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Messages - R

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1006
***BUMP***

We've now got two witnesses providing price feeds for the GRIDCOIN MPA, looking for more to step forwards.

Edit: Worth pointing out that over the last few days we've exceeded $800k trading volume, would have loved to have seen some of this traded on BTS via OPEN.GRC (soon to be launched) & the GRIDCOIN MPA.

I made my second appeal to BTS witnesses in #172 of beyondbitcoin hangouts: https://steemit.com/beyondbitcoin/@officialfuzzy/guest-signups-beyond-bitcoin-hangout-172-9-9-16-rsvp-to-friday-s-hangout-refer-projects-for-rewards

I'll be continuing the appeal in the #173 and #174 etc until we have more witnesses.

Thanks :)

1007
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: August 29, 2016, 01:31:52 pm »
*bump*

Any thoughts regarding my BTS liquidity bot BOINC project idea?

1009
Muse/SoundDAC / Re: is muse die?
« on: August 25, 2016, 11:49:13 am »
Are you able to buy MUSE? Cryptofresh/coinmarketcap shows $29 having been traded the last 24hrs but I cannot see it on the BTS market..
Found where I can buy muse, I've put up a fair offer of 1 SAT/MUSE.

1010
Muse/SoundDAC / Re: is muse die?
« on: August 15, 2016, 02:03:15 pm »
Are you able to buy MUSE? Cryptofresh/coinmarketcap shows $29 having been traded the last 24hrs but I cannot see it on the BTS market..

1011
Hey,

I'm running the latest Bitshares light GUI (version 2.0.160813).

I'm trying to change my MPA's variables, but the following variables can't go lower than 1%?
"PERCENT OFFSET OF FORCED SETTLEMENTS"
"MAX FORCE SETTLE VOLUME (PERCENT OF TOTAL SUPPLY PER HOUR)"

I can't put 0.01 directly into the field, it prevents it, I have to put 0.1 in then put the 0 before the 1 afterwards.

If I put 0.01 in, it results in '1', but if I put in 0.005 (0.5%) it results in 0.

Is this a glitch in the GUI? Can I get around this via CLI?

Cheers

EDIT: I tried sumitting 0.005 for "PERCENT OFFSET OF FORCED SETTLEMENTS" despite it returning '0' in the confirmation page, and it returned an error "stack: TypeError: Illegal value: 0.5 (not an integer)".

Edit: I've misinterpreted the overview/confirmation page. 0.01 resulting in 1 isn't 1% but rather 0.01% so attempting to set 0.005 would have been 0.005%, still interesting the error popped up.

1012
@pc is correct. Market Pegged Assets against a thinly-traded token are a recipe for disaster and abuse. I would not recommend having this price feed managed by the elected Bitshares witnesses.
When you say not managed by witnesses, would you be more comfortable with it being managed by a committee instead?
No, not by the official BitShares committee. That wouldn't be any better. What I had in mind was a private group providing the feed, to absolve BitShares itself of any liability in case of abuse.
Yeah, I don't think that handing control of price feeds to a private/unknown un-elected group is appropriate.

Ultimately, I don't think witnesses are liable in any case of abuse, especially when they're reporting legit price feeds (unlike if they were to provide fake price feeds).

If witnesses are liable for external abuse of legit price feeds then that's a risk that witnesses have acknowledged by becoming a witness in the first place.

I'm willing to vote for witnesses that do decide to provide the GRIDCOIN MPA price feeds.

I've changed the GRIDCOIN MPA variables:
I've reduced the required quantity of price feeds from 7 to 1.
Changed the "Force settlement delay" to 1 week.
Set the "Max force settle vol" to 0.1%

Just spotted there is the ability to disable forced settlement too, could enable that to take forced settlement out of the equation.. but I assume that would be bad because that would then mean that if the price tanked or soared then you would still have the coins you purchased at a high/low value, so yeah probably not going to do that as long as there is no manipulation of the Gridcoin market.

I have disabled the following permissions (first MPA to do so!) so that I have less power over the GRIDCOIN MPA:
Require holders to be white-listed
Issuer may transfer asset back to himself
Issuer must approve all transfers
Disable confidential transactions

1013
@pc is correct. Market Pegged Assets against a thinly-traded token are a recipe for disaster and abuse. I would not recommend having this price feed managed by the elected Bitshares witnesses.
When you say not managed by witnesses, would you be more comfortable with it being managed by a committee instead?

Can you provide links regarding black swan scenario & how MPAs handle them?

I'd really appreciate the bitshares documents on MPA's being updated to provide information regarding limitations surrounding low-volume assets - I've been hyped for the last 2 months since creating this MPA trying to get it live lol, at least we'll have our OPEN.GRC UIA in the near future.

1014
No, neither of these scenarios relies on forced settlement, and you don't have to sustain the price manipulation for a significant amount of time. Only long enough for the price feed to adapt, which is typically much less than one hour.
But you previously stated "This will trigger a black swan, and bitGRC holders are forced to settle at about 20% of the normal price." - how can force settlement occur without force settlement?

1015
Ok, so only those shorting the Gridcoin MPA would potentially be affected, not those holding the MPA (because they'd be saved by forced settlement) ?

In the scenario I described, yes, for some definition of "only".

But an attack in the opposite direction is also possible:

* Attacker short-sells a lot of bitGRC near the feed price.
* Then, he dumps the GRC price to (for example) 10% of its normal value.
* He creates another (small) short with minimum collateral, i. e. about 20% of the normal GRC price.
* Then, he pumps GRC to >20% of its normal value. This will trigger a black swan, and bitGRC holders are forced to settle at about 20% of the normal price.
You'd need to sustain such a manipulation of the external trading value for the full length of the 'Force settlement delay' setting though right, which for the 'GRIDCOIN' MPA is 24hrs?

What if we increased the 'Force settlement delay' to like.. 168hrs so that market manipulation would need to be sustained for a full week before forced settlement occured?

Likewise, what if we significantly reduced the 'Max force settle vol' variable? That too would reduce the impact of an attacker manipulating price feeds, right?

1016
I'd love it if the "5% on anything" to come back to BTS, I felt that was a major selling point for users that took BTSX to $100mil+ marketcap.
Would be even cooler if it was a variable within UIA settings.

1017
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: August 12, 2016, 03:41:53 pm »
https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@cm-steem/brainstorming-new-boinc-projects-anyone-can-create-a-project-and-reward-their-users-with-gridcoin#@cm-steem/re-cm-steem-brainstorming-new-boinc-projects-anyone-can-create-a-project-and-reward-their-users-with-gridcoin-20160812t153824382z

Thoughts? The major difficulty would be providing the liquidity software to volunteers without providing said volunteers the ability to steal funds from the liquidity software. If this difficult issue was solved, then we could easily distribute liquidity software to several thousand individuals from all around the world.

If a BOINC project was created for this purpose, you could go a step further and distribute UIA against those running the liquidity software: https://steemit.com/steem/@cm-steem/gauging-interest-would-you-be-interested-being-able-to-tip-boinc-users-your-crypto-asset-of-choice

1018
What is the usecase for Gridcoin MPA? If nobody is trading the real thing, why would they want to trade MPA?
We're rewarding ~1800 users, we've got 7000 in our team, there are 400k active BOINC users and 4 million registered BOINC users in total. All it would require to jump from 7000 to 400k users is removal of the team requirement in the future: https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@cm-steem/gridcoin-s-mandatory-team-requirement-should-it-stay-or-should-it-go

I'm investigating extending project rain (tipping thousands of users based on their BOINC computation) to BTS UIA, so there's the potential for driving significant quantities of new users to the Bitshares platform. https://steemit.com/steem/@cm-steem/gauging-interest-would-you-be-interested-being-able-to-tip-boinc-users-your-crypto-asset-of-choice

Sure, Gridcoin might currently have a low market cap and/or trading volume, but that's not going to be the case forever & the Bitshares platform has much to offer the Gridcoin community even if liquidity will be a problem in the short term.

1019
I'm not talking about settlement.

Suppose that the feed price is derived from external exchanges, that the total trade volume on these exchanges is low (as seems to be the case right now).
Suppose that external exchanges have not only low volume but also little liquidity and possibly a high spread (I haven't checked this). That means it is possible to move the price by a large amount with only little trade volume.

* An attacker with sufficient BTC in their pockets would try to buy up as many bitGRC on OpenLedger as he can get, at a price slightly above the feed. This may take a couple of days.
* Immediately before the attack, the attacker examines the short positions and their respective collateral. For each short position, he computes the black swan price.
* To execute the attack, the attacker positions a sell order for each short near the black swan price.
* Then he starts "manipulating" the price on the external exchanges.
* As the price of GRC goes up and takes the feed with it, the short positions will be margin called and will buy into the existing sell orders, consuming (almost) their entire collateral.

The attack is profitable if the cost for price manipulation is low in comparison to the value of the bitGRC the attacker has amassed.

The price manipulation attack has been considered before. AFAIR bm's response was that the attacker will end up with BTS that's worth less than what the attack costs. This argument is valid when you try to manipulate the price of BTS against FIAT, or against a high-volume currency like BTC. However, I think with a low-volume asset the attack can be profitable, in particular because the price of BTS itself is not damaged by the attack.
Ok, so only those shorting the Gridcoin MPA would potentially be affected, not those holding the MPA (because they'd be saved by forced settlement) ?

What if witnesses tracked market volume? If it's under a certain volume, shorting wouldn't be allowed/enabled for said MPA within the BTS DEX?

If such an idea is out of the question, then I guess it's a risk that those shorting the MPA would have to take into account?

Hopefully Gridcoin won't stay a low volume asset forever, hah! :P

1020
Guys,

this is dangerous. CMC shows the total trade volume of GRC in the last 24 hours to be less than 3k USD. An attacker who is long in bitGRC can easily steal collateral by manipulating the external trade price.
Could this be negated by changing the "Max force settle vol" and "Force settlement offset" variables? Could you elaborate on your concerns? The bitshares documentation doesn't cover any of this.

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