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Here are some strategies
https://cryptotrader.org/strategies
https://tradewave.net/help/trading
(Moving Average Crossover
Bollinger Band Mean Reversion
Honey Badger Ice Float
Breakout w/ Mathews Drop
OBV Lite 1.4
6 SAR Harmonica)
If exchanges use exchange.bts/exchange.fiat pairs then should be no problem.
However, it seems like the UIA issuer cannot collect market fee (in BTS!) from the trader who will be "receiving BTS" (a.k.a. UIA sellers) when a trade takes place. Why is that? Don't you think it's necessary for UIA issuer to be able to collect market fee from both the UIA buyer and seller, instead of the buyer only?
In this new build all my imported accounts are gone. I only have the new one I created?
did you try ctrl+r ?
1. Place orders that sit on the books for at least X minutes if they get filled instantly (less than X min) we will assume you are trading against yourself to "MINE" "MAKER_SHARES".
As you said it, metaexchange "had the problem in exchanging bitBTC - BTC". AFAIK, nobody - absolutely no businesses are pegging 1 bitBTC : 1 real BTC in the bitshares DEX. But why? IMHO, the risk of losses is probably too high to justify any profit.
BitUSD would become something worth at least $1.00 with a negative interest rate. A negative interest rate creates a net present value less than $1.00. You could achieve the same thing by saying that BitUSD is worth at least $0.99 in which case all you are doing is shifting the price and doing nothing about the premium.
Suppose that open orders to sell BitUSD paid a yield in BTS that was significant. For a certain amount of yield we could find plenty of participants willing to short BitUSD and sell near the feed. All we need to do is define a budget and a payout equation that rewards those who are SHORT and have orders placed near the feed AND keep them there for a while. An algorithm that is also efficient to implement will be required.
General rules:
1) When in oversupply, destruction (settling) should be incentivized
2) When in undersupply, creation (shorting) should be incentivized
Longs should pay the shorts a premium since shorts have more risk. If you know of a a trust-less system such that longs and shorts have equal risks, please publish that -- that will be exactly what we should do. So far no one in the world has come up with such a system.
Thats what we need to figure outi believe that the incentive of maintaining a good rep is better long term, but at the same time its True we would never know when someone could scam. Its something but not enough.
It doesnt necessarily mean someone is onymous. You can have a reputation for handling businesses on bloclchain and earn your share without anyone knowing your real identity.of course every can exist scam at any moment but having a rep is also an incentive not to scam as long term you can end up doing more money.
Plus, no one is limited to one account
You can have one.to handle your business or whatever you want to só with your rep and have another different account. Then its up to you not to let yourself be linked to your rep account.
Reputation systems could open the door to a whole number of other things. We still have lots of stuff to do first, but would like to know what you think about this and how we could use it.
