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if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.[/quoteyes,let's do it.the only one choice.
Quote from: matle85 on November 13, 2018, 02:14:22 pmI'm assuming the vote above is just informative - I guess the Committee have the authority make the decision and if they decide they want to put it to a worker vote on chain they do?Sure informative, like CNN or fake news.Rather than admit the sentiment is against this change, those pushing for it will keep trying to spin inputs until they get what they want, damned be the shareholders and contrary opinions.
I'm assuming the vote above is just informative - I guess the Committee have the authority make the decision and if they decide they want to put it to a worker vote on chain they do?
Create a worker proposal based poll, not an easily manipulated forum poll - I had to re-cast my vote for some reason and there's a new poll option now.. not ideal. 20% is way too much for force settlement offset
Quote from: bitcrab on November 12, 2018, 02:32:31 pmtomorrow the poll will be closed, please vote to express your opinion.Create a worker proposal based poll, not an easily manipulated forum poll - I had to re-cast my vote for some reason and there's a new poll option now.. not ideal. 20% is way too much for force settlement offset 👎
tomorrow the poll will be closed, please vote to express your opinion.
Quote from: abit on November 11, 2018, 01:30:32 amAlternatively, we can keep the 5% offset, but ask witnesses to set a % bottom (in comparison to trading price) when feeding BTS/bitCNY price.Do you mean with a % bottom to aim for a constant but positive premium? Or what is the bottom?
Alternatively, we can keep the 5% offset, but ask witnesses to set a % bottom (in comparison to trading price) when feeding BTS/bitCNY price.
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.
As a committee member I have one more request: When a proposal is created and approved for increasing the settlement offset, please make it execute with at least 5 days notice and ensure everyone trading on bitCNY has had a chance to adept to the upcoming change. Thank you.
Quote from: yamtt on November 08, 2018, 01:35:33 amQuote from: abit on November 07, 2018, 08:48:24 pmI've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.I feel very very disappointed now.After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.Update:Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.同意支持提高清算补偿一样的,喂价反馈一样可以反馈到无限低,难道清算补偿也要提高无限高?the situantion is same.
Quote from: abit on November 07, 2018, 08:48:24 pmI've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.I feel very very disappointed now.After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.Update:Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.同意支持提高清算补偿
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.I feel very very disappointed now.After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.Update:Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.
虽然BIP42已经可以保证BITCNY的锚定了,但是目前的喂价公式不利于活跃市场,灵敏度太低,反映迟于市场行情。压低喂价和强清都可以抑制抵押,但是强清也不是无风险套利,因为延后24小时执行,这就是市场风险了。用压低喂价的方式不如发起强清利于活跃市场,目前看市场已经很死了,不应该一味的打压市场活跃度了。 如果想发起强清,那么玩家手里必须备有bitcny,这也是bitcny的需求来源。所以目前保留强清会更合适,没有理由移除强清。况且,强清目前也没有什么坏处,无非就是把高抵押的清算了而已,下调喂价一样会把高抵押的爆仓的。移除强清是保护抵押者的说法不成立。只要市场bitcny需求不足,那么高抵押行为必须抑制。 强请补偿应该为零,而不是5%,会更有利于活跃内盘的。强清应该是很正常的市场行为,而不是偶尔来一次,习惯了就行了。阶梯式强清补偿可能更合适,可以避免恶意强清。 总之,BTS系统是做市场的,不是国家机构,不能管的太死,否则会适得其反。 另外,锚定精确不代表非要1:1才是锚定精确。只要在一定时间段保证汇率稳定,保证汇率可控就是锚定精确了。可以是1:1,也可以是1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03,都表示锚定精确。熊市行情应该是bitcny 适度贬值的锚定,比如1:1.02,这样会更有利于活跃市场。你这是想完全把bts改成期货交易Although BIP42 can guarantee the anchoring of BITCNY, the current feeding formula is not conducive to the active market, and the sensitivity is too low to reflect the market price later. Lower feeding prices and strong liquidation can suppress mortgages, but strong liquidation is not risk-free arbitrage, because delayed implementation of 24 hours, which is market risk. It's better to lower the feeding price than to activate the market by launching a strong Qing Dynasty. At present, the market is dead, so we should not blindly suppress the market activity.If you want to be strong, then players must have bitcny in hand, which is also the source of demand for bitcny. Therefore, it is more appropriate to retain strong clearance at present, and there is no reason to remove Qiang Qing. Moreover, there is no harm in Qiangqing at present, just liquidating the high mortgage, and lowering the feeding price will also explode the high mortgage. It is untenable to remove strong clearing is to protect mortgages. As long as the market bitcny demand is insufficient, the high mortgage behavior must be suppressed.Strong compensation should be zero instead of 5%, which will be more conducive to active internal market. Qiang Qing should be a normal market behavior, rather than once in a while, get used to it. Step by step compensation is probably more appropriate and can avoid malicious strong.In a word, the BTS system is a market, not a state institution. It should not be too rigid, otherwise it would be counterproductive.In addition, anchoring accuracy does not mean that 1:1 is anchoring accuracy. As long as the exchange rate is stable in a certain period of time, it is accurate to ensure that the exchange rate is controllable. It can be 1:1 or 1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03, which means anchoring accuracy. Bear market should be the anchor of bitcny moderate depreciation, such as 1:1.02, which will be more conducive to active market.
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, seehttps://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount. In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible withBSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt positionholders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punishthem. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offsetdynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.
I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this threadhttps://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explainagain. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.I feel very very disappointed now.
After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towardsa tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including theones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioningthe ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. Alldiscussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a validargument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve?We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your timeto learn a bit more?
OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (thefix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it andpush it online can go ahead, or write your own fix.
Actually, adjusting MCR iseffectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset,so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going,however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.
Update: Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversuppliedis fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this pointof view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it canbe replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply whena debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenlyapply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish afew positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHOnot a fair enough rule.
Quote from: sschiessl on November 06, 2018, 10:32:34 amChance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborateForce settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?
Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborateForce settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.
voted, i agree to disable force settlement temporarily to protect the BTS holder
I simply haven't understood yet how the exploitation works.Just to clarify for me, example from your picture: Code: [Select]latest price (LP) = 0.675035settlement price (SP) = 0.670566force settlement offset multiplier (FSOM) = 0.95Now assume I hold 100 bitCNYI can sell on free market and get 100 * 1 / LP=148.14 BTSI can force settle, now assume it would happen instantly then I get 100 * 1 / SP=149.12*FSOM=141.67 BTSAs the holder of the bitCNY this only gives me profit if LP * FSOM > SP. But, as long as LP > SP, the holder of the margin position would have a loss compared to latest price, i.e. someone could pay to hurt you (unlikely to happen though). This does not take the force settle delay into account.I think I understand the situation now, and I would agree this should be adressed. But not by disabling force settlement, but by ensuring that LP * FSOM <= SP is maintained.Just in general: The flag "DISABLE FORCE SETTLING" should be able to do exactly that, maybe a core dev could confirm. Not that I advertise this solution.
latest price (LP) = 0.675035settlement price (SP) = 0.670566force settlement offset multiplier (FSOM) = 0.95
if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.
Quote from: Thul3 on November 06, 2018, 03:24:08 pmQuote from: bitcrab on November 06, 2018, 02:38:38 pmif it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.So you are now breaking the peg for bitcny which was so important to you at all cost?I know this is not a perfect solution to solve the current issue and may break the peg, is there any better way? how about to increase the force settlement offset?
Quote from: bitcrab on November 06, 2018, 02:38:38 pmif it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.So you are now breaking the peg for bitcny which was so important to you at all cost?
We have the choice, If use the highest price as the last feed price, we can keep the forcesettlement and the dynamically feed price.
Couldn't an external actor target this sole 'highest price' to force an inflation of the feed price to attack collateral holders?
Quote from: Thul3 on November 06, 2018, 11:26:52 amYou are turning a free market into a centrally planned economywhat you called free market is a forrest where beasts can kill and eat people.
You are turning a free market into a centrally planned economy
Quote from: xeroc on November 06, 2018, 01:55:28 pmQuote from: bitcrab on November 06, 2018, 01:50:20 pmI own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?Well, that is a consequence of BSIP42 and not of settlements per se.Multiple solutions to that have been proposed already among which are:- let the price feed reflect the actual pricing again and do negative feedback through MCR- introduce a distinct price for settlements (though I believe that would allow exploting BSIP42)The proposal to remove one of the strongest reasons for bitassets to have a "floor"-price isn't easy for me to understand.the force settlement is already a problem for long time, that's why the bitCNY offset is set to 5%. BSIP42 just make the problem apparent.maybe the MCR solution can make things better, but I think it will cost at least several months for it to come, in this period we just let the debt position owner be put into the risk of being exploited?
Quote from: bitcrab on November 06, 2018, 01:50:20 pmI own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?Well, that is a consequence of BSIP42 and not of settlements per se.Multiple solutions to that have been proposed already among which are:- let the price feed reflect the actual pricing again and do negative feedback through MCR- introduce a distinct price for settlements (though I believe that would allow exploting BSIP42)The proposal to remove one of the strongest reasons for bitassets to have a "floor"-price isn't easy for me to understand.
I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?
Quote from: Thul3 on November 06, 2018, 11:26:52 amYou are turning a free market into a centrally planned economywhat you called free market is a forrest where beasts can kill and eat people.the real free market is a common infrastructure, it need careful design and will evolve with consensus.