Show Posts
This section allows you to view all posts made by this member. Note that you can only see posts made in areas you currently have access to.
i just did the next buyback http://cryptofresh.com/b/3169440
we bought 13.33 METAFEES for 0.32 BTC and will burn them the next days. The total supply for METAFEES will be going down from 6220 to 6206.67 METAFEES.
- I can see adding sidechains for other major cryptos such as litecoin and peercoin. Wouldn't it be possible now to trade amongst them as well? Huge liquidity.
this may not by true... so do not take my words as final... but I think we could integrate with everycoin which has multisig. But... it will require to run full node of that client by all witnesses. So it would be difficult to run 20 full nodes of different coins. So (in my opinion) we should focus on:
* BTC
* ETH
* DOGE
Agreed
abit's original point was simple, so I've just requoted his point, your reply, and my reply. To answer your question: the@abitRe 2): How does the software prevent someone with both bitcoin private keys from signing a "bitcoin" transaction? They would sign it on the bitcoin network, which doesn't care about the rules of the sidechain.
* The witness who hold the second key could be the same person who deposited the BTC which is supposed to be locked, but actually the person have both keys, she can just unlock the fund without destroy the issued bitBTC.
2 the software will only allow a witness to sign the bitcoin transaction once the corresponding SIDEBTC has been destroyed. Remember SIDEBTC is not transferable only BITBTC is.
Who would have both keys? As a depositor you guard your 1 of 2 key as well as you would a single key.
witness would have both keys: his "witness" key and his "sender" key. With these two keys, you can sell your BitBTC, then release your BTC.
I'm glad to see a BTC expert came in.@abitRe 2): How does the software prevent someone with both bitcoin private keys from signing a "bitcoin" transaction? They would sign it on the bitcoin network, which doesn't care about the rules of the sidechain.
* The witness who hold the second key could be killed, so the key lost, and the locked BTC become non-redeemable, hence no value.
* The witness who hold the second key could be the same person who deposited the BTC which is supposed to be locked, but actually the person have both keys, she can just unlock the fund without destroy the issued bitBTC.
1 all witnesses would hold the second key
2 the software will only allow a witness to sign the bitcoin transaction once the corresponding SIDEBTC has been destroyed. Remember SIDEBTC is not transferable only BITBTC is.
In general, I think this scheme is overly complicated and prone to some basic pitfalls. First and foremost, with potentially locked up BTC forever, all the BitBTC isn't redeemable for BTC, so it shouldn't trade as 1-1 for BTC.
I think BM's solution is much simpler, easier to understand, and therefore easier to trust. It's pretty safe except in the case of large scale collusion by the custodians of the SBA keys. To reduce this chance for collusion, the custodians could be compensated by some stream of income that goes away if they do collude.
Obviously there's political decisions involved in determining how to balance the amount of income to the custodians, the number of custodians, etc as the balance held increases. The biggest problem is this regard is probably the limited size of Bitcoin's multisig.
Imo what we need is a reputation system which will provide trusts. "Reputed signers hold the keys".
By the way multi-sig feature of BTC is too expensive, perhaps we can't afford the operating cost if eventually implemented the side chain thing.
Obviously we should be pushing to get a sidechain implementation going ASAP. But I think we're dramatically overcomplicating it in this thread and should probably leave the precise details to the devs (primarily @bytemaster).
Beyond that, I think we should be concentrating on pushing to incentivize a) creation of the primary fiat BitAssets and b) participation in BitAsset liquidity pools, among other liquidity measures.
Speaking of liquidity, I think we should be doing what we can to establish robust markets in any new cryptocurrencies that hit the market. The Lisk ICO will go for another 3 weeks and then it will launch and trade on the open market. I'll probably say this until I'm blue in the face. But we should make sure we are among the first exchanges (if not THE first) to trade Lisk. That would generate plenty of buzz and new users for the DEX.
We really need to get serious about making some of these pieces of the puzzle come together.
@bytemaster solution is just a bitcoin master wallet where the witnesses share the private keys and issue IOU tokens much like OPEN.BTC minus the multisig
Can we keep on topic with this thread. Please start a new thread if you want to discuss adding lisk.
I don't know the details of bytemaster's solution. What are the pitfalls of it? Sounds like a straightforward solution: bring bitcoin in one-way via sidechain, treat it as a token to trade inside bitshares, redeem via a convert to BTS then to shapeshift.
Obviously we should be pushing to get a sidechain implementation going ASAP. But I think we're dramatically overcomplicating it in this thread and should probably leave the precise details to the devs (primarily @bytemaster).
Beyond that, I think we should be concentrating on pushing to incentivize a) creation of the primary fiat BitAssets and b) participation in BitAsset liquidity pools, among other liquidity measures.
Speaking of liquidity, I think we should be doing what we can to establish robust markets in any new cryptocurrencies that hit the market. The Lisk ICO will go for another 3 weeks and then it will launch and trade on the open market. I'll probably say this until I'm blue in the face. But we should make sure we are among the first exchanges (if not THE first) to trade Lisk. That would generate plenty of buzz and new users for the DEX.
We really need to get serious about making some of these pieces of the puzzle come together.
In this case, only those that provide real BTC will be able to withdraw real BTC ..
That's a non-starter IMHO and I would personally prefer a big multisig scheme instead ..
it looks pretty awesome!I want to have situation like this... everyday!
If anything, a monthly event could be done until people get used to it and it remains constant
Looking good! Yeah, liquid Mondays? Or we could all just agree to just trade on days that end in ''y"
What about BMS concerns about being long and short at the same time. It artificially increases supply but not liqidity? Also there's no need for reserve pool subsidies of the buy side because of forced settlement.sure .. for that direction there is everything fine and we do have 2% of supply in instant buy orders for smartcoins ..
Settlement has nothing to do with liquidity (in core smartcoins like USD, EUR, CNY, etc..) IMHO
maybe I misunderstand what you're saying.
Settlement has everything to do with liquidity. That's its only purpose.
It guarantees up to 2% (or whatever it's set to) of daily smartcoin supply is liquid at the settlement price.
It is in effect a standing order to buy that smartcoin. (with 24 hr delay)
the liquidity issues are on the other side .. no one wants to sell his smartcoins .. not even for a 5-10% premium (depending on the actual asset) ..
simply because we don't have a big on/off ramp for bitassets ..
Forced settlement is guaranteed buy side liquidity at the peg.
I think we need some sort of guaranteed sell side liquidity at the peg+10%. This would have to come from the rerserve pool imo.
One of the benefits of @Empirical1.2's idea is that yield can be directed not only to BitUSD longs, but also to BitUSD shorts. Also, it stands to reason that a subset of the people buying BitAssets for yield would also be interested in participating in a liquidity pool to gain additional yield. Funds from such a pool can then be used in conjunction with funds from the reserve pool to create liquidity on both sides of the peg.
Increasing BitUSD supply via yield harvesting is still a positive imo because...
- It removes BTS supply from centralized exchanges
- Converts many BTS holders in Smartcoin holders (the product we are trying to bootstrap)
- Converts many BTS holders into longer term yield seeking holders vs. speculators http://bytemaster.github.io/article/2016/01/04/The-Benefits-of-Proof-of-Work/
- Makes us the Crypto USD market leader by value and numbers of holders thereby making us the most lucrative market for merchants.
>70% of BTC is illiquid and hasn't moved in >6 months, but the number of holders and value of their holdings is the most lucrative crypto market and has attracted over 100 000 merchants. This utility increases liquidity and usage. http://www.ofnumbers.com/2014/11/22/approximately-70-of-all-bitcoins-have-not-moved-in-6-or-more-months/
(Whereas why would a lot of merchants want to make the effort to offer their product and services in a much smaller market with fewer users? Let's become the USD crypto market leader fast.)
Nearly all other promotions and developments cause the BTS price to fall in the short term in the hopes of creating demand in the future, dilution for yield should increase the BTS price (via increase BitUSD (BTS) demand in the short and medium term) https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21641.0.html
Incentivizing liquidity, incurs a constant cost but not necessarily constant net new demand for BTS. (Without yield many seek crypto USD only temporarily during BTC/Crypto declines.) By offering yield we will bootstrap BitUSD (in a way that should actually increase the value of BTS from the outset and be a cost that can be mitigated by shareholders if they engage in the network beneficial behaviour of yield harvesting.)
So personally I think we should offer dilution for yield during the growth phase of the DEX as well as conservative liquidity subsidies.
I think this method may help but will likely be too expensive. It doesn't guarantee liquidity either. I much prefer the idea of providing guaranteed sell side liquidity at feed +20% funded by the reserve pool.
(I don't think the cost is high as it creates more demand that it costs from the outset and can be phased out if it doesn't and the cost can be easily mitigated by yield harvesting.) I don't mind using the reserve pool for things, but I'm not a big fan of making it the buyer of last resort and hence over-exposing BTS to risk. So it should have limits imo. I suppose 20% is pretty wide though.
I don't know if the following is true, but given most agree yield harvesting would create millions of BitUSD, it may make liquidity easier as with all that BitUSD already created and only a small amount needed for liquidity operations we may be able to incentivize a good amount of daily liquidity participation in a tight range for a low cost like NuBits liquidity pools? http://cybnate.github.io/index-liquidbits.html (Vs. now where we're trying to incentivize the creation of initial BitUSD as opposed to the buying and selling of already created BitUSD?)
