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There have been many discussions over the past 6 months about having paid workers separate from Delegates as well as changing the maximum income per worker without increasing the dilution limit. I would like to explore how this might look and see what ideas you all can come up with.
Step 1: Assume there are at most 432,000 BTS per day available to be paid to workers. (50 BTS every 10 seconds)
Step 2: Assume there is a list of projects that specify how much they need paid each day.
Step 3: Pay out projects in order of total approval once per day until all 432,000 BTS has been consumed.
Step 4: Have several projects that payout to no one (burning) and thus prevent dilution.
Next define each project in terms of the following parameters:
1) Start Date
2) Fundings to Receive Per Day
3) End Date for Funding
4) Vesting Period for Funds Received
Next give each account the ability to vote *FOR* or *AGAINST* each funding proposal.
Sort all projects by NET votes including the burn projects.
Each projects funding would flow to an account with multi-sig authority (for serious projects that demand accountability).
Under this model I would propose the following project:
We have 7 core developers that need at least $25,000 per month (combined) just to pay for Food, Shelter, and Clothing and earning 1/4 what they could make on the free market. These 7 core developers form a company that produces a wallet and profits from referral income. This company would have a funded project with a roadmap for BTS and would receive 250,000 BTS per day that their project is in the top list of projects for 4 years. The funds would not vest for 5 years which means the core company would not sell their 250,000 BTS/day for 5 years. 5 years is long enough that the project is either a success and the dilution is insignificant or a complete failure and the shares are worthless anyway. Either way existing BTS holders benefit from work today that is ultimately paid for in 5 years. Each year the devs can re-negotiate their project funding and shareholders can vote in new terms as the vote down the old terms.
At any time this developer company could be fired by giving more votes to a burn proposal or an alternative set of developers. When they are fired they stop receiving new income but must still wait for 5 years before they can touch any of the BTS they have already earned.
This would have the core devs consuming about half of the available dilution (3% per year) and allowing the community room to fund other projects with the remaining half of the funds.
Currently the Core DEVs have about 15 paid delegate slots and their pay vests immediately. Under this new approach their combined pay would be 3x higher but it wouldn't vest for 5 years. Perhaps most importantly, this would still keep the number of block producers decentralized and keep the sell pressure caused by dilution at bay. Additionally it makes it easier for shareholders to vote for one "company" than for individual developers which may come and go without accountability.
By having VOTES AGAINST a project it becomes easier for stakeholders to vote down projects they explicitly don't want funded in the event of a change in circumstances.
Thoughts?
In this post I introduced some economic analysis: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,16127.0.html
It has been nicely summed up by Thom.
- Buying 1 BitUSD should always be the most cost effective means to purchase BTS
- USD : BitUSD market price + BitUSD : BTS market price should be factored into the BTS : USD price feed
- It is far better for price feeds to error in the favor of BitUSD holders than in the favor of shorts
- Cashing out of BTS should be done more efficiently (for USD through other channels) than using BitUSD
- Creating BitUSD
will*should* always cost more than $1.00- BitUSD will initially be created by individuals who want to stay in a crypto currency but wish to have a price floor.
Two which the main critiques were:
1. An assumption that BitAssets 2.0 depends upon USD/BitUSD gateways (false assumption)
2. I didn't say *how* to achieve all of the *shoulds*
3. I need to be laser focused and this whole discussion is a distraction and BitAssets 1.0 is "just fine".
Now I would like to respond:
BTA 2.0 approach does not depend upon USD/BitUSD gateways, it merely indicates that if there was a market between BitUSD and IOU USD that it should trade at 1.00 or greater at all times assuming the IOU was from a reliable source. If we assume that there is an IOU USD issuer on the blockchain, that means that traders have two ways to get into BTS: Buy BitUSD and Sell for BTS and Buy BTS directly with their USD. Both markets would occur on the blockchain. Given the existence of both markets and our target of making sure that BitUSD is always worth *AT LEAST* $1.00 then buying BitUSD for $1.00 should always be a win (or at least equal) if your goal is to buy BTS.
Lets assume that the on chain IOU USD vs BTS market was very liquid and its 1hr moving average was used as the price feed. What incentive would someone with USD have to buy BitUSD first?
1. They must pay IOU USD Trading Fees Either Way
2. They must pay BitUSD trading fees *if* they go through BitUSD
3. Going through BitUSD allows them to "buy" without slippage if they buy in large quantities
4. They are free from counter party risk while trading.
Based upon these points the following things would result in me just buying BTS directly with USD rather than buying BitUSD first.
1. High trading fees for BitUSD would make two hops more expensive
2. A lag/time delay
3. I can get more BTS via IOU USD than via BitUSD
Based upon this analysis I would do the following:
1. 0% fee for forced liquidation
2. As short as possible, I think instant forced settlement at the feed is the way to go.
3. Allow all BitUSD to be force liquidated at the feed at any time.
4. very low trading fees for BitUSD assets
What these rules would imply for the BitUSD shorts:
1. Don't sell below the feed.
2. Don't sell within the error range of the feed
3. Maintain high collateral at all times to minimize risk of being called.
4. There is an implicit "no shorting below the feed" rule.
5. Shorts may have to sell above the feed, but they also have to cover above the feed thus the position is USD neutral
6. In addition to USD price change risk, shorts also face premium change risk that could go for or against them.
What these rules would imply for BitUSD longs:
1. To buy the first BitUSD requires you to pay to cover the shorts risks... a premium equal to the feed error / other factors
2. You can likely sell your BitUSD for a similar premium thus you are still protected from volatility and the "premium" doesn't matter to traders/hedgers.
3. You can easily sell your BitUSD for USD at 1:1 to someone looking to buy BTS (they profit by the premium on internal market).
4. You would almost never request forced settlement because you would end up forfeiting the premium.
What these rules would imply for the Price Feed:
1. The less error it has the lower the premium on the internal market.
2. Shorts carry 99% of the price-feed risk, shorts can be forced to cover at the feed.
3. Longs carry ~0% of the price feed risk, if the feed is manipulated too low they can just refuse to sell.
What the outside world would see:
1. BitUSD always trades for more than $1.00 worth of BTS.
2. BitUSD : IOU USD market is the most liquid / lowest spread
3. BitUSD has the lowest trading fees agains BTS
4. If I accept BitUSD as payment I know I can sell it for $1.00 (or more) worth of value.
In a bull market BitUSD is still not sold below the feed due to instant forced settlement
In a bear market the premium for creating new BitUSD goes up.
In conclusion I would like to submit that from a traders perspective BitUSD constantly trading a couple percent above USD against BTS is just as good as trading near 0% because the RELATIVE price movements are all the same. From the perspective of merchants and everyone else you want them to know that 1 BitUSD to USD is the floor and ALWAYS a safe price to exchange at.
与最近的盗币无关，下跌是趋势。除非BTS本质上的改变，否则长期跌势改不了，除庄外，已经没多少散户跟再放钱进去了。说白了，3I从上一年年末开始就一直没有什么大作为，所以价格也一直跌。这是价值问题，众人对3I信任的价值问题，失去了就很难回来了。
But the main part that slows sync is HDD not CPU. The software could also use more RAM that is left unused.
Sorry it already uses too much RAM lol
We are working to reduce RAM and CPU.
We are attending the Texas Bitcoin Conference in Austin on the 27 -29th of March.
Notes will be liquid by then (on the BTS blockchain) Expect news then, last week of march.
Thanks to everyone for your patience (:
If the best that the Chinese marketing and PR (head/spokesman) can come up with is an UIA like this....we are in deep deep shit.
(As the western side of that department is a sink hole at best, as we all must know by now)
Bter.com tweet https://twitter.com/btercom/status/573043042329882624QuoteSorry for the long wait. We will solve the security issue completely and get all altcoins online and enable the withdrawals in a week.
Edit: added 'quotes'
Altcoins yes. What about Bitcoins?
They lost ALL their Bitcoin, hot+cold wallet. What do you expect? Bitcoin balances are totally screwed. Only your altcoin balance is safe (IF they keep their promise of allow altcoin withdrawals in a week).
