I think this is fascinating how everyone approaches this from different points of view (and models) since this is really a multifaceted problem. There is demand side and supply side economics to think about here. Most are thinking of the demand side (how to set up a system that people want to use). I don't want to derail that, but here's my latest on the supply side thoughts. In theory, a simple system which properly manages supply will provide all the necessary features for a healthy and attractive investment.
Summary
Ideal system:
1) The system rewards market players for destroying BTA when there is an oversupply
2) The system rewards market players for creating BTA when there is an under supply
BTA2.0 Implementation of above:
Case (1) is handled by forced calls at 99% of the price feed.
Case (2) is unhandled, but the assumption is market players will do it with no explicit incentive because 1 BTA is supposed to equal the underlying asset.
New thoughts
To handle case (2), people have been offering the idea of yield for holding BTA - either positive or negative. However, I've been contesting that you can't peg a floating asset to itself, that is you need a mechanism by which there is market incentive to push towards the feed.
To do that how about the following:
A variable fee is charged on new shorts which is valued at X% of the difference between the feed and the short. This is a progressive "tax" paid by the parties (longs or shorts) pushing away from the feed and paid to the party that is pushing towards to feed. This fee is either in BTS or BTA depending on oversupply or undersupply and goes to a yield account paid out to all BTA shorts or for longs just like the current yield. It is market driven and leaves us with simple rules that are easy to explain.
The the market says that shorts need to be rewarded, there will be an auction for the size of the reward. The current market would be paying a yield to BTS shorters at one rate and longs at another. BOTH longs and shorts get a yield, and it is based on the fees that were collected when the asset was created.
Proposed, KISS, rules:
1) If a BTA is created (shorted) when there is an under supply, then the buyer would pay a fee in BTS based on how much the price was from the peg. That fee goes to a yield account. All shorts will be paid a fraction of that yield whenever they cover, and the yield is proportional to the fraction of the total BTA supply they are covering and how long they held the collateral (like the current system).
2) If a BTA is created when there is an over supply, the shorter pays a fee in BTA to a yield account which is paid out to longs similar to the current system.
Example:
Feed is 1 BTS per 1 Asset. I want to short at 1.10 BTS per 1 BTA, which means there is an under supply. Someone buys 1 BTA from me for 1.10 BTS. I put 1.10 in collateral so there is 2.20 in collateral, I owe 1 BTA, and the long is long 1 BTA. The buyer also pays a fee of some percentage of the 0.10 BTS they are from the peg, paid in BTS, to the short yield. Whenever any short covers, they are paid a yield proportional to the length of their short (capped at one year) and the percentage of their short. The is the contapositive of the current system.
If I want to short at .90 BTS per 1 BTA, that means there is an over supply of BTS. Someone buys 1 BTA from me for 0.9. I put 0.9 in collateral so there is now 1.90 BTS in collateral, I owe 1 BTA, and the long is long 1 BTA. I also pay a fee based on some percentage of the 0.1 BTS I am away from the peg, in BTA, to the long yield. It is paid out just like the long yield is paid out now. This is very similar to the current system.
Thoughts?