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Messages - starspirit

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301
General Discussion / Re: wait BitAsset3.0 and think about BitBond
« on: April 27, 2015, 02:53:03 am »
FYI, I've had a go at that here, but not a lot of feedback yet on whether others think its feasible or not...
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,15880.msg203776.html#msg203776





302
General Discussion / Re: BitAssets 3.0 - For Community Review
« on: April 27, 2015, 02:47:01 am »
There may well be good reason, but I am still trying to figure out how non-interest bearing cash is likely to fit into a broader bond market system.

For non-interest cash to find use in transactions, it would be important that it not get hoarded at fixed terms in the bond market to earn a yield. This hit me (*) in a recent discussion about 14% yields on roubles. Particularly when interest rates are high, I think this would require an interest-bearing at-call deposit market so that cash is able to move freely rather than be locked up. (*Till then I too thought that you might get away with just cash and term-based lending.)

One possible advantage of having cash in addition to at-call deposits could be that the at-call deposit market could be set up as block-chain based accounts that allow negative interest rates on the notional cash within it, when this is necessary in certain cycles to balance supply and demand. See The Zero Interest Bound Problem here...
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,15880.msg203780.html#msg203780
However, it may not be necessary to have a separate cash market to accommodate this – the cash units could be purely notional and only ever exist inside the accounts if there is some type of check-based system to move those notional credits. And allowing exchange above the feed price is an alternate market clearing solution to allowing negative interest rates. In other words, you could conceivable do away with cash and just have an at-call deposit market.

It is possible there are other reasons why users may choose at times to prefer to have a separate token for non-interest cash compared to just "interest bearing deposits". I feel these reasons need to be clear to justify the existence of a separate cash market. Possibilities might include increased privacy or anonymity, increased security/collateralization, or the ability to offer some cash-based services without the complication of dealing with interest payments on behalf of clients. Or I suppose we could just build both a cash and at-call deposit market and see how people use it, but as per my initial point, I don't think cash negates the need for an at-call market with interest.

Any thoughts?

303
It seems not many have read through this white-paper (understandable given length, but I think worth it), but I've added some edits covering:

- Considers how BitAsset 3.0, if warranted, could fit into the approach
- Considers the implications of the Bill Market being settled in currency rather than native tokens, being a one block delay in setting leverage
- Introduces the potential for a Flexible Collateral System, where shorts can choose and switch the form of their underlying collateral amongst native tokens, currency tokens, and shorter dated bill tokens
- Notes potential for feed price manipulation, without a resolution given at this stage
- Introduces the possibility that the collateral token need not be the native BTS token

304

Buying BitUSD == Selling BTS

I'm not too good with all the mechanics of the proposed bitasset 3.0 system, but does this mean that BitUSD demand will no longer positively correlate with a higher BTS valuation?

Buy BitUSD with BTS = Selling BTS = internal demand for BitUSD , so it's not positive on BTS .

Buy BitUSD with fiat or BTC = external demand for BitUSD , good for BTS .

Im pretty sure that's how it works today.  So the value proposition for Bts from bitassets hasn't changed?


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

You have to be very careful with this line of thinking, as I've discussed many times in this forum.

Growth in the supply of bitUSD does represent an additional bid made on BTS at the time it occurs. And that does tend to instantaneously lift the price of BTS. Arhag convinced me on that one.

But once that bid has been filled, it is removed from the market. After that point, the BTS market will equilibrate at whatever level is required to balance the subsequent supply and demand, according to the market's continuously adjusting perceptions of the value of BTS.

The value of BTS cannot simply reside in the fact that new bidders will keep bidding up BTS. This is a circular argument that provides no anchor at all for how BTS should be valued. I could just as easily argue that if the market perceives BTS as overvalued, bitUSD demand will decline, placing a continuous sell offer on BTS that does not end until zero.

The bottom line is that value for BTS must derive from what utility the token can offer to BTS holders, not a false concept of endless price gains. I have always stood by this view. Where I have moderated my view is that the form of that utility does not  need to be direct income on BTS, or even transactional utility as a global currency. It can derive utility from providing free-market opportunities (either in profit, or other forms of value) that are uniquely accessed in the system through the token. Think of this as the way fiat derives value today. If you want to live, work, and invest in the traditional economy, fiat is the token you need to do so. Well, the same can apply within any system, no matter how small or large, as long as it provides real opportunities for its tokenholders. An example in BitShares could be UIAs.

Derivation of income is like a "company model". And system utility is like a "network economy" model. For the foreseeable future, BitShares is likely to sit somewhere between the two, but needs to clarify and build both the income and utility opportunities to convince BTS holders.

305
Let me take the thought provocation a step further, and suggest something else we could do with a bitBTC backed by real BTC. We could create a class of bitAssets that are underpinned by BTC collateral (using bitBTC) rather than BTS collateral.

For a start, using this new bitBTC as collateral, there would be no concerns about users being able to manipulate the feed price through manipulations in the BTC market. BTC remains the most liquid market in the crypto space. With manipulation concerns allayed, it would be possible to implement bitCurrencies (bitUSD, butEUR, bitCNY) with the maximum level of pegging and liquidity, such as described in the draft whitepaper here... https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,15880.msg203776.html#msg203776

Secondly, the market for these bitCurrencies could be orders of magnitude greater. Users in the crypto space are far more likely to accept BTC-backed pegged currencies than BTS-backed pegged currencies at this stage, as BTC remains the strongest form of digital collateral available. And on the short side, there is probably far greater demand to get margin lending on BTC than there is on BTS, as $20m odd in loans at Bitfinex will attest to.

There is no reason why bitAssets must use BTS as collateral. This is an example where we can take the technologies that have been built, and re-target them at where the current market demand is.

Again, just throwing it out there.

[Edit: Just to be clear, I'm not suggesting a replacement of current bitAssets. This could be a new product class that acts as a bridge for the market until BTS is stronger.]

306
General Discussion / Re: ALL TIME LOW .
« on: April 26, 2015, 03:19:10 am »
summer?Means nothing will happen on bitshares this 3-5months.
sell signal.
you never have anything positive to say.  troll troll troll.
you're not an investor, you're a complainer.
We reach 0.0265cny now, seems will go down further.

Look at the price.Who wants to buy more ?everytime we reach a new low,i am sure there will be some guy jump out and say "GREAT TIME TO BUY,I WILL BUY MORE MORE PRECIOUS  BTS.."
you pathetic poor guys.

Bitshares is the best protocol at present. The constant changing is what is causing problems.  So I hodl. 

I feel this is half-right, but it's the nature of the change that is important. In fact I believe constant change is absolutely necessary to becoming the best we ever can be.  I think what is causing sentiment problems is the lack of a map. It's hard for people to see a clear direction. Without a clear map of what system design we are shooting for, and how each component will ultimately fit into it, the risk is that those changes can appear reactive and undirected.

307
General Discussion / Re: Current plans on delegate pay?
« on: April 26, 2015, 12:58:38 am »
Voting is only good for allocating trust.
It is very bad for running a business or even a project.
Such roles involve specialty skills and deep hands-on knowledge beyond the average voter's abilities.

Any solution needs to, at most, vote on who to hold accountable and then let them manage the allocated resources.

I wouldn't want to fly on a plane controlled by voting passengers.
(And I wouldn't want to own a company that worked that way either.)

:)
+5% +5%

Absolutely! This is why a voting system where the coding workers are delegates is now sub-optimal. The only people that should fill delegate roles are those whose mandates and delivery outcomes are transparent enough for the community to judge. Most stakeholders are not and should not need to be sitting alongside developers to have any control.

Stan, how do you envisage the delegate structure should best be utilised then? My view is something like this:

Remove the need for delegates to produce blocks and price feeds. Within the broad delegate group, there should be competitive subsets of delegates responsible for:

- managing the decentralised pool of (X=101?) block-producers
- managing the pool of price feed submitters

The "Head of Development" should be responsible for allocations amongst coders based on value produced, rather than being determined by broad stakeholder voting.

In the "company model" delegates should be more like directors or managers, who are hired and fired on how well they allocate resources, including to others, to meet expected outcomes.

If this evolves in time toward a "network economy " model, the delegates would be more like public agents that are granted budgets to implement their public mandates, by allocating these to the service providers that best meet them. An entire system of decentralised governance could be built around this.

The key is that stakeholders need to delegate accountabilities, but always hold the collective power of conferring or removing that accountability if needs are not being met.

Further, voluntary funding models should be strongly considered to complement anything else we do.

308
If you can control BTC as collateral (for example with spv sidechain) you might as well just use it directly as sidechain BTC
I only know a little about side chains. Would that enable a solution where bitUSD could be issued onto the BitShares block chain? And could counterparty risk be minimised in the design?

309
General Discussion / Is it feasible to make a bitBTC backed by BTC?
« on: April 25, 2015, 12:41:31 pm »
This is just a thought-provoker. Currently we make bitBTC backed by BTS. I wonder what the broader crypto-community would think of a bitBTC backed by a reserve of BTC, where the transfer operations of the reserve are largely automatic and maybe subject to decentralised control by bitBTC owners? One that had zero financial risk associated with BitShares except as the designer and owner of the system? The bitBTC would then have:

- fast, guaranteed exchangeability with real BTC
- 10 second block times
- no feed price
- no collateral volatility

Even though we might argue that counterparty risk is introduced (and the goal should be to minimise that as far as possible), I think if people accept the security is still very high they may find it more understandable and attractive than one backed by BTS, at least at this early stage in BitShares' growth.

For BTS owners, a spread could be earned on transfers in and out of the reserve, and transaction fees from exchange markets, and this would not be limited by the market cap of BTS. For example, there's no reason why there could not be $100m of bitUSD earning $2m a year for BTS, even if the BTS valuation were lower than this.

There's been a lot of talk recently about ACCT, escrow functions, multi-sig, etc, some of which could be used. So I wondered, does this concept seem technically and legally feasible?

Just throwing this one out there.

310
Only relative to a bitUSD. But not relative to a real USD. Which is all that holders care about when they take their settlement receipts and go to buy the real USD they wanted to track all along.

What if the external exchange has a BTS/USD and BTS/bitUSD markets? Isn't it possible that a change in one leads to a change in the other?
not really sure how. monsterer, I thank yourself and joele for the dialogue, but for now I still feel the evidence is lacking for this concept, and so I must continue to reject it.

311
General Discussion / Re: BitAssets 3.0 - For Community Review
« on: April 25, 2015, 08:05:54 am »

If the market is functioning properly you will see very few settlement requests (the 24+ hour delay means you cannot use settlement to "buy the bottom" of a flash crash with huge volume) and those that want the money NOW will just sell on the normal market.   There would be little incentive to pay interest to avoid a settlement that never happens.

bytemaster, why wouldn't we see frequent settlement requests? Demand continuously fluctuates. Whenever there is enough of a decline in demand and price, sellers or arbitragers would choose to request settlement instead. That's its purpose, in preventing further price decline. Depending on how the bond market is structured, there will also be settlements required when cash holders move to lend longer term.

I still can't think of a better market clearing mechanism than interest if the peg is to be maintained, and we want to mediate swings in supply and demand.

It would be helpful to understand the root issue a bit better. Is your concern that:

a) in principle collateral is a better clearing mechanism than interest
b) there are insurmountable flaws to getting interest to work as a clearing mechanism in this market
c) short term shorts generally won't pay interest, so the zero bound on rates is a limiting factor for proper clearing
d) something else?




 

312
Actually I was wrong, it seems to be simply a question of "You get what you ask for".

I assume you're talking about this:

Code: [Select]
Buy 268.601 BTS/USD 9,224.01 BTS 34.341 USD 0.0000 USD Apr 24, 2015 7:05:10 AM
Short 247.000 BTS/USD 34.341 USD 9,224.01 BTS
Buy 268.601 BTS/USD 244.74 BTS 0.911 USD 0.0000 USD Apr 24, 2015 7:05:10 AM
Short 248.000 BTS/USD 0.911 USD 244.74 BTS

As you can see someone placed a buy order well above the lowest ask, and got matched with shorts at 247 and 248 BTS/USD.
So that buy order just got charged a massive fee of nearly 10%? I thought the system was meant to protect from front-runners, but is it worth the cost?

313
Even if traders inside the exchange believed unrelentingly in the parity of the bitUSD, and exchange it internally for $1.00 of BTS, the arbitrage is to buy bitUSD outside and sell it inside, a behaviour that will cause the bitUSD prices inside and outside to converge somewhere between $0.90 and $1.00 of a USD, which is still a discount. And I'm not sure how this has an impact on the external price of BTS at all.

Are we on the same page, or am I on a tangent?

If the inside and outside prices converge, by definition the outside price of BTS has in fact been effected by the internal pricing?
Only relative to a bitUSD. But not relative to a real USD. Which is all that holders care about when they take their settlement receipts and go to buy the real USD they wanted to track all along.

314
General Discussion / Re: BitAssets 3.0 - For Community Review
« on: April 24, 2015, 06:29:08 am »
Another thing I'm still unclear on - why is there a preference shift for bitAsset shorts to be rationed by collateral on offer, rather than interest rate they are willing to pay?

I'm still trying to understand what the map of the system looks like and what the role of the bitAsset is within it. For example, if there is a plan to have a bond market and the like, how do bitAssets integrate with that?
Are we just talking about bitCurrencies having bond markets or all bitAssets?
Is bitUSD akin to cash, with at-call deposits and a bond market both to be separately defined, or is bitUSD the complete at-call market, with only a bond market behind that.
And is the bond market risk-free or credit-based? Or both?
Or does the map look completely different to this?

A map for context would be helpful in thinking about how proposed changes improve the fit of any component (e.g. a bitAsset) to its envisioned role within a broader system.

315
The BOT has short orders that will buy orders below the feed to correct the internal price, the external exchange will follow the internal price then.

or

The BOT will close all sell orders below feed and close all buy orders above feed price.


On these joele, I find your meaning a bit fuzzy, would you care to elaborate? What specific actions would the bot be taking? For example "it would buy the internal bitUSD for $0.90 of BTS, and sell for..[ ] on the  [ ]"


Like Bot will buy internal bitUSD any orders below the $0.99 of BTS and will have buy walls, and has a sell order above $1.01 of bts.
or a BOT can remove all internal sell orders below the $0.99 of BTS, then if no sell orders below the feed, buy orders will eventually normalize.

Yes, there may be a loss doing this, thus there is a 30 days price settlement notice kinda bluff to traders to correct the price.

Just my 2cents
I think that would be an almost certain loss. In the scenario I gave where the market's valuation of bitUSD is $0.90, the bot buys all the internal bitUSD up to $0.99, it will end up owning most of the bitUSD available, and there will be no buyers at $1.01+. They will be forced to sell at $0.90 again to get rid of it all, and make a very big loss.

"kinda bluff" sounds "kinda dodgy"?  ;)

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