Wow, based just on quickly skimming it, this looks great. Bookmarked for later reading. Thanks.
FYI. Voting is a coordination problem.I'm not sure if this is in reference to my idea above. The way I see this tool working is that, apart from the need for an initiator, it can be self coordinating. There is not even a need for widespread publicity in the beginning - there is no cost to signing up early (and indeed this can be reversed if desired), so only as critical mass builds and word spreads, are more and more people engaged to participate if they desire. And then when the critical mass point is reached, effective group action takes place.
Section 3 of the article on irrational choices is an illogical argument IMO. The author identifies that in certain situations people make predictably irrational choices. The example he gives is inaction often reflects a lack of mental energy applied to the problem rather than a preference. While this is true, it only justifies changing how the choices are arranged or presented for individuals, rather than constraining those choices. Second irrationality is most often subjective. Taking away the choice considered irrational by a majority, academics or some bureaucracy would harm those for whom that is a clear and purposeful preference that benefits them.That's an issue with the entire approach, given it's based in consequentialism. Unless he argues that he is guided by an objective and superior value system, the whole argument boils down to taking away people's freedom simply because he wants to. If all value is truly subjective, it's hard to point to any problem with that.
You don't switch | You switch | |
Other people don't switch | (1, 1) | (0, 0.99) |
Other people switch | (0, 1.99) | (2, 2) |
You don't pollute | You pollute | |
Other people don't pollute | (2, 2) | (2.1, 1.7) |
Other people pollute | (0.9, 1.3) | (1, 1) |
I also expect that interested consumers would voluntarily pay for services from expert private organisations to report on safety and environmental research in certain areas relevant to them.
That's an issue with the entire approach, given it's based in consequentialism. Unless he argues that he is guided by an objective and superior value system, the whole argument boils down to taking away people's freedom simply because he wants to. If all value is truly subjective, it's hard to point to any problem with that.
The problem with everyone voting to pass a law is the same "coordination problem" that already existed. There is a rational ignorance where the cost of learning how to vote responsibly is greater than the value of the vote. Thus no one learns how to vote responsibly.
I've been considering some of the arguments in this piece. Section 2 covers co-ordination problems (why boycotts don't work etc), and I wondered if the following solution could work as co-ordination tool without the need for state law. Let's say a polling tool is available, whereby passionate people can request a public call to action on some issue. But the agreed action is not taken until some specified critical mass supports the action. When that critical mass is reached, all participants know that their action will be effective, and the action goes ahead successfully. For example, it might be boycotting a consumer product for a month, which is more than the company can bear, but which is not a difficult (and only temporary) sacrifice for each individual. This might overcome the hurdle of people not willing to make a sacrifice when they are uncertain others will act similarly and that their sacrifice will be meaningful. Thoughts?
1. The English language spelling system is horribly bad. Just about every letter has multiple potential sounds that it can map to, and vice versa, there are combinations of letters that are completely silent in some cases but not others, and even the best possible formalizations of English spelling rules work only 85% of the time (http://www.zompist.com/spell.html). Hence, we could try to switch to a system that is better, yusing the saem leters to olways refur tu the saem sounds so yu kan noe hou tu pronouns a wurd from looking at it just liek mor siviliesd languages. If we all switch over, then that is better for all of us. But if you switch over and no one else does, then you are stuck writing posts that no one can understand well, and so you suffer.
The payoff matrix looks like this:
You don't switch You switch Other people don't switch (1, 1) (0, 0.99) Other people switch (0, 1.99) (2, 2)
Where the values are (your utility, society's total utility). Hence, even though everyone would switch over, no one benefits from switching over unilaterally.
2. You run a factory. Do you install filters in order to reduce the amount of pollution you emit? You suffer slightly from your own pollution, but not enough to notice; however, everyone's pollution together significantly affects your health and you would rather no one did. But then, installing filters is expensive.
Now, we have:
You don't pollute You pollute Other people don't pollute (2, 2) (2.1, 1.7) Other people pollute (0.9, 1.3) (1, 1)
Here, in all cases it's 0.1 units better for you to pollute, regardless of where others do. Coordination problems are solvable through many mechanisms; assurance contracts are perhaps the simplest one, and dominant assurance contracts also work well. Public good problems, however, are much more tricky, because there is always an incentive to defect; it's not just a matter of finding a way to move a rock from one valley to another, it's a matter of moving a rock up a 45 degree slope to a point at the top where the slope is still 45 degrees, and keeping it there. I think that solving coordination problems specifically really should be a primary objective of the crypto-mechanism-design community.
Somebody starts a poll to impose a boycott on factories that do not provide transparent audited evidence of non-pollution, and to give business to those that do provide this evidence. No action is taken until the poll builds up enough critical mass to be effectively punitive and rewarding to successfully affect the behaviour of the factories involved. In this way, there is no immediate cost to any consumer in electing to participate, until such time as their participation is guaranteed to be meaningful. As the numbers participating build, and the probability of an action builds, this changes the cost/benefit outcome for factories, and more and more will begin to non-pullute and provide evidence of such. If all the factories do so, its possible there may even be no action required in the end, but if there is, it should be guaranteed effective. So I think this process can work with public goods also.
until such time as their participation is guaranteed to be meaningful
I am not keen on voting in DPOS, but at least it is stake based and not per-person.
Voting for positions with LIMITED roles is very different than voting for positions with UNLIMITED roles backed by a gun.
I plan to address several of these topics in a blog post in the near future.
Wow so much unoriginal hogwash.+5%
...QuoteThat's an issue with the entire approach, given it's based in consequentialism. Unless he argues that he is guided by an objective and superior value system, the whole argument boils down to taking away people's freedom simply because he wants to. If all value is truly subjective, it's hard to point to any problem with that.
For that we have his other FAQ (http://www.raikoth.net/consequentialism.html).
...
QuoteSomebody starts a poll to impose a boycott on factories that do not provide transparent audited evidence of non-pollution, and to give business to those that do provide this evidence. No action is taken until the poll builds up enough critical mass to be effectively punitive and rewarding to successfully affect the behaviour of the factories involved. In this way, there is no immediate cost to any consumer in electing to participate, until such time as their participation is guaranteed to be meaningful. As the numbers participating build, and the probability of an action builds, this changes the cost/benefit outcome for factories, and more and more will begin to non-pullute and provide evidence of such. If all the factories do so, its possible there may even be no action required in the end, but if there is, it should be guaranteed effective. So I think this process can work with public goods also.
So, the crux of the matter is this:Quoteuntil such time as their participation is guaranteed to be meaningful
The problem is that an individual's participation is nearly meaningless if no one else participates, because the boycott fails either way, and it's nearly meaningless if many others participate, because the boycott succeeds either way. The probability of an individual actually being in that tiny sliver where they are pivotal is very very tiny.
There is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen.