Bitshares Poker

[monsterer]

Meh... file this in the "idea trashbin". It seems others don't share my same vision of how big of a market this could be.

I certainly share that part of your vision - it's a massive market. But, it has to be done right; too many compromises and you end up building something which is no better than online poker for the majority of people.

[CoinHoarder]

Meh... file this in the "idea trashbin". It seems others don't share my same vision of how big of a market this could be.

I'll just hope the other decentralized poker projects built on Nxt/Ethereum turn out decent. I have made them aware of my paper so maybe they can use an idea or two from it.

Cheers

[Empirical1.2]

I think Poker is a tough nut to crack.

At first I wouldn't worry too much about collusion. If you can reduce rake to 1% or less from the standard 5% you should have a market.

It's much easier to do basic gambling, blockchain based dice etc. to start.

Also the prediction market, Augur could be fantastic if they get quick turnaround on bets and good variety, they could be very big, very quickly. Gamblers will notice when you give them a 90% discount.

[monsterer]

True, but I still think it is ineffective towards multi-accounting. I think you need layers that make the most effective solution.

It is more effective at limiting multi accounting than is possible in online poker.

Mental poker protocols require some extensive CPU usage. I think it would be better to have the PoW done with a GPU-mine-able algorithm. One thing that is puzzling me though... how would you be able to tell if someone is actually mining in a transparent and provable way? Some people may want to mine with a pool, how do we stop them? If the network gets popular with a lot of players, then it may take solo miners forever to find blocks. Also, I was planning on using DPoS to utilize the efficiency, smart coins, electable witnesses, etc... How would you tie that into a PoW scheme?

Just some initial thoughts. Sorry if it seems like I'm being tough on you. This is the way I want people to do to my ideas too... tear them apart to get the best design possible! I appreciate you taking the time monsterer.

The choice of mental poker model is completely orthogonal to any POW stream - in fact, more CPU usage is better for combating collusion.

If you don't want players to use pools for the POW, you must have them sign their POW stream.

You can still use DPOS, but the only known solution for sybil is to use POW, so you'd have to use them in conjunction. The entire project will need a different chain anyway, so the choice of which consensus model to use is almost secondary.

[CoinHoarder]

I've updated the paper for the 4th time since posting the OP. I would love some more feedback.

I decided Golle's algorithm may bot be the most efficient mental poker algorithm, so I took which MPP we should use out of the paper. I will have to do more research on that. I added constant computationally extensive identities (credits monsterer), and elaborated on how the reputation system is mainly only intended for use in the "Risky Chip" market. I added quotes around "Risky Chips" and "Poker Chips" as I'm not crazy about the names and want some suggestions of a better naming scheme! I also reworded a lot of sentences and elaborated in a few places. I also removed some centralization, specifically regarding the shuffling and dealing, because I feel like this can be decentralized. I first though it would be better to have a more efficient shuffle and deal as far as game play, but considering all of the dynamics I think having as little trust as possible in the system is best.

I plan to elaborate a lot on the algorithm and processes which will be used to detect collusion in the next update. There will be an algorithm that analyzes statistics and generates charts to make spotting collusion easier. A player submission function so someone can report collusion with spam prevention. Also, a way for people to make custom charts and statistics if they want to do a specific or more detailed analysis.

[CoinHoarder]

There is still a disconnect here as we are talking about two different things. Forget I ever mentioned botnets for a moment. Your proposed system is highly ineffective if I wanted to setup 3 computers so I can play a 6 player game with 3 out of the 6 players at the table being accounts under my control. I could then use that to my advantage in a non-obvious way that is hard to detect.

That means you need to either rent or own the physical hardware, tho - that is expensive. Compare that to regular online poker, where you can just rent a VPS farm very cheaply, because online poker bots don't need 100% cpu, which will get your VPS shut down by the hosting company.

True, but I still think it is ineffective towards multi-accounting. I think you need layers that make the most effective solution. Otherwise, the poker network will be seen as being shady. Social identity confirmations, web of trusts, and certificate authorities should be used in conjunction to computationally extensive identities IMO. All except computationally extensive identities could be optional, but there would be a way for people to tell who have successfully identified through what types. If someone doesn't want to play against someone that hasn't been through the identification process then they shouldn't. I suggest we leave it up to the players to make this decision for us, but build in the tools for them to choose.


Back to your idea. I had thought about computationally secure identities, but not the way you suggested with continual PoW instead of simply generating a computationally intensive identity hash. So, that brings forth a couple more challenging problems. Mental poker protocols require some extensive CPU usage. I think it would be better to have the PoW done with a GPU-mine-able algorithm. One thing that is puzzling me though... how would you be able to tell if someone is actually mining in a transparent and provable way? Some people may want to mine with a pool, how do we stop them? If the network gets popular with a lot of players, then it may take solo miners forever to find blocks. Also, I was planning on using DPoS to utilize the efficiency, smart coins, electable witnesses, etc... How would you tie that into a PoW scheme?

Just some initial thoughts. Sorry if it seems like I'm being tough on you. This is the way I want people to do to my ideas too... tear them apart to get the best design possible! I appreciate you taking the time monsterer.

[monsterer]

There is still a disconnect here as we are talking about two different things. Forget I ever mentioned botnets for a moment. Your proposed system is highly ineffective if I wanted to setup 3 computers so I can play a 6 player game with 3 out of the 6 players at the table being accounts under my control. I could then use that to my advantage in a non-obvious way that is hard to detect.

That means you need to either rent or own the physical hardware, tho - that is expensive. Compare that to regular online poker, where you can just rent a VPS farm very cheaply, because online poker bots don't need 100% cpu, which will get your VPS shut down by the hosting company.

[CoinHoarder]

I understood your meaning, and my explanation of a solution still applies. The only way for a botnet to pay off in poker is for the bots to collude, and if each player is required to produce a stream of POW that makes being a player CPU expensive, so a botnet with a bunch of different colluding players under such constraints would be far more expensive to maintain than a botnet in regular online poker.

There is still a disconnect here as we are talking about two different things. Forget I ever mentioned botnets for a moment. Your proposed system is highly ineffective if I wanted to setup 3 computers so I can play a 6 player game with 3 out of the 6 players at the table being accounts under my control. I could then use that to my advantage in a non-obvious way that is hard to detect.

[monsterer]

I get where the confusion is. I should of never used the words Sybil or Sybil attack. Although it is the correct terminology, it is easy to confuse what I'm talking about. I am saying PoW is largely ineffective to combat players signing up for more than one account to gain an unfair advantage in the poker games. I am not referring to Sybil as in someone attacking the decentralized network by achieving a large amount of hash power.

I understood your meaning, and my explanation of a solution still applies. The only way for a botnet to pay off in poker is for the bots to collude, and if each player is required to produce a stream of POW that makes being a player CPU expensive, so a botnet with a bunch of different colluding players under such constraints would be far more expensive to maintain than a botnet in regular online poker.

I get the privacy concerns, but I feel like they can be mitigated in a way that would make it an acceptable system. Maybe my current design of that is not the best, but I still feel everyone would be mostly anonymous (pseudonymous) in this type of a system. That is why I have posted it here to get some feedback.

If you make it an onymous design you will create a target for the system to be taken down via the identity holding delegates.  And yes bitshares has the same problem, to a lesser extent.

[CoinHoarder]

You wouldn't even need a botnet though.. someone could simply set up multiple computers, utilize virtual machines on a powerful computer, or rent a VPS.

But a botnet is the only way you can profit from this. In any case, having a botnet in a system where the players are required to produce a stream of POW will be much more expensive than a botnet in online poker.

I get where the confusion is. I should of never used the words Sybil or Sybil attack. Although it is the correct terminology, it is easy to confuse what I'm talking about. I am saying PoW is largely ineffective to combat players signing up for more than one account to gain an unfair advantage in the poker games. I am not referring to Sybil as in someone attacking the decentralized network by achieving a large amount of hash power.

I don't get why you don't think trust/reputation systems will not work. Everyone will not be completely anonymous.. they will be known by a pseudonym with identities verified to deter players gaining more than one psuedonym.

Decentralized poker is attractive because it lets players bet unlimited amounts and/or from countries where the game has been made illegal. If you start introducing identity verification into the mix:

* The fed will go after the verification delegates (or whatever you want to call them)
* Your identity will be encoded onto a public blockchain

This is a worse value proposition than online poker.

Just like Bitshares witnesses are going to be arrested for supporting the illegal trading of derivatives, and aiding and abetting to a unregistered money service business... you are opening a huge can of worms with that argument.

I get the privacy concerns, but I feel like they can be mitigated in a way that would make it an acceptable system. Maybe my current design of that is not the best, but I still feel everyone would be mostly anonymous (pseudonymous) in this type of a system. That is why I have posted it here to get some feedback.

[monsterer]

You wouldn't even need a botnet though.. someone could simply set up multiple computers, utilize virtual machines on a powerful computer, or rent a VPS.

But a botnet is the only way you can profit from this. In any case, having a botnet in a system where the players are required to produce a stream of POW will be much more expensive than a botnet in online poker.

I don't get why you don't think trust/reputation systems will not work. Everyone will not be completely anonymous.. they will be known by a pseudonym with identities verified to deter players gaining more than one psuedonym.

Decentralised poker is attractive because it lets players bet unlimited amounts and/or from countries where the game has been made illegal. If you start introducing identity verification into the mix:

* The fed will go after the verification delegates (or whatever you want to call them)
* Your identity will be encoded onto a public blockchain

This is a worse value proposition than online poker.

[CoinHoarder]

Yes, botnets would still be a problem - but they are also a problem for traditional online poker. I just don't think adding trust into the mix for a system with anonymous actors is going to work.

You wouldn't even need a botnet though.. someone could simply set up multiple computers, utilize virtual machines on a powerful computer, or rent a VPS.

I don't get why you don't think trust/reputation systems will not work. Everyone will not be completely anonymous.. they will be known by a pseudonym with identities verified to deter players gaining more than one psuedonym. Some will slip through the cracks, but that is why the games have to still be policed for collusion separately, no matter their trust or reputation scores. The trust and reputation system is mainly used to weed out bad actors on the decentralized Poker Chip and Risky Chip ledger.

[monsterer]

Ok, so that would eliminate the ability for someone to sell an identity. However, it still seems ineffective.  Someone could simply set up multiple computers, utilize virtual machines on a powerful computer, or rent a VPS. It just seems ineffective at ensuring one person can only make one account. It provides such little protection for the costs/hassle that at that point you migh as well have no protection against multi-accounting at all. Which is something to consider, but then the reputation system and collusion becomes much harder (impossible?) to combat.

Yes, botnets would still be a problem - but they are also a problem for traditional online poker. I just don't think adding trust into the mix for a system with anonymous actors is going to work.

[mint chocolate chip]

Eliminate many collusion issues by making all games heads-up. It is a good place to start.

[pioneer]

I look at it this way.. Would you rather get scammed/cheated or would you rather less privacy? IMO most people would prefer security or game integrity over privacy as less privacy doesn't cost them money unlike the alternative.

I totally agree with this. I know many people are decentralized-anonymity-purists with anarchistic leanings that hate everything that has to do with centralization. But I feel that sometimes a combination of both is the best way to go, especially if you want mainstream adoption.

I don't care that much about anonymity in the case of poker/gambling, and I would gladly pay my taxes knowing that I'm playing in a fair and secure environment.

On another note.. would it be difficult to include other, simpler, games than poker in the same protocol? Like blackjack, roulette etc.. to make it a fully fledged casino? Poker is a complex player vs. player game, but these would simply be player vs. blockchain. The losses could be burned or added to tournament pots. Same for the rake.