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@cass .. the gfx needs an update .. BTSX -> BTS!
Quote from: Pheonike on September 11, 2014, 09:08:26 pmI think having the arrows point up and down is misleading. It makes is like something is being lost. The arrows should just be left/right which denotes more of an in/out vs up/down process.Yes, this.
I think having the arrows point up and down is misleading. It makes is like something is being lost. The arrows should just be left/right which denotes more of an in/out vs up/down process.
Selling BTSX, Shorting BitUSD, and Canceling the same orders result in BTSX transaction fee.I would call the BTSX fund "Accumulated Fees" and show it going 2 places... delegates and burn.
I updated it .. once again .. is the content still accurate?
Quote from: xeroc on September 09, 2014, 06:11:31 pmQuote from: MeTHoDx on September 09, 2014, 06:09:41 pmShould we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?*confirmed*"rainy day fund" sucks ..but I am unaware of a community consensus about the new nameRewards Fund is good.
Quote from: MeTHoDx on September 09, 2014, 06:09:41 pmShould we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?*confirmed*"rainy day fund" sucks ..but I am unaware of a community consensus about the new name
Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
*agreed*Gonna update the infographics zo account for reserves tomorrows
Quote from: OldMan on September 09, 2014, 08:52:23 pmQuote from: arhag on September 09, 2014, 08:29:08 pmQuote from: OldMan on September 09, 2014, 07:49:46 pmQuote from: MeTHoDx on September 09, 2014, 06:09:41 pmShould we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?Reserve fund.I agree. I would also like to bring up an earlier point regarding the supposed lack of a need for an insurance fund. I don't think the yields replace the need for an insurance fund. If a black swan event occurs and the BitUSD issued is partially collateralized by the BTSX held as collateral in the short position, this might hurt the peg. As the BitUSD that was collected for yield is instead destroyed until BitUSD is fully backed, the peg should return to normal. However, that may take some time. On the other hand if there was enough BitUSD held in the reserve fund, the necessary amount of BitUSD could be immediately destroyed to give BitUSD holders immediate confidence that their BitUSD is fully backed. They do not have to assume the network will be able to collect BitUSD in the future to balance things; they will know it immediately. In fact can't there be a possibility in which the network will not be able to collect enough BitUSD to again fully back the remaining BitUSD with the BTSX held in collateral? If everyone tries to convert their BitUSD into BTSX, couldn't it be possible that some slow movers will have BitUSD without any short position to back it. In such a scenario, the network was too eager in providing BitUSD holders high yields. All the quick movers were able to cash out their BitUSD with high yields into BTSX. The slow movers got stuck with worthless BitUSD.I think there should be a minimum limit on the BitAsset reserve fund. This minimum limit should be proportional to the amount of the BitAsset issued. If the reserve fund is below the minimum limit, the BitAssets collected as fees should first be used to fill up the fund to above the limit. As the fund grows well above the limit, the network should determine an appropriate yield rate to pay to the issued BitUSD that will not reduce the fund levels below the minimum limit. It should also consider the history of incoming fees in order to pick a yield rate that is fairly consistent (not too volatile) but still high enough to not grow the reserve fund without bound. If a black swan event occurs, the network should immediately destroy as much of the BitAssets in the reserve as necessary and possible to make the BitAssets fully backed.This merits consideration by the devs.The reserve fund will average the fees collected by the network over 1 year because it takes 1 year to pay them out. Thus the reserve fund will continue to grow and be available to handle issues.
Quote from: arhag on September 09, 2014, 08:29:08 pmQuote from: OldMan on September 09, 2014, 07:49:46 pmQuote from: MeTHoDx on September 09, 2014, 06:09:41 pmShould we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?Reserve fund.I agree. I would also like to bring up an earlier point regarding the supposed lack of a need for an insurance fund. I don't think the yields replace the need for an insurance fund. If a black swan event occurs and the BitUSD issued is partially collateralized by the BTSX held as collateral in the short position, this might hurt the peg. As the BitUSD that was collected for yield is instead destroyed until BitUSD is fully backed, the peg should return to normal. However, that may take some time. On the other hand if there was enough BitUSD held in the reserve fund, the necessary amount of BitUSD could be immediately destroyed to give BitUSD holders immediate confidence that their BitUSD is fully backed. They do not have to assume the network will be able to collect BitUSD in the future to balance things; they will know it immediately. In fact can't there be a possibility in which the network will not be able to collect enough BitUSD to again fully back the remaining BitUSD with the BTSX held in collateral? If everyone tries to convert their BitUSD into BTSX, couldn't it be possible that some slow movers will have BitUSD without any short position to back it. In such a scenario, the network was too eager in providing BitUSD holders high yields. All the quick movers were able to cash out their BitUSD with high yields into BTSX. The slow movers got stuck with worthless BitUSD.I think there should be a minimum limit on the BitAsset reserve fund. This minimum limit should be proportional to the amount of the BitAsset issued. If the reserve fund is below the minimum limit, the BitAssets collected as fees should first be used to fill up the fund to above the limit. As the fund grows well above the limit, the network should determine an appropriate yield rate to pay to the issued BitUSD that will not reduce the fund levels below the minimum limit. It should also consider the history of incoming fees in order to pick a yield rate that is fairly consistent (not too volatile) but still high enough to not grow the reserve fund without bound. If a black swan event occurs, the network should immediately destroy as much of the BitAssets in the reserve as necessary and possible to make the BitAssets fully backed.This merits consideration by the devs.
Quote from: OldMan on September 09, 2014, 07:49:46 pmQuote from: MeTHoDx on September 09, 2014, 06:09:41 pmShould we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?Reserve fund.I agree. I would also like to bring up an earlier point regarding the supposed lack of a need for an insurance fund. I don't think the yields replace the need for an insurance fund. If a black swan event occurs and the BitUSD issued is partially collateralized by the BTSX held as collateral in the short position, this might hurt the peg. As the BitUSD that was collected for yield is instead destroyed until BitUSD is fully backed, the peg should return to normal. However, that may take some time. On the other hand if there was enough BitUSD held in the reserve fund, the necessary amount of BitUSD could be immediately destroyed to give BitUSD holders immediate confidence that their BitUSD is fully backed. They do not have to assume the network will be able to collect BitUSD in the future to balance things; they will know it immediately. In fact can't there be a possibility in which the network will not be able to collect enough BitUSD to again fully back the remaining BitUSD with the BTSX held in collateral? If everyone tries to convert their BitUSD into BTSX, couldn't it be possible that some slow movers will have BitUSD without any short position to back it. In such a scenario, the network was too eager in providing BitUSD holders high yields. All the quick movers were able to cash out their BitUSD with high yields into BTSX. The slow movers got stuck with worthless BitUSD.I think there should be a minimum limit on the BitAsset reserve fund. This minimum limit should be proportional to the amount of the BitAsset issued. If the reserve fund is below the minimum limit, the BitAssets collected as fees should first be used to fill up the fund to above the limit. As the fund grows well above the limit, the network should determine an appropriate yield rate to pay to the issued BitUSD that will not reduce the fund levels below the minimum limit. It should also consider the history of incoming fees in order to pick a yield rate that is fairly consistent (not too volatile) but still high enough to not grow the reserve fund without bound. If a black swan event occurs, the network should immediately destroy as much of the BitAssets in the reserve as necessary and possible to make the BitAssets fully backed.
Quote from: MeTHoDx on September 09, 2014, 06:09:41 pmShould we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?Reserve fund.
Quote from: Riverhead on September 09, 2014, 09:11:01 pmVery nice!The default fee is now 0.5 BTSX for transactions. Should it be updated in the Infographic?the tx fees in btsx are denoted with "tx fees" (upper block)the fees in bitAsset (not yet implemented in the software) are just arbitrary numbers .. ie 0.1 bitUSD
Very nice!The default fee is now 0.5 BTSX for transactions. Should it be updated in the Infographic?
Quote from: xeroc on September 09, 2014, 08:30:58 pmOk so I guess there is no RPC call where I can set the minum fee required for a tx to be incldued in a block that my delegate builds?Ok but aren't you getting the average of all (delegates) anyway?
Ok so I guess there is no RPC call where I can set the minum fee required for a tx to be incldued in a block that my delegate builds?
Register a new delegate.Like in:117.delegate.xeroc
There is no "hard coded min fee"... delegates can set higher fees for being included in their block.
Quote from: xeroc on September 09, 2014, 08:16:00 pmhow are delegates supposed to 'increase fees'?Register a new delegate.Like in:117.delegate.xeroc
how are delegates supposed to 'increase fees'?
Quote Perhaps a more accurate statement would be "the end game for delegates will always be delegates breaking even".All occupations eventually revert to the same average rate of return given the risks and free competition.
Perhaps a more accurate statement would be "the end game for delegates will always be delegates breaking even".
Quote from: MeTHoDx on September 09, 2014, 07:04:16 pmQuote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 06:54:48 pmThis will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value. The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents. I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.With this system for interest, that seems true. But we'll never be a serious payment system rivalling Visa's TPS rates with that approach.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 06:54:48 pmThis will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value. The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents. I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.
This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.
Quote from: tonyk on September 09, 2014, 07:05:26 pmQuote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 06:55:42 pmQuote from: tonyk on September 09, 2014, 06:54:24 pmQuote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 05:52:00 pmMargin call fee is in btsx. Market fees are in bitassetsBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning. You still have not told me how you do that trick?Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit". Ok I bid 51 BTS/ bitUSD and trying to buy 2 bitUSD ;the best ask (more likely short) is asking for 47 BTSX for each bitUSD. The 2 are matched. The seller gets his 94 BTSX, I get my 2 bitUSD and I pay 102 BTSX. Now the system has 8 BTSX... how those 8 BTSX get converts into bitUSD?You could view that same market the other way around... you bid $0.04 they ask $0.03 for 100 BTSX. Bid pays $4 and gets 100 BTSX. Ask receives $3 for their 100 BTSX. Network is left with $1.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 06:55:42 pmQuote from: tonyk on September 09, 2014, 06:54:24 pmQuote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 05:52:00 pmMargin call fee is in btsx. Market fees are in bitassetsBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning. You still have not told me how you do that trick?Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit". Ok I bid 51 BTS/ bitUSD and trying to buy 2 bitUSD ;the best ask (more likely short) is asking for 47 BTSX for each bitUSD. The 2 are matched. The seller gets his 94 BTSX, I get my 2 bitUSD and I pay 102 BTSX. Now the system has 8 BTSX... how those 8 BTSX get converts into bitUSD?
Quote from: tonyk on September 09, 2014, 06:54:24 pmQuote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 05:52:00 pmMargin call fee is in btsx. Market fees are in bitassetsBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning. You still have not told me how you do that trick?Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit".
Quote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 05:52:00 pmMargin call fee is in btsx. Market fees are in bitassetsBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning. You still have not told me how you do that trick?
Margin call fee is in btsx. Market fees are in bitassetsBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents. I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.
I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.--> Rewards Fund--> Burn--> Delegate IncomeThe shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.
Quote from: Troglodactyl on September 09, 2014, 06:28:47 pmIf my understanding is correct, paying fees other than short fees out as interest should break the peg. In an uncertain market in which demand due assets matches demand to short, the peg should work. If everyone wants to short, that breaks the peg, which is why we had to use the price feeds. Allowing the shorts to pay the longs interest should recreate the balanced/uncertain market in which the peg works, but providing additional interest from other fees to asset holders would then break the peg again by increasing demand for assets.The question is whether demand for bit assets is greater than the demand to short. Considering demand for BitAssets increases demand for BTSX 2x... short demand should be in very high supply. The game theory on the peg still holds. Also, it doesn't matter *as much* if it breaks the peg to the upside (because a BitUSD will remain >= $1) which means people can accept it at face value with confidence.
If my understanding is correct, paying fees other than short fees out as interest should break the peg. In an uncertain market in which demand due assets matches demand to short, the peg should work. If everyone wants to short, that breaks the peg, which is why we had to use the price feeds. Allowing the shorts to pay the longs interest should recreate the balanced/uncertain market in which the peg works, but providing additional interest from other fees to asset holders would then break the peg again by increasing demand for assets.
Quote from: MeTHoDx on September 09, 2014, 06:41:29 pmI think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.--> Rewards Fund--> Burn--> Delegate IncomeThe shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.This sounds like a reasonable... I think "burn" is probably the least effective option on the list. The more BitAsset users/holders there are BTSX gets a 2x advantage. Thus in my estimation driving demand for BitAssets is #1.
You still have the 5% fee on short orders (I assume you mean to say 5% fee on margin calls) going to the rewards fund. According to bytemaster's response, it should be going to the delegate's box instead.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 05:52:00 pmMargin call fee is in btsx. Market fees are bitassetsBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning. *fixed*
Margin call fee is in btsx. Market fees are bitassetsBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
The yield on BitAssets is coming from the various fees the network collects. This is a value transfer from the participants paying the fees to the network (it doesn't really matter what it is denominated in). This value has three places it can go: the BitAsset holders, the BTSX holders, and the delegates. I am saying that we would be better off if we (the shareholders) could define how much value goes to which.
Show bid ask overlap going to rainy day fund
Quote from: arhag on September 09, 2014, 06:00:57 pmQuote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 05:52:00 pmBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning. I get that but shouldn't BTSX stakeholders have a way of defining how much interest they want to give to each particular BitAsset? Interest given to a BitAsset is money not given to the stakeholders. For some BitAssets this makes a lot of sense in the initial stages. I am perfectly fine giving up to 5% interest to BitUSD for example (anything more than that I feel would be more useful given back to the stakeholders). However, I don't care much about giving high interest on BitBTC for example. The reason is because making BitUSD more attractive can help marketing to new users and thus increase adoption of BitShares X and thus increase value in BTSX. Providing additional value to BitBTC on the other hand seems counterproductive to our interests.So basically, I would like to see what I proposed in the second paragraph of this post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8396.msg109865#msg109865.I dont really understand yet .. How is the btsx shareholder supposed to pay 'interest' for the bitAsset holder? have I missed sth?please enlighten me!
Quote from: bytemaster on September 09, 2014, 05:52:00 pmBtsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning. I get that but shouldn't BTSX stakeholders have a way of defining how much interest they want to give to each particular BitAsset? Interest given to a BitAsset is money not given to the stakeholders. For some BitAssets this makes a lot of sense in the initial stages. I am perfectly fine giving up to 5% interest to BitUSD for example (anything more than that I feel would be more useful given back to the stakeholders). However, I don't care much about giving high interest on BitBTC for example. The reason is because making BitUSD more attractive can help marketing to new users and thus increase adoption of BitShares X and thus increase value in BTSX. Providing additional value to BitBTC on the other hand seems counterproductive to our interests.So basically, I would like to see what I proposed in the second paragraph of this post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8396.msg109865#msg109865.
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
Is the 5% fee on margin calls on BTSX or is it extracted as the BitAsset? Also, wouldn't the transaction fees on the market orders be sometimes BTSX and sometimes BitAsset? Finally, is the bid ask overlap always extracted as a BitAsset and never as BTSX?Really it seems like there is no reason the network couldn't exchange between BTSX fees and BitAsset fees as desired. After all there is a decentralized exchange right there. So I guess my question is how much of the potential value available should be given to BitAsset holders vs BTSX holders?