7c2f7e82b8ef5035ab7cce8f314bc45e04abb5a316fe0f0e0d03b499070e72d9dcc1e8b48b7f767473d5599f7ddb446f59d00","1fb073d5ef0290b7688477910f1ca4511d21b26f8207a58deb6feb0d3ad56466e599bb6eaebde9823e3de92f21b285c23189856208b68bb8ba9f36d6ff73c1f81f"]}}
th_a chain_database.cpp:1953 store_pending_transaction
{}
th_a wallet.cpp:1540 sign_and_cache_transaction
{"owner_address":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}
th_a wallet.cpp:2852 cancel_market_order
{}
th_a common_api_client.cpp:1331 wallet_market_cancel_order
{"command":"wallet_market_cancel_order"}
th_a cli.cpp:538 execute_command
SentCode: [Select]------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-07-17T13:53:18 5200 spartako-w itnom 100.00000 XTS 0.10000 XTS 63bd94d
Thanks spartako! Just registered as a delegate.
Please wallet_approve_delegate bitsapphire true so we can do some testing on our server this round.
BTW, has anybody built a tool for delegate server monitoring yet? Email notifications or anything?
I have an idea to avoid the attack with almost no limit to the market. I will post this evening.I try to write clearly.
来自我的 HUAWEI P7-L00 上的 Tapatalk
short alt 20 0.18 USD // short USD with 20 XTS , and use these USD to buy XTS at price 0.18 USD / XTS
bid alt 2/0.18 XTS 0.18 USD // buy 2/0.18 XTS at price 0.18 USD/XTS
ask NETWORK 200 XTS 100/200 USD //buy 100 USD with price 0.5 USD/XTS
still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
Arrrg. I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low. There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network. :o Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. :-\
+ 1
--- there are now 8 active connections to the p2p network
(wallet closed) >>> getinfo
{
"blockchain_head_block_num": 3939,
"blockchain_head_block_age": "5 hours old",
"blockchain_head_block_timestamp": "20140717T101150",
"blockchain_average_delegate_participation": 5.6456120737842372,
"blockchain_delegate_pay_rate": 10,
"blockchain_blocks_left_in_round": 101,
"blockchain_confirmation_requirement": 1,
"blockchain_accumulated_fees": "12.89899 XTS",
"blockchain_share_supply": 199999998692024,
"blockchain_random_seed": "b5a0d967911b6a1132a74039fefaa90c4618a60b",
"blockchain_database_version": 114,
"blockchain_version": 108,
"network_num_connections": 8,
"network_num_connections_max": 200,
"network_protocol_version": 104,
"ntp_time": "20140717T145220",
"ntp_error": -0.025156000000000001,
"wallet_open": false,
"wallet_unlocked": null,
"wallet_unlocked_until": null,
"wallet_unlocked_until_timestamp": null,
"wallet_block_production_enabled": null,
"wallet_next_block_production_time": null,
"wallet_next_block_production_timestamp": null,
"wallet_version": 100
}
You are wrong. The point is that even at the current market cap which is approximately 20-30 mil you would have to spend 200k or 300k on acquiring shares before you could attack the network (in the future it will be much more expensive). And if you had that many shares, it would be WAY more profitable to INCREASE the value of the network than to destroy it by having some kind of attack on it.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
You are wrong. The point is that even at the current market cap which is approximately 20-30 mil you would have to spend 200k or 300k on acquiring shares before you could attack the network (in the future it will be much more expensive). And if you had that many shares, it would be WAY more profitable to INCREASE the value of the network than to destroy it by having some kind of attack on it.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
"After the birth of Jesus, "wise men from the East" visited Herod to inquire the whereabouts of "the one having been born king of the Jews"... Herod killed all kids under 2 years old because as King of the Jews, was alarmed at the prospect of a usurper... "
I hope the modern king in crypto currency world will not copy paste Herod's attitude and sacrifice about 300,000 kids sorry I mean $dollars... But in the event they did, I would suggest to name that historical crypto event something like...
"Massacre of the Innocents...bitUSD's"
ask alt 200000 XTS 500 USD // buy 10^8 USD with 2*10^5 XTS
short alt 100000000 500 USD // short 10^8 USD with 2*10^5 XTS backup
I earn 10^8-10^7=9*10^7 USD, WITH 4*40^5 XTS.If current price is 1xts/usd, current buy order totally 10^7USD
I can attack with these process:Code: [Select]ask alt 200000 XTS 500 USD // buy 10^8 USD with 2*10^5 XTS
I earn 10^8-10^7=9*10^7 USD, WITH 4*40^5 XTS.
short alt 100000000 500 USD // short 10^8 USD with 2*10^5 XTS backup
these XTS should only worth 4*10^5 XTS with normal price 1XTS/USD.
Whats going on with the test now? Im getting stuck on a block again:Code: [Select]--- there are now 8 active connections to the p2p network
(wallet closed) >>> getinfo
{
"blockchain_head_block_num": 3939,
"blockchain_head_block_age": "5 hours old",
"blockchain_head_block_timestamp": "20140717T101150",
"blockchain_average_delegate_participation": 5.6456120737842372,
"blockchain_delegate_pay_rate": 10,
"blockchain_blocks_left_in_round": 101,
"blockchain_confirmation_requirement": 1,
"blockchain_accumulated_fees": "12.89899 XTS",
"blockchain_share_supply": 199999998692024,
"blockchain_random_seed": "b5a0d967911b6a1132a74039fefaa90c4618a60b",
"blockchain_database_version": 114,
"blockchain_version": 108,
"network_num_connections": 8,
"network_num_connections_max": 200,
"network_protocol_version": 104,
"ntp_time": "20140717T145220",
"ntp_error": -0.025156000000000001,
"wallet_open": false,
"wallet_unlocked": null,
"wallet_unlocked_until": null,
"wallet_unlocked_until_timestamp": null,
"wallet_block_production_enabled": null,
"wallet_next_block_production_time": null,
"wallet_next_block_production_timestamp": null,
"wallet_version": 100
}
default (unlocked) >>> quit
[Thread 0x7fffeeffd700 (LWP 8931) exited]
[Thread 0x7fffcbde4700 (LWP 8936) exited]
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
bts::blockchain::chain_database::get_head_block_id (this=0x17c15a8) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/blockchain/chain_database.cpp:2230
2230 return my->_head_block_id;
(gdb) bt
#0 bts::blockchain::chain_database::get_head_block_id (this=0x17c15a8) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/blockchain/chain_database.cpp:2230
#1 0x00000000005f5743 in bts::client::detail::client_impl::handle_message (this=0x1783680, message_to_handle=..., sync_mode=<optimized out>) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/client/client.cpp:949
#2 0x00000000006e612f in operator() (__closure=<optimized out>) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/net/node.cpp:3494
#3 fc::detail::functor_run<bts::net::detail::thread_switching_node_delegate_wrapper::handle_message(const bts::net::message&, bool)::__lambda44>::run(void *, void *) (functor=<optimized out>, prom=0x7fffd8126840)
at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/fc/include/fc/thread/task.hpp:48
#4 0x000000000064e873 in fc::task_base::run_impl (this=this@entry=0x7fffd8126790) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/fc/src/thread/task.cpp:39
#5 0x000000000064ef25 in fc::task_base::run (this=this@entry=0x7fffd8126790) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/fc/src/thread/task.cpp:29
#6 0x000000000064d0db in run_next_task (this=0x1784e60) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/fc/src/thread/thread_d.hpp:372
#7 fc::thread_d::process_tasks (this=this@entry=0x1784e60) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/fc/src/thread/thread_d.hpp:395
#8 0x000000000064d326 in fc::thread_d::start_process_tasks (my=24661600) at /home/bitcoiner/local/bitshares_toolkit/libraries/fc/src/thread/thread_d.hpp:352
#9 0x0000000000cba46e in make_fcontext ()
#10 0x0000000001784e60 in ?? ()
#11 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
现在的问题是抵押发行资产时,价格可以随意定,我可以抵押1XTS,发行1亿bitUSD,在精心设计的攻击下,可以让这个挂单成交获取很多bitUSD.
以下是我的修改
1. 首先对每个block,我们可以获取这个block内所有交易中,bitUSD 卖单的最高成交价。可以认为如果按这个价格抵押XTS发行USD,能把USD发行数量限制在安全值内。
2. 为进一步保证安全,可以扫描每个块的bitUSD最高成交价,按最近360个价格取最高值。对初始状态,没有360个块,可以设定一个安全的初始值,比如0.2USD/XTS。到此可以强制规定一个安全的资产发行价。
3. 现在举实例,假设按以上逻辑算出来的发行价为 0.2 USD/XTS
1) 我要拿出20 XTS,按0.18 USD/XTS价格发行,这个价格小于 0.2,所以强制按 0.2USD/XTS发行,加上双倍抵押,只能创造 20 *(0.2/2) = 2 USD。这2个USD直接就创造出来,属于我了。同时按 0.18USD/XTS 挂 USD 卖单。
2) 如果我设定按 0.22 USD/XTS 发行,这个价格本身就大于 0.2,是安全的,就直接按这个 0.22 的价格创造 USD,并挂USD卖单。
这样做连市场深度检查都不需要的
为更加保险,可以把360个块再取大一点,比如按1天24小时算,是24*60*6 个块。
如果想发动攻击,发行大量bitUSD,除非能控制一天之内所有的 USD 卖单价格都严重偏低,这是不可能的。
在正式启动之后
第一个block就可以创造出 bitUSD,第一天之内的所有发行价应该都是<=0.2USD/XTS 。
第二天开始,发行价由前一天成交的 bitUSD 买卖单市场价决定。如果XTS开始升值,发行价自然会提高。XTS价值越高,1个XTS能发行的USD越多,但上限总是被市场趋势控制的,无法被个人左右。
still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.
1. use about 10^7 XTS or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.
It is just a matter of scale. Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless. We can set that value as high as 5% or more. The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network. No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset. You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk (http://tapatalk.com/m?id=1)
Arrrg. I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low. There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network. :o Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. :-\
+ 1
Lets look at this very closely because it is very easy to confuse yourself when it comes to thinking about markets (happens to me a lot and I have a good grasp on it). I write this to "think out loud" so I may have something wrong.
Before any trading can occur there must be at least X% (say 1%) of the XTS sitting in unmatched shorts & asks. Lets also assume that this 1% does not belong to the attacker because the attacker would have no victims if it all belonged to him.
Primary goal of the attack:
1) Create a large amount of BitUSD with very little XTS backing it which will be unresolvable and break the peg until someone eats the loss.
2) To be successful the attacker must be on both sides of the trade (collecting a large USD balance, and an equal short position).
3) To achieve this the attacker must eliminate all other asks on the book that are not their own.
To execute the attack:
1) You must sell 1 XTS for 10000 USD (a very high ask if it were real USD)
2) This means you must place bids to match every ask at 1, 10, 100, 1000 USD per XTS
3) To places these bids means you must short USD at lower and lower prices
4) As you short USD at lower and lower prices you are creating more and more USD backed by less and less XTS.
5) At the end of the day you have a lot of people who long USD while you are short USD at a very low value.
*** Critical Point: Does the rest of the market run out of money before you do ********
6) Eventually you run out of money and can no longer fight off the hoards of people selling XTS for USD
7) The value of USD starts rising absent your manipulation until your short position is blown.
8) Those who were buying USD while you were shorting knew at the time of purchase that USD wasn't pegged to the dollar and they bought knowing their max return would be 2x on their XTS. So these buyers of USD gladly sell their USD at a 2x profit even if it is below the dollar peg.
9) The market will continue to correct until all of the attackers USD has been covered and his collateral lost.
10) The peg is restored and all is well.
Some things to note:
1) During the attack many legitimate shorts will start covering to lock in their profits and thus make it more difficult to maintain the attack
2) During the attack many savvy users will start buying USD at the huge discount. If BitUSD is currently 10% of real USD then you buy it because you know it has collateral worth 20% of real USD backing it. Sure you don't get to realize a 10x gain when it returns to market peg, but you still get a free 2x gain on the return to market peg. For this reason, BitUSD is a solid buy any time it is below parity and profit can be made by selling BitUSD for XTS even below market peg if you bought it at an even lower point.
What this means is that only the attacker's short positions get blown out, and everyone else still profits. In this case I consider an attacker anyone who shorts BitUSD when BitUSD is already below USD value.
So the attacker has to clear the order book of all orders but their own, create a large short against their own ASK so they end up being LONG and SHORT a significant amount of USD. To execute this attack requires:
1) Enough XTS to buy out all existing asks while having enough XTS to keep the market open, so lets call that 2% of XTS
2) The ability to execute your attack faster than the rest of the market participants can enter to take your money.
- shorts entering to cover at a profit
- asks entering to buy USD cheap
I think that the 2% attack threshold is only viable if the rest of the network is idle, in practice I suspect that the market depth could be 10% and would grow as the attacker attempted to push down USD.
Lastly I would like to submit one last fail-safe feature: Delegates
To execute any attack requires delegates to include your transactions in the first place and for regular users to propagate your transactions. For this reason an attacker would have to connect directly to a delegate that will include their transaction because it is unlikely to propagate among regular users. If there are good delegates then the market can function with little opportunity to attack.