Show Posts

This section allows you to view all posts made by this member. Note that you can only see posts made in areas you currently have access to.


Messages - Agent86

Pages: 1 ... 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 [19] 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ... 32
271
General Discussion / Re: Stolen fund alert system?
« on: July 07, 2014, 05:50:52 pm »
Ok, as long as the funds are not recoverable to the original owner.   So you remove a lot of the incentive for theft.

The system could still be abused.  If I wanted to cause your business a loss, I do our transaction then mark the transfer as stolen.  What does the receiver do to protect themselves once this is introduced ?

I'd love to see something like this in general, I just do not know if there is an adequate system.  It could be used to attack exchanges who support this feature and thus force them to withdraw support for the currency.
If you transact with a business and then mark the money that you sent them as stolen, first off they know who you are and that you tried to rob them of money for no reason even though you didn't gain anything.  So they could probably take appropriate action against you.  And again you didn't gain anything from doing this.  You could also walk into their business and just break something and probably accomplish about as much.  For a very big transaction where they don't trust you they have the option to wait 24hrs.  Even still as long as they come forward to the community and say they did not take the funds and are willing to identify themselves they will almost certainly get the alert tag removed by community.

272
General Discussion / Re: Stolen fund alert system?
« on: July 07, 2014, 05:20:54 pm »
The problem I see is that once someone has acquired the private key, can't they do the same thing in reverse to the legitimate owner ?
I'm not following what you mean by "do the same thing in reverse to the legitimate owner"

-The thief xfers money out of your wallet
-Your wallet is now compromised and also empty
-You irreversibly mark the transaction as fraudulent
-You no longer use this wallet

What does the thief do?

273
The optimal system for security may be to have 101 unique delegates all around the world but the optimal investment decision could involve directing a lot of this new equity they receive to development. Thereby in your opinion resulting in potentially security compromising clusters, like in the extreme - A developer controlling over 50% of the delegates.

But if we decided on 101 unique delegates all around the world, but now needed 5 delegates worth of equity to be released to Toast for .p2p development. Would we,

A) Fire 5 delegates originally based in Guatamala, The North Pole, Mt. Everest, The Amazon Jungle  & The Sahara Desert. Instead giving Toast control of five delegates?

Or would we

B) Vote for those 5 delegates that could still be based in Guatamala, The North Pole, Mt. Everest, The Amazon Jungle  & The Sahara Desert who send all of the equity they are released to the Toast development fund, with Toast simply confirming on a regular basis that he's received it? 

Maintaining high security is in the best interests of the company so shareholders will choose options that maximise the best investment decisions with minimal compromise to security imo.

You agree with shareholders directing equity. But how would you do it? I think we'd have to find a decentralised trusted group of people to administer it according to our wishes. But that's pretty much what the 101 delegates system is. So I think introducing any secondary system to do the exact job the delegates can do is sub-optimal. Tweaking the delegate system and maybe putting in some tracking controls, automations and limits etc. will be best.

I'm not saying I agree 10/10/80 will be optimal, I'm still processing my own thoughts on it. But in general the concept is quite brilliant and inspired in my opinion. (Like for example in the first year we obviously trust the developers who released the product so I think we should direct a portion to them in the allocation model for maintenance & development without the need to go through/complicate the delegate system at the start.)
My idea is to have a separate class "DAC advocates" or whatever you want to call them.  The simplest way I can think of is anyone can run as a DAC advocate and propose their own salary and what they will do with it.  If they get more than 50% of stake to vote for them they get it.

50% might seem like a high burden but I think it is an achievable and necessary high burden.  It's more achievable when you allow people to "abstain" from voting on advocates, that way their stake doesn't count for or against any advocates.  It shouldn't generally be encouraged to abstain but could be a good option for some people who trust the rest of the stakeholders to make the right choices.

This makes the process of assigning funds soooo much easier for shareholders to understand and make informed decisions and will be much less wasteful imo.

274
General Discussion / Stolen fund alert system?
« on: July 07, 2014, 02:00:59 pm »
Ok, I'm well aware that this idea would be controversial.  I'm basically just throwing it out there.  I don't claim it's fully fleshed out or that we must do something like this, but I want to get people thinking and see any feedback.

Basically if you control a wallet, any transaction out of that wallet within the last 24hrs you can mark as a fraudulent transaction.  Everyone can distinguish funds that have been marked as fraudulent and most likely not accept them.  To make sure you are not doing business with someone trying to give you stolen funds for any large transaction you can demand that you only accept funds coming from an address that has held those funds at least 24hrs… these are "seasoned funds".  Exchanges can also demand that only funds that have been held in the sending address 24hrs prior to sending to the exchange are immediately available, otherwise they are quarantined 24hrs.

You could have a blockchain explorer app on your phone that alerts you anytime funds move out of any of your designated addresses.

Marking funds as stolen won't get you the funds back but will make it much more difficult for a thief to get a payday; so I would imagine there is little reason to do it unless it was a legitimate theft.  Anyone who is in control of funds that have been marked stolen can come forward to give an explanation and appeal to the community to have the designation removed.   There would be a process whereby the community can vote to remove the designation, otherwise after one year the stolen funds are burned as dividends (you could do without the auto burn while people get used to idea).  There's not necessarily a high burden of proof to have the designation removed but it forces someone to come forward and the party who marked them stolen has a chance to respond.

You could also have some kind of consensus community fund tagging.  For instance if Somali pirates or other demand BTSX for a ransom the community could vote to attach an alert to those funds even after 24hrs has expired but hopefully before there is a good chance for the criminal to liquidate.

275
You have now turned what should be a simple process into an excruciatingly complex process by mixing 2 naturally separate roles and combining them.  I now must analyze the spending habits of tons of delegates and combine that info with my various levels of trust and faith in their abilities to perform a simple task of running delegates to write blocks.  It will cause voters (shareholders) to disengage, tune out, and only approve a couple delegates at a time, and ultimately lose faith in the institution.

I think it engages shareholders MUCH more.

As long as the system drip feeds the equity, the risk is low.

DAC's are businesses selling products & services, so they will need centralised advertising campaigns etc. imo. So I can see DAC's having a marketing delegate which may even end up being a full service agency that gets their budget released via the blockchain and if the shareholders don't like the job they're doing, they will be fired. I can see them having a Charity delegate. A couple of Developers as delegates Etc. (Though most of the delegates elected will probably be the ones giving the equity back to shareholders most of the time.)

I think it's potentially great, like personally I think airdropping equity is generally a bad idea, if I'm right and that when you have a competitive product/service the money is better spent on traditional advertising to let customers know about it and make it accessible and convenient for them, then that should quickly be realised by self interested shareholders & they should move towards voting to direct equity in the best interest of the company when one or another approach is shown not to work. (For example if I saw oh wow airdropping to Y did generate a lot of free advertising, new support & the share price wasn't effected then I would even change my mind and vote for airdropping more of the equity.)

So basically whatever is the best model, this kind of approach gives the DAC the best opportunity to find it imo.
Empirical, I think if you looked at my post history you would see I've been a big proponent of letting shareholders direct equity for a long time; I'm well aware of the merits.  My problem is that tying this function to being a delegate is a very inefficient way for shareholders to have their will done.  If shareholders want to fund a core dev, let them simply make a decision about that.  Don't make them try to find which delegates are currently giving some percentage of funds to core development along with deciding if these delegates have reliable network statistics and are trusted community members, and now maybe they need to somehow set alerts to find out if any of their delegates has changed their priorities/fund allocation.  The shareholders might think we should be aggressively reinvesting in development above all else but that doesn't mean they want to let a developer control over 50% of delegates.  The two things are separate.

276
Shareholder controlled distribution (SCD?) is needed.  Doing this through delegates is a big mistake.  There will be a LOT of wasted money and value that goes into delegate profit for the simple reason that people don't have time to keep track of how 101 people spend money.  Right now the process of approving a delegate is rather simple; you ask yourself the question:  Is this a trustworthy member of the community who will keep a server running reliably?

You have now turned what should be a simple process into an excruciatingly complex process by mixing 2 naturally separate roles and combining them.  I now must analyze the spending habits of tons of delegates and combine that info with my various levels of trust and faith in their abilities to perform a simple task of running delegates to write blocks.  It will cause voters (shareholders) to disengage, tune out, and only approve a couple delegates at a time, and ultimately lose faith in the institution.

277
General Discussion / Re: DAC development incentive models
« on: July 06, 2014, 05:13:05 pm »
I think the #1 thing that everyone here is missing in the pre-allocation vs time-release allocation is that under the time-release the shareholders have an opportunity to change who receives the funds and how much after getting to observe performance.   With pre-allocation you are effectively stuck with one development team and a fixed fee.

So from my perspective an allocation of 20% AGS/PTS and 80% delegates over the life of the DAC is greatly preferable to 20%/80% preallocation.  It is certainly more flexible, keeps the majority of the pre-allocation off of the market  and gives AGS/PTS holders 100% control over the allocation of these funds without violating the social consensus of 10/10/80

In fact the only thing that I think needs to be decided is the release schedule for the 80%.
I agree that defined time-release schedule is better than preallocation.  I can also see how this is more "understandable and palatable" to many current market participants.  Maybe in the same way that we started with a mined proto-coin for share allocation; it made sense to the current market participants even though it was wasteful.  I mean people still love counterparty proof of burn …

I think this could be a compromise "transition system" while people get used to it and start to understand how this works better.  They'll start to like having a say in allocation and realize their fears of secret colluding majorities don't happen. 

In the long run a hard limit at 20% or defined rate of dilution has no real justification. I think we could probably skip the transition even if it means losing appeal to some people until they see the results.

Some people may disagree but I think the "industry" we are working on has multi-trillion dollar potential.  Lets keep that in mind when thinking how far we can predict the need for growth/development/re-investment.  The idea that we can pre-decide the right amount of dilution we need and when we'll need it to get this whole thing wrapped up in a neat bow is not convincing.  If we don't allow for it, dilution of your stake in the industry will just happen in other ways, such as the introduction of more new chains and competitors.

Do you honestly think if you got a 1% stake of the industry now and then just park it in a cold wallet that you will wake up 20 years from now with a 1% stake of a new multi-trillion dollar industry with all these people working their butts off to increase the value of your "non-dilutable" shares?  Sorry to pop your bubble but that's not how things work.

I at least am in agreement with you on that, but the time released shares your suggesting are still preallocated and limited, which is the key point for me.
Trog, not sure what you mean by "preallocated" but I think bytemaster was essentially saying the opposite:  time-release allows shareholders to make allocation decisions later as the picture on how to best allocate it becomes clear.  So the funds are not "preallocated"

278
General Discussion / Re: DAC development incentive models
« on: July 05, 2014, 11:11:31 pm »
So as long as some AGS holders have at least a little PTS, they can issue new shares to AGS holders only and take away most of the PTS based stake?
Trog, there's no secret illuminati AGS society that coordinates in secret without PTS holders knowing.  Where the hell do you get these ideas?
...

That was a quick example, and no secret societies are required.  The point is that in a direct democracy with unlimited power, you're very likely to end up with tyranny of majority and oppression of minorities as soon as a possible choice comes up that reveals that not everyone's interests are perfectly aligned.
Yes, they are required; you just haven't thought it through.  anyway I may be afk for a bit, I will see where this stands later.

279
General Discussion / Re: DAC development incentive models
« on: July 05, 2014, 10:44:35 pm »
So as long as some AGS holders have at least a little PTS, they can issue new shares to AGS holders only and take away most of the PTS based stake?
Trog, there's no secret illuminati AGS society that coordinates in secret without PTS holders knowing.  Where the hell do you get these ideas?
For the record, are you in favor of a fixed limit to the dilution rate, or completely discretionary dilution?
I wouldn't care that much if there was a cap that seemed reasonable.  In principle I don't believe in the need to babysit shareholders and have no problem with completely discretionary dilution.

280
General Discussion / Re: DAC development incentive models
« on: July 05, 2014, 10:29:04 pm »
I have another idea of how to handle it... We can make a DAC that honors PTS/AGS 50/50 with no dilution, then a new DAC or version of this DAC is quickly proposed that allows dilution.  A delegate is created (or other stake voting mechanism) and announce that in 2 months there will be a snapshot and every stake/share that is approving this delegate at snapshot time will be honored in the new chain with dilution.  All others not approving can honor themselves in a separate chain without dilution.

281
General Discussion / Re: DAC development incentive models
« on: July 05, 2014, 09:56:07 pm »
Meh, I don't even care to argue my points as I've said them elsewhere.
I can see how you can start to feel that way.  At some point it's not your job to convince everyone.
For everyone who is opposed to this concept after reading the many posts explaining it.  There is an easy solution:  when DACs that have this property are released PLEASE PLEASE PLEASE sell your shares.  Then we are both happy!!  I actually believe in empowering shareholders to make decisions and put their fate in their hands.  And for this reason, I am actually a little particular who my co-owners are.  I wouldn't want to run a business with co-owners that I have to constantly explain simple concepts to and who are going to make bad decisions that affect me, or who will vote to sit on their hands when we should be reinvesting in growth.

I also want to go on record as being in favor of dilution with no bound: dictated by business needs and shareholder vote;  no limit @ t=infinity.

If a DAC starts off 50/50 PTS/AGS but those original shares end up representing less than 20% in the long run that was a decision made by the shareholders.  We must allow our thinking to evolve with what is right and not box ourselves into corners because some people like to bitch about "pray we don't alter the deal" whenever a development in thinking happens.

282
General Discussion / Re: How do you prevent fraud within DACs?
« on: July 04, 2014, 12:34:02 am »
Apologies, I wasn't trying to say that accelerated growth was bad, or that saving up profits was the only appropriate path to expansion.  The biggest problem I have here is that capital infusion based growth is not a sustainable permanent strategy.  Eventually you should reach saturation, at which point further dilution serves to reclaim and centralize profits away from the shareholders the delegates or their associates, rather than to create additional value for all shareholders.

The simplest way to handle this dichotomy is to use the IPO funds for accelerated growth (hopefully to the point of self sustenance) and then fall back on gradual profit funded growth.  It's not the only way, but I am suspicious of any system that allows for permanent dilution, since growth cannot permanently outpace profit.  The result seems likely to be a rotting phase following saturation, when those in control loot the minority through malinvested dilution.
I don't understand how in one breath you worry about the power of "those in control" (meaning a consensus majority of shareholders I guess) and in the same breath you advocate for the exact system that the OP is complaining about which is rife for abuse and fraud and puts huge sums of money in the hands of one individual who has proven nothing.  If all funding for growth must be done up front then it is a perfect justification for people to collect obscene amounts of money for work they haven't done yet.  They have "big plans" and will need this funding some day so they have to get if from you now.

283
General Discussion / Re: How do you prevent fraud within DACs?
« on: July 03, 2014, 11:51:57 pm »
Either the customers pay for the growth eventually, or you're talking your investors into a bad deal.  The question is whether you should charge your customers absurd prices in an attempt to expand quickly (obviously a bad idea), save your reasonable profits patiently in order to expand as you can afford it, or accelerate that growth by attracting investors.  The investors should not invest if they don't expect the profit (customers) to pay for that expansion eventually.  It's just a question of whether the customers pay in advance, or after the fact.
Trog, a lot of these businesses involve a network affect or an unmet need in the market.  Most often you don't have the option to take your sweet time opening a new restaurant every 10 years after you've saved enough profit from the first one.  (you're not going to be the next starbucks that way anyway).  You'll also be disappointed to see someone has ripped off your idea and has used economies of scale to drive you out of the market.

You often have 2 options, and in our case I think this applies:  Expand quickly, meet the unmet need, grab the network effect or let someone else beat you to it.

Once you have grown to meet the market need and hopefully got a network effect you can charge customers a competitive price for the service provided and the profit goes to the shareholders.

284
General Discussion / Re: How do you prevent fraud within DACs?
« on: July 03, 2014, 11:29:51 pm »
Yes, the solution to this is DACs that have the ability to issue new shares gradually over time to pay for things like development.  This must be done by shareholder vote.  Some variation of "DAC employees" https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=4660.0

A DAC could bootstrap a brand new DAC that will honor their shareholders by issuing shares to the developer that he can sell to collect a salary as he works.  If the developer disappears, so do his payments.

This is a SUPER important power that is key to sustainable competitive DACs.

It is also important for growth and I want to expand on this in light of recent discussion about delegate payment structure and transaction fees.

It is bad business to put the responsibility of funding growth/development onto the CUSTOMER/USER.

An analogy: if you have a restaurant and it is doing well so you want to open up 3 more locations and expand but you don't have the money... How do you do this?  Where does the money come from?  The right way to do it is to get a new investor that has the money and you work together and split the profit.  The wrong way to do it is to try to charge the customers of your first restaurant 4 times the competitive price for their food.

We want to attract customers with LOW transaction fees to get a network affect going.  We do not want to put the burden of funding our future growth and development onto the people who are actually using the system by overcharging them for transactions while the shareholders try to get a free ride and not get diluted.  THIS IS NOT THE RIGHT WAY TO DO BUSINESS.

ALSO:
We should do everything we can to not conflate the role of "Delegate" with the role of  "DAC employee".  Funding everything through delegates makes deciding what delegates to approve much more complex than it should be.  You might totally trust a delegate to be a good delegate but don't like the way they spend money so maybe you elect someone else who is cheaper but not as trustworthy.  Mixing the roles is not the appropriate thing to do and creates barriers to entry and confusion.

...end rant :)

285
KeyID / Re: .p2p auction parameter discussion
« on: July 03, 2014, 02:49:14 pm »
Quote
First thing I do when this releases (if I don't just sell my shares) is buy every halfway reasonable sounding domain I can and promise never to sell them in hopes you guys start to "get it"
irrational actors are everywhere. Consider all possibilities!
It's not completely irrational :)  I think I would make more money if I can somehow convince them to make a valuable domain DAC than I would make by worrying about my shares in an ultimately flawed DAC that's of little use or value.

A domain registry is basically a spreadsheet with a list of domains with their corresponding list of owners.  Why should the rest of the world take our spreadsheet full of domain names snatched up by our little group of insiders and early adopters as the definitive spreadsheet?  Why is this spreadsheet more valuable or legitimate than anyone else who puts together a spreadsheet and assigns/sells the domains to other people?  You have to get the world to take it serious and the way it's currently proposed will not accomplish that.  I believe my idea will accomplish this.

Pages: 1 ... 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 [19] 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ... 32