There is a weird game theory thing happening with delegate payrates, by preventing delegates from raising rates you risk damaging network coverage.
Current Rules:
1) You are allowed to lower, but not increase fees
2) Once elected a delegate, you remain one until votes decrease to eliminate you.
Market forces:
1) BTSX price and BTC are volatile, as is daily fees earned
2) there are fixed expenses (for the most part) for running a node/delegate
3) People are bidding on fees, lowest bids should, in theory win.
Outcome:
1) Delegates bid such that they make a profit
2a) If BTSX increases in value, they can decrease to stay competitive in the market
2b) If BTSX decreases in value, there is no ability to increase fees to stay competitive. The delegate will turn off their machine since income is less than cost. Voting response is slow. Network yield is hurt.
I currently am only running 1 delegate, at 15%, and am providing services to the community (maintaining an ubuntu PPA, bug reporting/testing/validation). Others are running 5 nodes at 100%. That's fine, I don't mind only running one delegate since I believe in decentralization - but now that BTSX is slipping I see I'm stuck with the choice of losing money or hurting the system. I'm going to keep it running, but others in my situation will hurt the system.
Could there be a mechanism by which delegates increase their fee? perhaps they declare a fee change and have to wait x number of days before it is implemented so voters can vote them out if they think it is unfair?