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D will be 0 and no 1) The initial required bid is 0.2) Your required_bid is equal to (previous_bid + (R*(previous_bid - previous_required_bid))3) When you place a bid, (D*(your_bid - previous_bid)) goes to dividends and (previous+bid + (1 - D)*(your_bid - previous_bid)) goes to previous bidder.
QuoteFirst thing I do when this releases (if I don't just sell my shares) is buy every halfway reasonable sounding domain I can and promise never to sell them in hopes you guys start to "get it"irrational actors are everywhere. Consider all possibilities!
First thing I do when this releases (if I don't just sell my shares) is buy every halfway reasonable sounding domain I can and promise never to sell them in hopes you guys start to "get it"
Yes, like a trapped investor turned troll. You guys have created a bunch of potential that, so it seems like a plausible concern
I expect shares to be trading on exchanges before domain sales begin
Yes.If I spent $10,000 supporting invictus very early and that results in 10,000,000 domainshares for me, is it really so painful to spend 1000 each on 1000 promising domains ASAP? Really the only one who can stop me is someone else who also bought in at cheap cheap prices because my actions do not make economic sense to someone coming in at this later point when the multiplier is so much worse.I *love* this system, i'm just saying be real
Quote from: toast on July 02, 2014, 04:57:30 pmOk so let's use that analogy on the other extreme:I pay $100 per year to list my personal webpage with a few download links to some crypto tools I built. A few days before my lease expires someone bids $200, I'm on vacation and they get it. Replace my download links with versions that steal everyone's keys.So now what, we have to add some logic where when someone makes a bid above you there's some minimum time you get to re-bid before you actually lose the name? I guess that's not so bad, I just have to somehow notify all my users that my site is about to get compromised.The more concerning scenario, actually almost identical to the one you said but formulated in a way that doesn't sound irrational: Big Corp sees that my site with its new brand is quickly gaining popularity, says to pay them $10k per month or else they'll buy my name for that much because it's worth it for them to not have competition grow even if it is not possible to monetize the users for that much. This also coincidentally happens near the end of my lease, because hey it takes about a year to build up a good brand.@adam I imagine everyone will always be using $ value to judge and so I don't think initial supply or price per share matters at all. Let's just pretend we're using USD for these, all the points made by everyone else are still valid.Toast, isn't the current strategy going to result in a lot of people having tens of millions of Domainshares each? You can reckon it in whatever currency you want but if you are talking about relative prices, it seems safe to say an attacker can greatly amplify their attack by supporting invictus early and securing an overlarge share relative to your anticipated value of them for purposes like dns auction.
Ok so let's use that analogy on the other extreme:I pay $100 per year to list my personal webpage with a few download links to some crypto tools I built. A few days before my lease expires someone bids $200, I'm on vacation and they get it. Replace my download links with versions that steal everyone's keys.So now what, we have to add some logic where when someone makes a bid above you there's some minimum time you get to re-bid before you actually lose the name? I guess that's not so bad, I just have to somehow notify all my users that my site is about to get compromised.The more concerning scenario, actually almost identical to the one you said but formulated in a way that doesn't sound irrational: Big Corp sees that my site with its new brand is quickly gaining popularity, says to pay them $10k per month or else they'll buy my name for that much because it's worth it for them to not have competition grow even if it is not possible to monetize the users for that much. This also coincidentally happens near the end of my lease, because hey it takes about a year to build up a good brand.@adam I imagine everyone will always be using $ value to judge and so I don't think initial supply or price per share matters at all. Let's just pretend we're using USD for these, all the points made by everyone else are still valid.
Quote from: toast on July 02, 2014, 04:06:21 pm@Agent86 I still do not see how you can't imagine someone with more money than you wanting to buy your name and doing something malicious with it. I would *never* rent a domain if I expect it to be possible for some rich guy I piss off to snipe it out from under me.Ok, I'm trying to think of best way to explain how I see it.Imagine you have a barber shop and you are leasing a space for your business (common practice). You have been there 5 years and have prepaid your lease out by 5 years @ $12k/yr. Now, your customers know your location, you have adds in yellowpages etc. Some rich guy who wants to spite you (maybe the large hairdresser at other end of stripmall?) He wants to raise your rent to $20k/yr.
@Agent86 I still do not see how you can't imagine someone with more money than you wanting to buy your name and doing something malicious with it. I would *never* rent a domain if I expect it to be possible for some rich guy I piss off to snipe it out from under me.
Agent86 -p2p is going to appeal people specifically looking for anti-censorship. Established businesses are not going to want to be on the domain with all the weird riff-raff. Your idea might help the DAC in the longrun if it wouldn't kill adoption. And it is censorship. It isn't like a First Amendment level of censorship, but having someone be able to buy up your private domain for $XXX blows. So now you have to pay extra. With these concerns in the back of people's minds, who is going to be the early adopters? I would think just squatters. There is so many problems with adoption that adding FUD to this by the concerns expressed surely won't help.
After a talk with BM just now:* You get back exactly what you put in, no kickbacks.* Delegates set the number of auctions that are allowed to close in a given time to prevent domains that didn't get attention from getting sold off.* Global, fixed renewal rate set by delegates.@Agent86 I still do not see how you can't imagine someone with more money than you wanting to buy your name and doing something malicious with it. I would *never* rent a domain if I expect it to be possible for some rich guy I piss off to snipe it out from under me.QuoteFirst thing I do when this releases (if I don't just sell my shares) is buy every halfway reasonable sounding domain I can and promise never to sell them in hopes you guys start to "get it"Really? You're going to sink $20,000 on a few hundred domains and not sell them for a profit?
I still think you need a minimum price. Previously I said a decaying price function, but the point was really just that auctions have a minimum price. There are going to be domains people fight over, then domains that are worth the minimum allowed to bid. Those low value (but worth something) domains could clog your blockchain. I mean, thats what i'd at least consider doing. Although thats not necessarily wise either with renewal fees.
Frankly, it just adds a big unknown into the equation that would keep me from using p2p if I was looking at the p2p features. People are coming to p2p so they don't have to worry about their domain being removed by some process out of their control. AFAIK thats the main reason.
The whole point of p2p to me is to be uncensored. You've just removed the largest selling point for me. Anyway.. I agree about disagreeing. I do think with the current system there will be a lot of squatting. Although squatting has lost a lot of value with the proliferation of top level domains.. so.. lots of things to consider.
1) Press for the simulation/testing phase. 2) Gameify the simulation/testing phase. 3) Exploits found go ASAP 1 again.Maybe my intellect is just too limited, but I don't see any other way to figure this stuff out than by being experimental. It is like when you sit inside too long and you go outside and become astonished at how detailed everything is.
Quote from: gamey on July 01, 2014, 09:02:55 pmI am not a big fan of the alternative but I think I prefer it over the ability of allowing well capitalized opponents to force you to pay any amount they're willing to lose. It could become a game of chicken. It will also be huge source of FUD going forward. I wouldn't work on building a brand under such a system. You've removed the possibility of government censorship and replaced it with privatized censorship via capital.What happens if your domain isn't even making money? Or it wasn't intended to make money? Lots of people buy domains for reasons that do not fit under a classic business model. IMO I think your analysis assumes a few things and one being that anyone trying to outbid your domain will be working on a rational economic basis.The 3rd party should be able to bid, but the owner should have the ability to reject any bid. I just don't see the leasing model working.. I doubt I could come up with an improvement on Toast's model to make everyone happy. Somewhere I've asked how it prevents squatting and I agree with your criticism in that regard. Perhaps squatting could be mitigated by a voting system that removed the squatter's domains ? Perhaps we need to agree to disagree. My feeling is your interpretation of how it plays out is way off base. I suspect if you experienced this model you'd quickly see it different. Why are all these "well capitalized opponents" in such a rush to give you all this money and waste their own? Everyone who has shares is invested in the system and profits from its success. I don't think there will be all these people running around trying to harass people and renting domains they have no use for and which are of no value to them. I think the "well capitalized" people will run out of money quickly with that strategy.If someone offers you more for your domain than it's worth to you, you can take the profit and invest it in your business or use it for your non-profit objectives. They can follow you around buying from you any domain you use, and you'll collect the profit and they'll end up with a giant pile of domains they paid tons of money for that are worthless. You'll probably be able to go back and scoop up your original domain for cheap once they're bankrupt and you're newly wealthy. More likely, wealthy people will be smart enough not to do this to themselves in the first place.
I am not a big fan of the alternative but I think I prefer it over the ability of allowing well capitalized opponents to force you to pay any amount they're willing to lose. It could become a game of chicken. It will also be huge source of FUD going forward. I wouldn't work on building a brand under such a system. You've removed the possibility of government censorship and replaced it with privatized censorship via capital.What happens if your domain isn't even making money? Or it wasn't intended to make money? Lots of people buy domains for reasons that do not fit under a classic business model. IMO I think your analysis assumes a few things and one being that anyone trying to outbid your domain will be working on a rational economic basis.The 3rd party should be able to bid, but the owner should have the ability to reject any bid. I just don't see the leasing model working.. I doubt I could come up with an improvement on Toast's model to make everyone happy. Somewhere I've asked how it prevents squatting and I agree with your criticism in that regard. Perhaps squatting could be mitigated by a voting system that removed the squatter's domains ?
Quote from: gamey on July 01, 2014, 07:02:30 pmBeing able to outbid an owner of a domain seems bad to me. There is a lot of value the owner of a domain may put into the domain itself. Then you're asking them to pay for this value again to defend against a well funded opponent. It seems like you're going to be fighting for adoption to begin with. Giving this ability to your opponents isn't going to help...I think this thinking is a relic of being used to the current system. In my proposal there is an incentive to put your roots down early and hold on to a domain you care about long term. The longer you've held a domain (more established you are), the longer it takes to uproot you, it's more expensive and risky for them to do it, and the more you get paid if you decide to accept an offer to move. The value of most domains in not transferrable; the real value is in the company and people running the site behind the domain. It unlikely your domain will be worth more to someone else than it is to you; if someone bids on it they would need a legitimate long term interest that goes beyond putting up a spoof site to be worth it. You will also have plenty of time to tell your customers that you're moving away from "furniture.com" and moving to "joesfurniture.com" because "furniture.com" got some bids from a national chain while you just have a small local shop. Customers would understand this and it wouldn't ruin your business. You don't get to monopolize a generic name like furniture.com in perpetuity just because you happened to win an auction before anyone else had heard of ".p2p". It's better for everyone if domains can find themselves in the hands of the people that maximize their value in the long run. It's also sooo much better than the alternative. You won't find that every domain you're interested is taken and parked with some place holding site and you have to get ahold of some DB trying to figure out how much it's worth to you and play games. You'll be able to easily get sites you like for a fair market value.If someone wins a site with the intent to flip it, they will be out there making sales calls to get it sold because once their lease is up they just lost that money. People trying to make money from investing in .p2p domains could become our most aggressive sales force trying to promote .p2p so they can sell the domains quick; holding them loses money.
Being able to outbid an owner of a domain seems bad to me. There is a lot of value the owner of a domain may put into the domain itself. Then you're asking them to pay for this value again to defend against a well funded opponent. It seems like you're going to be fighting for adoption to begin with. Giving this ability to your opponents isn't going to help...
I don't understand how your incentives stop squatting; you're still letting people buy a domain and then renew it indefinitely for a transaction fee.The way I would do it: the domains are owned by the DAC, we rent/lease them for use.People can bid on a 1 year lease. You don't have to do this complicated stuff where half the difference goes to the DAC etc. You just have an auction for a 1 year lease and whoever wins pays the DAC up front for 1 year. They can extend the lease at the same rate whenever they like to keep the lease expiration date up to one year into the future.If someone else has their eye on the domain, they can put in a bid with an upfront payment for a 1 year lease at a higher rate. At that point, the current owner has options. They can sublease the domain to the higher bidder and collect the difference until the date that their lease is up. Or they can continue to extend their lease at a rate that matches the higher offer. If they ignore the bid then they can no longer extend their lease at their old rate and the new bidder takes over when their lease expires.I would also say people who have held domains for a long time have the option to extend their lease further into the future (up to the length of time they've held the domain) So if you've rented it for 3 years you can prepay your lease for 3 years into the future so you know you won't be priced out of your domain without lots of warning. Even if they prepay for 3 years they have to complete at least 1 transaction per year like everyone else to verify they haven't lost their key.
High level goals:1) Make it more profitable to hold shares than names
2) Make it profitable to participate in price discovery
3) Make it profitable to bid high early
the shares will be deflationary and thus someone who attempts to buy a bunch of names early will face higher and higher holding costs until they put the name up for auction again and reset the lease rate....Lease rate remains fixed until name is re-auctioned
Names remain available from the squatters who always have the names for sale.
Lastly, allow someone to exit their lease early and recover the balance of their term. Otherwise squatters have no incentive to give up a name prior to the end of their lease.
As far as bidding rules go you want to achieve the following:1) recognize that bidders are taking a major risk that someone started an auction at a low price and didn't have any intent of bidding higher. This particular attack causes a lot of people to lose money and costs the attacker nothing (they make money when they get outbid)2) because there is no way to tell the difference between this "fake initial bid" and a legitimate bid the best we can do to prevent this kind of attack is to make all bids costly. If you get outbid then you only get 95% of your bid back. This will encourage individuals to bid the winning bid first, rather than risk being outbid.
1) recognize that bidders are taking a major risk that someone started an auction at a low price and didn't have any intent of bidding higher. This particular attack causes a lot of people to lose money and costs the attacker nothing (they make money when they get outbid)
Based upon the value proposition of squatting, it becomes clear that PricePaid * Holding Period becomes the biggest deterrent to squatters. We must also factor in that if the DAC is successful the shares will be deflationary and thus someone who attempts to buy a bunch of names early will face higher and higher holding costs until they put the name up for auction again and reset the lease rate.1) Bid on lease rate2) Lease rate remains fixed until name is re-auctioned3) Lease payments go to shareholders4) You can transfer your lease, but not change the rate.
Quote from: toast on June 29, 2014, 11:09:47 pmThere's another discussion to be had about whether to limit the number of concurrent auctions near the start when it is not clear that the .p2p namespace is worth anything at all, and whether to keep it limited to some larger number once it is just to make it so that humans can go through and evaluate all the domains for sale at a given time.Yes, it's probably a good idea to regulate the flow of auctions to some extent, especially early on. This would help prevent the problem whereby quality names fall through the cracks, are scooped up for dirt cheap, and then squatted on. After all, people are boundedly rational, and they have limited attention and search capabilities.
There's another discussion to be had about whether to limit the number of concurrent auctions near the start when it is not clear that the .p2p namespace is worth anything at all, and whether to keep it limited to some larger number once it is just to make it so that humans can go through and evaluate all the domains for sale at a given time.
Quote from: toast on June 30, 2014, 12:49:30 amYou're missing the fact that you can sell the names off-chain for any price. Since that is possible you mught as well let them do it on-chain for the chance of getting at least something for the network.Sent from my SCH-I535 using TapatalkIs this true? There's really no way to prevent or deter off-chain sales?Then why would a holder ever sell on-chain and give up a fraction of profit to shareholders? Why not run a private off-chain sale or auction and capture all of the rents?
You're missing the fact that you can sell the names off-chain for any price. Since that is possible you mught as well let them do it on-chain for the chance of getting at least something for the network.Sent from my SCH-I535 using Tapatalk
Quote from: amatoB on June 29, 2014, 11:19:44 pmApparently, the proceeds from a resale are largely captured by the network, not by the holder who puts a name back on auction (is this accurate?) A seller can start an auction at whatever price, and will get at least that much (+ kickback ratio * difference). The rest will go to network (dividend ratio on all subsequent bids). Otherwise all sales would be off-market, which would stop us from capturing potential income from bidders the original seller didn't know about.
Apparently, the proceeds from a resale are largely captured by the network, not by the holder who puts a name back on auction (is this accurate?)
Quote from: Agent86 on June 29, 2014, 11:41:08 pmYou can still profit from a domain you added value to by subleasing it. But you can only do this until your lease expires and you are forced to compete on the market again afterwards, right?
You can still profit from a domain you added value to by subleasing it.
QuoteI also think your current plan has big squatter problems.Can you explain? You think it will be worse than .com / .bit, or just "not much better"
I also think your current plan has big squatter problems.
I've thought a solution like yours before and I don't really like it. One issue is that it doesn't let people capture the value they added to a name. The other value proposition of this DAC is that you can finally *own* a domain, not just have it leased to you by ICANN.The goal is not that "your" domain is available (not being 'squatted'), just that it is being sold by someone who wants to sell it to you for a fair price.These incentives just make it more profitable for you not to squat and simply hold nameshares unless you know that you can flip a domain for *higher than what the market currently prices it at*. There is still room for "squatters", but these are more like real estate companies. They want to sell their space and will eat their losses as soon as it becomes obvious they made a bad bet.There's another discussion to be had about whether to limit the number of concurrent auctions near the start when it is not clear that the .p2p namespace is worth anything at all, and whether to keep it limited to some larger number once it is just to make it so that humans can go through and evaluate all the domains for sale at a given time.
So, the proposed system is sort of like a lease. For example, a name might be worth 500, but if a potential cybersquatter can only personally get 100 from putting it on auction later, then they have much less to gain from squatting in the first place. It's a rather clever system, the effectiveness of which will depend on the parameter choices. A lot of thought and tweaking will probably be needed to choose the best implementation of the basic idea to get the economics right.
What are the units and potential variability of the value of the bid? "I bid 100" of what?
Quote from: amatoB on June 29, 2014, 08:43:19 pmQuote from: toast on June 29, 2014, 06:17:17 pm* R needs to be high enough to realistically motivate people to bid as high as they would be willing to pay right form the start. Why is this necessary? In practice (e.g., like on EBay), short auction times can be a powerful motivator to get people to bid at or near their valuations. Couldn't setting R high (to motivate people to bid their true value right from the start) exclude speculators and hinder price discovery? Some auctions might not start at all, with the names sitting idle...The purpose of R is to get information out of people who are willing to bet the domain should be worth more but don't want to actually hold it.Your second point doesn't make sense... if R is high and people are motivated to bid the true value right from the start isn't that the opposite hindering price discovery or having auctions not start at all?
Quote from: toast on June 29, 2014, 06:17:17 pm* R needs to be high enough to realistically motivate people to bid as high as they would be willing to pay right form the start. Why is this necessary? In practice (e.g., like on EBay), short auction times can be a powerful motivator to get people to bid at or near their valuations. Couldn't setting R high (to motivate people to bid their true value right from the start) exclude speculators and hinder price discovery? Some auctions might not start at all, with the names sitting idle...
* R needs to be high enough to realistically motivate people to bid as high as they would be willing to pay right form the start.
Help me reason through these incentives.There are two critical parameters at play, let's call them R (above 0) and D (between 0 and 1).The rules for an auction are:1) The initial required bid is 0.2) Your required_bid is equal to (previous_bid + (R*(previous_bid - previous_required_bid))3) When you place a bid, (D*(your_bid - previous_bid)) goes to dividends and (previous+bid + (1 - D)*(your_bid - previous_bid)) goes to dividends.An example: suppose R = 1 and D = 0.5Brand new auction.I bid 100. My required bid was 0, so the next person must bid 200. (100 goes to dividends as there is no previous bidder)Next person bids 210. His required bid was 200, so next required bid is 220. (Previous bidder gets 150, 50 goes to dividends)Next person bids 300. His required bid was 220, so next required bid is 380. (Previous bidder gets 255, 45 goes to dividends).Thoughts:* R needs to be high enough to realistically motivate people to bid as high as they would be willing to pay right form the start. I'm thinking this might happen even with a value less than 1.* D needs to be low enough to motivate people to call people out on low bids, but high enough to make outbidding yourself not worth it (extra price buffer more worthwhile than money you save from your own kickback).