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Messages - abit

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3061
General Discussion / Re: Radical ideas for liquidity
« on: February 01, 2016, 10:16:33 pm »
IMHO there are flaws. Market making is NOT a 100% safe business, it will definitely loss in a trend, so the system itself should never dilute to operate such service.

Meh. You are arguing that once there is a sufficient amount of liquidity on the books, that there will be sufficient incentive for people to manipulate the market to their advantage. You are effectively saying that the DEX is broken, as once a sufficient to amount of liquidity exists that it will be manipulated and profited off of from bad actors. What your are saying is a possibility whether my proposal is enacted or not. It is possible as long as there is enough incentive on the orderbooks, which can occur naturally. How do you know this isn't already taking place as is?

I get what you are saying, but while bringing up a good reason the proposal should not be implemented, you are also stating the DEX is broken and unfixable. As soon as there is enough liquidity (incentive) then bad actors will manipulate the market for easy profits. This seems more like a flaw with Smart coins than with the proposal as it could easily happen without it.
I've posted the reason above but you didn't quote it.

One of the challenges is: if we have huge liquidity, we shouldn't simply move the feed price when price on external exchange moves, especially when liquidity of external exchanges is less, otherwise it's a good target to manipulate/exploit. But, since the IOU USD backed by exchanges are real USD, on the opposite bitUSD is NOT fully backed especially when huge amount of them are created via dilution, the feed price should move/follow the price on external exchanges, otherwise bitUSD would be considered "not pegged well". Imo BitUSD can be considered as fully backed if there hasn't been unlimited BTS diluted to create them. I'm not saying that smart coins are already broken, but I suspect that it will break if doing this way.

Exactly this:
The challenge is preventing the feed from being abused among a few other things.

3062
General Discussion / Re: Radical ideas for liquidity
« on: February 01, 2016, 03:04:19 pm »
@CoinHoarder: I like your idea. Your document is sound and IMHO we should do it. However, it involves quite some coding to have this an integrated automation and we may start trying to convince the committee to provide some liquidity in the short term. Not sure they are willing to do so.

As for the implementations, internally, those autonomous sell orders could be 'virtual' orders such that the DAC only borrows at the fixed ration IF there is a buyer for them ..
That way, we could have a ${MARKETCAP} sell order at the feed price in every single bitasset owned by the DAC/committee and the wall will be reduced in all markets simultaneously if a trade happens in any of them.
You should certainly write this together into a BSIP and have the devs thing about it ..
IMHO there are flaws. Market making is NOT a 100% safe business, it will definitely loss in a trend, so the system itself should never dilute to operate such service.

3063
General Discussion / Re: Radical ideas for liquidity
« on: February 01, 2016, 02:55:58 pm »
If the system dilutes unlimited BTS for market making, what will happen when a whale or a group of whales manipulates the price of BTS?
* buy the BTAs which are borrowed via dilution, dump BTS to external exchange, settle
* borrow BTA, and sell to the system, pump BTS on external exchanges, buy BTA back from system

The autonomous liquidity operations would not ever buy SmartCoins. It only shorts them, and then places them on the sell side of the market above the price feed. I don't understand what you mean by "sell to the system" since the "system" is never buying any coins.

If this works how I think it works, couldn't someone do this type of an exploit as Bitshares exists today?
I wrote above post from a manipulator's perspective.
Since your "autonomous liquidity operations" (in my word: your bot) place orders into the market, I named it "the system", whatever price you place it, a manipulator can take advantage of your open orders. Once your smart coins are bought by the manipulator, you have open short positions, which can be settled by the manipulator. Your bot would passively accept all the commands sent by the manipulator, thus cause losses.

//Update
Quote
If this works how I think it works, couldn't someone do this type of an exploit as Bitshares exists today?
Since no one provides unlimited liquidity without moving the price. The manipulator has no opponent to worth exploiting.

3064
Technical Support / Vesting balance doesn't vote?
« on: February 01, 2016, 10:15:24 am »
I think it doesn't.
If anybody happens to know more, please leave a message here.
Thanks.

3065
General Discussion / Re: poll for the "1 BTS for transfer" proposal
« on: February 01, 2016, 10:12:25 am »

Moreover, I think you can return 16k BTS to the user immediately after s/he upgrades, as you'll be sure to be compensated in 90 days by the vesting process.
This way you loan 16k to the customer but this loan is absolutely NOT safe.
It all makes sense if you have other ways to make profit on this customer.

Corrected.

The vesting period of 90days means a fluctuation of bts price.  From a business perspective, you need to keep accounting of the price fluctuation at the point of sales and the potential of losses if bts price dropped by end of the vesting period.  Some may not be interested to offer a non-profit faucet because of that.
IMO it IS perfectly safe, assuming you are BTS long anyway.
You're right, this will not suit everyone but this assumption holds for most BitShares-related businesses, including bitcrab's transwiser.
You give away 16k BTS today and you're sure to get the full amount back in 90 days.
You need to freeze some of your BTS capital this way, but in return you get a happy customer having access to low transfer fees.

I'm still curious why @bitcrab is not willing to consider this as an alternative option to "1 BTS for transfer".
Probably it need to freeze too many BTS's. Probably you don't know how many potential (ab)users are there in China. 16K BTS per user means 1.6M per 100 users, 16M per 1000 users, imo it's too easy to be exploited.

//Update:
Even the 16K BTS is paid by the referrer, the 4K upgrading fee seems to be still high for some users who want 1 BTS transfer fee.

3066
how about we restrict most "advanced operations" to require LTM and only have the basic stuff in the basic membership included:
- transfers (also blind)
- trading

require LTM:
- proposals
- bond market (eventually)
- withdraw permissions
- creating assets
- creating accounts (already implemented that way)
The referrers don't want their referred people to upgrade to LTM indeed..
More features require LTM, more likely users will upgrade or leave.

3067
General Discussion / Re: Proposal - Permit non-LTMs to be referrers
« on: February 01, 2016, 12:35:53 am »
yes, and then everyone refers their own accounts and marketers get nothing. but go for it, if you guys add 0 fees you might as well give this project the final blow
If one register a new account which referred by herself, she won't actually save money until she upgrade the first account to LTM (to be able to withdraw from cash-back object), which will give the original referrer/marketer 80% of upgrading fee, so it's not "nothing" but "only thing". However this upgrading would come after a long period, or even never, so yes in this case the original referrer will get nothing.

3068
Technical Support / Re: is the witness thing running under win?
« on: January 31, 2016, 11:38:46 pm »
Stupid question maybe, but do you have enough disk space left?

193 G under win, 183 G under Linux

Update.... weird enough, stuck at exactly the same point under Ubuntu. [only difference it stuck a few blocks earlier 2821705..i.e 05 instead of 22

Granted I just ran it, then ran it with --replay-blockchain

At least this is the more supported OS so probably more people can help.
Can I login to your Linux machine and take a look? Or windows? I suspect from the beginning that you're using a wrong version, and still think so. Might be stupid reasons.

3069
Code: [Select]
cd libraries/fc
git checkout master
git pull
cd ../..
make witness_node

3070
I apologize if I've ever been offensive.

By saying "refuse to share", I mean if you apply plan A for your product, which obviously doesn't share anything to referral program.

3071
General Discussion / Re: Radical ideas for liquidity
« on: January 31, 2016, 10:52:14 pm »
If the system dilutes unlimited BTS for market making, what will happen when a whale or a group of whales manipulates the price of BTS?
* buy the BTAs which are borrowed via dilution, dump BTS to external exchange, settle
* borrow BTA, and sell to the system, pump BTS on external exchanges, buy BTA back from system

Risks are too high IMO.

If price is decided by external exchanges, to be safe, fund for market making inside Dex have to be much less than volume/depth of external exchanges. However, if the fund are too few, it makes little sense, since no enough liquidity will be provided to the Dex..

So the Dex should find price by itself. For example run a LMSR bot with huge fund. But how to peg?

So a possible solution would be, do market making on external exchanges and Dex. When volumes on external exchanges are high, market making on the dex will be safe. If no depth on external exchanges, dex will die.

3072
@abit we really need to talk about the definition of 'robbing' which is the act of taking someone elses goods.
Similar to the settlement 'robbing', the rules for businesses are clear, they can share user base or they require ther own users to be referred by your own faucet (which is just stupid IMHO). People using the service will have to pay the fee no matter what and unless they are ltm, they will pay a higher fee. Period.
This is not whole. People referred by this owner can still use services provided by others, and in this case this owner will get referral income. This is unfair imo.

I don't know whether it's good for the system if every (selfish) business force their users to register a new account. At least we'll hopefully seems to have more registered accounts.

3073
I'd like to bump this thread as someone who didn't agree with bitcrab in the past is now trying to follow bitcrab's ideas.

3074
By selecting mode A means the issuer will get benefit when users referred by other referrers come to use her service, in the meanwhile the referrers will be hurt, unless the issuer white-list her users. This can't satisfy all parties if fee rate not set properly.


What if the issuer of Mode A brings in 1,000,000,000 new users because of low fees and brings new users to pay higher fees for another asset that uses Mode B or C?  The network should take just one low fee to sustain itself for maximum network effect.  Issuers should have flexibility on pricing, not the committee.  The committee should simply determine the network fee.  Any UIA, FBA, Privatized Smartcoin issuer should be able to set fees on top of the network fee.  Technically an issuer can try to add fees outside of the Bitshares system, but it's much more natural to just add that as a standard feature to the system to attract far more businesses to use the platform.
Issuers don't bring in users by their own alone. When they bring in users, they act as registrars or referrers. In this case, the issuer is able to reimburse the users the extra fees paid by users and split to referral program (actually to the issuer in this case), no matter what fee mode she selected for her product.

More important, if the issuer selected a fee mode which doesn't split fees to referral program, OTHER REGISTRARS/REFERRERS would be not willing to bring users FOR THE ISSUER, even worse, they may try to isolate/hurt the issuer's product since it does nothing good to them but probably get benefit from THEIR user bases. Which means the issuer has to fight alone, even against other parties. Which will do no good to the whole system.

Sure you can think of issuers of assets as a mini-platform for various businesses to use.  Bitshares BTS is the broader platform.  Wallet/Exchange/Referral businesses can choose any issuer/asset they want.   If  a wallet or exchange want lower basic fees they can choose an asset with Mode A.  If a wallet or exchange wants to have a referral/membership model they can choose an asset with Mode B or C.

It seems that you are trying to save the issuers from themselves rather than give them a choice?  If an issuer chooses a fee Mode A that has no referral/membership program and many registrars/referrers don't promote them they will have to find other methods to gain users with outside capital, but they will have an advantage of offering lower basic fees.   Why is that a problem especially when a predominant contingent in China want Mode A?

What are your thoughts on Privatized Smartcoins?  My thought is that people will naturally want to promote Public Smartcoins instead of a BitCash Privatized Smartcoin or even TCNY so we who issue Privatized Smartcoins are at a disadvantage. Do you want to save us from ourselves?  Privatized Smartcoins need to find users by improving parameters,  providing liquidity, acquiring different customer segments etc.  The positive is that they aren't forced into using particular parameters or price feeds.  In the same way they shouldn't be forced into a particular fee Mode or fee schedule especially because their business and customer demographic may be different than other businesses.

As I see it, if we have three modes it may look something like this for Smartcoins:
CNY Public Smartcoins:  Mode A  - 1 cent transfers
TCNY Privatized Smartcoins: Mode A - 1 cent transfers
USD /Eur Public Smartcoins: Mode B or C - 1% or 20 cent transfers, 1 cent for members
BitCash Privatized Smartcoins: Mode B or C -  1% or 20 cent transfers, 1 cent for members

Wallets/Registrars/Referral:
OpenLedger
Moonstone
Lime
Bunker
Transwiser
BitCash
Referral Businesses/Blogs/Affiliates

Can you explain to me what will go wrong in this example?  What will businesses be doing to each other rather than focusing on building their own user bases for their business models and target consumer demographic?
What I've seen, and said again and again:

You keep insist that you'll provide services to "your own users", and build your user base somehow.
You don't think "your own users" will use services provided by others, which will benefit you via referral income.
You don't think users who are brought in BitShares by other referrers will use your services, and you refuse to share profit with the referrers when you gain benefit from these users.

In short, I think you're trying to rob other referrers.

If you still don't understand, sorry, I think I'm unable to reach you.

3075
By selecting mode A means the issuer will get benefit when users referred by other referrers come to use her service, in the meanwhile the referrers will be hurt, unless the issuer white-list her users. This can't satisfy all parties if fee rate not set properly.


What if the issuer of Mode A brings in 1,000,000,000 new users because of low fees and brings new users to pay higher fees for another asset that uses Mode B or C?  The network should take just one low fee to sustain itself for maximum network effect.  Issuers should have flexibility on pricing, not the committee.  The committee should simply determine the network fee.  Any UIA, FBA, Privatized Smartcoin issuer should be able to set fees on top of the network fee.  Technically an issuer can try to add fees outside of the Bitshares system, but it's much more natural to just add that as a standard feature to the system to attract far more businesses to use the platform.
Issuers don't bring in users by their own alone. When they bring in users, they act as registrars or referrers. In this case, the issuer is able to reimburse the users the extra fees paid by users and split to referral program (actually to the issuer in this case), no matter what fee mode she selected for her product.

More important, if the issuer selected a fee mode which doesn't split fees to referral program, OTHER REGISTRARS/REFERRERS would be not willing to bring users FOR THE ISSUER, even worse, they may try to isolate/hurt the issuer's product since it does nothing good to them but probably get benefit from THEIR user bases. Which means the issuer has to fight alone, even against other parties. Which will do no good to the whole system.

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