So the question is ...
Are we still playing in the Bitcoin 2.0 regime?
These incentives combine to form a system where every new employee added to the company, DO NOT have diminishing marginal returns due to an increasing lack of information.
I had thought that Bitshares had hit upon something with the ability to hire paid delegates by a vote - a potential new corporate structure. A distributed corporation.
Is this the future of the blockchain technology?
Will the blockchain not only revolutionize money and finance but also revolutionize THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE OF OUR CORPORATE WORLD?
2009-2014: Bitcoin, the first big application of the blockchain technology revolutionizes money.
2014-20??: Bitshares, the second big applicaiton of the blockchain technology, revolutionizes the nature of corporations.
Wow that is some vision! And this is awesome sales copy (among other things), good stuff +5%These incentives combine to form a system where every new employee added to the company, DO NOT have diminishing marginal returns due to an increasing lack of information.
There is a limited amount of time stakeholders have to perform research on delegates as it will take a lot of time to read all the stuff they transparently reveal about their work and keeping up with the discussion among stakeholders about delegates could easily become a full time job for those with large enough stake to make it worth their time.
How efficiently this discussion + research takes place will be crucial. Some kind of social platform will be needed for delegates to showcase their work and propose plans for fund spending. This forum may become over run soon, we'll need a more advanced platform where individual comments can be voted up reddit style to help sort though the junk (maybe it should require a small stake to do an upvote/downvote).
Anyway I like this kind of thinking, it's good to have a long term vision for BTS.
I wonder if this thread will be absolutely epic in a year...
I wonder if this thread will be absolutely epic in a year...
I wonder if this thread will be absolutely epic in a year...
Actually I've probably jinxed it now :P
I wonder if this thread will be absolutely epic in a year...
Actually I've probably jinxed it now :P
and let's not forget possible biological evolution of the human brain structures as a result of adaptation to network knowledge.... might take a few generations though?
Another really lousy scenario is that delegate campaigning ends up as a money race.That is why we as a community / we as shareholders should refuse any vote buying from the beginning so it doesn't sneak in over time and get a serious habit of what is appropriate for deciding who to vote for. Culture (a commonly shared basis of habits and thought patterns) / voting culture matters here because it is not super evident how to decide best for a delegate and shareholders decide like other shareholders decide (=are not always rational).
That (OP) was a bit a crazy but I liked it :)
There are a few things which also apply here why companies do not get infinitely big you did not mention:
1) The most obvious one is: competition. If barriers to entry are not infinitely high a second company can always form and offer lower prices / better quality if the one big company begins to offer low quality products are high prices to increase profits.
2) Innovation and diversity: There is never only one way to do things. A different basic structure of an organization might make it more effective to serve certain markets better than the one big company. Not every innovation can be copied since it might contradict the fundamentals. Example: You can just either do approval voting OR delegation voting...(not a perfect example...)
3) Complexity leading to inefficiency: Although slate voting and specialized slate formation agents make hiring and firing pretty efficient it will still be pretty complex at scale.
4) At scale network effect might not be really big if the services provided by the DAC do not rely on each other or do not have overlapping user bases.Another really lousy scenario is that delegate campaigning ends up as a money race.That is why we as a community / we as shareholders should refuse any vote buying from the beginning so it doesn't sneak in over time and get a serious habit of what is appropriate for deciding who to vote for. Culture (a commonly shared basis of habits and thought patterns) / voting culture matters here because it is not super evident how to decide best for a delegate and shareholders decide like other shareholders decide (=are not always rational).
Don't compete with us, join us!
It's more profitable for everyone.
But if you choose to complete with us,
well,
we would be forced to compete with you,
to protect our stakeholders' hard-earned network effect.
So come,
add your biological and technological distinctiveness to our own.
:)
Worth translating this into Chinese and posting in the Chinese forum to help everyone see the bigger picture! I'd tip 100BTSX to whomever does that.
1) What I meant was that there will never be only 1 service provider since that one WOULD increase prices if it would be the only one.That (OP) was a bit a crazy but I liked it :)
There are a few things which also apply here why companies do not get infinitely big you did not mention:
1) The most obvious one is: competition. If barriers to entry are not infinitely high a second company can always form and offer lower prices / better quality if the one big company begins to offer low quality products are high prices to increase profits.
2) Innovation and diversity: There is never only one way to do things. A different basic structure of an organization might make it more effective to serve certain markets better than the one big company. Not every innovation can be copied since it might contradict the fundamentals. Example: You can just either do approval voting OR delegation voting...(not a perfect example...)
3) Complexity leading to inefficiency: Although slate voting and specialized slate formation agents make hiring and firing pretty efficient it will still be pretty complex at scale.
4) At scale network effect might not be really big if the services provided by the DAC do not rely on each other or do not have overlapping user bases.Another really lousy scenario is that delegate campaigning ends up as a money race.That is why we as a community / we as shareholders should refuse any vote buying from the beginning so it doesn't sneak in over time and get a serious habit of what is appropriate for deciding who to vote for. Culture (a commonly shared basis of habits and thought patterns) / voting culture matters here because it is not super evident how to decide best for a delegate and shareholders decide like other shareholders decide (=are not always rational).
I like to see counter arguments against my crazy conclusion, but I actually think I have pretty good answers to these points.
1) open source as a requirement means that we can fork any innovative features, and metcalfes law means that anything applied to our network will have higher value than on its own. In the end a developer will have much higher economic incentives to join us rather than compete with us.
2) I've been thinking very hard about this because it would make sense for it to be true, but I literally cannot come up with any example other than the same one as you, the delegate voting mechanism, which I think is inconsequential.
3) the economic incentives to develop even further on the slate voting mechanism will be insane, there will very soon be millions of dollars up in their for anyone who will do that. I think that if the smartest developers in the entire crypto industry get together and work on this it will not really be a problem in the long run.
4) all services use money. We can take over a freaking bakery and it will be profitable for us, because it will continue to run as before but will now also be a POS for all bitshares financial services.
Given that a DAC is a sort of organism..
Deflation-centric views center on conserving energy and trying to avoid spending. This refers to the internal dynamic of the DAC as an idealized, perfect balance sheet.
However DACs also have external conditions that determine its growth and death, such as competing DACs and core development. These are radically outside the scope of the idealized balance sheet.
Unless the DAC can dynamically spend resources to address such issues, it will not last in the marketplace.