Rather than having an income of X BTS per round, I'd rather have an income of $Y per round. The dilution of BTS holders necessary to sustain that level of income will change as the BTS / USD exchange rate rises and falls. It makes more sense to pay developers fiat-denominated salaries.
Measuring inflation in terms of $ value instead of BTS quantity provides stability for delegates like a salary at a job does, so I understand that desire.
But it also leaves open the vulnerability of a death spiral in BTS. If the price of BTS drops, then to cover expenses a greatly increased number of BTS are created. These BTS are sold causing the price to drop, which causes even more BTS to be created, and so on.
In that situation, if the price decline is sustained and not just short term, I feel that the Bitshares project must cut back, in the same way that a government needs to cut back its spending when it is facing hyperinflation, instead of trying to continue to pay its current expenses with an ever increasing quantity of fiat money.
The developers need to resist the temptation to be like an irresponsible government, willing to inflate their currency to fund their projects. We must stick to the sustainable, fixed inflation plan, fixed as a percentage of BTS like we have now.
Also, I think that this plan would open up an attack vector for BTS, which is the following:
* Buy up enough stake to elect most/all of the delegates.
* Using your control of the delegates, give bogus price feeds saying that BTS is almost worthless. As a result, give massive block rewards to all your delegates, taking away the stake of everyone else.
(Of course, the response to that attack could be to hard fork back to previous snapshot, just as the response might be to any such attack which controlled all of the delegates, so I dont know if this is actually any worse than before).