The same way you inform others that GHash is doublespending on a gambling site ... you make a post in the community, news, forums ....

We can't make shareholders re-vote, why can we make them read the forum? Also, what should be used as a proof of the words?

Its a block chain. Everything is public

I mean what protocol should I follow to detect misbehavior.

There are those forging pools or whatever NXT calls them.  So we  realize you don't call them Delegates, but what happens if 51%+ of them are malicious and ignore the blocks of the minority?  Can the rest of the network recover?

Max period for delegation of power is 32767 blocks.

Thank you Come-from-Beyond, for helping us harden our security model, and harden our theories backing up our current system.

It's more about whitepaper now.

I see that the whitepaper lacks the following:
1. Protocol that allows to detect hostile delegates (with some quantitative analysis on probabilities of detection).
2. Protocol how hard-fork is handled.

This is a serious obstacle to world domination because the outer world doesn't know what to do in extraordinary cases. It will not figure out the details by itself and will simply pick another cryptocurrency.

This whole thread has been focused on the implausible scenario in which most delegates are compromised. Exploring handling for such extreme cases is healthy, but it's important to keep the probability context in mind.

Actually the thread was derailed with bribery example. The point was supposed to be - if delegates control the only medium of exchange then this channel cannot be used for sending information that affect the delegates.

People who accept bribes think there's a high likelihood they won't get caught.

The delegates don't know who they're screwing over in an attack but the shareholders would  know who the majority of them are.

Finding a large group of people willing to take this risk is almost completely implausible especially high trust individuals who are elected based on established reputations.

If majority accepted the bribe then you will earn nothing because your blocks will be ignored. Game theory tells that you will follow the majority as long as risk of being caught and voted-out is below some threshold. You don't know what threshold the others chose so you start observing if Bob included voting-out transactions. With non-zero probability Bob can be a honest delegate but he picks all non-voting-out transactions (pure random). What will you do? More likely you will think that Bob is rogue. There is a bias towards scenario when delegates decide to abuse the power. Sybil attack makes it less risky to go the bad route.

I assumed that people will update their votes to make sure they can get all 100 evil delegates replaced by good ones so that the honest chain can take over.

Now we need something to distinguish bad and good delegates.