From delegates perspective this is a profitable solution, but initial BTSX delegates were (and still are) selected by a few strong hands.
If there are another 5% given to developers and AGS/PTS holders are given less than ~20% each coin (BTSX is 50/50 AGS/PTS) then:
- developers will initially have between 10 - 50+% of all shares (5% + BTC/PTS from AGS donations and some privately owned MYSTERY stake they can buy cheap before resolving the mystery
, and this all x2 since remaining 50% will be produced in following years);
- it will be even harder for small investors to elect their delegate of choice without help of a developer/ another token-whale;
- new users will probably drive down token's value - it's free money, but it's fine since more people will get interested;
So it will start even more centralized in comparison to those systems we are trying to replace.
This proposal could stand like that (or better with some changes) but with some additional steps:
- 101 is not a fixed number of total delegates, it is a minimum # of delegates required;
- # of delegates can grow and shrink after each round, between 101 to, say up to 8640 (1 block / delegate / day);
- 0.01% (1% of 1%) of all shares is the minimum approval threshold to get a delegate on a waiting list;
- after round is finished, network recalibrates itself like below:
{
avg delegate participation during las round: 90%;
number of active delegates: 101;
number of delegates with a warning: 17;
number of delegates to lay off (second warning): 11;
minimum threshold of future round avg. delegate participation: 80%;
number of new delegates to introduce: 20 (if all fail, avg del part will be 80%) - select delegates from waiting list (randomly or randomly with weighted probability by approval votes );
};
Delegates that have a warning can clear their warning after producing in from 3 to x consecutive rounds;
Delegates that were fired can get on a waiting list after placing a fee payment;
Registered users can get on a waiting list by placing a fee.