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中文 (Chinese) / Re: 【喂价讨论】动态调整最低抵押率要求和爆仓惩罚
« on: November 06, 2018, 05:50:57 pm »
声明: 我不是大佬也不是大神啊!!!
我只是一根被套牢的韭菜……
现在只有嘴上功夫,没有实际能力😭
我只是一根被套牢的韭菜……
现在只有嘴上功夫,没有实际能力😭
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其实我还是觉得bitcny就锚定充值一头就行了,就锚定充值费率为0,±0.3%以内不反馈,范围内喂价随现价波动,范围以外喂价就是现价乘上反馈积分比率。毕竟提现费率有承兑商与市场需求供需关系的影响在里面,承兑商少了自然就会高,多了就会低,这个提现费率是不是应当交给市场。从近期盘面表现上来看,感觉锚定精度在一个范围里面就行了,过于刚性反而会使市场僵化。
如果负反馈继续进行,而考虑折中的话,那么喂价负反馈能够成为BTS受外盘暴涨暴跌的缓冲器就不错了。
当市场暴跌时候,喂价能够通过负反馈缓慢下跌,从而减少暴仓单对市场的冲击,但是当喂价达到外盘价格时候,就不应该再继续降低了,该下降的已经下降了。
同样,当外盘爆拉上涨时候,内盘喂价也通过负反馈缓慢上涨,但是当上涨到外盘价格时候,就应该停止上涨了,而不应该像前些天那样,为了锚定精度,无休止的拉升喂价,从而形成下次暴跌或者阴跌时候的堰塞湖。
但是我还是反对这种不透明不直观的喂价负反馈,至少初始喂价应该是透明的。哪怕是提供动态的MSSR或者MCR,也不想看到见证人提供出来一些看不清来龙去脉的喂价。因此当喂价负反馈进行到一定时候,就该携带着经验和教训或者终止负反馈,或者迁移到动态的MSSR或者MCR了。
毕竟两个月以来,充提手续费之差很少小于过0.5%
喂价理论上可以低于市场价,但是却必须考虑到强清防护。
当前CNY强清补偿是5%,USD强清补偿是1%。
那就要求CNY喂价不得低于市场价*96%,USD喂价不得低于市场价,这样既防护了强清,也算是最大限度支持了负反馈,可算作不完美的权宜之计。
如何?
不好,想要保留喂价反馈与防止被恶意强清须采用最高价法,最高价法灵活性更大一些,即使每个人的参数不一,对最后出来的喂价结果影响不会太大,只存在喂价反馈什么时候会超过或低于外盘喂价的问题,也就是喂价反馈进场与出场的时机问题,留给市场自由竞争的空间更大,即使不想承认,最高价法已经是妥协中的最好办法。
即使不低于市场价的96%,依然存在喂价向下反馈压制内盘向上空间的问题,也属于变相的恶意强清,不属于市场自身调节。
喂价反馈在外盘喂价上升时属于几乎不动的情况,即使动也远低于以前外盘喂价上升速度,一旦内盘价格一时超过外盘,就会反馈爆仓,形成空间严重压缩。
抵押低于外盘喂价被爆了无话可说,被喂价反馈爆了这就属于被计划,高于外盘喂价时候的向下反馈还能接受。
最好舍弃锚定精度的想法,没有强大的外汇储备与经济实力想控制汇率基本不可能,但是抵押者不是筹码。
另外,左右堵窟窿是堵不住的,问题出在喂价反馈上,不是出在强清上,提高强清补偿也不能彻底解决喂价反馈本身的问题。
现在的这个体系,需要内盘与外盘联动,如果内盘对价格的拉升不能传导到外盘,那么这种拉升本身就没多大意义。被压缩就被压缩呗。
当然,现在内盘与外盘联动的程度还比较低,需要提高。
抵押者本来就需要承担各种风险,现在抵押者承担的风险,比起719之前已经小多了。
没什么好争的呀,采用最高价方案和采用巨蟹防止强清方案不就差了4%么?区别不大啊,总之就是控制喂价不要无限度的下跌嘛,大家观点是一致的。都是为了bts好,利益一致,不必那么激动呀。问题很好解决,不要吵来吵去耽误时间。关键是要想全面一点,尽量避免老改,影响行情。
喂价理论上可以低于市场价,但是却必须考虑到强清防护。
当前CNY强清补偿是5%,USD强清补偿是1%。
那就要求CNY喂价不得低于市场价*96%,USD喂价不得低于市场价,这样既防护了强清,也算是最大限度支持了负反馈,可算作不完美的权宜之计。
如何?
We have the choice, If use the highest price as the last feed price, we can keep the forcesettlement and the dynamically feed price.
Couldn't an external actor target this sole 'highest price' to force an inflation of the feed price to attack collateral holders?
I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?Well, that is a consequence of BSIP42 and not of settlements per se.
Multiple solutions to that have been proposed already among which are:
- let the price feed reflect the actual pricing again and do negative feedback through MCR
- introduce a distinct price for settlements (though I believe that would allow exploting BSIP42)
The proposal to remove one of the strongest reasons for bitassets to have a "floor"-price isn't easy for me to understand.
the force settlement is already a problem for long time, that's why the bitCNY offset is set to 5%. BSIP42 just make the problem apparent.
maybe the MCR solution can make things better, but I think it will cost at least several months for it to come, in this period we just let the debt position owner be put into the risk of being exploited?
Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate
Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.
I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?
友情提示,2018.11.06现价和喂价差价已经高于5%,小心强清,这什么狗屁负反馈,真不想骂人