Setting a 1% offset won't change anything here. Shorters always have
just two options:
* adjust collateral
* get margin called
What changes is the premium (maybe) and the liquidity (also maybe).
But I am willing to support such an experiment in bitCNY unless someone
can come up with a solid argumentation to NOT try it. For me, a
settlement offset is still just a percentage fee that is taken by the
network (and thus profits all shareholders at the cost of long-positions
that can get out before this gets implemented on chain) and might bring
in some liquidity.
in my view, if we can say force settlement is a service, then the offset is the service fee paid from holder to shorter.
The offset is NOT paid to the shorter but to the issuer of the asset,
i.e. committee-account in case of bitCNY and thus is paid to all bitshares
shareholders!!
The solid argument is that modifying the settlement guarantee is hurting bitCNY holders by effectively robbing them of 1% of their assets.
Committee members voting for such a proposal may even be legally liable for the resulting financial damage.
Robbing holders of bitAssets will destroy all credibility of bitAssets, nobody's going to touch them again with a long pole. Committee members voting for such a proposal will be responsible for this, too.
modifying settlement offset is just to make the rule more fair, force settlement is the final way for holders to get liquidity, not the only way,not the routine way. and if the proposal is applied, holders has at least 30 days to execute force settlement with 0 offset to avoid the loss.
committee has pushed several big change, this is not the biggest one, and not the last one, one of committee's mission is to optimize the network parameters, of course the precondition is the change get enough support from shareholders.
this is not robbing holders, this is just ask holders to pay when they are served by shorters.
@pc, this is not really a "robbery" since they can still sell their long
position at market prices into the order book. They just can't settle it
without a 1% fee/loss.
But I do recognize the credibility issuer here. We advertised bitUSD to
be redeemable for 1$ woth of BTS but changing the rules will result in
them being "settled" at $0.99. Still, currently people won't settle
their longs because they could sell the bitUSD for more than $1 at the
market because of the premium. If we reduce the premium, then they can
probably (experiment here) sell their bitUSD for ~$1 at the market and
settle for slightly less (-1%).
It changes the game, but does IMHO not rob the longs of their bitUSD
value!
Not sure about legal liabilities as committee members merely act in
favor of the shareholders. Any shareholder can start a proposal to tweak
any parameter and committee-members are forced to at least decide
whether to support or not support any proposal brought forward. Also,
there was no contract signed by any party that guaranteed a settlement
price of 100% in a legal binding manner (credibility put aside).
Even banks are changing their deals from time to time and give you an
extraordinary option to quit a contract. Same thing here with a 30 day
notice.
At least we are having a solid discussion about this.