Thanks. We're starting off slowly, but I plan to put decent resources into this as time goes on. Some new API servers, adding liquidity, and more coins as well.

How did BitShares handle the market crash?

Hi bytemaster,

my name is Stefan, I have been working closely with various workers in the past years and am currently one of the reviewers for BSIPs.

I'm gonna take a guess and assume that you are interested in how the BitAsset/SmartCoin mechanism handled the market crash. I'm gonna try to objectively give a historical overview, links to the respective BSIPs were posted before. The mechanisms work as intended as we have seen last year when bitUSD went into global settlement. It got revived again when MCR was reached and re-pegged beautifully. Still, the global settlement mechanism has flaws: Everyone gets globally settled even if its just one individual with a bad CR, instant force settlement keeps the price off peg, new debt positions cant be created and the revival process takes too long (reaching MCR instead of CR 1) which is a big hindrance for adoption and liquidity and allows individuals with deep knowledge to gain massive advantage of unbenownst everyday users.

The flaws led to (controversial) refinements of the mechanisms: Global settlement protection price. Since core changes are slow and take time and immediate action was deemed necessary, a proposal was done that witnesses should feed a price that avoids global settlement (i.e. allow intentional undercollaterization to avoid global settlement). Ontop of that, MSSR and FSO were adjusted in a way to strengthen the peg. The global settlement price caused bitCNY to not global settle when bitUSD did. Looking at the markets after this event, bitCNY did significantly better in terms of liquidity and peg. Still, intentional undercollaterization while protecting debt position holders at the cost of a manipulated feed price is no longterm solution as it lacks transparency in the DEX (the feed price does not reflect a realistic external BTS price anymore). Some ideas that came to mind: a) Implement a selective settlement mechanism that only affects positions with CR < 1 instead of all b) refined margin call mechanism where the margin call price depends on CR and MCR c) incentivize force settlement for debt positions that have CR < MCR. All of them need core change and would take significant time to implement and d) give debt position holders the ability to set a TCR > MCR (target collateral ratio), then margin calls are selling only as much to reach that TCR (is now implemented). The chosen solution of a global settlement protection price could be implemented swiftly. A BSIP was written afterwards to replace this mechanism in a more transparent way in the core, although it is not realized atm.

This year another incident happened when there were alleged shorting attacks on CEXes (i.e. influence the price feed) to cause margin calls and take advantage of debt position holders. This was possible due to many debt position holders margining to the max and keeping their CR as close to MCR as possible, with no reserves to replenish and with no proactive way to close their debt position. Debt position holders demanded swift action and since they hold significant voting weight and at that time were (still are) a big part of the BTS voting power, consequently another debt position holder protection was proposed and implemented through the price feed: namely the threshold price (highly controversial). Which really just means that, if price below threshold, then feed threshold instead. Ultimately that meant that we now had a margin call protection price as feed price and pretty much all debt position holders kept their CR exactly above that price. This threshold price is still in effect, thus the latest crash had no impact on the BitAsset mechanisms. If no price feed alterations were in effect the BitAssets would all have globally settled. So the current solution is the ultimate protection of debt position holders, which is not a surprise because they hold the largest voting weight. Now that margin calls are effectively rendered inactive some individuals shifted to massive force settlements when profit was possible. Some ideas that came to mind: a) give the debt position holders a way to manually trigger a margin call with a price they can choose (BSIP is voted in) b) refine force settlement mechanisms and give them a fee that goes to the asset owner (similar to the stability fee of DAI). The peg is of course not maintained with this measure, and has not been for a while.

There exist a multitude of other ideas for refinement of the BitAsset mechanism which are currently in drafting status but paused mostly due to the funding issues, which were also caused through the voting behavior. Essentially, majority of BTS voting power has blocked all proposals a couple months back.

I hope I could describe it properly (anyone please correct me ), and you also were interested in that subject. If not, and other aspects of BitShares progress interests you please let me know.

Best regards,
  Stefan (@sschiessl-bcp in GitHub, @sschiessl in Telegram)

Quote from: binggo on February 22, 2020, 12:17:45 am

Quote from: abit on February 22, 2020, 12:10:13 am

I think it's too early to discuss the part 2 right now. Things can change a lot in 6 months. If part 1 worked well, we may start discussing part 2.

Got it.

Development for BSIP 64: Operational HTLC preimage length, HASH160 addition, and memo field (up to 12 hours)
Development for BSIP 69: Additional Assert Predicates (up to 25 hours)
Development for BSIP 74: Margin Call Fee Ratio (up to 60 hours)
Development for BSIP 77: Require Higher CR When Creating/Adjusting Debt Positions (up to 80 hours)
Development for BSIP 86: Share market fee to the network (up to 60 hours)

If we can make a small Mainnet Release for these BSIPs asap? in the next two months?

If to add features into 4.0.0 (and postpone the release date), I'd like to have "BSIP 85 Maker Order Creation Fee Discount" in it, since it's important to increase chain income.

Also "BSIP 87: Force Settlement Fee Ratio".

In addition, if to attract gateways building businesses on top of the chain, "BSIP 81 Simple Maker-Taker Market Fees" would be helpful.

Each of these changes is relatively small. However, more BSIPs means more development work and more time is needed.

First step would be to get them voted in. Please keep in mind that 1.14.158 - threshold-bsip is yet to be established, and at least I don't see it as the threshold for BSIPs as approved by BTS holders. If you do see it as the active threshold for BSIPs, please explain why.

-------------------------------
[Committee Proposal] Set asset_settle fee from 2.413 BTS to 1,000 BTS.

https://cryptofresh.com/p/1.10.57202

I will give the decision and why later.

Listening...
---------------------
[理事会提案] 设置强清手续费从2.413 BTS到 1,000 BTS.

https://cryptofresh.com/p/1.10.57202

Code: [Select]

  BTS-RFC 1.10.57202

Review Period: Wed Feb 19, 2020 22:55 - 23:55
Review begins 2020-02-19T22:55:00+00:00

{
  "proposer": "1.2.12376",
  "fail_reason": ""
}

Proposed change to blockchain parameters

All BTS amounts below have been scaled for ease of comparison.

    {
    "current_fees": {
    "parameters": {
    "transfer[0]": {
    "fee": "0.869 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.483 BTS"
    },
    "limit_order_create[1]": {
    "fee": "0.0483 BTS"
    },
    "limit_order_cancel[2]": {
    "fee": "0.00482 BTS"
    },
    "call_order_update[3]": {
    "fee": "0.0483 BTS"
    },
    "fill_order[4]": {
    },
    "account_create[5]": {
    "basic_fee": "4.83 BTS",
    "premium_fee": "241.3 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.338 BTS"
    },
    "account_update[6]": {
    "fee": "0.0483 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.338 BTS"
    },
    "account_whitelist[7]": {
    "fee": "4.83 BTS"
    },
    "account_upgrade[8]": {
    "membership_annual_fee": "4,777,833,291 BTS",
    "membership_lifetime_fee": "5,791 BTS"
    },
    "account_transfer[9]": {
    "fee": "241.3 BTS"
    },
    "asset_create[10]": {
    "symbol3": "386,088 BTS",
    "symbol4": "96,522 BTS",
    "long_symbol": "2,413 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.483 BTS"
    },
    "asset_update[11]": {
    "fee": "96.5 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.338 BTS"
    },
    "asset_update_bitasset[12]": {
    "fee": "241.3 BTS"
    },
    "asset_update_feed_producers[13]": {
    "fee": "241.3 BTS"
    },
    "asset_issue[14]": {
    "fee": "0.869 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.483 BTS"
    },
    "asset_reserve[15]": {
    "fee": "0.0483 BTS"
    },
    "asset_fund_fee_pool[16]": {
    "fee": "24.13 BTS"
    },
    "asset_settle[17]": {
    "fee": "2.413 BTS"
    "fee": "1,000 BTS"
    },
    "asset_global_settle[18]": {
    "fee": "241.3 BTS"
    },
    "asset_publish_feed[19]": {
    "fee": "0.00482 BTS"
    },
    "witness_create[20]": {
    "fee": "2,413 BTS"
    },
    "witness_update[21]": {
    "fee": "0.483 BTS"
    },
    "proposal_create[22]": {
    "fee": "9.65 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "2.413 BTS"
    },
    "proposal_update[23]": {
    "fee": "0.2413 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.338 BTS"
    },
    "proposal_delete[24]": {
    "fee": "0 BTS"
    },
    "withdraw_permission_create[25]": {
    "fee": "7.24 BTS"
    },
    "withdraw_permission_update[26]": {
    "fee": "0.483 BTS"
    },
    "withdraw_permission_claim[27]": {
    "fee": "0.695 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.338 BTS"
    },
    "withdraw_permission_delete[28]": {
    "fee": "0 BTS"
    },
    "committee_member_create[29]": {
    "fee": "241.3 BTS"
    },
    "committee_member_update[30]": {
    "fee": "483 BTS"
    },
    "committee_member_update_global_parameters[31]": {
    "fee": "0 BTS"
    },
    "vesting_balance_create[32]": {
    "fee": "4.83 BTS"
    },
    "vesting_balance_withdraw[33]": {
    "fee": "4.83 BTS"
    },
    "worker_create[34]": {
    "fee": "2,413 BTS"
    },
    "custom[35]": {
    "fee": "0.483 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "2.413 BTS"
    },
    "assert[36]": {
    "fee": "24.13 BTS"
    },
    "balance_claim[37]": {
    },
    "override_transfer[38]": {
    "fee": "48.3 BTS",
    "price_per_kbyte": "0.338 BTS"
    },
    "transfer_to_blind[39]": {
    "fee": "10.13 BTS",
    "price_per_output": "3.38 BTS"
    },
    "transfer_from_blind[41]": {
    "fee": "10.13 BTS"
    },
    "asset_claim_fees_operation[43]": {
    "fee": "48.3 BTS"
    },
    "[44]": {
    },
    "[45]": {
    "fee": "0.0483 BTS"
    },
    "[46]": {
    },
    "[47]": {
    "fee": "241.3 BTS"
    },
    "[48]": {
    "fee": "483 BTS"
    },
    "[49]": {
    "fee": "0.0483 BTS",
    "fee_per_day": "1.593 BTS"
    },
    "[50]": {
    "fee": "0.0483 BTS",
    "fee_per_kb": "4.83 BTS"
    },
    "[52]": {
    "fee": "0.0483 BTS",
    "fee_per_day": "1.593 BTS"
    }
    },
    "scale": 10000
    },
    "block_interval": 3,
    "maintenance_interval": 3600,
    "maintenance_skip_slots": 3,
    "committee_proposal_review_period": 3600,
    "maximum_transaction_size": 409600,
    "maximum_block_size": 2000000,
    "maximum_time_until_expiration": 86400,
    "maximum_proposal_lifetime": 2419200,
    "maximum_asset_whitelist_authorities": 10,
    "maximum_asset_feed_publishers": 25,
    "maximum_witness_count": 1001,
    "maximum_committee_count": 1001,
    "maximum_authority_membership": 10,
    "reserve_percent_of_fee": 2000,
    "network_percent_of_fee": 2000,
    "lifetime_referrer_percent_of_fee": 3000,
    "cashback_vesting_period_seconds": 7776000,
    "cashback_vesting_threshold": 10000000,
    "count_non_member_votes": true,
    "allow_non_member_whitelists": false,
    "witness_pay_per_block": 100000,
    "worker_budget_per_day": "50000000000",
    "max_predicate_opcode": 1,
    "fee_liquidation_threshold": 10000000,
    "accounts_per_fee_scale": 1000,
    "account_fee_scale_bitshifts": 0,
    "max_authority_depth": 2,
    "extensions": {
    "updatable_htlc_options": {
    "max_timeout_secs": 2592000,
    "max_preimage_size": 10240
    }
    }
    }


            
btcbchbts    0.260201   444824.5045   115744   2020/2/17 9:10
hangjun-btss    0.260201   384317.5495   100000   2020/2/17 11:06
bts-ydy8    0.260201   307454.0396   80000   2020/2/17 22:23
yinchg    0.260201   188546.1898   49060   2020/2/18 0:51
hakuku-findom    0.260201   153727.0198   40000   2020/2/18 6:42
yykxuxu830905    0.260201   141113.7178   36718   2020/2/17 22:21
dqt812    0.260201   115295.2649   30000   2020/2/17 21:38
dqt812    0.260201   115295.2649   30000   2020/2/17 21:44
dqt812    0.260201   115295.2649   30000   2020/2/17 21:45
dqt812    0.260201   115295.2649   30000   2020/2/17 21:48
dqt812    0.260201   115295.2649   30000   2020/2/17 21:55
dqt812    0.260201   115295.2649   30000   2020/2/17 21:57
dqt812    0.260201   115295.2649   30000   2020/2/17 21:59
love8zf02    0.260201   76863.50991   20000   2020/2/17 9:42
anbi    0.260201   38431.72075   9999.9911   2020/2/17 17:19
yutaoweishan1    0.260201   7993.805031   2080   2020/2/18 7:36
fengshen123456    0.260201   48.424011   12.6   2020/2/17 9:21


LTM just need pay 1000*0.02=200 BTS.

at least to settle: 100,000 bts
make sure the profits：0.4%

What is the reasoning for it? I can't follow what you have laid out above.

Budget
100,000 BTS
used as airdrop to cooperate with market promotion

Hey there,

I wanted to partake in the BTS airdrop but could not find information on the xt.com website. Could you please point me to it?

Are the payouts still being reduced, or participation declining?

Did the majority of committee agree to adding bitassets? In light of a possible BSIP 86 transparency is very important, at least for me.