[poll] Should we use a worker proposal to reduce the premium for bitassets?

[BunkerChainLabs-DataSecurityNode]

what happened to this idea and the proposal to sell accumulated fees which are now sitting in the committee account?

It got stuck inbetween some trying to make a push to lower fees.. the threat we recently addressed.

I have bought it up again now and hopefully there are some actionable recommendations that can come to a consensus.

[Akado]

what happened to this idea and the proposal to sell accumulated fees which are now sitting in the committee account?

I've asked about this too. I was under the assumption they had all figured out so once it was approved, they could immediately do that. However that's not what happened. The fees got collected but they're still finding the best way to use them...

[xeroc]

committee was busy closing an exploitable issue in the fees .. and AFAIR, there is another issue with the fees yet to be fixed ..

[JonnyB]

what happened to this idea and the proposal to sell accumulated fees which are now sitting in the committee account?

[puppies]

Whether we end up using worker funding or not we will need to sell the bitassets we are withdrawing from the fee pool.  I like xerocs idea of creating an account owned be the committee account and using that for trading.  Who would we like to see on it?  I'd like to be involved.  Any other volunteers?  You will need to be handy with the cli wallet and able to run a python script.  I don't think any special understanding of market mechanics is needed.  I think 5 members with a 4 of 5 weight would be a good target

[CoinHoarder]

I don't think worker proposal should be used to do the things such as market making for a specific BitAsset, system should only define rules.

If there is a constant premium, then adjust the market operations (eg. forced settlement) to bring the risk/incentives as well as price back in line.

Alternatively, if it is the spread that is too large, then that's a signal that there are profit opportunities for market-makers.

Using dilution for this, is like a company buying it's own product to improve it's books.

Adjusting market dynamics and relying on more adoption/market makers has been the strategy used for the past 2 years with little success. How long do we have to wait before admitting it's broken... a decade?

[julian1]

I don't think worker proposal should be used to do the things such as market making for a specific BitAsset, system should only define rules.

If there is a constant premium, then adjust the market operations (eg. forced settlement) to bring the risk/incentives as well as price back in line.

Alternatively, if it is the spread that is too large, then that's a signal that there are profit opportunities for market-makers.

Using dilution for this, is like a company buying it's own product to improve it's books.

[CoinHoarder]

@CoinHoarder Are you aware of the Forced Settlement feature inside Bitshares? It allows the holder of a smartcoin like BitUSD to convert back to BTS at 99% of the price feed.

Settlememt is at exactly feed price (100%)

@xeroc @Chronos

 ROFL. I am stupid, no I did not know that was possible. How can I miss something like that?!

[morpheus]

You need to also realize that a workee that pays to the committe does not 'really' result in an extra 'dilution' since the funds cannot easily leave the system as sell pressure on polo .. the workers pay will stay in the system and may even make some profit for the dex ..
Fast forward some months, those profits could be burned again

I've been trying to reason through the math of that. 

Let's say we create  a worker proposal for $30k worth of bts.  We then use that to short $10k USD.  We then sell that $10k USD for $10k worth of bts. 

Result is not net inflationary right? $10k USD on the market plus $30k USD as collateral.  I think I must be missing something through.

Net result is deflationary.  $30k worth of bts is effectively locked up and out of circulation while only $10k is in circulation.  This is assuming the usd creator maintains $30k in collateral. 

[morpheus]

Ok...Now that the wording of the poll has changed I don't have a problem and would support a worker proposal for that reason. I will even start voting if we have a worker proposal to reduce the premium for bitassets..Just please never mention the word dilution in the forum even if the worker proposal is essentially that please don't mention this word..!!

Bitcoin uses the term 'block reward'  or 'block subsidy' which is what we should use.  There is really no difference in the 21 million supply limit in bitcoin and the 3.7 billion supply limit in bitshares.  15 million of the 21 million limit (71.4%) has been created in bitcoin.  2.5 billion of the 3.7 billion limit (67.5 %) has been created in bitshares.  As long as we NEVER vote in something that exceeds this limit, then the bitshares reward is no differrent than the bitcoin reward.

That said, I say we go ahead and use block rewards to fund maker, lending, and some market making if possible.  sprint to the finish line, not walk, and do everything we can to get liquidity to the exchange within the limits of funding that we have to work with.

[puppies]

As far as external market making I think a worker proposal that pays members to risk their own liquidity is a good idea. 

If the liquidity itself is being provided by the worker proposal then I think we should keep it simple verifiable and on blockchain.

Xeroc.  Great idea about setting the committee as the owner of the account.  That way we still have a means of recovering funds if needed. 

[abit]

why not have it so all thebworkers pay out in actual bitassets instead of bts directly?

Are you speaking seriously?
Because nobody create the bitassets.
Because of lack of liquidity.
Because the borrower can be margin called, if the system borrows, it would be more vulnerable.

[fuzzy]

why not have it so all thebworkers pay out in actual bitassets instead of bts directly? 

[abit]

I don't think worker proposal should be used to do the things such as market making for a specific BitAsset, system should only define rules.

As a developer, I do want more funds go to development activities (so perhaps less go to others).
But as an investor, I want funds to be spent on whatever benefits the whole "company" most.

[pc]

I don't think worker proposal should be used to do the things such as market making for a specific BitAsset, system should only define rules.

[Musewhale]

, great, good idea, i like it, just do it!

[abit]

Use some fund to make a bot on Polo's bitCNY/BTC pair，manually bump the volume there if no one was trading, we will get eye balls. I already have a worker proposal for the latter. If the bot operates at a slight loss, maybe no need the manually bump, people like free money (by hedging between Dex and polo)

[bitcrab]

I don't think worker proposal should be used to do the things such as market making for a specific BitAsset, system should only define rules.

[valtr]

I thing that spread on bitUSD/USD is too wide and we may have payment systems able to accept it, but people willing to use it will not be able to obtain it at reasonable price.
The worker proposal may help.

[xeroc]

Exactly. I would 100% unequivocally buy 1 Nubit before buying 1 bitUSD, because it is way more likely that there will be someone to buy it back close to parity whenever I happened to want to sell it.

@CoinHoarder Are you aware of the Forced Settlement feature inside Bitshares? It allows the holder of a smartcoin like BitUSD to convert back to BTS at 99% of the price feed.

I'm interested to hear what @bytemaster thinks of the idea of committee-owned short sales at some fixed percentage above the price feed.

Settlememt is at exactly feed price (100%)

[xeroc]

I think the members who manage the account should be a separate committee or sub-committee of members who are  dedicated to just managing this. They should be experience traders who primary responsibility is managing the spread. This way there is no conflict with any other responsibilities they will have

How about an account OWNED by the committee account but with ACTIVE authority being a set of 5 traders or so .. (threshold 2-4)

[xeroc]

You need to also realize that a workee that pays to the committe does not 'really' result in an extra 'dilution' since the funds cannot easily leave the system as sell pressure on polo .. the workers pay will stay in the system and may even make some profit for the dex ..
Fast forward some months, those profits could be burned again

I've been trying to reason through the math of that. 

Let's say we create  a worker proposal for $30k worth of bts.  We then use that to short $10k USD.  We then sell that $10k USD for $10k worth of bts. 

Result is not net inflationary right? $10k USD on the market plus $30k USD as collateral.  I think I must be missing something through.

Depends what supply you look at ..

BTS supply is increases by 30k from worker and reduced by 30k when using it as collateral .. with a collateral ratio of 3 .. you increase the bitusd supply by 10k

[Pheonike]

I think the members who manage the account should be a separate committee or sub-committee of members who are  dedicated to just managing this. They should be experience traders who primary responsibility is managing the spread. This way there is no conflict with any other responsibilities they will have

[BunkerChainLabs-DataSecurityNode]

You need to also realize that a workee that pays to the committe does not 'really' result in an extra 'dilution' since the funds cannot easily leave the system as sell pressure on polo .. the workers pay will stay in the system and may even make some profit for the dex ..
Fast forward some months, those profits could be burned again

I've been trying to reason through the math of that. 

Let's say we create  a worker proposal for $30k worth of bts.  We then use that to short $10k USD.  We then sell that $10k USD for $10k worth of bts. 

Result is not net inflationary right? $10k USD on the market plus $30k USD as collateral.  I think I must be missing something through.

It's profitable when you factor in transactions I think.

What it does take away from is other development elements that require worker funding.

[puppies]

You need to also realize that a workee that pays to the committe does not 'really' result in an extra 'dilution' since the funds cannot easily leave the system as sell pressure on polo .. the workers pay will stay in the system and may even make some profit for the dex ..
Fast forward some months, those profits could be burned again

I've been trying to reason through the math of that. 

Let's say we create  a worker proposal for $30k worth of bts.  We then use that to short $10k USD.  We then sell that $10k USD for $10k worth of bts. 

Result is not net inflationary right? $10k USD on the market plus $30k USD as collateral.  I think I must be missing something through.

[xeroc]

You need to also realize that a workee that pays to the committe does not 'really' result in an extra 'dilution' since the funds cannot easily leave the system as sell pressure on polo .. the workers pay will stay in the system and may even make some profit for the dex ..
Fast forward some months, those profits could be burned again

[BunkerChainLabs-DataSecurityNode]

If we don't get Smartcoins closer to a 1% peg you will never get utility out of them and everyone who comes to bitshares is going to end up just creating their own UIAs and smartcoins because the system bitassets are simply too expensive to consider using.

That's my take on it anyways. I haven't seen any reason for driving the premiums up on Smartcoins even beyond 5%+ as has happened other than because we have so little volume some people could and thus profit from the situation in the DEX market...  while those few who attempted to buy and use them would just get screwed.

If you are looking to buy them for holding value, what good is it if you are paying/losing 10%+ doing that?

If you are trying to use it as a currency for its counterparty (ie. bitUSD) how do you justify paying 10 cents on every dollar more than the real counterparty value?

At on time I had some customers who wanted to pay us for hosting in BTC in bitUSD instead at my request. The result was continued issues with collection because the premium was SO far from what the value of the BTC was that they were sending to convert to bitUSD at the time due to the premium taking 15%+ of the balance off what was being shown as the value of the BTC in USD on Coinbase. I was forced to contact them and instruct them to send more because the difference sometimes was hundreds of dollars short of their invoice due.

Any business that might consider using these Smartcoins would quickly start getting negative feedback from their customers about this, and any merchants who look into them and see this likely are stopped from adopting them for this very reason knowing that they will have customers upset with paying an extra 10 cents on very dollar.. for what? Because traders in an illiquid market made it that way. Good for trader, bad for utility and adoption.

Some would argue that merchants can short Smartcoins, but really, unless their business revolves around the Smartcoin with lots of BTS to just lockup that is a huge barrier to entry.

It seems like it depends what you think Smartcoins should be used for that will determine what you think should happen with them.

As a merchant I can accept a 1% spread from the peg along with other transaction charges to consider it accepted as a payment method (assuming there is an offramp for me to be able to convert to real counterparty Smartcoins to pay the bills etc). Once you get beyond that.. even credit card companies would charge at most 2.5% spread on currency exchanges (in my part of the world anyways), and transaction charges are getting closer to 1% on top of that (except for paypal.. thats just going up).

I believe it is generally perceived that one of the selling points of crypto/smartcoins is that we have a network that is more efficient and sercure than banks, and therefore we have assets that can be transacted for equal to or less than them. In this case though, the cost of dealing in bitassets are not competitive and therefore make no business sense to use them.

I am not a trader (I have said this before) so my outlook on bitassets is more on the side of their practical use and utility. I understand though that for traders unless there is a bigger spread there is no reason to create the markets with such little volume. The idea from what I understand is that once there is more demand/volume that the spread will become closer to the peg. I have just illustrated the chicken/egg situation that is preventing demand from happening through utility so I hope that if this does come into effect we might start to see that tighter spread that would make bitAssets worth using for businesses.

Otherwise you can expect Smartcoins to become continually fractioned into multiple private assets and thus diluting demand on the network bitAssets ongoing. That would not be so bad either really. The fractioned markets would occur with the bitAssets markets only becoming something to trade but not what businesses should/would use for any utility.

I could be missing something in regards to trading at such high premiums too.. so if there is something I have missed feel free to give input.

[puppies]

Exactly. I would 100% unequivocally buy 1 Nubit before buying 1 bitUSD, because it is way more likely that there will be someone to buy it back close to parity whenever I happened to want to sell it.

@CoinHoarder Are you aware of the Forced Settlement feature inside Bitshares? It allows the holder of a smartcoin like BitUSD to convert back to BTS at 99% of the price feed.

I'm interested to hear what @bytemaster thinks of the idea of committee-owned short sales at some fixed percentage above the price feed.

I am also interested in what @bytemaster thinks of the committee going short assets.  I am pretty confident he is aware of the discussion that has been going on.   I would guess that he is trying to allow the "community" to come to a consensus without his input.

Whatever your opinion of BM and his role in BTS.  If you refuse to accept that he has a keen intellect then I would have to question your motives. 

With that said.  I am warming to the idea of allowing an account other than the commitee-account to control these funds.

The upside of only allowing the committee account to create these shorts would in my opinion be.  That if we didn't like the way things were being run, we could vote out those responsible and assuming we could vote in a group that would do as we wished we could reclaim those funds.  The downside is the increased difficulty of creating and approving transaction of the committee-account, and the increased scrutiny, and threat that the committee account holding tens or hundred of thousands of dollars of assets would bring.

The upside of using a different multi key account is largely the inverse.   What is changing my mind though is the wish to prevent the committee account from being a position that it is worthwhile attacking. 

[Chronos]

Exactly. I would 100% unequivocally buy 1 Nubit before buying 1 bitUSD, because it is way more likely that there will be someone to buy it back close to parity whenever I happened to want to sell it.

@CoinHoarder Are you aware of the Forced Settlement feature inside Bitshares? It allows the holder of a smartcoin like BitUSD to convert back to BTS at 99% of the price feed.

I'm interested to hear what @bytemaster thinks of the idea of committee-owned short sales at some fixed percentage above the price feed.

[CoinHoarder]

Nubits is just a little bit under the market value of Nushares, so what will happen when some whale will dump Nushares and the value will drop below that?

i don't get it how they will solve this problem, but anyway in my understanding most of the nubits are holded by liquidityprovider and not so much with users.

The way I understand it, the Nushares price doesn't really matter (for the peg to work any ways). Reading the full Whitepaper is a great way to learn exactly how it works... it is kind of complicated to explain like Smartcoins. The main danger of Nushares/Nubits is that the demand for Nubits declines and has no potential to increase in the future.

While Bitcoin is a first generation cryptoasset, Peercoin was the beginning of the second generation defined by proof of stake. Nu heralds a third generation of cryptoassets featuring stable value managed by shareholders. Will there be a fourth generation? Likely. I do not yet know what will be its defining characteristics, when it will arrive or whether it will make Nu obsolete. Nu is more adaptable than Bitcoin or Peercoin with its voting mechanisms and shareholders are likely to devote considerable revenues to updating it as well as research and development. While I believe the system can likely be sustained for a very long time, it would be foolish to believe it could last forever, as in century after century. Someday it will be replaced by a superior system based on technology not foreseeable today.

When this occurs, NuBit demand will decline permanently. The end of the currency will be marked by interest rates rising to unprecedented highs and then going still higher until the vast majority of NuBits are parked. When market participants reach a unanimous consensus that NuBits are worthless, then they will suddenly drop to zero value from one USD. As long as a small group of speculators believe there is even a small chance NuBit demand will reach a new all time high the price will remain one USD. As the currency shows signs of stress and serious decline in levels of use NuBits will pass from ordinary businesses and people to speculators willing to take large risks for large rewards. Ownership of NuBits will centralize somewhat as the currency shows signs of stress. Failure of the currency is not synonymous with failure of the network. If there are other currencies offered by Nu, they will continue to be unaffected.

In the space between now and obsolescence, there is much that Nu can do to benefit shareholders and its users.

Finally, it should be noted that Nu is experimental software at this point. It may not work as intended. However, shareholders will be tenacious in repairing any defects that are found.

If you go through the tabs on this page it will give you a good idea how Nubits works: https://nubits.com/about/overview
Chronos' videos are good too: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUiLNR0BnZBbQy8UjB263sw13ANLPCxK_
Forums are enlightening as well, specifically the liquidity, nushares, and nubits sections: https://discuss.nubits.com/c/Liquidity

I'm tired of the "liquidity will increase because adoption will increase" state of mind that has been instilled in this community for the past couple years, and I think Bitshares can take a page out of Nushare's book. Namely, paying "custodians" to provide liquidity on the Smartcoin market.

[Shentist]

Nubits is just a little bit under the market value of Nushares, so what will happen when some whale will dump Nushares and the value will drop below that?

i don't get it how they will solve this problem, but anyway in my understanding most of the nubits are holded by liquidityprovider and not so much with users.

we have our issues with liquidity - thats for sure - but we are all aware of this problem and are thinking hard about solutions.

lets look from a standpoint of a merchant

1. at the moment i would be happy to get 1 bitUSD for 1 USD because i can sell them with a premium, but more likely no one will give me 1 bitUSD for 1 USD so i will
give a different conversion rate. so no big deal. the only problem here is that the similar names imply that the value is the same.

2. perspective of a shorter . difficult, because if i get margin called i will pay a huge premium as well and will loose a lot, and this only because no one is selling the
assets for a reasonable price for this trader. But i think a big problem at the moment is this long downtrend in all altcoins, if we can brake this we will get people to short again.

3. buyer of bitUSD? if you want to have it instantly you have to pay a huge premium on the internal DEX so, maybe not a good choice to do it.

[mf-tzo]

Ok...Now that the wording of the poll has changed I don't have a problem and would support a worker proposal for that reason. I will even start voting if we have a worker proposal to reduce the premium for bitassets..Just please never mention the word dilution in the forum even if the worker proposal is essentially that please don't mention this word..!!

[CoinHoarder]

They have liquidity and strong peg. The two things we need the most.

Exactly. I would 100% unequivocally buy 1 Nubit before buying 1 bitUSD, because it is way more likely that there will be someone to buy it back close to parity whenever I happened to want to sell it.

Everyone is still disillusioned that these issues can be fixed by adoption or market maker bots. Adoption is a chicken and egg problem... if there is not liquidity no one will adopt smartcoins, if there is no adoption there is no liquidity. We have been saying that adoption will fix the liquidity problem for two years now. Furthermore, market making bots currently exist and existed in BTS 1.0 with little effect on the peg or liquidity. There are market making bots running on BTS 2.0 right now already.

Bitshares needs to put its customers first, as that is the only way it will be adopted. We have the ability to deliver a one-two punch to Nubits, our biggest competitors. We can do this by diluting shareholders to provide liquidity to the Smartcoin markets in a similar way that Nubits does.  You guys are so adamant that dilution is the issue- it is not. It is the shitty service that we provide.... lets face it.... the DEX sucks. Every time I buy a Smartcoin I pay a huge premium, and then to make things even worse there is no one that wants to buy them back without paying another huge premium. Do you guys not understand that? All of this rhetoric "focus on the DEX", yet you guys are too cheap to do something that would truly improve the DEX... more so than anything else.

I don't understand how you guys don't get this... this is part of the reason I have been recently diversifying into Nushares/B&C because you guys don't seem to get it that the DEX sucks as a product..

[onceuponatime]

I changed the wording of the poll. 

Looks like we lost the ability to reset our votes when I did though.

Thank you. Was able to vote now. Perceptions count!

[puppies]

I changed the wording of the poll. 

Looks like we lost the ability to reset our votes when I did though.

[merivercap]

The word 'dilution' is a bad word to use in cryptoland.  I say we stop using it around here and not consider it.

Maker and lending are best for increasing liquidity organically in a more market-driven, p2p fashion.  These two features combined with some market making with the reserve pool should be the first steps towards increasing liquidity.

Yeah I agree.  It's better to ask 'Should we fund a worker proposal to create a liquidity bot'..  A market making bot can be managed to break even or make a profit.  You can even have insurance just like Rune's Maker Dao proposal to support extreme adverse events.

[Pheonike]

They have liquidity and strong peg. The two things we need the most.

[mf-tzo]

Can someone please explain me what is so amazing about Nubits? I see them mentioned a lot lately in our forum and I really don't understand why.. What is so special about them? Nushares had a max market cap of $6 mil a year ago and bitshares had a market cap of $80 mil. Currently Nushares ar $3 mil and we are more than double that..Nubits is a bit less than a usd and bitusd is always at premium to usd except in the very beggining of bitsharesX..So what is so special about Nubits and we should imitate them?

You want some bitusd liquidity? I bet that if bitshares market cap goes to $3 mil, lots of people will short the hell of bitusd and a lot of bitusd will be created.. Do we want bitshares market cap at $3 mil?? Because if we keep talking about dilution I bet you it will go below $3 mil...

[CoinHoarder]

My vote is yes.... we have the chance to crush our competition (Nubits) by implementing such a feature.

Pretty much Nubit's only benefit is that they dilute Nushares holders to provide liquidity for Nubits, and I think we should level the playing field and do this ourselves with Smartcoins. However, the way you state it should work in your OP is flawed because it only helps people that want to buy Smartcoins at a reasonable price, and does nothing to ensure that they can sell them at a reasonable price. There is a reason Nubits puts up both sell and buy walls... if I am buying Smartcoins I want to be reasonably certain that I will be able to sell them close to parity. I think the way Nubits/Nushares provides liquidity is a much better way of doing it... by the use of elected custodians which are provided incentive by diluting Nushares. Each custodian provides their own funds for operating liquidity operations and is incentived by payments made from Nushares dilution.

In my opinion Smartcoins would truly be a superior solution to Nubits' solution in every way if this were to be implemented. If you guys are going to pass this proposal, then make sure to let me know so I can dump my Nushares... lol. 

[Akado]

Maker and lending are best for increasing liquidity organically in a more market-driven, p2p fashion.  These two features combined with some market making with the reserve pool should be the first steps towards increasing liquidity.

This is true and would love to see it, however I just don't see lending any time soon. And maker, well, maybe after stealth. Stealth should be done by what, March? i'd give it two more months for maker, this if we don't have anything getting in it's way. Maybe after summer we will see the liquidity increasing. We also are having an API similar to Polo so that may facilitate bots.

[Shentist]

The reserve pool should be used to create a supply of bitasset and then they should be put up for sale as a single large wall at no lower than feed price +10% 
This is important for those wishing to close their bitasset debt obligations at a reasonable price.
If bitasset creators are not confident they will be able to exit their positions they are less likely to create bitassets which is bad for liquidity.
The committee will have to be trusted with value that is 300% than the assets created because of reserve requirements.
the proceeds of these sales should be returned to the reserve pool so it is less of a dilution and it stops the committee destroying the bitassets created.
I think this should be done with bitusd only first as a trial.

  and maybe BTC

the lack of closing as a shorter is really bad. we should think about some solutions like this.

[mf-tzo]

The word 'dilution' is a bad word to use in cryptoland.  I say we stop using it around here and not consider it.

Maker and lending are best for increasing liquidity organically in a more market-driven, p2p fashion.  These two features combined with some market making with the reserve pool should be the first steps towards increasing liquidity.

fully agree! Please let's stop using the word dilution! lending, margin trading, POS, developers accepting bitasssets as donations these things will increase liquidity. Please start thinking how to destroy and burn some bts and reduce their supply instead of further dilution..

[abit]

The word 'dilution' is a bad word to use in cryptoland.  I say we stop using it around here and not consider it.

Agree.

Maker and lending are best for increasing liquidity organically in a more market-driven, p2p fashion.  These two features combined with some market making with the reserve pool should be the first steps towards increasing liquidity.

[morpheus]

The word 'dilution' is a bad word to use in cryptoland.  I say we stop using it around here and not consider it.

Maker and lending are best for increasing liquidity organically in a more market-driven, p2p fashion.  These two features combined with some market making with the reserve pool should be the first steps towards increasing liquidity.

[xeroc]

I further recommend to use a separate multisig account controlled by people familiar with trading and scripting to not bother the committee more.

How to run a trading bot with a multisig account, would be a challenge. Maybe MAKER is easier/sooner.

One master in multi sig proposes transactions and others in multisig approve automatically using a bot/script (according to some predefined rules/protocol)

[abit]

I further recommend to use a separate multisig account controlled by people familiar with trading and scripting to not bother the committee more.

How to run a trading bot with a multisig account, would be a challenge. Maybe MAKER is easier/sooner.

[xeroc]

I support this idea and I also think that for the short-term a +10% should be fine from a market making perspective ... once the orders are no longer filled in a timely manner (because liquidity went up) then we can consider lowering the premium or removing the worker entirely.

I further recommend to use a separate multisig account controlled by people familiar with trading and scripting to not bother the committee more.

It is important for us to realize that liquidity is not for free and we need to figure out how to best approach the market without causing to much of a loss for the shareholders while still providing some liquidity

Once the MAKER fork went through we can kill this idea .. or not ..

[JonnyB]

The reserve pool should be used to create a supply of bitasset and then they should be put up for sale as a single large wall at no lower than feed price +10% 
This is important for those wishing to close their bitasset debt obligations at a reasonable price.
If bitasset creators are not confident they will be able to exit their positions they are less likely to create bitassets which is bad for liquidity.
The committee will have to be trusted with value that is 300% than the assets created because of reserve requirements.
the proceeds of these sales should be returned to the reserve pool so it is less of a dilution and it stops the committee destroying the bitassets created.
I think this should be done with bitusd only first as a trial.

[puppies]

Liquidity is one of our greatest issues.  One possible solution would be to use the power to dilute to create more bitassets to hold the peg. 

We could create a worker proposal that sends funds to the committee account.  We could design a bot that will short assets into existence and sell them at a prescribed rate above the peg.  This would still require a majority of committee members to approve each transaction.  this approval could also be automated.

We could through the committee have a market maker that holds the peg of smartcoins to within a couple of percentage points of the feed price.  We could even branch out into other derivatives such as individual stocks. 

Once again I am looking for community input.  Please argue your point.  If there are specific parameters that would be deal breakers please mention them as well.   You may change your vote if you have changed your mind.

Thank you for your input.