接下去要扩展的话， 我觉得有三个交易对可以考虑。

bitCNY/USDT
BTS/ETH
BTS/EOS

这其中，又以第一个可期望获得的支持最大，虽然bitCNY现在还是残废状态，但如果把bitCNY/USDT交易对做起来的话，可以减少强清，减少系统去杠杆的压力。相当于给bitCNY持有者送温暖，也相当于给整个系统送温暖，长远来看，这个交易对也有望成为bitCNY除了承兑之外的另外一条对外通道。

ETH是目前CEX里面除了BTC和USDT之外与BTS交易量最大的，EOS则因为与BTS同属石墨烯系，用户交集很大。

当然，大赛奖励资金有限，所以考虑扩展的话，应该是bitCNY/USDT第一优先。

Currently BTS suffer big problems in several sides.

bitCNY and bitUSD devalued greatly, bring big loss to holders and hurt reputation a lot.
Most of the workers are voted down, core team do not have a clear future, some members are considering to leave.
China community and Western community conflict in some key problems.

Bitshares is in a dilemma, Bithares need to find a way to reborn.

Bitshaes has flaws from initial design, simply speaking:
1.smartcoins operation request BTS be robust in price, otherwise shorting attack will have chance to make smartcoin crash, as well as BTS.
2.worker proposal also request BTS be robust in price, otherwise the inflation also have chance to make BTS crash in bear market.

China community press "STOP" in a simple and crude way, it really "stop" the problems but what we need is to solve the problems.

In my view, we need some shift on paradigm, at this moment we need to focus on how to make BTS generate enough income to sustain BTS price.

Based on this idea, I have a simple review on the candidate BSIPs and classify them into 3 categories:

Class A: BSIPs that will help to generate system income directly, and are in controlled development cost and risk.

BSIP74：Margin Call Fee Ratio
BSIP86: Share market fees to the network
BSIP81: Simple Maker-Taker Market Fees
BSIP85：Maker Order Creation Fee Discount

Class B: BSIP - irrelevant to generating income directly, however is important and in low development cost and risk

BSIP62：  Close Short Position     
BSIP71：  Add "Prevent Global Settlement" Flag for Smartcoin
BSIP73：  Match Force-Settlement Orders with Margin Calls and Limit Orders
BSIP61：  Operation to Update Limit Orders
BSIP39:   Automatically approve proposals by the proposer
BSIP64:   Optional HTLC preimage length, HASH160 addition, and memo field

Class C: BSIP - too complicated, uncontrollable development cost and risk, or the feature is not important and in early stage.

BSIP70:  Peer-to-Peer Leveraged Trading
BSIP69:  Additional Assert Predicates
BSIP57：Managed Vesting Balances
BSIP22:  Vote Decay for Witnesses, Committee Members & Proxies
BSIP47: Vote Proxies for Different Referendum Categories and explicit voting operation
BSIP45: Add bitAsset Backing Collateral flag/permission

In my view, we can put BSIPs in Class A and also some in Class B into a package and request core team to work on it, maybe a independent worker is necessary for that.

Committee, core team, witnesses, cn-vote, BEOS and also other big proxies, please review this post and share your ideas, sufficient discussion and strong consensus and needed for optimize and apply this plan.

For promoting the contest, I created 2 Telegram gorups:

English:  https://t.me/btsmmcontest
Chinese: https://t.me/BTSMarketMaker

Welcome for joining!

Quote from: bitcrab on December 03, 2019, 09:50:46 am

奖励比例改73三天后的感想：

但是还是明显感觉到，在涨跌趋势难以判断的时候，矿工还是更倾向于砸盘挂买单，而不是拉盘挂卖单，毕竟买单奖励现在还是买单奖励的两倍多，这个对矿工决策的影响还是很明显的。

我还是倾向于认为，主要原因是熊市，所以交易者更倾向于持有 USDT 等更有期望保值的资产。现金为王。

熊市当然是熊市，BTC和USDT当然比BTS硬，但问题是现在的分配比例让内盘的BTC和USDT更硬。

难道交易大赛的最终目的不是让BTS硬起来吗？不是在熊市尽可能地赋予价值给BTS吗？

每天6万BTS，相对整体流通量是沧海一粟，但如果规则定得好，发挥杠杆效应，是有希望对价格形成有力支撑的。尤其现在这个时间节点，我觉得大赛几乎是全村的希望。

决定矿工买卖的因素很多，但挖矿收益肯定也是重要考量，熊市已经到这个地步了，现在这个价格，许多矿工都是有心加仓BTS的，但别的不说，一加仓挖矿收益就下降，这不是更加鼓励持有BTC/USDT而不是加仓BTS吗？

系统出钱，在熊市本来用户就更愿意持有BTC/USDT的基础上强化用户拿BTS换BTC/USDT的意愿？

奖励比例改73三天后的感想：

首先是能明显感觉到矿工逃避买单成交的意愿没以前那么强烈，毕竟挂卖单也可以挖矿，虽然比例低，但比以前还是好很多。

而且能发现时有内盘价格相对外盘略高的情况出现，也许内盘玩家更倾向于认为现在BTS价格偏低吧。

但是还是明显感觉到，在涨跌趋势难以判断的时候，矿工还是更倾向于砸盘挂买单，而不是拉盘挂卖单，毕竟买单奖励现在还是买单奖励的两倍多，这个对矿工决策的影响还是很明显的。

当前的盘面，把两边的深度相除，得到0.0449USDT/BTS和0.0000032BTC/BTS，还是买盘量大。





我的观点，从91向73的调整是走在了正确的方向上，但是还不够，要进一步发挥大赛支撑BTS价格的潜力的话，还需要进一步调整。

也许最终55或者46是比较合理的结果，但谨慎起见，还是建议节奏慢一点，也许下一步可以先调到64？

Three committee proposals are created to update bitCNY, bitUSD and bitEUR.

1.10.53309 set bitCNY reward percent to 60%.

1.10.53311 set bitUSD reward percent to 60%.

1.10.53312 set bitEUR reward percent to 60%.

All the three proposals will expire at 2019-12-10 00:00:00 UTC.

Currently all the above 3 smartcoins are set market fee as 0.1% and reward percent as 80%, the proposal for this change is based on below considerations:

1. BTS need more income to buy back BTS and support the DEX economy, now bitCNY income is much lower than months ago,  this change can double the market fee income of relevant smartcoins(means the part that go to system will change from 0.1%*20% to 0.1%*40%)

2. market fee actually paid by LTM change from 0.02% to 0.04%, it is still very low.

3.60% sharing to referrer is still a very high incentive.

Committee members, please check and vote according to your opinion.

别着急，明天改73，改完继续观察，继续优化。

内盘并不完全是木偶戏，这决定于矿工的策略。

比如我，今天早上284砸了50万BTS，然后买单挂在283，一边挖矿一边等着接盘，完全不管外盘价格。

只要能吸引资金进来就好。不能指望什么时候都有大交易量。

慢慢，等定价权转到内盘，就可以继续搞事情。

这是一个典型的内盘盘面。

外盘顶部买单价格>292，搬砖机器人在持续300一笔搬砖，一众矿工缩在290挂买单。

这是奖励比例90：10的情景，假设奖励比例调为50：50的话，会有什么不同呢？

很显然，矿工会选择吃掉291，甚至292的卖单，然后在293或之上挂卖单。

系统出钱奖励做市，到底是希望买单挂着好看，还是希望买盘真正踊跃？