awesome, thank you so much for doing this and posting on YouTube!

every business needs marketing, even DACs. in the spirit of a DAC, though, we probably don't need a single coordinated marketing effort. maybe it's best if we break the effort into manageable chunks and have trusted members of this community run with areas they think they can best handle. as a finance researcher specializing in investments with a project management background, i think i can reasonably handle a low-level sustained campaign targeting traders. i also think this is one of the primary groups we should be introducing to our technology.

if someone can either help walk me through how to put together a worker proposal or at least point me to some resources, i'd consider running with this particular effort.

the plan would be to pay someone in this community to put together a reasonable marketing package targeted to traders, mainly highlighting the awesome features of the DEX, then i'd use social media and direct marketing to select retail traders and ultimately small institutions. I'd manage a loose team of freelancers to build and work through a database of candidate traders, and outsource contact.

i'm extremely busy, so this would be a low level effort meant to be sustained over a prolonged period with discrete outreach objectives.

thoughts?

Quote from: tbone on March 07, 2016, 05:42:15 pm

Also, to receive yield, perhaps it should be required to lock up funds for a month at a time.  So yield would be paid every month starting 1 month after lock-up (on an account by account basis), and early withdrawal means yield is forfeited. 

I personally like this idea more & could be in favour of it. This would make the advertisable variable yield higher. In terms of liquidity, you want to increase Makers at key times but also reduce liquidity takers at those key times. This may incentivise those who would probably be liquidity takers to not suck liquidity out of the market as much at key times. (Buying BitUSD when BTC/BTS is rapidly falling & selling BitUSD when BTC/BTS is rapidly rising) So besides all the other benefits of yield, this would be a way of using yield to improve liquidity imo.

Edit: At the same time once we have merchants accepting BitUSD this might be a negative in terms of getting the good liquidity in terms of people easily spending their BitUSD & creating the Pool to customer to merchant back to pool liquidity cycle.

or a hybrid approach that pays out daily yield with a monthly holding bonus. fundamentally, i prefer we start with short-term instruments, but i appreciate the lock-in concept for stability.

@JonnyBitcoin has contact to that guys who is willing to sell the twitter and facebook handle for ~$3k .. There was a forum thread about it as well

nice! any status on that @JonnyBitcoin?

I just tweeted to the account to try to get it for the community. It sucks that @bitshares is taken by someone tweeting about mainly bitcoin, not our actual bitshares community. It's just embarrassing that the most official twitter account we have is @_bitshares.

I didn't hear any announcement, but my trading fees are only 0.23386 BTS. Is this a new change? I'm definitely not complaining!

I'm all for really seeing how it works out.  But I would hate to overpay with more yield than is necessary to incentivize the behavior we seek.   Also, let's assume we do 10% and it works great.  Do you think that would be sustainable going forward?  Do you not think 5% would do the trick? 

Also, I'm sure we won't get the full desired results (or support for this to begin with) without liquidity measures done in conjunction.  So the question is, how much will the liquidity incentives cost and will we be able to add that to the tab?  And let's not forget that there will also be some dev costs.

agreed, which is why we should treat everything as a limited experiment with a priori criteria to test, then adjust after results indicate some path, test again, adjust, etc. no one knows which set of incentives in either structure or magnitude will work for us, so we might as well just get going with the experiments...

Quote from: cylonmaker2053 on February 20, 2016, 04:56:14 am

Quote from: Erlich Bachman on February 20, 2016, 03:48:12 am

i would suggest paying these kickbacks on a sliding scale based on length of time on the order books so if someone had a real safe hedge on the books for months that saved us from having a black swan event then he would deserve more than someone who put an order up for 10 min then sold to himself

i like a sliding scale concept, but actually think it should work in the reverse. open orders deep in the order book don't add real liquidity IMO, the action happens on the margin and closing the bid-ask spread is key. if there's going to be any subsidy for liquidity, it would best be spent narrowing spreads. that said, i'm more a fan of fee discounts than kickbacks; rewarding higher frequency trading and/or open orders near the highest bid and lowest ask.

I'm not sure I agree with any rewards based on filled orders (HFT or otherwise) since that's where there's an incentive to do self-trading.  Whereas if we reward based only on placing orders on the books, then there's no incentive to self-trade, only to provide liquidity. 

Beyond that, I agree with larger rewards for open orders closer to best bid and ask.  So we can factor in size of orders placed, time on order book, and proximity to best bid/ask.  We should probably also factor in balance between buy side and sell side, although I imagine at any given time we can skew this more toward either the buy side or the sell side depending on market direction.

good point re: varying incentives on buy/sell sides. from my experience, when prices move quickly being a market maker is a terrible business to be in! when there's skewed demand on either the buy or sell side, it hurts liquidity providers who get stuck with inventory that's rapidly losing value. it'd be interesting to consider subsidization models that support market makers when conditions skew.