...I get a Segmentation fault (core dumped)...

for those that want debugging symbols,
apt-get install graphene-dbg

Quote from: xeroc on July 31, 2015, 10:12:18 am

Quote from: Krills on July 31, 2015, 10:08:16 am

shit coin share

FIFY .. sounds better that way!

bitshitshares

shit rhymes with bit, so I agree with xeroc - shitshares sounds more catchy.

Now write it a hundred times...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IIAdHEwiAy8

So I think my conclusion, thinking on the fly, is that the consumption of Bitcoin isn't an important requirement and that there will be higher multiples in Bitcoin than gold because the amount of BTC mined can't increase in response to higher prices. (However as I said earlier there is a relationship in the sense that in order to sustain any valuation, new $ demand for BTC has to at least offset the $ value of BTC being mined.)

You're right, consumption isn't necessarily important, and I choose the wrong word. I meant more as, "a store of something that is essentially to be purchased and used in industry" -- a commodity. At some point I will need gold electrodes and I must buy gold. My point is that gold is tied to a broader economy of goods that require it. There isn't the analogy for BTC.

While the total amount of BTC mined can't increase indefinitely, transaction fees can if miners only accept transactions in to blocks that pay for themselves. From a miner's point of view, there is no difference between transaction feeds and block rewards. That's why placed the fundamental limit the the minimum value of BTC to the marginal cost to "produce" a BTC, which from the miner's point of view is both fees and mining.
$ to produce a block / # of btc "produced" (mined or fees) = the value.
The scarcity keeps the denominator small, and the value stable.

Everyone focuses a lot on the "technicals," of crypto,  which makes sense since it is entirely driven by speculators at the moment and fundamentals don't come in to play. But the fundamentals require analysis, because in the end - things really only last long-term because of fundamentals.

BTS is essentially a non-profit, it does not generate any value on its own. It pays for network security with dilution and transaction fees. The intrinsic value of a bitcoin is the marginal cost to produce the block divided by number of bitcoins paid to the miner per block. The number of bitcoins paid to miner via reward is decreasing over time, but will reach the floor of transaction fees, which is a variable. The marginal cost to produce a block is also a variable depending on the collective power of the miners (i.e., network difficulty), miner computing efficiency ( hashes/sec/(W*electricity rate) ), financing/depreciation of mining hardware, and development costs (since miners are the sole players with network financial incentive to maintain the code). In theory, if prices drop, then people turn off miners until the new network difficulty-price equilibrium is reached. There, therefore, is a minimum value to bitcoin (namely, where is the cheapest electricity in the world), but no maximum value besides speculation. There is no reason why a bitcoin should be priced anything except for the minimum, besides speculation.

BTS is different, as it is a "for-profit" coin. Real companies that produce goods and services and list on the network (with true regulatory compliance), which collects network fees. Fees pay expenses (technology development, marketing, business development, network security) and return a "profit" to the network via burned fees. The value of BTS is in the earning rate, as it is in a normal company (price per earnings ratio, for example, which is always "infinity" for bitcoin). If you can you estimate of the bitshares return and risk -- you can actually price BTS. The game is then trying to be the best at predicting return and risk.

That fundamental difference is why I've come to support bitshares.

But this was also my concern with BTA2.0: how do I price a short to create BitUSD when I know the floor is enforced by the network (the peg), but there is no explicit mechanism for enforcing a ceiling? I think the answer is in the expected profit from BTS. As long as BTS produces profit (my projections of earnings of BTS exceeds the current valuation), I'd be willing to leverage what I have to get more of them. So I price at a discount because I don't know what liquidity will be like when I sell and I want to account for it. There then becomes an auction on willingness to accept liquidity risk. Market makers profit from liquidity risk (over the long term), and also inject liquidity in the market - so I feel like the system has a good chance of working...

Bm is not a gui developer but has grown the gui team for 2.0 to a total of 5 or 6.   Even Nathan is doing gui work.  That leaves only 4 people doing backend work.   

as someone that follows the repos closely to make sure porting to other architectures works, I can validate this comment. graphene-ui has actually been getting almost as much attention as graphene lately, which I took to mean that resources are shifting towards UI.

For the UI, in the past week:
Excluding merges, 4 authors have pushed 49 commits to master and 49 commits to all branches. On master, 99 files have changed and there have been 2,953 additions and 1,436 deletions.

here's the backend for the past week:
Excluding merges, 6 authors have pushed 62 commits to master and 63 commits to all branches. On master, 103 files have changed and there have been 4,905 additions and 1,329 deletions.

The mechanic is the free market, your competitor will provide a better service if you are corrupt.  If the corporation is violating some natural law against you, than you would bring that against them, and it would be very costly for them, for all sorts of reasons.

But what if that corporation used their influence to stifle competition and destroy the free market (to replace it with their controlled market)? You can take it to the extreme and say there should be an "armed revolution" against such a corporation, but if that corporation has a monopoly on essential services (food, medicines), then there is no market mechanism to correct it. Group network theory always pushes to utopia (monopoly) or distopia (free market). If market conditions create a utopia, that same market can't be expected to suddenly generate distopia. There needs to be feedback in the loop, and monopolies work to remove feedback, so the market drives further in their direction.

Right now you can say we have a government monopoly, but all governments are subject to their market economy. And market economies exist with the expectation of a stable political structure to enforce market rules and prevent players from themselves destroying the market. Thus the current situation of balance between government and market.

We also live in a market of governments. They are all similar, but if you don't like what your government is doing you can vote with your feet and move out. Cities that spend too liberally and go bankrupt lose the income centers and populations. Cities that have good policies grow. Countries with bad economic policies (Greece, Argentina, Venezuela, Soviet Union, North Korea) collapse under their own weight.

North Korea is a great example of a monopoly that has destroyed the "market of governments."

I used to work with BTS API a couple of months ago and I have a vague memory that accessing the RPC outside the localhost is disabled in the C++ source code for security reasons.

if you enable the rpc server, the default settings only allow 127.0.0.1 (localhost) to connect. You have to add allowed IPs. It's documented "./bitshares_client --help"