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Messages - bitcrab

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1501

is it possible to add some economic incentive for voting?  for example is it possible to give voters some reward when the voted witness generate a new block? even a little reward can encourage voting.

Thought experiment:

Suppose every account had a knob we could turn increasing their pay until they were incentivized to take the time to vote.
One would assume that at that price they are still not incentivized to take the time to become suitably informed to vote.
So at this point, their vote is just a random variable reflecting lack of information or, worse, just the easily available disinformation. 
We could generate such uninformed, random votes automatically at much lower cost.
Why would we pay to inject their human generated equivalent into the system?
How much higher would you have to turn the dial to get them to study everything they need to know to vote wisely?
How would you prove they had actually done that work to earn the higher pay rate?

while discussing this, we need first to follow the decentralization principle, to say "generate votes" is just as saying "we can ask a consultant institution to decide who will be US President, the institution is more professional in doing this".

and here we can first focus on the witness voting, this does not cost much time for information, the "block missing rate" can be a main factor to estimate one witness.

while the voted witness generate block, the voter get some reward, and while the voted witness miss block, there will be some penalty to the voter.
the result: more voting, more efficient witness voted. more security network.

also just thought expriment.



 

1502
 +5%

1503
原来的开发的计划里就有Bond Market的,我觉得很好很急需,但现在bm离开后不知开发能不能继续。

基于BTS的金融业务能搞多大,还是要看能给bitCNY/bitUSD开发多少应用,transwiser正在开发ETH系,小蚁,BTC,USDT(tether)等资产的自动充提,希望能有所帮助。

顺利的话,再过十几天bitCNY强清就要付给shorter 1%的价格补偿了,那时shorter对强清的担忧应该会大大降低。

6月22日区块链北京峰会,transwiser会参加项目路演,我到时会仔细介绍一下现在的BTS.
bond market 是什么概念

简单说,就是P2P抵押借款,比如你拿BTS抵押给我向我借BITcny,现在的价格我可以不要求两倍抵押,1倍抵押就够了,但我要向你收利息。到期不还抵押的BTS自动转给我。
你借出bitCNY,很可能不想要BTS。

按照BM之前给出的一个设计,到期不还、或者出现资不抵债(爆仓)情况,抵押物直接在市场上卖掉,然后给你bitCNY,保证本金。按这个思路,需要市场深度足够,才能避免黑天鹅。并且爆仓卖抵押物会有连锁反应,计算量比较大(据说p网每次大量爆仓时系统都会卡),实现不好会影响出块,导致整个网络宕机。

如果不保本,不自动爆仓,借出者也承担风险,相对好做一点。但是不知道这样的话,来用的人会多还是少?

市场不缺投机者和冒险家。
比如现在的价位,一倍抵押我就愿意借出bitCNY, 收个10-15%的年化利率就好,到时不还,我就当是直接买BTS了。风险可控的。
当然,这个需要系统最好有一定的征信功能配合,能够根据历史表现评价一个借入者的信用。不然借入者可以根据价格变化选择还还是不还,借出者风险就大了。

1504
TL;DR Don't know whether this be considered in the thread yet:
 If we want to automatically have top 15 witnesses multi-sig the BTC wallet, we need to improve voting participation first, otherwise for example btc38 would be able to steal the fund easily.

 
is this a big problem of DPoS? now in theory btc38 can build up 29 witnesses and vote them on to replace the current ones, is that a big risk of the system?

that is not the worst, the worst is if btc38 is hacked and the hacker get the whole BTS in the wallet, he can control all the witnesses

is it possible to add some economic incentive for voting?  for example is it possible to give voters some reward when the voted witness generate a new block? even a little reward can encourage voting.



1505
@dannotestein could you update us on this proposal? you are still working on this, right? and what's your plan on it in the coming future?

1506
Thanks to the committee members that support this proposal, currently the proposal has got enough approval and will be executed at 21st,  June.

kindly remind relevant parties, especially bitCNY holders, to be aware of this and take actions if you feel necessary.

1507
I don't think we need to rebrand BitShares as such, partly because I don't like rebranding in general (wastes precious time, sends a conflicting message, and usually leads me to suspect it's being done because of mistakes made in the past) and partly because I don't think it is a bad name.

But I do think it would be beneficial to promote the use of the term DEX as "ours" in our marketing literature (web site, social media, and even the web wallet). I use this term all the time in telegram/slack, as do many others, to describe our trading network. So I suggest we keep BitShares to describe the coin and the chain and use "the DEX" to describe the actual market that runs on the chain.

 +5%

1508
原来的开发的计划里就有Bond Market的,我觉得很好很急需,但现在bm离开后不知开发能不能继续。

基于BTS的金融业务能搞多大,还是要看能给bitCNY/bitUSD开发多少应用,transwiser正在开发ETH系,小蚁,BTC,USDT(tether)等资产的自动充提,希望能有所帮助。

顺利的话,再过十几天bitCNY强清就要付给shorter 1%的价格补偿了,那时shorter对强清的担忧应该会大大降低。

6月22日区块链北京峰会,transwiser会参加项目路演,我到时会仔细介绍一下现在的BTS.
bond market 是什么概念

简单说,就是P2P抵押借款,比如你拿BTS抵押给我向我借BITcny,现在的价格我可以不要求两倍抵押,1倍抵押就够了,但我要向你收利息。到期不还抵押的BTS自动转给我。

1509
原来的开发的计划里就有Bond Market的,我觉得很好很急需,但现在bm离开后不知开发能不能继续。

基于BTS的金融业务能搞多大,还是要看能给bitCNY/bitUSD开发多少应用,transwiser正在开发ETH系,小蚁,BTC,USDT(tether)等资产的自动充提,希望能有所帮助。

顺利的话,再过十几天bitCNY强清就要付给shorter 1%的价格补偿了,那时shorter对强清的担忧应该会大大降低。

6月22日区块链北京峰会,transwiser会参加项目路演,我到时会仔细介绍一下现在的BTS.

1510
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 内盘问题
« on: May 31, 2016, 11:22:38 am »
简化 bts1元一个
初始工资1w bts
市值1w 抵押5000 买5000市值bts 循环抵押
最后抵押2w的bts bitcny没有。
bitcny债务是1wbts对应的bitcny

bitCNY   |   bts          |     bitcny/bts   |   市值   |   抵押bts借一半bitcny
                10000.00 |   1.00    |   10000.00    |   5000.00
5000.00    |   4950.50    |   1.01    |   5000.00    |   2500.00
2500.00    |   2450.74    |   1.02    |   2500.00    |   1250.00
1250.00    |   1213.24    |   1.03    |   1250.00    |   625.00
625.00    |   600.61    |   1.04    |   625.00    |   312.50
312.50    |   297.33    |   1.05    |   312.50    |   156.25
156.25    |   147.19    |   1.06    |   156.25    |   78.13
78.13    |   72.87    |   1.07    |   78.13    |   39.06
39.06    |   36.07    |   1.08    |   39.06    |   19.53
                        9980.46875
这个alt很早以前讨论过。
买到你的cny的人,发起强清,同时砸盘,怎么应对?

这样搞就是人为制造bitCNY的通胀。
很多的bitCNY要寻找出路,很多强清就在所难免。
最终发起bitCNY拉盘的人只会亏损。
土豪要这么干拦不着,但搞worker干这个不会被通过的。



1511
As one of the community's most active traders and from a financial market theory perspective, i support @pc perspective on this. I also share @Empirical1.2 frustrations in having many short positions force settled on me; however, I've been on the settlement initiation side of trades many times and it is a very valuable feature.

@pc is correct that this is mainly an issue in bear markets. From personal experience, it has SUCKED pouring more and more collateral into my shorts just to keep them open, but that's a reasonable price to pay for the leverage on the upside when market conditions reverse, and for the fact that I've sold all of my short assets at premiums to begin with.

#1 priority is to guarantee parity with the underlying asset. Forced settlement seems the best way to do this. We cannot compromise on this priority or we lose one of our biggest value propositions in the smartcoin market.

#2 there are times when asset holders, mainly Chinese CNY from my experience, value immediate liquidation and so put their assets up for sale at discounts to the feed price; this is where market makers like myself and @JonnyBitcoin come in, buy at a discount, and settle for some risky profit (risky in that the feed can fluctuation in the next 24 hours).

#3 we all know the rules of the game going into any trade, these are built into our expectations ex ante, and so the prices we choose to initiate ought to compensate for the risk of forced settlement.

What could be improved is the old idea we've punted in this community about compensating short positions with some sort of yield on collateral. This would further incentivize short initiations, especially in bear markets. Once we're back to a bull market, it'll be irrelevant.


I was reading all comments and opinions about this proposal.

After considering the case I decided to vote against the BSIP 16 and to not support a change of the CNY settlement parameters.

PC made his point clear enough that we should not break the trust in the guarantee of getting at least 1 CNY back. This could have another negative impact on the BitShares ecosystem and further harm our reputation in the crypto community. I think the current settlement parameters are fine and the spread will get tighter when volume picks up. Please don't forget we are at the beginning of this payment platform and we see many anomalies due to low volumes.

I also think that market makers like cylonmaker2053 and JonnyBitcoin know the trading risks and can evaluate the associated risks and potential profits. Shorting and providing liquidity is not for everyone and should be handled by experts who know how to create a derivate. I am looking forward to adding bankers to the BitShares platform so that they can add their market expertise and help us with the market creation. Creating a derivate is banking 101. Just replace BTS with USD and every banker knows what you are talking about.

cheers Chris4210

I haven't expected that it's so difficult to push such a change.

China community is the main bitCNY ecosystem,  here users can deposit/withdraw bitCNY with fiat,  most of the users support this change,  but seems their opinion is less important than some outside speculators'?

Bitshares is a decentralized platform, anyone can short if he like, this is simple trading, no need to suppose only seldom experts can/should do that.

if shorters are forced to sell his collateral without any compensation when the collateral price is above the margin call price, there is no reputation on this system. you guys always mention "guarantee" to holders, but who has thought in the place of shorters?

we cannot expect a financial system where everyone like to hold but seldom like to short can grow big enough. 

if we do not change, shorters will always worry of being force settled and we can not expect enough supply of bitCNY.

20+ days left for the committee proposal, let's see what will happen.

1512
before the deposit/withhraw UI is ready, if you want to withdraw, please just send TRANS.DAO to transwiser-wallet and specify your ETH address in the memo.

1513

if you are bitCNY holder or shorter, or if this change is important to you for any reason,  please pay necessary attention to the status of the voting and take according action while necessary.

Ironically, bitCNY holders who will be robbed of 1% of their holdings by the proposal cannot vote.


worker proposal 1.14.39: http://cryptofresh.com/workers

Why the worker?

every shareholders can vote to the committee members that hold the same opinion with him.

the worker is to see the opinion of the shareholders, as suggested.

1514
actually I feel the worker owners need to give some report/explanation on the current status of the workers. community are not aware whether the owners still pay time and effort on these workers, especially after some developers switch to STEEM.

in China community the "vote the workers out" voice rise again. if you need to convince them that the worker is necessary you need to explain to them.

1515
after all the necessary process, now this proposal is on the final step, the committee proposal is created and will expire in 06/21.

if you are bitCNY holder or shorter, or if this change is important to you for any reason,  please pay necessary attention to the status of the voting and take according action while necessary.

relevant links:

committee proposal: http://cryptofresh.com/p/1.10.286
worker proposal 1.14.39: http://cryptofresh.com/workers
BSIP:https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0016.md
discussion thread:https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,22355.0.html  https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,22416.0.html

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