Quote from: bitcrab on April 03, 2021, 05:22:40 am

Quote from: sschiessl on March 19, 2021, 07:25:47 am

I added liquidity pools as well here https://blocksights.info/#/pools

The overview will be extended and more data displayed, any feedback welcome.

it will be great if you can add the 24h trading volume in the list.
it will be even more great if you can add the DEFI APY to the pairs that BTSDAO airdrop to.

Can you elaborate how to calculate that APY?

the latest airdrop rule is:

the pairs that accept DEFI airdrop are classified as 2 groups:

group1: BTS-CNY, BTS-USD, BTS-EUR, BTS-DEFI

group2:CNY-USD, CNY/CNC, BTS-GDEX.USDT, DEFI-GDEX.USDT

the airdrop happens at each "prime day" in China lunar calendar， for example, in April the airdrop will happen at 4th, 10th, 13th, 14th,16th, 18th,22rd, 24th,28th 30th, because these days are listed as 23, 29, 2,3,5,7,11,13,17, 19 in China lunar calendar, airdrop depend on the snapshot at UTC 12:00 at that day.

each time, each pair in group1 will be airdroped 300K DEFI to the LP token holders, each pair in group2 will be airdroped 150K DEFI to the LP token holders.

so we can suppose the airdrop happens every 3 days, you can get LP token amounts, asset A amounts, asset B amounts at the snapshot time for each pairs in group1/group2.

then APY for one pair = DEFI airdrop amount(300K or 150K)*365/3/(asset A amounts*2*price of A in DEFI)

as I know the rule will be updated in recent future, I'll ask the BTSDAO guys to share the latest rule ASAP.

AMM 流量池相关操作 ( cli_wallet 命令 和 API )

1. 建池

op code: 59

参数

Code: [Select]

fee                     手续费，测试网默认手续费 50 TEST
account                 账号，格式 1.2.x
asset_a                 资产A，格式 1.3.x
asset_b                 资产B，格式 1.3.x
share_asset             权益资产（即LP TOKEN），格式 1.3.x
taker_fee_percent       交易手续费，整数表示，单位是万分之一
withdrawal_fee_percent  提现手续费，整数表示，单位是万分之一

注：
* 资产 A 的 ID 必须小于资产 B 的 ID
* 建池必须绑定权益资产，只有权益资产持有人才能绑定，且自动成为池主
* 权益资产必须预先建好，不能是AB之一，必须是普通UIA，不能有存量

貌似池子创建者可以获得maker fee分成？这个费率是在哪里设置的？

Below polls are created to set margin call parameters for bitCNY, bitUSD and bitEUR:

For bitCNY:

1.14.282 Poll-BAIP10-Set bitCNY MCFR to 1% and MSSR 1.02
1.14.285 Poll-BAIP10-Keep bitCNY MCFR and MSSR unchanged

For bitUSD:

1.14.283 Poll-BAIP10-Set bitUSD MCFR to 1% and MSSR 1.02
1.14.286 Poll-BAIP10-Keep bitUSD MCFR and MSSR unchanged

For bitEUR:

1.14.288 Poll-BAIP10-Set bitEUR MCFR to 1%
1.14.287 Poll-BAIP10-Keep bitEUR MCFR and MSSR unchanged

According to the BAIP rules, for each bitAsset, the FOR proposal will be considered approved while meeting below 3 criterias:

FOR worker get more voting power than AGAINST worker.
FOR worker get more voting power than BAIP-Threshold Worker.
Both No.1 & 2 above last for three consecutive days.


Here the "Keep parameters unchanged" proposals are the AGAINST proposal, the proposal to set the parameters are FOR proposal, for bitCNY there are 2 FOR proposals and if both are approved the one that get higher voting power will be executed.

please check https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/38 to get the detail of BAIP10 and check https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0074.md if you need a deep understanding on that.

Please vote according to your opinion.

投票的规则很简单，有人非要争我也懒得解释。我就说说这东西的作用。

问题：在喂价尚不能解锁，价格也没有到threshold之上的情况下，有什么方法能抑制强清？

强清补偿之所以对抑制强清没什么用，因为无论怎么增大强清补偿，强清者的买价和被强清者的卖价都是是一样的，一个玩家借了bitCNY去强清别人，就算自己又被强清了，也基本上没亏损，而他却又很大的机会拿BTS高价卖出套利。

提高强清补偿只是让大家换了了价位交易，顺便让bitCNY贬值得更多一些。

那么设个强清费用呢？

那就不一样了。

就象现在这样设个1%，那就意味着强清者的买价是0.2266，而被强清者的卖价是0.22449，中间有1%的价差，借了bitCNY去强清别人，如果自己被强清了那是有亏损的，通过强清套利需要更好的机会和更精确的算计，这对强清的抑制是显而易见的。

市场价格到了0.22之后，强清费用依然能起到类似的作用。

一会儿骂抵押的耍无赖，一会儿又说抵押的是猪仔，不知道该怎么评价这种精神分裂症。

之所以设1%这样的费率，也正是根据“明显能起到作用，但又不很痛”的原则。

actually I do not like the words style of Thul3, it's easy to find lies in his words, and if he do not like one people, the one will be the worst in the world under his words.

even though, I hope the Administrator of this forum can release him to post freely.

建议公会支持解锁喂价。

Quote from: bitcrab on August 17, 2020, 12:38:36 am

now only few voters have voted, and all the 4 features get more support than against voting powers.

hope every voters, especially big proxies to vote to show your opinion.

do not wait after 20th, no one is sure what will happen in 20th.

and either fork or not, I believe the current chain need a Plan C.

These vote can't say anything:

This is the vote power now, let the data talk:

beos:          70.0M
baozi:         53.3M
B-DEX:        47.5M
CN-VOTE:    237.0M

70+53.3+47.5=171-237=-66

171+237=408

The vote power of CN-VOTE is 237.0M, only have 30M BTS is not leveraged collateral.

Fair vote?

大螃蟹上午回了又删了，我本想接着那个思路回一下，既然删了就算了，但是我们可以再举一个简单的例子来解释或者什么一下: 为什么抵押票权与挂单票权必须要割掉。

比如我是威且科技的一个小股东，可以在公司抵押我的股权从公司借出资金，且还享有表决权，然后再从股市或者其它小股东手里收购公司股票，再抵押给公司借出资金，大螃蟹你做为这个公司老板是不是要疯？等到我的杠杆表决权可以独断的时候，直接让公司不可以爆我的仓位，那么大老板心里是不是要MMP? 如果所有股东都这样搞表决权的话，那公司还需要发展吗？其它不愿意这样参与的股东是不是打心底里有分家的想法？

再退一步讲，我不在本公司抵押而是在外部做抵押，然后回购公司股票做杠杆，只要表决权不灭失，我想大螃蟹你作为这个公司的老板心里也要无限MMP吧？！

至于为什么挂单票权也要割掉，都挂着单子要卖了，很明显是前脚投票后脚跑路的节奏，这对于一个DAO治理有何意义？！

至于猴子，将来你是想跟着cn-vote这些人不断把杠杆加上去去抗衡抵押票权呢，还是等着他们抵押票权高到可以独断的时候，一个激动直接锁到10块，抵押筹码不丢还能干你？

至于其它，我实在是搞不清楚，一个1.7亿实打实持有bts的票仓有何怕的？...所有的东西都站不住脚...这么多独立见证人难道还不如一个组织控制的贿选见证人体系, 现在就可以这样横着把独立见证人体系干掉，将来岂不是要渡劫上天?!


再者，真的是多说无益，既然关键矛盾不可调和，赶紧×了算完，这种票权结构之下，谈个毛的共识。

作为我个人来说，现在的投票规则并非不可接受，但我并不认为是非常合理的。

如果一个公司上市了，有投资者借钱买股票获得投票权，我想谁都得认，如果想让公司少受投资人影响，不上市就行了呗，学学任老板。

事实上，我觉得锁仓票权+抵押票权也许可以刚好互相平衡，如果说过去曾经有抵押票权罔顾整体利益，那么如果完全取消了抵押票权，谁来代表抵押者的权益？以后抵押者是不是可以被尽情欺负了？

对了，你给出的那几个大户票权应该不准确，先搞准确了。