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Messages - bitcrab

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496
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 08:41:19 am »
1.do not stop the borrowing feature.
Yes

2.ensure smartcoin holders to settle bad debt positions from lower CR to higher CR.
Even better, Smartcoin holders does not need to use their BitAssets to settle bad debt which mean number of BitCNY/USD will not reduced.

3. accept the possibility that the smartcoin will devalue, just try to minimize the hurting to the ecosystem.
Yes. No price manipulation required and under collateralized time will be shorter than GS protection due to huge incentive.

Please check this:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27273.msg332494#msg332494

this is similar to the individual settlement solution with disabling force settlement as described above, and has similar disadvantages.

another disadvantage is that this is so complicated for common users to understand, and also cost big development efforts.

497
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 07:36:44 am »
Let's assume we want to explicitly allow undercollaterization. In my opinion, a more suitable way would be to implement a bitasset parameter "prevent global settlement", which then can be turned on by committee, and leave the price feed as is. Then the undercollaterization is transparent.

What are your thoughts on that?

what does bad debt mean? which means the debt in the position cannot be fully paid by selling the collateral with margin call/force settlement referencing the market price.

then you choose to disable margin call and force settlement while bad debt appears? or you allow the existence of a debt position with pure debt and 0 BTS?


498
General Discussion / New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 07:04:34 am »
I plan to draft a BSIP to implement GS protection via core code, before doing that, I'd like to do some explanation here:

Global Settlement may be the worst way to handle bad debt, because:

1. it settles all the debt positions, including the ones with CR>1
2. it stop the borrowing feature.
3. it make it not easy for the smartcoin to revive, and it's easy to make whales in the revive process, as what happened in bitUSD in recent past.

GS is just like suicide.

another mechanism has been discussed for long time at https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27273.0, which can be called "individual settlement", the core idea is that when bad debt appears, instead of triggering GS, only convert the bad debt positions to sell orders at settlement price of that individual debt position.

but this solution also have big issues.

if force settlement is still active after settlement order appears, for example, bad debt positions have been converted to sell orders in 0.04~0.06bitUSD with debts, however, as the market price fall sharply to 0.02bitUSD, bitUSD is off peg, devaluated to about 0.6USD.

which means, feed price is 0.02USD, DEX price is 0.033 bitUSD.

then bitUSD holders begin to exploit debt position owners with force settlement.

even worse, the last bitUSD balance cannot do force settlement, it can only fill the settlement orders with higher price.

this process is unfair to the debt position owners and the last bitUSD holders, and will not help things to recover.

then how about disable force settlement feature while settlement order appear?

then bitUSD holders can only fill the settlement orders from lower price to higher price, in other words, from debt positions from higher CR to lower CR, and filling some settlement orders will devalue bitUSD more, as the left settlement orders has higher price.

after considering this, I think a good mechanism need to follow base principle:

1.do not stop the borrowing feature.
2.ensure smartcoin holders to settle bad debt positions from lower CR to higher CR.
3. accept the possibility that the smartcoin will devalue, just try to minimize the hurting to the ecosystem.

GS protection is perfect to suit the above principle.

GS protection ensure the feed price be above the GS price, this is irrelevant to market manipulation or price faking, it is just to force the smartcoin holders to settle the bad debt position with lowest CR first. and filling margin call orders will reduce GS price and also feed price as well and have chance to end the bad debt, this is a way to let the market do the choice.

in the last several days we have seen that this mechanism protect bitUSD from one more time black swan, it works well, however now it depend on witnesses' work and not 100% reliable, to switch to realize the mechanism via core code will help to make it 100% reliable.

 


499
Stakeholder Proposals / [Poll] BSIP59:Reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.5
« on: July 17, 2019, 05:46:31 am »
Based on BSIP59, https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0059.md, now 2 poll worker proposals have been created:

1.14.210   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.5
1.14.211   Poll - BSIP59 - Keep MCR of bitUSD as 1.6

We have to save bitUSD.

bitUSD is in illiquidity for long time, partly because the black swan hurt its brand seriously, partly because now bitCNY is in good liquidity and pegging so even less traders would like to trade in bitUSD.

However, we need to find ways to change this, to make bitUSD still play an important role in BTS financial ecosystem.

To reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.5 will reduce the cost to mint bitUSD, hopefully this will attract users switch from CNY market to USD market, as MCR of bitCNY will be kept as 1.6 at the same time.

On the other hand, GS protection for bitUSD already worked to avoid the risk of black swan.

Please vote according to your opinion.
----------------------------------------------------------------

智能货币的三个状态:

A:随爆随吃
B:黄单高悬
C:黑天鹅防护

bitCNY现在大部分情况下处于A状态,少量时间处于B状态,基本不进入C状态,比较健康。
bitUSD现在大部分情况下处于B状态,BTS价格较高的少量时间处于A状态,进入C状态的概率比较大,比较不健康。

Alt这类用户属于典型的低风险偏好型,有明显的尽量减少负债囤积智能货币的倾向,bitUSD供应量一直难以增加,加上bitCNY好得多的市场深度和活跃度更能吸引用户,如没有相对有力的措施,bitUSD将难以摆脱困局,这对整个生态是非常不利的。

bitUSD的黑天鹅防护已经生效,当前,通过降低MCR来促进bitUSD供应显得更加可行。

500
As the poll worker proposal 1.14.207 has been voted active and got more support than the "Keep MSSR of bitUSD as 1.02" worker proposal 1.14.208, MSSR of bitUSD will change from 1.02 to 1.01.

The change will happen after  UTC 00:00 22th, July, 2019.

Every witness is requested to update the feeding script to publish 1.01 as MSSR of bitUSD, please do the job after UTC 00:00 22th, July, 2019 and finish before UTC 00:00 24th, July, 2019.

For more information about the poll for this change, please check https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28558.0

501
anyone can help to vote this up? only 3M voting power needed.

we need to make bitUSD peg better, we need to make bitUSD liquidity as good as bitCNY...

502
Given one of the reasons for returning to 1% offset is to return it to same status as the others, presumably there was a reason to deviate in the past.

Bitcrab would you please comment on those conditions generally and if you believe they are unlikely to return please comment on why? Thank you.

why we have set the offset of bitCNY to 2% and even 5% in the past?

because some time in the past the feed price is bad, which make it possible for bitCNY holders to exploited debt position owners by force settlement, under the pressure from China community, we increased the offset to solve the problem.

now I believe the feed price is much better than before, and we see the necessity to limit bitCNY discount.

we still need efforts to improve the exactness of price feed, I believe we can make it better.


503
Proposal 1.10.38714 is created to set force_settlement_offset of bitCNY to 1%. the proposal will expire in UTC 18th, July, 00:00

To do this is based on below considerations:

1.the feed price quality is obviously better than before.
2.bitCNY is in obvious discount, A lower offset can help to limit the discount.
3.other smartcoins, like bitUSD&bitEUR, all have a force settlement offset of 1%, it make sense to set same force settlement offset for them.

Committee members, please check and vote according to your opinion.

Code: [Select]
unlocked >>> get_object 1.10.38714
[{
    "id": "1.10.38714",
    "expiration_time": "2019-07-18T00:00:00",
    "review_period_time": "2019-07-17T23:00:00",
    "proposed_transaction": {
      "ref_block_num": 0,
      "ref_block_prefix": 0,
      "expiration": "2019-07-18T00:00:00",
      "operations": [[
          12,{
            "fee": {
              "amount": 12650000,
              "asset_id": "1.3.0"
            },
            "issuer": "1.2.0",
            "asset_to_update": "1.3.113",
            "new_options": {
              "feed_lifetime_sec": 86400,
              "minimum_feeds": 7,
              "force_settlement_delay_sec": 86400,
              "force_settlement_offset_percent": 100,
              "maximum_force_settlement_volume": 50,
              "short_backing_asset": "1.3.0",
              "extensions": []
            },
            "extensions": []
          }
        ]
      ],
      "extensions": []
    },
    "required_active_approvals": [
      "1.2.0"
    ],
    "available_active_approvals": [],
    "required_owner_approvals": [],
    "available_owner_approvals": [],
    "available_key_approvals": [],
    "proposer": "1.2.121"
  }
]

504
并非有利于系统生态的行为都是有害于个人的。

对了,透漏点消息,顺利的话,bitUSD的MSSR很快会降到1.01.



505
中文 (Chinese) / 市场呼唤有历史使命感的大户和机构
« on: July 09, 2019, 03:23:15 am »
alt的USD大债仓最近引起不少抱怨。

alt的策略大致是,当BTS喂价升高,就从债仓撤出一部分BTS,贴线抵押,这样等喂价降低,就爆仓,当价格高于某一基准线时,不设TCR,否则,设TCR=1.6。

因为USD流动性不好,所以大的USD债仓面临着较大风险,有可能当市场大跌时被摁在地上抹茶,大USD债仓有较大的出货平仓意愿是可以理解的。

从个人角度讲,这种策略也许是最优的,毕竟这样可以直接卖抵押物。

但对整个系统讲,这种策略却影响很坏。因为这种策略客观上造成了一定程度上对价格的压制。

但这也不是alt一个人的问题。

要彻底解决这个问题,就需要培养USD市场的流动性,需要更多的人去抵押借出USD。

如果能把流动性搞成跟bitCNY一样,那也不存在这个问题了。

但几个月来,USD的供应量是在下降的。

值此bitCNY已经折价,USD溢价很高的情况下,大户们能平掉一些CNY债务,多去借借USD吗?

alt能不能换换出货方式,直接拿BTS现货挂USD卖单,尽量别用爆仓方式出货?

506
the correct question is:

so many BTS are being sold with discount, why don't you borrow bitUSD and buy them?

507
this mechanism has a big problem.

say, when one time bad debt appear, bad debt positions have been converted to sell orders in 0.04~0.06bitUSD with debts, however, as the market price fall sharply to 0.02bitUSD, bitUSD is off peg, devaluated to about 0.6USD.

which means, feed price is 0.02USD, DEX price is 0.033 bitUSD.

then bitUSD holders begin to exploit debt position owners with force settlement.

this is unfair to the debt position owners and will not help things to recover.


508
I feel we need to make one essential decision first -  general Lending for Margin Trading or just "leverage trading"?

for example, when you borrow BTS by put GDEX.BTC to collateral, can you buy OPEN.BTC by selling the borrowed BTS?

in other words, are the borrowed BTS totally fungible with GDEX.BTC or OPEN.BTC as collateral.

if yes, then that is general Lending for Margin Trading, if no, that's "leverage trading".

Binance will flag several pairs as margin trading, as I know, that's general Lending for Margin Trading.

I also like general Lending for Margin Trading.

you can use the borrowed bitCNY to buy any assets, not only BTS, that's important.

509
Thanks for the fruitful discussion so far! This is really helpful.

I don't think "price" for calls etc should be determined from feeds and other external markets. "Price" should be determined from the market the loans relate to.
Agree. Because margin calls are executed against internal markets, an external price is of limited usefulness for determining how much collateral would be required to buy back the outstanding debt from the market, which is really what the "reference price" is all about. Also, requiring external price feeds won't scale, so IMO that can't be a solution.

I think it depends on the asset types and also the market depth, take "GDEX.BTC/BTS" pair as an example, do you think it's a good idea to let the latest price be the reference price for margin call calculation? I don't think that, as the depth is not enough and market manipulation is easy.
in this scenario I prefer to use the feed BTC/BTS price as reference.

510
USDE规则怎么比BTS好,说来听听。

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