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Many have expressed the opinion that dilution should be avoided and that is the preferred solution. It is always better to fund growth from profits rather than via dilution if you have enough profits to grow fast enough.I am going to contend that dilution and spending from profits are the same thing.1) Lets suppose that BTSX takes off and delegates are earning $10,000 per day2) Lets suppose that the cost for running a node is $100 per day.Under the no dilution argument $9900 per day should be paid to the shareholders rather than left to the discretion of the delegates because this will maximize shareholder value "today". Spending this $9900 is diluting the shareholders by denying them a potential buyback. It all comes down to something fundamental that this analogy will explain:If you are starting a road construction company and on day one you have enough money to hire a bunch of people with shovels then you can build 1 mile per day and earn $100. It will require 4 years of operation to save enough to backhoes and bulldozers and once you have the backhoes and bulldozers you can build 100 miles per day and earn $20,000 per day. If the company had issued shares earlier to buy the bulldozers and backhoes in year 1 then the profits of the company would be significantly higher for the next 3 years. Companies that have a "no dilution clause" in the shareholders agreement cannot attract new capital to grow and thus the new capital flows to competitors which see the successful business model of the road building company with shovels and puts their money into a competitor.So you can never stop dilution because if you don't dilute your own shares to raise capital the market will dilute your market share with competitors who issued shares in their own companies that are now competing with your company. Take Bitcoin for example: it is unable to fund more than a small team of developers paid for by DONATIONS which in turn centralize development decisions in the hands of those paying the bills. In order to grow people have to build companies AROUND bitcoin but gain nothing from the value this adds to Bitcoin. Thus as fast as the Bitcoin ecosystem appears to be growing it is very slow compared to what could be done if the money spent on mining were spent on providing payment infrastructure and adoption incentives.Do you really think that BTSX can fund 10 years of development on a couple million dollars? Here is what BTSX needs to grow to the Multi-Billion dollar network we all want to see:1) A web development team of 10 people producing and maintain a web wallet.2) A backend development team of 10 c++ developers producing countless tests, enhancing performance, and improving security. 3) A mobile app development team of 10 people focusing only on maximizing ease of use on mobile apps.4) A legal team working around the clock to lay the ground work for companies like Overstock and help guide the development team5) A massive referral network / marketing campaign similar to how PayPal got bootstrapped. 6) A dozen exchanges / gateways facilitating bringing money into/out of BTSX while following all regulatory issues. - each of these exchanges/gateways needs a team of people to integrate their systems with BTSXTotal cost of maintaining that kind of infrastructure? At least $10 million per year for 10 years or $100 million dollars. Do you really think a project can raise enough funding prior to having a proven / working base system and expect that funding to last for 10 years?Do you really want a foundation to be sitting on 10 years worth of funding in advance?Do you really want it to be forever centralized in the original developers / foundation with the initial funding?Do you really want developers to be developing at a slower pace despite having funds today so they don't run out of funds in the future?These are all the issues people must grapple with. I am working on a plan to keep BTSX up to date with the best possible software for 10+ years without adding dilution to BTSX. But for new systems AGS/PTS holders benefit greatly from a larger initial allocation + dilution under their control rather than a smaller initial allocation with no control over how the 80% dilution they could face would be allocated.
I just want to add, as BM himself said, if we do not include it in the toolkit the competitors will. So, what is the reason to not include 2 kind of delegates (i.e. delegates and workers) in the toolkit, again?
I promised myself not to post in this thread!
You cannot know what percent of shares are "apathetic" or "available for voting" because shares held as bids/asks/collateral/cold storage may not be voting.
You will never see 51% approval due to apathy, lost stake, etc.Motivation to avoid downtime helps the entire network... delegates should be doing that anyway.
Why are we trying combine a Board of Directors with normal employees?
Quote from: Empirical1.1 on September 29, 2014, 07:50:32 pmI even like having as little as 5 positions to focus on that can get access to a budget flow and be the accountable face of the DAC.The 101 Delegates are like an IT role to me, while incredibly important it is separate and can't be followed all the time especially in multiple DAC's whereas the top 5 key people can.I also still don't like inflation/dilution. I prefer setting aside 10% of the shares initially with a social consensus on how many will be released a year. (Like 25% of the remaining total a year). So unless the business plan is flawed/there's a great opportunity/there's a great emergency, then there will be no need for inflation, only the distribution of shares that have been set aside in the business plan.So you would say that only the top 5 delegates can receive more income than transaction fees.
I even like having as little as 5 positions to focus on that can get access to a budget flow and be the accountable face of the DAC.The 101 Delegates are like an IT role to me, while incredibly important it is separate and can't be followed all the time especially in multiple DAC's whereas the top 5 key people can.I also still don't like inflation/dilution. I prefer setting aside 10% of the shares initially with a social consensus on how many will be released a year. (Like 25% of the remaining total a year). So unless the business plan is flawed/there's a great opportunity/there's a great emergency, then there will be no need for inflation, only the distribution of shares that have been set aside in the business plan.
I propose 101 "technical delegates" as currently, plus up to 101 "business delegates"
Quote from: drltc on September 29, 2014, 06:38:49 pm for separate business (sub)accounts. I propose 101 "technical delegates" as currently, plus up to 101 "business delegates", each requires 51% approval. Keep the design simple and conservative.Having non-separate accounts as in the original proposal would mean the business delegates' funding is contingent on their ability to produce blocks, which means they should invest a substantial portion of that funding into making their block production infrastructure ironclad against failures ($10 million / year ~ $1000 per hour of downtime). You'd basically force delegates to use a portion of the created inflation to pay IT costs that are not required for the network to function.do we really need 101 delegate to take the inflation road? what about to split them 81 block producer 20 inflators? so we could increase pressure to the inflators. I don't see 101 delegates who will spend the shares for the future of the blockchain. Only some people will want to do it.
for separate business (sub)accounts. I propose 101 "technical delegates" as currently, plus up to 101 "business delegates", each requires 51% approval. Keep the design simple and conservative.Having non-separate accounts as in the original proposal would mean the business delegates' funding is contingent on their ability to produce blocks, which means they should invest a substantial portion of that funding into making their block production infrastructure ironclad against failures ($10 million / year ~ $1000 per hour of downtime). You'd basically force delegates to use a portion of the created inflation to pay IT costs that are not required for the network to function.
Quote from: Agent86 on September 29, 2014, 06:28:54 pmQuote from: emski on September 29, 2014, 05:53:05 pmNetwork Maintainers' (aka Delegate's) job is measurable, strictly defined, and can be audited. It can even be decentralised (Imagine each delegate split into X different subdelegates that need all approve the same block). Their job is network support and security.You propose to merge these accountable/auditable strictly defined jobs with investment politics, dilution and subjective "increase the value of DAC".Here I disagree with you.I am also of the opinion that delegates should be separate from workers. I also feel strongly that dilution should require majority (50%+) approval of "active" shares. Gamey, I think your idea that merging this function into the role of delegate simplifies things is wrong and it will have the opposite effect. It creates more complication and need for "brainpower" than keeping the roles separate.discussion from a while back:https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5467.msg73251#msg73251You operate under the assumption that people have spare time to learn the 101 delegates to begin with. This has shown to be wrong.We haven't really cracked keeping track of 101 delegates. A person spending their inflation in a wasted manner will be likely brought to light quite quickly. Having 2 lists of people keep track of etc just adds obvious complexity, but it might happen not be as novel and so it makes more sense to people. So I agree if the board of directors is sufficiently small it could make it simpler for a user to keep track of, yet it is still another page on the GUI, another separate race, etc etc. I understand it fits into pre-existing defined roles, but that doesn't mean it actually makes it all simpler. Perhaps it does, but it definitely does not from the coding end and makes the codebase even more complex.Also by making a smaller board of directors, you give any 1 person more power than spreading the power around 101 delegates. I'm not sure thats actually a good thing.
Quote from: emski on September 29, 2014, 05:53:05 pmNetwork Maintainers' (aka Delegate's) job is measurable, strictly defined, and can be audited. It can even be decentralised (Imagine each delegate split into X different subdelegates that need all approve the same block). Their job is network support and security.You propose to merge these accountable/auditable strictly defined jobs with investment politics, dilution and subjective "increase the value of DAC".Here I disagree with you.I am also of the opinion that delegates should be separate from workers. I also feel strongly that dilution should require majority (50%+) approval of "active" shares. Gamey, I think your idea that merging this function into the role of delegate simplifies things is wrong and it will have the opposite effect. It creates more complication and need for "brainpower" than keeping the roles separate.discussion from a while back:https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5467.msg73251#msg73251
Network Maintainers' (aka Delegate's) job is measurable, strictly defined, and can be audited. It can even be decentralised (Imagine each delegate split into X different subdelegates that need all approve the same block). Their job is network support and security.You propose to merge these accountable/auditable strictly defined jobs with investment politics, dilution and subjective "increase the value of DAC".Here I disagree with you.
You operate under the assumption that people have spare time to learn the 101 delegates to begin with. This has shown to be wrong.We haven't really cracked keeping track of 101 delegates.
You will never see 51% approval due to apathy, lost stake, etc.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2014, 06:11:00 pmQuote from: emski on September 29, 2014, 06:08:55 pmQuote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2014, 06:05:52 pmI propose that the ratio be decided by the voters....Looks good to me! Ability to "hire" entities is always good for a DAC. Imagine a future where a DAC hires another DAC ... So that leaves us with just deciding on the required approval percentage.51% ?75% ?Dilution based on approval ?
Quote from: emski on September 29, 2014, 06:08:55 pmQuote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2014, 06:05:52 pmI propose that the ratio be decided by the voters....Looks good to me! Ability to "hire" entities is always good for a DAC. Imagine a future where a DAC hires another DAC ... So that leaves us with just deciding on the required approval percentage.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2014, 06:05:52 pmI propose that the ratio be decided by the voters....Looks good to me! Ability to "hire" entities is always good for a DAC. Imagine a future where a DAC hires another DAC ...
I propose that the ratio be decided by the voters....
Quote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2014, 05:59:49 pmQuote from: emski on September 29, 2014, 05:53:05 pmNetwork Maintainers' (aka Delegate's) job is measurable, strictly defined, and can be audited. It can even be decentralised (Imagine each delegate split into X different subdelegates that need all approve the same block). Their job is network support and security.You propose to merge these accountable/auditable strictly defined jobs with investment politics, dilution and subjective "increase the value of DAC".Here I disagree with you.I don't do anything of the sort but for the sake of discussion lets simply make ONE change:90 block signing positions (audit-able, etc, paid as percent of trx fees)10 business policy positions (paid as proposed in their bid for the position) Each of which requires approval of the shareholders.... Do you really think that the people in the business policy positions position couldn't also sign blocks or hire someone who could for them?Now all you are debating is the voting threshold for the 2 different positions...Now all we are debating is what the proper ratio is between the two types of users...Logic prevails. I'm onboard with that provided the numbers above are further discussed.
Quote from: emski on September 29, 2014, 05:53:05 pmNetwork Maintainers' (aka Delegate's) job is measurable, strictly defined, and can be audited. It can even be decentralised (Imagine each delegate split into X different subdelegates that need all approve the same block). Their job is network support and security.You propose to merge these accountable/auditable strictly defined jobs with investment politics, dilution and subjective "increase the value of DAC".Here I disagree with you.I don't do anything of the sort but for the sake of discussion lets simply make ONE change:90 block signing positions (audit-able, etc, paid as percent of trx fees)10 business policy positions (paid as proposed in their bid for the position) Each of which requires approval of the shareholders.... Do you really think that the people in the business policy positions position couldn't also sign blocks or hire someone who could for them?Now all you are debating is the voting threshold for the 2 different positions...Now all we are debating is what the proper ratio is between the two types of users...
Keep it simple. You guys don't have a huge budget. We are already victims of complexity. Guy who like designing things come through and don't see the sky for the grass... or whatever that metaphor is.. (oh yea see forest for the trees!) We really don't need to make things more complicated. The separation can always be applied in the future. Keep it simple ! Keep the costs down required to implement ! Keep the complexity involved minimal to invite participation and adoption ! People are stupid. That isn't an insult, thats just how it is. Everyone has a limited amount of brain power and attention they are willing to give things. Never overestimate that brain power.We obviously need the DAC model with inflation. We don't need another model where there are 2 elections to keep track of. This will *not* help adoption.
The network administrator for the national ballerina society archive is also not likely voted into their position by approval voting of the society. If they were however, it would seem reasonable to expect that they could make a competent decision on who should give the year's presentation.
I'm referring to how I think things are running now of course. I don't know how many delegates are currently competent directors employing others managing the IT side of the operation.
You don't seem to be getting the reason why I want a separation of roles between delegates and other workers of the DAC. If some magic consensus technology meant delegates weren't necessary, that would be ideal. I would still want to have workers that are paid by the DAC to improve it. Delegates to me are only necessary to make the consensus technology work. In my opinion that should be their only role. Let me put it another way. To me delegates are not the board of directors of the company. They are the machinery of the company that unfortunately needs a human element to it. In my proposed system, either there is no board of directors at all and the company is run by code that is modified in limited ways by shareholders directly with their votes, or alternatively shareholders could even appoint specific workers through the proposal system to act as a limited board of directors that get to direct some of the decisions of the DAC. Either way, the delegates should have a very limited role in my view. I don't want shareholders choosing delegates because of the promises they provide on how they will improve the DAC. The only promise I want the delegates to fulfill is to keep the DAC running and not collude to filter transactions or double spend. In my view, complicating their role adds new attack vectors for malicious actors to trick shareholders into voting for their delegates.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2014, 04:23:24 pmI really, really, really dislike politics of delegates and inflation.You have already established that centralization with scale is inevitable, so that's useless to dislike. Voting could perhaps be replaced by prediction markets. Inflation seems required to solve tragedy of the commons, but perhaps some alternative is possible.
I really, really, really dislike politics of delegates and inflation.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2014, 04:27:15 pmQuoteDilution is a serious matter that should be voted on separately of delegate approval process.Delegate selection is equally serious.Here we agree!What about the separation?
QuoteDilution is a serious matter that should be voted on separately of delegate approval process.Delegate selection is equally serious.
Dilution is a serious matter that should be voted on separately of delegate approval process.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2014, 03:40:14 pmYou gain nothing by separating the roles out other than increasing the number of people, costs, and complexity. I strongly disagree. I want to vote for delegates who I think are capable of keeping the network running, upgrade promptly as necessary, are spread throughout the globe to reduce risk, and who can be trusted to not collude to damage the network. And that is it! I don't want to now start considering other frivolous stuff like are they donating their money to a charity I like, or are they the best people to manage the funds for development, or any number of other things. Once we have delegates we can trust enough to keep the network running and the consensus of the blockchain working, we can then utilize the blockchain to vote for the BEST people to handle all the other important tasks that grow the value of the DAC.
You gain nothing by separating the roles out other than increasing the number of people, costs, and complexity.
Quote I don't want to now start considering other frivolous stuff like are they donating their money to a charity I like, or are they the best people to manage the funds for development, or any number of other things. Once we have delegates we can trust enough to keep the network running and the consensus of the blockchain working, we can then utilize the blockchain to vote for the BEST people to handle all the other important tasks that grow the value of the DAC.So only vote for delegates that have no inflation to speak of? Nothing prevents you and the entire network from doing this. This leaves only a small handful of delegates that you must think harder about (or not even consider).
I don't want to now start considering other frivolous stuff like are they donating their money to a charity I like, or are they the best people to manage the funds for development, or any number of other things. Once we have delegates we can trust enough to keep the network running and the consensus of the blockchain working, we can then utilize the blockchain to vote for the BEST people to handle all the other important tasks that grow the value of the DAC.
Yes you could have a table... but how do shares vote on that table... how many line items go in that table.
Quote from: emski on September 29, 2014, 03:45:43 pmWhy do you want to burden the delegates with anything except block signing?What you propose can be described to the blockchain the same way:Send X of the fees to address Y until the total accumulated funds becomes greater than Z if this is approved by shareholders.It is essentially the same as your proposal with the exception that the recipient is not a delegate.95% of delegates would take no pay have have no burden beyond what they have today.Anyone who wants some large amount of money to fund development, marketing, legal, etc should find that producing a block nothing to be concerned about and can easily hire someone to help them maintain their delegate node.
Why do you want to burden the delegates with anything except block signing?What you propose can be described to the blockchain the same way:Send X of the fees to address Y until the total accumulated funds becomes greater than Z if this is approved by shareholders.It is essentially the same as your proposal with the exception that the recipient is not a delegate.
There are many proposals floating around about how things could be done... such as share holders voting on a limited set of proposals that are filtered by delegates. But these proposals all have the issue of 'how do you describe them to the DAC'? Ethereum like scripting? A set of addresses to be paid upon approval?
Making it difficult to "increase your pay" by forcing election of a new delegate is the entire POINT and is no different than requiring a new proposal to be accepted by the shareholders in terms of complexity.
Shareholders (or delegates) vote on dilution "offers" by 3rd parties.
Do you really think that BTSX can fund 10 years of development on a couple million dollars? Here is what BTSX needs to grow to the Multi-Billion dollar network we all want to see:1) A web development team of 10 people producing and maintain a web wallet.2) A backend development team of 10 c++ developers producing countless tests, enhancing performance, and improving security. 3) A mobile app development team of 10 people focusing only on maximizing ease of use on mobile apps.4) A legal team working around the clock to lay the ground work for companies like Overstock and help guide the development team5) A massive referral network / marketing campaign similar to how PayPal got bootstrapped. 6) A dozen exchanges / gateways facilitating bringing money into/out of BTSX while following all regulatory issues. - each of these exchanges/gateways needs a team of people to integrate their systems with BTSXTotal cost of maintaining that kind of infrastructure? At least $10 million per year for 10 years or $100 million dollars. Do you really think a project can raise enough funding prior to having a proven / working base system and expect that funding to last for 10 years?Do you really want a foundation to be sitting on 10 years worth of funding in advance?Do you really want it to be forever centralized in the original developers / foundation with the initial funding?Do you really want developers to be developing at a slower pace despite having funds today so they don't run out of funds in the future?These are all the issues people must grapple with. I am working on a plan to keep BTSX up to date with the best possible software for 10+ years without adding dilution to BTSX. But for new systems AGS/PTS holders benefit greatly from a larger initial allocation + dilution under their control rather than a smaller initial allocation with no control over how the 80% dilution they could face would be allocated.
What I meant was that delegate's pay shouldn't dilute the DAC. Delegates should get percentage of fees. (An option is instead of burning the remainder of the fees to go to a fund controlled by shareholders).
QuoteWhat I meant was that delegate's pay shouldn't dilute the DACA delegate with HIGH PAY doesn't just get to "keep it"... they are spending it on the DAC and only keeping a small part necessary to compensate them for their time.
What I meant was that delegate's pay shouldn't dilute the DAC
1) Delegates are already a trusted source and continually competing for the approval of "shareholders".
2) Asking shareholders to consider 1001 individual proposals AND vote for 101 delegates would increase transaction sizes 10x because at a technical level, voting for a proposal and voting for a delegate are tied to shares not people and thus every transaction affects the votes / accounting.
3) If proposals should require X% of voter turn out and X% is higher than the minimum delegate can achieve then that is a problem. Delegates should be campaigning for high approval and increasing their pay when they are elected is a major way to do this.4) It has already been pointed out that apathy is the default mode when "everything is ok".... but as soon as there is a threat suddenly everyone cares. This will drive voter turnout for delegates and improve security.
5) Allowing the delegates to approve spending bills like a congress is the "delegated approach", but this approach doesn't give shareholders a chance to review and grants many low-trust delegates (those only trusted to sign blocks) a blank check.
Quote from: blahblah7up on September 29, 2014, 02:20:39 pmIt certainly isn't merely about Delegate Pay Models but a rather sweeping proposal effecting the entire ecosystem structure.*agreed* .. it's currently a little difficult for me to grasp all consequences of the proposal .. need to re-read that thread more some times
It certainly isn't merely about Delegate Pay Models but a rather sweeping proposal effecting the entire ecosystem structure.
Think of it this way: One year after this DAC gets launched, it's growth and performance comes to the attention of a major music industry player who represents, say, 200 of the biggest names. She agrees to bring her clients to the table in exchange for, say, 2% (or 20%) of the business. In doing so, she doubles the value of the business overnight and sets it on a new accelerated growth path because all of their fans are now going to learn about BitShares Music in a real and viral way.
The more I think about this proposal the more backwards it seems. Please convince me otherwise, though.It actually removes incentive to participate in the initial stages of a project when the most work needs to be done. To quote from cob's cross post announcing the same novelty for his new Music DAC:"As the DAC matures, dilution will be less and less necessary, until it becomes a thing of the past."Imagine I am a web designer and will be payed in the Music DAC's "Notes" (the currency) to make the DAC's first website. 500 Notes is the price. Why would I accept this job offer if I know that in a years time dilution will rapidly negatively affect the value of labor I invested? Wouldn't I much rather avoid new projects and only participate in those which have established themselves where the currency is less inflationary?
I have to admit that I somewhat dislike the proposed system.Are there any advantages, that being a delegate and getting funding is so closely entangled? I think it would be better to leave the delegate pay system as it is in BitsharesX right now and implement a more or less independent funding feature. Your proposed system has multiple disadvantages:1. You need to be a delegate to potentially get funding. Especially in the beginning it is a big hurdle to set up and maintain a delegate node.2. There is a limited number of delegates. If there are many smaller projects this will probably be a bottleneck. Moreover this might have the effect that projects that aren't finished get voted out just because of the shortage of active delegate positions.3. There are competing criteria when selecting delegates. It is not only about the trusworthyness and ability of an individual to maintain a delegat node but also independently the plans for projects that need funding. That might lead to an overall decreased blockchain security and stability.4. Once high payed delegates get voted in they are not incentivised to finish on minimal budget and time. Getting voted out again is the only threat and in my opinion not sufficient to motivate the delegate. This is a general problem of every solution that isn't timely restricted.
I have been working through the delegate pay model that I recomend for future DACs including VOTE, MUSIC, DNS, etc.It works off of the principle that shareholders have a right to dilute to raise capital and that the ability to dilute to raise capital ultimately maximizes shareholder value by allowing rapid growth through many rounds of funding.1) 100% of all fees are burned. 2) Delegates can set any fee per block they like measured in XTS (BTSX, VOTES, etc) 3) The cost to register a delegate with a "high fee" is equal to 100x the fee-per-block they want to get paid. With this system a delegate must produce at least 100 blocks to break even. It also naturally limit potential abuses because the cost of registering a HIGH PAY delegate will be VERY HIGH while the probability of getting elected will be very low. The person registering the HIGH PAY delegate will also lose out on the ability of using their own shares to vote for themselves. For starters no one would be able to register a delegate that would pay 2 billion BTSX per block because the cost would be 200 billion BTSX (which don't exist). This puts a limit to what one could attempt to register to be 20 million BTSX per block... assuming they owned all 2billion BTSX... if we assume the largest stakeholder owns 10% of BTSX and the use 100% of their stake to register a high paying delegate then the maximum pay per block would be 2 million and they would have no stake left to vote for themselves. Assume someone used 1% of the BTSX to register their delegate at a pay rate of 200K BTSX per block it would take them over 28 hours to break even during which the rest of the shareholders could coordinate their votes to get them ousted if they didn't consent.With this setup the DACs can fund development in a decentralized manner for their entire lifetime. One thing I would like to mention is that there is a "HARD" limit on the share supply based upon limits of 64 bit numbers and the precision.
I have a suggestion 1.if resume max translations per block is N, fee per translation is 0.1, exclude the translation fee ,the delegate also can get some fee for creating block ,but this fee is calculation by formulation addtional fee =(N-N_tx)*R*0.1N: max translations per block N_tx: translations of this blockR: a ratio 0<R<10.1 : this is equal as fee per translationso the total fee = N_tx*0.1+(N-N_tx)*R*0.1I reume R=0.25, N=1001. if it is a empty block (no translation) the fee giving to delegate = 100*0.25*0.1=2.52. if it is a full block( include Max translation) the fee giving to delegate =100*0.1=10 you can see delegate can gain some fee even it is a empty block, and if the delegate want to gain more fee ,they must try to include more translationsas the following picture show ,the horizontal mean how many translations in the block , and the vertical mean fees delegate gain.there are five sulation ,they are R=0.1 , R=0.25 ,R=0.5 , R=0.75, R=1 .
Quote from: BTSdac on September 29, 2014, 01:24:23 ampay fee to delegate directly , how to motivate delegate include more translation ?Votes and approval.
pay fee to delegate directly , how to motivate delegate include more translation ?
Assume someone used 1% of the BTSX to register their delegate at a pay rate of 200K BTSX per block it would take them over 28 hours to break even during which the rest of the shareholders could coordinate their votes to get them ousted if they didn't consent.