BTS系统中的别名是否真的有价值？

大家说说看？

2000less than balance list..
my account balance should be ***4,237btsx and not the one show as ***2,237

Quote

>> wallet_account_balance

ACCOUNT                         BALANCE                     
============================================================
chinese                         0.03329 BTSX               
tiger                           ***2,237.99915 BTSX       

Quote from: sfinder on July 19, 2014, 10:27:17 pm

BIG PROBLEM.  my following 2000 BTSX  are missing from my wallet

Quote from: clout on July 19, 2014, 10:11:00 pm

Quote from: sfinder on July 19, 2014, 10:04:26 pm

I transferred 1000btsx from "tiger" to "chinese " in the same wallet but almost 1 hour past and still showing pending .  and "duplicate" status in wallet_account_transaction_history

Quote

wallet_account_transaction_history chinese

2014-07-19T19:38:01 EXPIRED   tiger               chinese             1,000.00000 BTSX                                                    N/A                     0.00000 BTSX        8d7b6e8
2014-07-19T20:46:27 DUPLICATE tiger               chinese             1,000.00000 BTSX        mmmmm                                       N/A                     0.00000 BTSX        ad12f04

go to console and clear pending transactions

someone please track my above 2 transactions

把这个帖子顶上来聊聊，呵呵

现在的问题是抵押发行资产时，价格可以随意定，我可以抵押1XTS，发行1亿bitUSD，在精心设计的攻击下，可以让这个挂单成交获取很多bitUSD.
以下是我的修改
1. 首先对每个block，我们可以获取这个block内所有交易中，bitUSD 卖单的最高成交价。可以认为如果按这个价格抵押XTS发行USD，能把USD发行数量限制在安全值内。
2. 为进一步保证安全，可以扫描每个块的bitUSD最高成交价，按最近360个价格取最高值。对初始状态，没有360个块，可以设定一个安全的初始值，比如0.2USD/XTS。到此可以强制规定一个安全的资产发行价。
3. 现在举实例，假设按以上逻辑算出来的发行价为 0.2 USD/XTS
  1) 我要拿出20 XTS，按0.18 USD/XTS价格发行，这个价格小于 0.2，所以强制按 0.2USD/XTS发行，加上双倍抵押，只能创造 20 *(0.2/2) = 2 USD。这2个USD直接就创造出来，属于我了。同时按 0.18USD/XTS 挂 USD 卖单。
  2) 如果我设定按 0.22 USD/XTS 发行，这个价格本身就大于 0.2，是安全的，就直接按这个 0.22 的价格创造 USD，并挂USD卖单。
 
 
 
  这样做连市场深度检查都不需要的
为更加保险，可以把360个块再取大一点，比如按1天24小时算，是24*60*6 个块。
如果想发动攻击，发行大量bitUSD，除非能控制一天之内所有的 USD 卖单价格都严重偏低，这是不可能的。
 
 
  在正式启动之后
第一个block就可以创造出 bitUSD，第一天之内的所有发行价应该都是<=0.2USD/XTS 。
第二天开始，发行价由前一天成交的 bitUSD 买卖单市场价决定。如果XTS开始升值，发行价自然会提高。XTS价值越高，1个XTS能发行的USD越多，但上限总是被市场趋势控制的，无法被个人左右。

Quote from: liondani on July 17, 2014, 12:53:43 pm

Quote from: JakeThePanda on July 17, 2014, 12:43:48 pm

Quote from: bytemaster on July 17, 2014, 12:26:12 am

Quote from: alt on July 17, 2014, 12:16:57 am

still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.    Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. 

+ 1

Lets look at this very closely because it is very easy to confuse yourself when it comes to thinking about markets (happens to me a lot and I have a good grasp on it).   I write this to "think out loud" so I may have something wrong.

Before any trading can occur there must be at least X% (say 1%) of the XTS sitting in unmatched shorts & asks.  Lets also assume that this 1% does not belong to the attacker because the attacker would have no victims if it all belonged to him. 

Primary goal of the attack:
1) Create a large amount of BitUSD with very little XTS backing it which will be unresolvable and break the peg until someone eats the loss.
2) To be successful the attacker must be on both sides of the trade (collecting a large USD balance, and an equal short position).
3) To achieve this the attacker must eliminate all other asks on the book that are not their own.

To execute the attack:
1) You must sell 1 XTS for 10000 USD (a very high ask if it were real USD)
2) This means you must place bids to match every ask at 1, 10, 100, 1000 USD per XTS
3) To places these bids means you must short USD at lower and lower prices
4) As you short USD at lower and lower prices you are creating more and more USD backed by less and less XTS.
5) At the end of the day you have a lot of people who long USD while you are short USD at a very low value.
*** Critical Point:  Does the rest of the market run out of money before you do ********
6) Eventually you run out of money and can no longer fight off the hoards of people selling XTS for USD
7) The value of USD starts rising absent your manipulation until your short position is blown.
Those who were buying USD while you were shorting knew at the time of purchase that USD wasn't pegged to the dollar and they bought knowing their max return would be 2x on their XTS.   So these buyers of USD gladly sell their USD at a 2x profit even if it is below the dollar peg.
9) The market will continue to correct until all of the attackers USD has been covered and his collateral lost.
10) The peg is restored and all is well.

Some things to note:
1) During the attack many legitimate shorts will start covering to lock in their profits and thus make it more difficult to maintain the attack
2) During the attack many savvy users will start buying USD at the huge discount.  If BitUSD is currently 10% of real USD then you buy it because you know it has collateral worth 20% of real USD backing it.  Sure you don't get to realize a 10x gain when it returns to market peg, but you still get a free 2x gain on the return to market peg.  For this reason, BitUSD is a solid buy any time it is below parity and profit can be made by selling BitUSD for XTS even below market peg if you bought it at an even lower point.

What this means is that only the attacker's short positions get blown out, and everyone else still profits.   In this case I consider an attacker anyone who shorts BitUSD when BitUSD is already below USD value. 

So the attacker has to clear the order book of all orders but their own, create a large short against their own ASK so they end up being LONG and SHORT a significant amount of USD.       To execute this attack requires:

1) Enough XTS to buy out all existing asks while having enough XTS to keep the market open, so lets call that 2% of XTS
2) The ability to execute your attack faster than the rest of the market participants can enter to take your money.
       - shorts entering to cover at a profit
       - asks entering to buy USD cheap

I think that the 2% attack threshold is only viable if the rest of the network is idle, in practice I suspect that the market depth could be 10% and would grow as the attacker attempted to push down USD. 

Lastly I would like to submit one last fail-safe feature:  Delegates
  To execute any attack requires delegates to include your transactions in the first place and for regular users to propagate your transactions.  For this reason an attacker would have to connect directly to a delegate that will include their transaction because it is unlikely to propagate among regular users.   If there are good delegates then the market can function with little opportunity to attack.

BitUSD这个的数量是固定的吗？

Quote from: liondani on July 17, 2014, 12:53:43 pm

Quote from: JakeThePanda on July 17, 2014, 12:43:48 pm

Quote from: bytemaster on July 17, 2014, 12:26:12 am

Quote from: alt on July 17, 2014, 12:16:57 am

still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.    Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. 

+ 1

Lets look at this very closely because it is very easy to confuse yourself when it comes to thinking about markets (happens to me a lot and I have a good grasp on it).   I write this to "think out loud" so I may have something wrong.

Before any trading can occur there must be at least X% (say 1%) of the XTS sitting in unmatched shorts & asks.  Lets also assume that this 1% does not belong to the attacker because the attacker would have no victims if it all belonged to him. 

Primary goal of the attack:
1) Create a large amount of BitUSD with very little XTS backing it which will be unresolvable and break the peg until someone eats the loss.
2) To be successful the attacker must be on both sides of the trade (collecting a large USD balance, and an equal short position).
3) To achieve this the attacker must eliminate all other asks on the book that are not their own.

To execute the attack:
1) You must sell 1 XTS for 10000 USD (a very high ask if it were real USD)
2) This means you must place bids to match every ask at 1, 10, 100, 1000 USD per XTS
3) To places these bids means you must short USD at lower and lower prices
4) As you short USD at lower and lower prices you are creating more and more USD backed by less and less XTS.
5) At the end of the day you have a lot of people who long USD while you are short USD at a very low value.
*** Critical Point:  Does the rest of the market run out of money before you do ********
6) Eventually you run out of money and can no longer fight off the hoards of people selling XTS for USD
7) The value of USD starts rising absent your manipulation until your short position is blown.
Those who were buying USD while you were shorting knew at the time of purchase that USD wasn't pegged to the dollar and they bought knowing their max return would be 2x on their XTS.   So these buyers of USD gladly sell their USD at a 2x profit even if it is below the dollar peg.
9) The market will continue to correct until all of the attackers USD has been covered and his collateral lost.
10) The peg is restored and all is well.

Some things to note:
1) During the attack many legitimate shorts will start covering to lock in their profits and thus make it more difficult to maintain the attack
2) During the attack many savvy users will start buying USD at the huge discount.  If BitUSD is currently 10% of real USD then you buy it because you know it has collateral worth 20% of real USD backing it.  Sure you don't get to realize a 10x gain when it returns to market peg, but you still get a free 2x gain on the return to market peg.  For this reason, BitUSD is a solid buy any time it is below parity and profit can be made by selling BitUSD for XTS even below market peg if you bought it at an even lower point.

What this means is that only the attacker's short positions get blown out, and everyone else still profits.   In this case I consider an attacker anyone who shorts BitUSD when BitUSD is already below USD value. 

So the attacker has to clear the order book of all orders but their own, create a large short against their own ASK so they end up being LONG and SHORT a significant amount of USD.       To execute this attack requires:

1) Enough XTS to buy out all existing asks while having enough XTS to keep the market open, so lets call that 2% of XTS
2) The ability to execute your attack faster than the rest of the market participants can enter to take your money.
       - shorts entering to cover at a profit
       - asks entering to buy USD cheap

I think that the 2% attack threshold is only viable if the rest of the network is idle, in practice I suspect that the market depth could be 10% and would grow as the attacker attempted to push down USD. 

Lastly I would like to submit one last fail-safe feature:  Delegates
  To execute any attack requires delegates to include your transactions in the first place and for regular users to propagate your transactions.  For this reason an attacker would have to connect directly to a delegate that will include their transaction because it is unlikely to propagate among regular users.   If there are good delegates then the market can function with little opportunity to attack.