submitted issue for BSIP: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/13

Quote from: xeroc on May 05, 2016, 10:22:47 am

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This is the percent to adjust the feed price in the short's favor in the event of a forced settlement.

This is what I've been saying all the time. You're stealing from the holders in favour of the shorters.

Bitcrab/Transwiser are shorters, so they clearly have their own interests at stake here, yet he claims to be acting in the best interest of the network. Just like last time we had a discussion (and rushed actionism) about forced settlement.

transwiser is a gateway, it is not always a shorter or holder, depend on the supply/demand of a smartcoin, actually in current moment transwiser is a shorter of bitCNY and holder of TCNY(with 1% offset), you can check the transaction records of btareserve, this account requested settlement of about 100k TCNY in the last 2 weeks, if bitCNY is applied 1% offset, it's very possbile that more users would like to short bitCNY and transwiser will be a holder of bitCNY.

Quote from: bitcrab on May 03, 2016, 05:11:20 am

in China now transwiser is the only gateway that handle the deposit/withdraw of bitCNY and TCNY. btareserve is the main userid of transwiser, you can check the current data of bitCNY and TCNY at http://cryptofresh.com/a/CNY and http://cryptofresh.com/a/TCNY , one obvious fact is that for bitCNY, transwiser always need to short to supply bitCNY to users and now has a big debt, because users always prefer to buy bitCNY from transwiser than short by himself, as they are afraid to be force settled. for TCNY, transwiser now have net balance without any debt, as users would like to short by themselves.

sometimes as gateway, transwiser has to issue force settlement of TCNY with paying 1% offset for liquidity, anyway this is better than the status that transwiser always has to short. if bitCNY be set 1% offset, I believe shorters will provide more bitCNY however holders do not always need to issue force settlement, as bitCNY is more wildly used and can be used in several trade pairs.

the voice from the main market area should be a main reference on whether and how to modify a smartcoin's parameters, now in China community most of the members support this change.

Well, I interpret that as the voice of transwiser who is taking the risk
of shorting bitcny into existence. But it has been your decision to do
so and should be part of your risk considerations.

Having said that, I still see merits in "asking for a 1% fee" (i.e.
settlement offset of 1%) or even a variable percentage in order to get
the non-settlement trades closer to the peg and reduce the premium.

However, I recognize the issues @pc is having with "changing the rules
mid-game" but the rules will only change if the shareholders agree (i.e.
do not disagree) and thus such proposal should have a long expiration.
30 days may even be to short.

I don't think we should rush this topic but instead prepare properly. I
would like to see some statistics about the actual premium for bitassets
(against settlement price) over time. Maybe @abit can help with this
using he new plugin.

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@xeroc afaik, MAKER use variable settlement offset in the design, the higher the collateral ratio, the higher the settlement offset, this is reasonable, and this means it is not fee charged by network, but a compensation from settler to shorter. surely BTS can also consider similar variable settlement offset, but I still strongly propose to do a simple parameter change first for bitCNY, as to implement a variable settlement offset may cost much long time.

I don't have a direct contact to chinese investors/CNY holders, but we
might want to use bitCNY to test a settlement offset before even
considering other smartcoins. That way, a change only affects CNY
holders and not USD, GOLD holders but I don't know how to best approach
this

this topic is not only relevant to transwiser, it is relevant to the whole ecosystem, I take transwiser and bitCNY/TCNY as example to show that 0 offset really discourage shorters, if shorters are always discouraged, with low supply level smatcoin cannot play the role of a senseful trading medium.

yes, we should  first apply the change to bitCNY and observe what's the different behavior between bitCNY and other smartcoins, especially bitUSD, this can also help us to understand "what will 1% offset bring"  more deeply.

however, I think 30 days expiration is long enough, we need to balance stability and efficiency.

@pc
suppose Alice buy some BTS at 0.04CNY and short them to get 1000 bitCNY to buy some assets, the margin call price of the debt position is 0.02CNY, if the BTS price fall to 0.03CNY and Alice's debt position is force settled, is she hurt?

the normal business logic is: she borrow 1000 bitCNY with enough collateral, then the collateral should not be force settled except that the collateral price fall below the margin call price.

you may say that she can buy BTS at 0.03CNY and hedge this risk, but she need to pay time and effort to follow what happen, and even when she try to do this, she may not able to find the chance to buy BTS at 0.03CNY as the price always change quickly, anyway she need to pay more cost of time/effort/chance to avoid loss. this is why she is hurt.

holder has the choice of whether to issue force settlement, but shorter has no option to refuse being force settled.

Quote from: bitcrab on May 01, 2016, 02:09:27 pm

in 0 offset setting, the holder is ok but the shorter is always hurt. why should the holder have power to force the shorter to sell BTS to him without any compensation? the 0 offset setting discourage shorting, means it discourage bitasset supply.

We've had that discussion before. Settlement doesn't hurt anybody because it happens at face value. Compensation is not necessary.

Changing the rules in the proposed way *does* hurt holders, by devaluating their holdings by 1% in favour of shorters.

You haven't answered my question about your motivation for this proposal.

I have told the motivation clearly  -  to encourage more bitasset supply to fulfill trade demands.
I haven't saw your discussion, but the 0 offset setting really hurt the shorter, maybe only a robber will think he definitely have the power to force a shorter to sell the collateral just at the settlement price.

Quote from: bitcrab on May 01, 2016, 02:09:27 pm

this is not changing rules in mid-game, the design of BTS2.0 set the committee mechanism for parameter change, now and then there are necessity to review some parameters and make necessary change,  a reasonable change with good notice work will benefit the whole economy.

This change is not "necessary". If you think it is, prove it. All I've seen here are assumptions and wild speculations.
You haven't answered my question about TCNY/TUSD either, despite the fact that you're the issuer and should know the answer.

the 0 offset hurt the shorters and discourage the bitassets supply - that is why it need to be changed, I cannot convince you if you do not want to understand.

TUSD is just defined but not actually put into use, so now let me compare the behavior of bitCNY and TCNY.

in China now transwiser is the only gateway that handle the deposit/withdraw of bitCNY and TCNY. btareserve is the main userid of transwiser, you can check the current data of bitCNY and TCNY at http://cryptofresh.com/a/CNY and http://cryptofresh.com/a/TCNY , one obvious fact is that for bitCNY, transwiser always need to short to supply bitCNY to users and now has a big debt, because users always prefer to buy bitCNY from transwiser than short by himself, as they are afraid to be force settled. for TCNY, transwiser now have net balance without any debt, as users would like to short by themselves.

sometimes as gateway, transwiser has to issue force settlement of TCNY with paying 1% offset for liquidity, anyway this is better than the status that transwiser always has to short. if bitCNY be set 1% offset, I believe shorters will provide more bitCNY however holders do not always need to issue force settlement, as bitCNY is more wildly used and can be used in several trade pairs.

the voice from the main market area should be a main reference on whether and how to modify a smartcoin's parameters, now in China community most of the members support this change.

@xeroc afaik, MAKER use variable settlement offset in the design, the higher the collateral ratio, the higher the settlement offset, this is reasonable, and this means it is not fee charged by network, but a compensation from settler to shorter. surely BTS can also consider similar variable settlement offset, but I still strongly propose to do a simple parameter change first for bitCNY, as to implement a variable settlement offset may cost much long time.



 

You cannot make sure that every holder of bitassets will notice.

The settlement function is the "guarantee" that holders can exchange their bitassets for the equivalent worth of BTS. Bitasset holders have bought under the assumption that this guarantee will hold. Now you want to reduce that guarantee from "equivalent worth" to "99% of its value", which will automatically devalue the affected bitassets and effectively rob bitasset owners of 1% of their holdings.

IMO we're going to lose all credibility if we start changing the rules in mid-game.

in 0 offset setting, the holder is ok but the shorter is always hurt. why should the holder have power to force the shorter to sell BTS to him without any compensation? the 0 offset setting discourage shorting, means it discourage bitasset supply.

this is not changing rules in mid-game, the design of BTS2.0 set the committee mechanism for parameter change, now and then there are necessity to review some parameters and make necessary change,  a reasonable change with good notice work will benefit the whole economy.

in China community - the main area that use bitCNY - bitCNY is accepted well, but always the supply is not enough, considering there will be more assets be traded in DEX, the supply of bitCNY is far from enough, this change mainly intent to encourage shorting.

I'll check and draft a BSIP.
 

China community has some discussion on the parameter of bitCNY. most of the community member agree that some modification of the bitCNY parameters can make this smartcoin work better, I had issued a poll https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,22335.0.html to get opinions on such a change:

"force_settlement_offset_percent": from 0 to 1%   //to encourage the shorters
"maximum_force_settlement_volume": from 2% to 0.5% //as this parameter is per hour, not per day, so 2% is still too high, 0.5% is more reasonable

up to now the number of supporters:objectors is 8:1

I propose such a change based on my observation on the behavior of bitCNY and TCNY, obviously bitCNY is more acceptable than TCNY, however one interesting the 1% settlement offset actually encourage users to short TCNY, now I have about 50k TCNY in my hand without any debt -  because there are some other users to short and made me have no chance to short.

for one smartcoin it is necessary to encourage the shorters to provide more supply, and it seems always not easy for a privatized smartcoin to get enough trust like public smartcoin, previously I created TCNY because the parameters of bitCNY is not satisfying enough, but now I changed my mind - to do some change to bitCNY is a better way - to make one public smartcoin the best one will benefit the whole economy.

plan to discuss this topic in committee.

any thoughts?

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爆仓，平仓和强清这三样要分清楚。

杠杆的风险对应的是爆仓的风险，BTS跌到爆仓价格就触发爆仓，任何补贴都没有，shorter自担风险，没问题。

强清是系统赋予持有者的权力，对shorter来说是一种剥夺，那么根据权责平衡的原则来讲，一定的补贴是需要的，显然开发者也明白这一点，不然根本没必要设强清补贴率这个参数。

shorter天地锁拿到bitCNY后，可以把bitCNY花出去，可以拿bitCNY来平仓，也可以拿bitCNY来强清别人，只要别人的bitCNY债仓的抵押率更低的话。

一般杠杆期货是有固定交割时间期限的，而short没有，可能很短，也可以很长。这算是利与弊吧，如果说要给shorter一个保障的话那就设定新的short单要一个月后才可被强清。

这不现实，要做大改动，而且一个月后才可被强清也算不上什么保障，还会造成发起强清的持有者可能无法完成强清。