Interesting blog, I agree with most of the points.
What are you views on requiring locked up stake to vote frequently as well in order to receive maximum reward?
As you say...
"When power is in the hands of users who have a long-term capital commitment to a project they have greater incentive to vote because they cannot sell for months or years."
So when you ask those users who have made a long term commitment as investors to BTS to vote as part of the requirement it's likely those investors will make quality votes especially when there is an incentive to do so. (Perhaps using a proxy should be rewarded slightly less.)
I think it has a good chance of achieving a lot of positive results, though it should probably start with A LOT of advance notice so that the market is prepared for it. (If it was ever applied to BTS) While it should work, if it doesn't work in practice to substantially increase active voting stake but ends up mostly rewarding the small minority that are already long term investors who are actively voting, then it would be paying for work that is currently received for 'free' and hence reduce the value of BTS, in which case it should be stopped. So perhaps there should be some sort of voting stake target to aim for.