The short term and quickest solution is already presented here, since it requires no blockchain update (change fees, collected fees used to create bitassets).
I would also agree to incentivize the creation of BitAssets, but I think in long-term it should be mostly user driven. Thus I could think of an additional feature when creating a margin position that allows dividends of some sort.
When the user creates a margin position, he can choose his collateral ratio. If the ratio is above some ratio, lets call it incentivize collateral ratio ICR, then additional features becomes visible:
User can lock his position for timespan X, where locking means:
- the position can not be closed
- the positions borrowed amount of bitAssets amount can not be reduced, only increased
- the positions collateral can not be reduced below ICR, only increased
- position becomes unlocked if ratio is less then the unlock incentivize collateral ratio UICR (set by commitee)
If position becomes locked, then the positions collateral in BTS receives Y% from the reserve pool (or some commitee account, eventually filled by fees?) every month the position is locked, where the Y% is only with reference to amount of BTS necessary to achieve ICR. Value Y% depends on the choice X of the user.
For example: ICR is 3.
- User opens position to create 1000 bitUSD backed by 50000 BTS (assume 10 BTS/bitUSD price).
The collateral ratio of this position is then 5, which is higher than ICR, and user chooses to lock for one month. - Bitshares says now he will get 0.1% paid every month for all BTS required to achieve ICR.
To achieve ICR, he would need only 30000 BTS, so the incentive is 30000 * 0.1% = 30. - The positions collateral will be increased by 30 BTS taken from reserve pool every month. After the two months,
the position unlocks itself automatically (but is not closed) and the user has now 50060 BTS as collateral.
This approach would certainly need development on back- and frontend, but could be very interesting for hodlers.
BSIP 19 (
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0019.md) is highly related, however I disagree with only rewarding shorters - both shorters and asset holders aught to have a portion of market fees redistributed to them.
How would the reward be balanced between the shorter and holder though?
Holders aught to benefit from the 'coinage' of their held MPA, whilst the shorter aught to benefit from a higher collateral ratio.
Eligibility for fee redistribution should only trigger once the borrowed asset has been included in a fill order (perhaps only the backing asset to keep it simple?) so that we have cryptographic proof that it is publicly liquid instead of simply borrowed and transferred to a secondary account owned by the shorter. It would still be possible for someone to put up a huge sell/buy wall and sell/buy to themselves but by doing so they offer the public (bots included) the opportunity to eat into that public market liquidity, it could also boost the trading volume considerably.
I want to see the BTSX marketing of "x% on anything" come back - it was one of the major selling points for me that the broken FIAT banking sector offer 1% but I could get 5%+ on the blockchain - very powerful!