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Quote from: svk on November 29, 2015, 01:50:25 pmQuote from: jakub on November 29, 2015, 01:37:02 pmQuote from: svk on November 28, 2015, 01:30:36 pmI still think most people don't understand how margin calls work in BTS 2.0, so in a bid to clarify things I've created a Google Doc that explains the mechanics of margin calls as per my current understanding. I'd appreciate some input on the correctness, and if something's wrong I'll update it. You can add comments directly in the doc. @alt @tonyk @Xeldal @bytemasterhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1h9E6N9VECh48NKRQGFoPQsSwfZXT4p_TD3LT3CqeTYk/edit?usp=sharingNice write-up, @svk I've put my comments in the document.I fully agree with your suggestions but they might not be relevant any more. AFAIK bytemaster has already fixed the margin call mechanism, it just awaits tests and a hard-fork to be implemented.Thanks.What have they been "fixed" to though?https://github.com/cryptonomex/graphene/issues/436
Quote from: jakub on November 29, 2015, 01:37:02 pmQuote from: svk on November 28, 2015, 01:30:36 pmI still think most people don't understand how margin calls work in BTS 2.0, so in a bid to clarify things I've created a Google Doc that explains the mechanics of margin calls as per my current understanding. I'd appreciate some input on the correctness, and if something's wrong I'll update it. You can add comments directly in the doc. @alt @tonyk @Xeldal @bytemasterhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1h9E6N9VECh48NKRQGFoPQsSwfZXT4p_TD3LT3CqeTYk/edit?usp=sharingNice write-up, @svk I've put my comments in the document.I fully agree with your suggestions but they might not be relevant any more. AFAIK bytemaster has already fixed the margin call mechanism, it just awaits tests and a hard-fork to be implemented.Thanks.What have they been "fixed" to though?
Quote from: svk on November 28, 2015, 01:30:36 pmI still think most people don't understand how margin calls work in BTS 2.0, so in a bid to clarify things I've created a Google Doc that explains the mechanics of margin calls as per my current understanding. I'd appreciate some input on the correctness, and if something's wrong I'll update it. You can add comments directly in the doc. @alt @tonyk @Xeldal @bytemasterhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1h9E6N9VECh48NKRQGFoPQsSwfZXT4p_TD3LT3CqeTYk/edit?usp=sharingNice write-up, @svk I've put my comments in the document.I fully agree with your suggestions but they might not be relevant any more. AFAIK bytemaster has already fixed the margin call mechanism, it just awaits tests and a hard-fork to be implemented.
I still think most people don't understand how margin calls work in BTS 2.0, so in a bid to clarify things I've created a Google Doc that explains the mechanics of margin calls as per my current understanding. I'd appreciate some input on the correctness, and if something's wrong I'll update it. You can add comments directly in the doc. @alt @tonyk @Xeldal @bytemasterhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1h9E6N9VECh48NKRQGFoPQsSwfZXT4p_TD3LT3CqeTYk/edit?usp=sharing
Quote from: jakub on November 02, 2015, 06:31:55 pmQuote from: Xeldal on November 02, 2015, 05:28:38 pmI believe SQP rule is misguided and adds an unnecessary level of complication with ultimately no benefit. Currently we are lying to shorts about where/when their positions will/can be called.If your goal is to encourage shorts to put up more collateral, simply raise the minimum collateral requirement.If your goal is to reduce dependence on the feed, increase liquidity. Ill-liquid markets *should be heavily feed based. If the information we give to the shorter is " your margin call price is feed price x " then they should never be called if the feed price is above x. Currently they can be called when the price (in all other markets) is upto 10% above x (their prescribed call price). This is a terrible practice IMO. Initially, shorts could be called upto an unbelievable 50% above their margin call price.In effect SQP just raises the price at which shorts can be forced margin called. regardless of whether the fair price/ feed is above their prescribed margin call rate.This really needs to be gotten rid of IMO. Or the ACTUAL margin call rate needs to be communicated (Call rate * (1 + SQP percentage))In nearly every way, I think the rules under bts1 for margin calls are preferable. So the main thing is the discrepancy between your personal margin-call price displayed in the GUI and the actual margin-call execution price you can get on an ill-liquid market (10% or previously 50% above the feed).And the problem is those two prices can be quite far from each other: you expect to be margin-called at price x but the margin call actually executes at price y.Do I understand your point correctly?That is certainly part of it. It is not clear to the user that his margin call will be based on the bid, and not like prior BTS1 rules, based on the feed. I think the conclusion of this debate might be: why do we have a feed at all? If you can't use SQP without liquidity, and if you have liquidity, you don't need a feed; What good is the feed? outside of a settlement rate which we claim should ideally never be necessary to use.I have to admit, that basing the margin call on the bid (at the exchange, not from outside the exchange) makes sense and is how every exchange out there would do it, and rightfully so as they intend to remain solvent. We just saw a margin event on polo as an example. Obviously there are no feeds involved. The problem is, an exchange would not likely open margin accounts to trade an asset that was not liquid, and our MPA SmartCoins can not exist without margin accounts. Its unavoidable. So to protect illiquid markets the margin call should be based on the feed...or the market should not be able to trade without some very large level market depth liquidity. Which currently none of our MPA's qualify for and if they did the feed would never come into play especially at a 50% SQP.In the case of massive liquidity, the feeds are mostly irrelevant and an SQP approach can work, but only because its unnecessary and irrelevant. Given that margin accounts are by default required to have a functioning SmartCoin. I believe more weight, not less, should be put on the feeds, to protect the backbone of the SmartCoin markets, until the market is so large that they are perhaps inconsequential.
Quote from: Xeldal on November 02, 2015, 05:28:38 pmI believe SQP rule is misguided and adds an unnecessary level of complication with ultimately no benefit. Currently we are lying to shorts about where/when their positions will/can be called.If your goal is to encourage shorts to put up more collateral, simply raise the minimum collateral requirement.If your goal is to reduce dependence on the feed, increase liquidity. Ill-liquid markets *should be heavily feed based. If the information we give to the shorter is " your margin call price is feed price x " then they should never be called if the feed price is above x. Currently they can be called when the price (in all other markets) is upto 10% above x (their prescribed call price). This is a terrible practice IMO. Initially, shorts could be called upto an unbelievable 50% above their margin call price.In effect SQP just raises the price at which shorts can be forced margin called. regardless of whether the fair price/ feed is above their prescribed margin call rate.This really needs to be gotten rid of IMO. Or the ACTUAL margin call rate needs to be communicated (Call rate * (1 + SQP percentage))In nearly every way, I think the rules under bts1 for margin calls are preferable. So the main thing is the discrepancy between your personal margin-call price displayed in the GUI and the actual margin-call execution price you can get on an ill-liquid market (10% or previously 50% above the feed).And the problem is those two prices can be quite far from each other: you expect to be margin-called at price x but the margin call actually executes at price y.Do I understand your point correctly?
I believe SQP rule is misguided and adds an unnecessary level of complication with ultimately no benefit. Currently we are lying to shorts about where/when their positions will/can be called.If your goal is to encourage shorts to put up more collateral, simply raise the minimum collateral requirement.If your goal is to reduce dependence on the feed, increase liquidity. Ill-liquid markets *should be heavily feed based. If the information we give to the shorter is " your margin call price is feed price x " then they should never be called if the feed price is above x. Currently they can be called when the price (in all other markets) is upto 10% above x (their prescribed call price). This is a terrible practice IMO. Initially, shorts could be called upto an unbelievable 50% above their margin call price.In effect SQP just raises the price at which shorts can be forced margin called. regardless of whether the fair price/ feed is above their prescribed margin call rate.This really needs to be gotten rid of IMO. Or the ACTUAL margin call rate needs to be communicated (Call rate * (1 + SQP percentage))In nearly every way, I think the rules under bts1 for margin calls are preferable.
The forced margin call does not try to use any balance that you already have in your account, but will instead always buy on the open market.
We currently allow people to open positions that get margin called instantly. Any position at a ratio of less than 1.5 * 1.75 = 2.62 gets margin called right away which doesn't seem to be right.
What is crazy is to base your margin call price on the more thinner and illiquid market [read easier to manipulate by buying/selling]. The current rules chose the Dax prices/market to do that...The dax has long ways to go before being more liquid than all BTS markets combined.I have not understoodnd until now that all this crazy rules were an attempt to achieve exactly this even crazier goal - to use the less liquid market...ohh my god.
Quote from: Xeldal on November 02, 2015, 05:28:38 pmIn effect SQP just raises the price at which shorts can be forced margin called. regardless of whether the fair price/ feed is above their prescribed margin call rate.@Xeldal - I think your statement above is either incorrect, OR you're referring to something different than bytemaster here:Quote from: bytemaster on October 15, 2015, 09:15:42 pmA margin call will occur any time the highest bid is less than the CALL PRICE and greater than SQPThis appears to mean that if the market goes against you and your collateral drops below the threshold (i.e. the highest bid goes below the call price) a margin call is triggered. UNLESS the highest bid is BELOW the SQP. In which case, no margin call is triggered. So it appears this is effectively saying that if the market has gotten too far away from the feed, something is wrong so let's not trigger a margin call. This seems to makes sense as a safety measure for shorts. And although the need for this appears that it would be much less likely in a liquid market, I don't see why you wouldn't still want it there as a safety net since you never know when a market will lose liquidity.The problem I'm having is that people (perhaps including bytemaster) seem to be conflating 2 different concepts: 1) the price at which a margin call is triggered, and 2) the price at which the actual buyback can occur. We just went over #1 i.e. how SQP affects the price at which a margin call gets triggered (or whether it gets triggered at all). What about #2? Below, bytemaster is clearly saying SQP can affect the price a short will actually pay to cover: Quote from: bytemaster on October 16, 2015, 01:58:41 pmThe SQP price is the MOST that a margin call will pay to cover. This seems to be referring to the SQP as a CEILING and that the highest bid can't be HIGHER than the SQP. But we've already established that for a margin call to be triggered to begin with, the highest bid MUST be higher than the SQP. So either something is wrong here, or bytemaster misspoke and there is actually a second value that acts as a ceiling on the cover price (which I think would make sense). Or maybe I'm missing something, @Bytemаsteг - can you please she some light here?
In effect SQP just raises the price at which shorts can be forced margin called. regardless of whether the fair price/ feed is above their prescribed margin call rate.
A margin call will occur any time the highest bid is less than the CALL PRICE and greater than SQP
The SQP price is the MOST that a margin call will pay to cover.
Sqp must've been 291 yea, and it didn't execute because margin calls aren't allowed to buy cheaper than their call price, which would've been shown in the depth chart and in the status at the time of that picture.
Quote from: Xeldal on November 02, 2015, 08:46:00 pmThat is certainly part of it. It is not clear to the user that his margin call will be based on the bid, and not like prior BTS1 rules, based on the feed. I think the conclusion of this debate might be: why do we have a feed at all? If you can't use SQP without liquidity, and if you have liquidity, you don't need a feed; What good is the feed? outside of a settlement rate which we claim should ideally never be necessary to use.I have to admit, that basing the margin call on the bid (at the exchange, not from outside the exchange) makes sense and is how every exchange out there would do it, and rightfully so as they intend to remain solvent. We just saw a margin event on polo as an example. Obviously there are no feeds involved. The problem is, an exchange would not likely open margin accounts to trade an asset that was not liquid, and our MPA SmartCoins can not exist without margin accounts. Its unavoidable. So to protect illiquid markets the margin call should be based on the feed...or the market should not be able to trade without some very large level market depth liquidity. Which currently none of our MPA's qualify for and if they did the feed would never come into play especially at a 50% SQP.In the case of massive liquidity, the feeds are mostly irrelevant and an SQP approach can work, but only because its unnecessary and irrelevant. Given that margin accounts are by default required to have a functioning SmartCoin. I believe more weight, not less, should be put on the feeds, to protect the backbone of the SmartCoin markets, until the market is so large that they are perhaps inconsequential.I think I'm getting the picture:(1) if we have good liquidity the SQP concept is irrelevant as it never has a chance to be applied.(2) If we have poor liquidity the SQP concept (together with basing the margin call on the internal bid) works badly as it disregards the feed whereas the feed is the only thing which we can rely on.So the SQP concept is delusional in this sense: it is meant to protect the shorts from the effects of poor liquidity but it actually does the opposite - it cuts us off from the reliance on the feed when we need it the most.
That is certainly part of it. It is not clear to the user that his margin call will be based on the bid, and not like prior BTS1 rules, based on the feed. I think the conclusion of this debate might be: why do we have a feed at all? If you can't use SQP without liquidity, and if you have liquidity, you don't need a feed; What good is the feed? outside of a settlement rate which we claim should ideally never be necessary to use.I have to admit, that basing the margin call on the bid (at the exchange, not from outside the exchange) makes sense and is how every exchange out there would do it, and rightfully so as they intend to remain solvent. We just saw a margin event on polo as an example. Obviously there are no feeds involved. The problem is, an exchange would not likely open margin accounts to trade an asset that was not liquid, and our MPA SmartCoins can not exist without margin accounts. Its unavoidable. So to protect illiquid markets the margin call should be based on the feed...or the market should not be able to trade without some very large level market depth liquidity. Which currently none of our MPA's qualify for and if they did the feed would never come into play especially at a 50% SQP.In the case of massive liquidity, the feeds are mostly irrelevant and an SQP approach can work, but only because its unnecessary and irrelevant. Given that margin accounts are by default required to have a functioning SmartCoin. I believe more weight, not less, should be put on the feeds, to protect the backbone of the SmartCoin markets, until the market is so large that they are perhaps inconsequential.
Quote from: tonyk on October 25, 2015, 05:17:42 amIn the above example order book, you believe the sell orders below 291 make sense...more dangerously you have based you system on the assumption that people will just act like that... irrationally.I guess the yellow buy order at 291.24615 is a margin call order attempting to buy USD to close the collateral position.Does anyone know why it could not execute while there were matching sell orders?What was the SQP in this case? 291.24615?
In the above example order book, you believe the sell orders below 291 make sense...more dangerously you have based you system on the assumption that people will just act like that... irrationally.
Quote from: jakub on October 29, 2015, 06:44:06 pmQuote from: xeroc on October 29, 2015, 06:24:04 pmI think I got it now .. gonna try to put this on paper with some figures to make it more clear to others .. let's see if tony agrees with what I am writing down Looking forward to it Tony might be on to something but his inability to let go of the sarcastic & succinct style even for a moment is a big obstacle to understanding.I can talk long and longer... but when the creator of this nonsense is silent... after causing real true supporters of his project to loose thousands upon thousands of dollars, for no reason at all but just for him to be amused...it is not my place to talk or explain.https://bitshares.openledger.info/#/account/tester12Is this enough for you? The guy above lost about 1.2 mil of his 2.9 mil bts... in a single instance with no warning..And this is a straight loss of the tokens ...not just some run of the mill position depreciation due to price drop.and yes, this was expected [predicted is a strong word for something about to happen with 100% certainty] :Quote from: tonyk on October 16, 2015, 07:07:02 am ha-ha-ha
Quote from: xeroc on October 29, 2015, 06:24:04 pmI think I got it now .. gonna try to put this on paper with some figures to make it more clear to others .. let's see if tony agrees with what I am writing down Looking forward to it Tony might be on to something but his inability to let go of the sarcastic & succinct style even for a moment is a big obstacle to understanding.
I think I got it now .. gonna try to put this on paper with some figures to make it more clear to others .. let's see if tony agrees with what I am writing down
ha-ha-ha
Is this right?Dot file decision treeCode: [Select]digraph decision{A [label="New Block"]B [label="Is the highest bid (in USD/BTS) < SPP?", shape=box]C [label="MARGIN CALLS NOT EXECUTED", shape=box]D [label="Is the highest bid < margin call price?", shape=box]E [label="MARGIN CALL EXECUTED AT HIGHEST BID", shape=box]A -> BB -> C [label="True"]B -> D [label="False"]D -> E [label="True"]D -> C [label="False"]}
digraph decision{A [label="New Block"]B [label="Is the highest bid (in USD/BTS) < SPP?", shape=box]C [label="MARGIN CALLS NOT EXECUTED", shape=box]D [label="Is the highest bid < margin call price?", shape=box]E [label="MARGIN CALL EXECUTED AT HIGHEST BID", shape=box]A -> BB -> C [label="True"]B -> D [label="False"]D -> E [label="True"]D -> C [label="False"]}
What are you suggesting should be changed, to make this wheel round?
Nothing is confusing, once you get the basic idea.The "S Protection price" is protecting the shorts from buying cheap! So if they are called they cannot buy cheap, they can only buy expensive. That's the general idea behind it!PSYou are so behind in the theory of the square wheels Xeroc.
Quote from: bytemaster on October 22, 2015, 10:52:22 pmQuote from: tonyk on October 22, 2015, 04:26:14 pmQuote from: bytemaster on October 22, 2015, 02:41:08 pmThe SQP defines the most that a margin position will ever be forced to pay to cover (that is it). It is there only to protect against thin markets.A margin position will be forced to sell its collateral anytime the highest offer to buy the collateral is less than the call price (USD/BTS). The market defines everything (as it should).The market sets the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD based on the highest offer to buy BTS with BitUSD.Once we know the market value, we can trigger margin calls.There is ONE edge case and that is for thin markets. In this edge case the market cannot define the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD. This is where we use the SQP as the lower bound on the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD.You still do not see how this whole theory of yours hangs on the market participants exhibiting illogical behaviour, do you?I don't see the illogical behavior. Please explain.Do margin calls buy bitUSD left or right of the SQP in your figure abote (0.005 bitUSD/BTS)if they only buy on the right hand side of the SQP than I do understand tony, because they only execute if there are no orders there ..so I assume they buy on the left hand side of the SQP .. which would make them pay "more" than the SQP in BTS-terms to aquire bitUSD .. but you said is the "MOST they have to pay to cover" would be misleading since the best they can do (cheapest) is AT the SQP and it only gets more expensive the less orders/volume there are ..Maybe that is what confuses tony (and me)!?So, margin calls occure when the highest bid is less than the margin call price (which is a function of the SWAN price and the maintenance collateral ratio) AND the SQP crossed the margin called price and is thus left (read: smaller) of it ..but WHERE do margin calls execute? which orders are bought at which prices and what are the limits for the margin call?
Quote from: tonyk on October 22, 2015, 04:26:14 pmQuote from: bytemaster on October 22, 2015, 02:41:08 pmThe SQP defines the most that a margin position will ever be forced to pay to cover (that is it). It is there only to protect against thin markets.A margin position will be forced to sell its collateral anytime the highest offer to buy the collateral is less than the call price (USD/BTS). The market defines everything (as it should).The market sets the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD based on the highest offer to buy BTS with BitUSD.Once we know the market value, we can trigger margin calls.There is ONE edge case and that is for thin markets. In this edge case the market cannot define the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD. This is where we use the SQP as the lower bound on the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD.You still do not see how this whole theory of yours hangs on the market participants exhibiting illogical behaviour, do you?I don't see the illogical behavior. Please explain.
Quote from: bytemaster on October 22, 2015, 02:41:08 pmThe SQP defines the most that a margin position will ever be forced to pay to cover (that is it). It is there only to protect against thin markets.A margin position will be forced to sell its collateral anytime the highest offer to buy the collateral is less than the call price (USD/BTS). The market defines everything (as it should).The market sets the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD based on the highest offer to buy BTS with BitUSD.Once we know the market value, we can trigger margin calls.There is ONE edge case and that is for thin markets. In this edge case the market cannot define the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD. This is where we use the SQP as the lower bound on the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD.You still do not see how this whole theory of yours hangs on the market participants exhibiting illogical behaviour, do you?
The SQP defines the most that a margin position will ever be forced to pay to cover (that is it). It is there only to protect against thin markets.A margin position will be forced to sell its collateral anytime the highest offer to buy the collateral is less than the call price (USD/BTS). The market defines everything (as it should).The market sets the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD based on the highest offer to buy BTS with BitUSD.Once we know the market value, we can trigger margin calls.There is ONE edge case and that is for thin markets. In this edge case the market cannot define the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD. This is where we use the SQP as the lower bound on the value of BTS in terms of BitUSD.
Quote from: tonyk on October 22, 2015, 04:26:14 pmYou still do not see how this whole theory of yours hangs on the market participants exhibiting illogical behaviour, do you?I don't see the illogical behavior. Please explain.
You still do not see how this whole theory of yours hangs on the market participants exhibiting illogical behaviour, do you?
please use simple words to explain this ,I think original intention is to make many people use this ,because there need market deep .but I think less people can make it clear and now in message board of btc38.com ,there are a little rumour that committee change parameter cause many people been margin .BM can you explain the details ?
Margin is called any time the HIGH BID is less than the CALL PRICE. In other words anytime the highest offer to buy the collateral and pay off the debt is below the call price.
If you make it closer to the SWAN than the FEED then you lose the benefit of outside information provided by the price feed. Namely, someone with high collateral already has a very low CALL price (derived from SWAN) . It would also have the effect of disabling any possibility of doing a margin call between SWAN and SQP.
Cool, so now how do we vote on these parameters?
Market competition will cause sellers of usd to move closer to feed. Why let someone else pocket 1.5 when you are still happy with 1.4. If you want to go short now you must sell at a price people will but
Market competition will cause sellers of usd to move closer to feed. Why let someone else pocket 1.5 when you are still happy with 1.4.
Quote from: alt on October 17, 2015, 01:23:53 amQuote from: puppies on October 17, 2015, 01:19:32 amWhat is the solution? If we had more buy side pressure would that help?no one will buy BTS with bitUSD at feed price when you know the reserve BTS is sell at price /1.5the solution is to adjust the sell price for reserve to a reasonable premium, I think it should more than 1/1.1I get that no one is going to buy it. I guess I am still just unsure about what is going wrong. I have a hard time believing that the system was designed to make bitusd $1.5
Quote from: puppies on October 17, 2015, 01:19:32 amWhat is the solution? If we had more buy side pressure would that help?no one will buy BTS with bitUSD at feed price when you know the reserve BTS is sell at price /1.5the solution is to adjust the sell price for reserve to a reasonable premium, I think it should more than 1/1.1
What is the solution? If we had more buy side pressure would that help?
This addresses one of my previous rants about the supply-side of bitassets. From the supply-side approach, I think it illustrates that SQP should be a percentage of SWAN not FEED.1) When BID < (CALL=debt/collatoral*.175), then a forced margin call is made which destroys a bitasset.2) During a short squeeze, 1 bitA is worth more than 1 corresponding asset (e.g., 1 bitUSD > 1 USD). That means there is an under-supply of bitA. When in under-supply, avoid destroying bitassets. In fact, people should have an incentive to short above the highest bid since they are being paid a premium [footnote].3) Since bitA should not be destroyed, margin calls should be avoided until DEBT/COLLATERAL=1, that is, the SWAN value. SQP should enforce this.Therefore, SQP should be a function of SWAN. You want it as close to SWAN as possible while still giving a cushion to force collatoralization and avoid the swan. Since FEED and SWAN are not functions of each other, setting SQP to a fraction of FEED doesn't necessarily perform proper squeeze protection, and in fact could potentially push the short squeeze in the wrong direction by destroying bitA that are already overvalued.[footnote] Pricing bit assets is becoming a little clearer. The system enforces:SWAN < bitUSD/BTS < USD_FEEDA/USD_FEED < bitUSD/BTS < USD_FEEDwhere A is the least collateralize debt/collateral ratio (in units of bitA/BTS)So there are two arbitrage opportunities:If I think USD_FEED should go down (that is BTS value increasing), I want to short at USD_FEED so I make a profit no matter what (or at worst, break even).If I think USD_FEED will increase (BTS value decrease), I want to buy bitA at close to SWAN as I can, as I will make a profit no matter what (or at worst, break even).Therefore, as long as BTS is increasing in value (i.e., making a profit), I will want to short as close to USD_FEED as I can get.
The CALL PRICE is unique to every user and depends upon their debt / collateral ratio. It has nothing to do with the feed.The user is in direct control of their CALL PRICE and it will never change on them unless they update their position.The SQP price is the MOST that a margin call will pay to cover. Margin is called any time the HIGH BID is less than the CALL PRICE. In other words anytime the highest offer to buy the collateral and pay off the debt is below the call price.
Yes, intitial = SQP, and no the engine won't allow you to open margin positions with collateral below the maintenance ratio which would get you margin called. You can however very easily get margin called if you have low collateral ratio, and when you do an automatic buy order will be placed that will execute up to feed price * 1.5!! This already happened to someone yesterday, and to make things worse the forced margin call does not try to use any balance that you already have in your account, but will instead always buy on the open market. What complicates the matter (and that I didn't know until yesterday) is that the call price for any given asset is independent of the feed price, it only depends on the total debt and collateral of that asset, and the maintenance ratio. For example, the call price of the CNY:BTS market is currently 47.45 BTS/CNY, while the settlement price (feed * SQP) is at 49.47 BTS/CNY. For USD:BTS the call price is 365.42560 BTS/BTS and settlement price (feed + SQP) is 314.35000 BTS/USD, which is the similar to BM's graph.I have an update of the GUI partially done that will address this and always show the current call price of that market, in the Exchange as well as the modal used to adjust margin positions. Until that's out I'd advise caution in opening margin positions.
Why I was called even if my call price is 600K? Could be a problem in feeds (4 hour ago)?
It looks like you were margin called at 1.50 SQP. I do not understand it though why this is happening.
Publish feed Publisher in.abitAsset USDInitial collateral ratio 1.50Collateral maintenance ratio 1.75Core rate 208.299050781 BTS/USDSettlement price 208.299050781 BTS/USDFee 1 BTS