BitShares Forum

Main => General Discussion => Topic started by: gulu on August 28, 2014, 10:26:49 pm

Title: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: gulu on August 28, 2014, 10:26:49 pm
Current problem:
BitUSD is undervalued compared to USD outside (~20% at the time of writing). Potential reason:
1) Not enough incentive to hold BitUSD. No interested received.
2) Not much demand for BitUSD for commercial usage, especially when little merchants accept BitUSD for payment.

Result to achieve:
1) BitUSD receives interest to add incentive for holding it.
2) The added incentive evens out the imbalanced force from one side of the market, which pushes the peg towards 1:1.

Goal/requirement:
1) Interest rate, R, needs to be market-driven.
2) BitUSDs are fungible, meaning they enjoy the same R. The previous proposal of BitUSDx (R = x%) would generate many kinds of BitUSDs, and inherently they are non-fungible, as they enjoy different interest rates. Here, the interest that BitUSD receives comes from the BTSX collateral, which is the loss of the BitUSD shorter.

Design principle:
More short of BitUSD pushes up R; more long of BitUSD drives down R.
(BitUSD priced in BTSX)

Range of R:
Rmin < R < Rmax, while Rmin can be negative if necessary.

Specific rules:
1) Orders can be sorted into three categories: sitting orders, driving orders, and neutral orders. When a buy order and a sell/short order are matched, usually they were initially placed in the different blocks. The one placed in the earlier block becomes the sitting order, and the other is the driving one. Sometimes, two matching orders are included in the same block, which makes both neutral.
2) Presumption: driving orders represent market direction/intention.
3) Only driving orders move R.
4) A long driving order drives R down; a short driving order pushes R up.
5) R moves 0.1% for every $x million BitUSDs in the driving order, proportionally. For instance, x can be 1, 10, or 100.

Expected end results:
1) R reaches equilibrium. This is the market-driven interest rate, which represents the wills of both sides of the market. If one side disagrees, it would move R by buying or selling BitUSDs to the direction that it prefers.

This proposal provides a general idea of how to set up a market-driven interest rate. Measures against various attacks are very likely to be in need. 
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: Shentist on August 29, 2014, 04:27:17 am
good idea!

so you get more incentive to take the side of the market who is totally ignored at the moment. now we seeing what happens if everyone believes the same.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: gulu on August 29, 2014, 04:34:03 am
good idea!

so you get more incentive to take the side of the market who is totally ignored at the moment. now we seeing what happens if everyone believes the same.

Right, this is the goal. Market-adjusted interest rate that balances demands from the two sides. Would like to hear feedback from Bytemaster.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: jakub on August 29, 2014, 10:59:00 am
Expected end results:
1) R reaches equilibrium. This is the market-driven interest rate, which represents the wills of both sides of the market. If one side disagrees, it would move R by buying or selling BitUSDs to the direction that it prefers.

This makes a lot of sense.
Assuming R has reached equilibrium - please explain how is this interest rate going to be applied?
I mean: how will bitUSD shorts be paying the interest R to bitUSD longs? What will be the mechanism? 
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: yidaidaxia on August 29, 2014, 12:42:54 pm
It's really a good idea. We need to provide incentive for holding BitUSD, otherwise it will just go down continuously vs USD. The pegging should be based on the useful value of BitUSD, the best way is to have massive merchants to support BitUSD so that people could use BitUSD for their daily activity just like USD(and even better). But that's would be implemented step by step, merchant by merchant, it would be a long run. And we need to provide the incentive now to push the trend back to pegging(even if it's not 1:1 or close to 1:1 now), and Gulu's proposal does make sense especially he provides a detailed solution about how it works logically. The community do need to evaluate it in details.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: gordonhucn on August 30, 2014, 02:44:56 am
 +5%, this is a very practical proposal just like many other great ideas of how to operate the whole bitAssets(bitUSD for now) business to make bitsharesX market grow larger steadily. As many bitshares holders may probably agree to give a certain level of system profits to make the market grow based on business activities and real world market demands rather than just speculation of the btsx price. There are also some other ways to help market peg and btsx business development like market marker of bitUSD/USD/btsx, more gateways of bitUSD/btsx<->USD. I believe that the social consensus will work as expected eventually with no doubt, but we need to come up and try more different ways to make sure we can get there and get there sooner than later.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: wesphily on August 30, 2014, 02:52:30 am
I am not hardcore on forex trading BUT, I did read where interest rates were part of the equation for controlling currency prices. Monetary theory? Would be nice to have that in bit currencies.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: jsidhu on August 30, 2014, 03:39:54 am
I am not hardcore on forex trading BUT, I did read where interest rates were part of the equation for controlling currency prices. Monetary theory? Would be nice to have that in bit currencies.

Central banks set their borrowing rates from which the banks can borrow and lend. The interest is paid to the central bank from borrowing. The different currencies have different interest rates for holding it, thus creating a SWAP essentially where you have to pay to hold the currency pair or you get paid to hold it, i.e.: GBP/JPY where GBP interest rates where higher than JPY which had major deflationary issues before BOJ stepped in to intervene in the market to sell massive amount of JPY because people were buying JPY (at low interest) and selling GBP at higher interest creating a positive SWAP carry trade. Around the time when the central bank releases their interest rate statement you sometimes see carry trades unwinded affecting the market in mass.

The problem is once there is an interest rate applied it is subject to manipulation and speculators will feast on it to create extreme circumstances where external stimulius needs to be applied, kind of like what the bond vigilanties and carry traders which have incentive to cause JPY to rise because its cheap to borrow vs any other currency. Once BOJ stepped in I knew this wasn't going to end pretty, you have BOJ/SNB and many other central banks intervening which creates incentive to force their hand for almost free money (which is printed anyway).

An incentive should in this case needs to be totally decentralized and its hardt o see right now that if an interest based stimilus was added that it would avoid central authority or stimilus later on because its hard to cover 100% of the angles before hand, im guessing this is why this kind of thing is left out until we use the system quite a bit.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: joele on August 30, 2014, 05:57:50 am
The short collateral should be borrowed from bitUSD holders that earn interest.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: changematey on August 30, 2014, 08:54:12 am
I am not hardcore on forex trading BUT, I did read where interest rates were part of the equation for controlling currency prices. Monetary theory? Would be nice to have that in bit currencies.
Yes. Even when you open any position, the broker pays you an interest for the currency you are long (buying) and charge you for the currency you are short (selling). Example short GBP/JPY (sell GBP, buy JPY) given by Sidhu will give you a negative interest on a day to day basis, decreasing you holding. So for a profit you need the movement to be larger than the interest being applied.
Similarly, long GBP/JPY (buy GBP, sell JPY) also called a carry trade, will give you profit + interest.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 07:00:00 pm
I think that a proxy for interest rate is collateral requirement.  The more collateral required the less BitUSD can be created.   
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: theoretical on August 31, 2014, 07:44:34 pm
I think that a proxy for interest rate is collateral requirement.  The more collateral required the less BitUSD can be created.

No, I don't think this is true.

Sometimes I think of BitUSD holders as "creditors" and shorters as "equity investors".  In other words, the BitUSD holders get their due before shorters get anything.  Reducing the collateral increases the credtiors' risk exposure, so they would demand a bigger premium -- but there is currently no way for creditors to allow variable collateral.  And I think that's a good thing because it allows BitUSD to be fungible.  So collateral requirement is related to interest rate -- but not the same.

Now that I think about it, you might be able to allow variable collateral by making the collateral requirement equal to the average current collateralization of BitUSD plus a percentage, rather than fix it at 2x.  That should increase the demand to short when the price rises, and when the price falls it will discourage new shorts until existing shorts take their profits.  The tradeoff is BitUSD will recapitalize more slowly per short, so the risk of a margin crisis or even FDIC situation (resulting in unbacked BitUSD, a bailout, or halting the market) increases substantially.

I think the discount of BitUSD relative to real USD actually represents something like an interest rate (although it has no reference to any time horizon).

Average collateralization of BitUSD is something that we should definitely have easy access to.  I actually filed a ticket to add the feature yesterday:  https://github.com/BitShares/bitshares_toolkit/issues/726
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: starspirit on September 01, 2014, 03:27:35 am
Great to keep thinking about this problem, but I do not think this propel will work. There is no reason why any fixed rule (e.g. rule 5) should lead to the BitUSD being properly pegged. Buy and sell orders for BitUSD will be driven by many factors such as views on Bitshares, not just the discount/premium to real USD. So situations are possible such as where BitUSD is already at a discount to USD for some reason, people suddenly become more bearish on BTSX (buys increase on BitUSD) but the action of rule 5 would be to decrease interest paid on BitUSD and diminish the incentive further to own BitUSD over real USD.

The only way I can think of to get such a scheme to work is to actually fix the peg (i.e. fix BitUSD to real USD price) and float the interest rate. That is, people make bids and offers quoted as an interest rate rather than the price. The matching process defines the variable market interest rate at any time. With such a scheme, you would have to be ready for interest rates to vary dramatically and be extremely high at times of peak BTSX demand (e.g. see Bitfinex margin lending book as an analogy).
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: starspirit on September 01, 2014, 03:29:09 am

*** meant proposal not propel (line 1)
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: gulu on September 02, 2014, 02:32:27 pm
Great to keep thinking about this problem, but I do not think this propel will work. There is no reason why any fixed rule (e.g. rule 5) should lead to the BitUSD being properly pegged. Buy and sell orders for BitUSD will be driven by many factors such as views on Bitshares, not just the discount/premium to real USD. So situations are possible such as where BitUSD is already at a discount to USD for some reason, people suddenly become more bearish on BTSX (buys increase on BitUSD) but the action of rule 5 would be to decrease interest paid on BitUSD and diminish the incentive further to own BitUSD over real USD.

The only way I can think of to get such a scheme to work is to actually fix the peg (i.e. fix BitUSD to real USD price) and float the interest rate. That is, people make bids and offers quoted as an interest rate rather than the price. The matching process defines the variable market interest rate at any time. With such a scheme, you would have to be ready for interest rates to vary dramatically and be extremely high at times of peak BTSX demand (e.g. see Bitfinex margin lending book as an analogy).
The rule5 can be modified to be some percentage of existing BitUSD. Not a big issue. When R moves from an equilibrium, it is the result of the interest rate acting as a counter-balancing force against initial market shift.

Bidding on interest rate would make BitUSDs non-fungible, because different BitUSDs would carry different interest rate.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: gulu on September 02, 2014, 02:45:04 pm
I think that a proxy for interest rate is collateral requirement.  The more collateral required the less BitUSD can be created.
Both collateral and interest rate are cost of the shorts. But they are slightly different.

Collateral represents opportunity cost. If there is no BTSX bank that pays interest for BTSX deposit, there is not much opportunity cost here.

Interest rate represents real cost, because the shorts will lose real BTSX everyday.

As a BitUSD holder, such as a market maker, he will be much more comfortable holding an interest-carrying BitUSD. In a market of variable interest rate, it's much easier for a market maker to honor 1:1 peg, or something close, because now he does not have to go against the entire market force to peg BitUSD. The interest rate acts as a counter-balancing force against the initial market move and therefore helps the market maker.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: gulu on September 02, 2014, 03:06:10 pm
Expected end results:
1) R reaches equilibrium. This is the market-driven interest rate, which represents the wills of both sides of the market. If one side disagrees, it would move R by buying or selling BitUSDs to the direction that it prefers.

This makes a lot of sense.
Assuming R has reached equilibrium - please explain how is this interest rate going to be applied?
I mean: how will bitUSD shorts be paying the interest R to bitUSD longs? What will be the mechanism?

Shorts will be paying the interest from their collateral. An average interest rate can be calculated every 8640 blocks, which is one day in time. For instance, when 1 BitUSD is covered and the long is entitled to 0.05 BitUSD in interest, he would receive 1.05 BitUSD worth of BTSX based on current market price (or moving average of last 1000 blocks).
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: Empirical1.1 on September 02, 2014, 07:10:23 pm
I like your proposal.

Edit: But why don't we bring money into our system the way treasuries bring money into theirs?

This is my understanding of how BitUSD would be brought into use for a treasury in the real world..

Bonds are sold at auction by the treasury (the auction decides the interest rate)

In our case the shorts would be the treasury but unlike an overly indebted country we know the shorts are good for the interest because of the collateral requirements.

Kind of like this video up to 1:20 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p3_Q1SiRN-A

Why don't we bring BitAssets into existence similar to the way bonds are done (Excl. central banks and fractional reserve banking.) It seems to work so why re-invent the wheel. I don't understand enough though to figure out exactly how to cross apply it to BitAssets.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: starspirit on September 03, 2014, 05:18:05 am
Great to keep thinking about this problem, but I do not think this propel will work. There is no reason why any fixed rule (e.g. rule 5) should lead to the BitUSD being properly pegged. Buy and sell orders for BitUSD will be driven by many factors such as views on Bitshares, not just the discount/premium to real USD. So situations are possible such as where BitUSD is already at a discount to USD for some reason, people suddenly become more bearish on BTSX (buys increase on BitUSD) but the action of rule 5 would be to decrease interest paid on BitUSD and diminish the incentive further to own BitUSD over real USD.

The only way I can think of to get such a scheme to work is to actually fix the peg (i.e. fix BitUSD to real USD price) and float the interest rate. That is, people make bids and offers quoted as an interest rate rather than the price. The matching process defines the variable market interest rate at any time. With such a scheme, you would have to be ready for interest rates to vary dramatically and be extremely high at times of peak BTSX demand (e.g. see Bitfinex margin lending book as an analogy).
The rule5 can be modified to be some percentage of existing BitUSD. Not a big issue. When R moves from an equilibrium, it is the result of the interest rate acting as a counter-balancing force against initial market shift.

Bidding on interest rate would make BitUSDs non-fungible, because different BitUSDs would carry different interest rate.

Re rule 5, I'm definitely trying to understand the logic, but still not convinced that trying to temper the "driving" orders through changes in R always acts to reduce the peg, because it does not refer to the actual peg level in any way - at times it could distort the gap further. Suppose the value of BTSX rises, then sellers of BitUSD should drive price down to keep the proper peg. Won't rule 5 be counteracting that? Also you refer to an Rmin and Rmax limit, but the market may be in equilibrium outside of that, meaning that even at either limit the peg may not be holding (and liquidity is consequently thin). Now if the "driving" order were subsequently in the direction of reducing the distortion, wouldn't rule 5 again counteract that? There are many other examples I think showing that rule 5 is laden with assumptions about what is driving movement to or from the peg. In principle I think R needs to be set by the market, not a rule.

(Re bidding on rates, I accept your point on non-fungibility.)
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: starspirit on September 03, 2014, 05:43:23 am
I just had a subsequent idea that levers off your principle of a floating R, but better satisfies my concerns that R always acts to sustain rather than distort the peg. What if you had a simpler set of rules, that if BitUSD is below the peg price, R could be steadily increased once every hour say, and if above, R could be steadily reduced every hour. The rate of increase or reduction at the end of each hour could further depend on how far the price is from the peg price, the further it is requiring more aggressive change. The increments would step down again as the gap tightened.

It should also not be required to have any limits on R, as if they are hit, it will only mean the peg will break again. We should be prepared for R to get very high if that is what is required to balance the supply and demand, given the view is that the peg is more important.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: 当年很厉害 on September 15, 2014, 04:29:30 am
 +5% +5% +5%
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: PTS中国 on September 15, 2014, 07:19:07 am
good idea :)
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: gulu on September 15, 2014, 08:23:25 am
I just had a subsequent idea that levers off your principle of a floating R, but better satisfies my concerns that R always acts to sustain rather than distort the peg. What if you had a simpler set of rules, that if BitUSD is below the peg price, R could be steadily increased once every hour say, and if above, R could be steadily reduced every hour. The rate of increase or reduction at the end of each hour could further depend on how far the price is from the peg price, the further it is requiring more aggressive change. The increments would step down again as the gap tightened.

It should also not be required to have any limits on R, as if they are hit, it will only mean the peg will break again. We should be prepared for R to get very high if that is what is required to balance the supply and demand, given the view is that the peg is more important.
This would still require price feed.

The question whether R limits should be lifted is open to discussion. They are there for preventing short-term market manipulation.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: ripplexiaoshan on September 15, 2014, 09:15:08 pm
I strongly agree that we need more manipulation on bitUSD/bitCNY issuance based on the current situation. Now that the business market requirement of bitUSD/bitCNY is still very low, BTA issuance should be further limited by adding more cost to "short", besides price feeds. Price feeds can only guarantee a rough pegging, but a dynamic interest rate will guarantee an accurate pegging.  However, the rule that we need to follow to change the interest is still worth discussing.   
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: starspirit on September 16, 2014, 12:13:48 am
I just had a subsequent idea that levers off your principle of a floating R, but better satisfies my concerns that R always acts to sustain rather than distort the peg. What if you had a simpler set of rules, that if BitUSD is below the peg price, R could be steadily increased once every hour say, and if above, R could be steadily reduced every hour. The rate of increase or reduction at the end of each hour could further depend on how far the price is from the peg price, the further it is requiring more aggressive change. The increments would step down again as the gap tightened.

It should also not be required to have any limits on R, as if they are hit, it will only mean the peg will break again. We should be prepared for R to get very high if that is what is required to balance the supply and demand, given the view is that the peg is more important.
This would still require price feed.

The question whether R limits should be lifted is open to discussion. They are there for preventing short-term market manipulation.
Yes a price feed would be required, which ideally we would do without. But without some sort of reference to a feed price, any rules for adjusting R could just as likely be distorting the peg as aiding it. The only alternative schemes to this would involve having a way for the market to agree on the level of R that equates supply and demand. This is being explored in some other threads.

I don't think an unrestricted R could lead to market manipulation. Market manipulation can occur where few trades set a price for the entire market. In this case, R could not be outside where the market wants it because to drive it to that level would mean either buying large amounts way above the feed price or selling way below it, and the rest of the market will be glad to take the other side of the trade. The manipulator would make losses. Bit I could be missing something. Can you provide a scenario would a manipulator might be able to screw the rest of the market?
 
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: liondani on September 17, 2014, 09:10:18 pm
It is getting to complicated !
Make it please simple!
Cut the Gordian knot!

In theory maybe it's ok, or maybe you will find even "better" solutions than the initial proposal but I think
it will not work! I feel allready I must go to a University to study bitsharesx before starting with trading!

Let the market free! Remove even the initial restrictions for shorting? What can go so wrong ? What are we afraid? Its normal on early days to have a peg even at -40% at some point because the volatility  is huge now for BTSX, but that will change after some weeks/months.... Its different to have a 60 million market cap and different with 6 billion (and we get there).
What do you think will the average investor/speculator/supporter do when 1 bitUSD is 0.6 USD ? (Personally I will only watch because I would have gave all my money for bitUSD when it was at 0.75 USD).And what will I do when 1 bitUSD goes to 1.1 USD? Guess!.... I mean it doesn't need a rocket scientist to predict what will happen! The early days the peg will deviate from parity and every day it passes and the market matures it will come closer and closer... Am I missing something??? We must give more time to the market!
And yes it is more importand to have a stable platform right now with lots of new futures, tweaks, design improvements,bug free and more secure, and of course begin the marketing aggressively. Without happy users (market) the peg will never be established even if we have 10 Agents on our team.

PS After all it's a bitUSD, think about it! The most stable cryptocurrency that gives you interrest....
PS2 Try to accomplish your goals only with a free market and .... interest/dividends
PS3 I really think it will make a big difference when you let the users make orders (bid or asks) depended of the ratio...    [(bitAsset price) / (median price of realAsset)]
      For example :  buy x bitUSD at ratio:85% nobody would be afraid to make orders !!!!!!!!!!!!  for me that's the cut of the GORDIAN KNOT!!!!!!!!! That's the way to help the peg!!!!
      Then we see on the charts BIG BIG WALLS.... ;)


EDIT: I POSTED THIS ANSWER ON A WRONG THREAD !!!   SORRY
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: starspirit on September 18, 2014, 04:03:35 am
liondani, a quick look at my post history would show I'm on the side of a free market incentives. The OP for this thread proposed a complicated rule system that I was opposed to, and along the way I thought of a what I think is a better alternative given a rule-based approach.

If there are no rules or other mechanisms in place, and price is free to float anywhere, I cannot see any reason why the consensus should necessarily settle on a price around the peg. It could settle anywhere and constantly shift. It would then behave like any independent crypto. At the moment, being within 10% seems like an excellent result IMO.

In the end, I think there needs to be some sort of mechanism to ensure this consensus settles and becomes stable around the peg. I do not think any of the rules introduced to date achieve this, because they assume ex-ante that there is some sort of magic attraction around the peg price (a lot of which seems to rely on the principle of keep saying it till everyone believes it), and a little bump here or there will remove the current gap. Instead I think there needs to be a mechanism in place that financially affects the results to all parties of trading around that peg price specifically, not just any price the market consensus might instead settle upon. That I suspect is where the self-perpetuation idea mentioned in the white-paper might break down - it is a "holding yourself up by the bootstraps" concept that only works if the market has already permanently settled on the peg price as being the one and only right price.

To give the peg price such financial tangibility, some possibilities are: (i) a floating (interest) incentive paid from shorts to longs (or visa versa), (ii) a floating (interest) incentive paid from BitUSD borrowers to BitUSD lenders in a separate lending market where BitUSD could be deposited for lending, (iii) market exchangers who are willing to make BitUSD 1:1 fungible with USD, subject to an incentive. There may be others you might think of. But even in these cases, we need to be careful assuming things about what the market consensus (if there is even such a thing) might be.

I think such a mechanism would see confidence in the peg rise considerably, especially in outside circles, and then we see potentially massive interest and growth.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: jsidhu on September 18, 2014, 05:16:12 am
In todays market there is something called a SWAP which pays an interest rate to the bank (or whoever you borrow from) which can be negative based on the currency you borrow vs the one you lend. ie holding long GBP/JPY pays positive interest because you buy GBP at a higher interest rate and sell JPY at a lower interest rate, making the difference. Could something be applied analogous to lending mechanisms today in the world of bitshares?
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: bitmeat on September 18, 2014, 07:41:25 am
In todays market there is something called a SWAP which pays an interest rate to the bank (or whoever you borrow from) which can be negative based on the currency you borrow vs the one you lend. ie holding long GBP/JPY pays positive interest because you buy GBP at a higher interest rate and sell JPY at a lower interest rate, making the difference. Could something be applied analogous to lending mechanisms today in the world of bitshares?

 +5%

This swap could be derived from the market inefficiencies.

What if you adjust the swap based on how far from the median price the order executed?

Lets' say someone shorts 20% below median price of BitUSD. Then they just entered a contract, in which the shorter pays 20% interest to the holder of the BitUSD. Of course trouble with this is that you can't have different classes of BitUSD floating around (i.e. earning different interest). Perhaps interest is only paid if the buyer is still holding.

Either way, some sort of incentive needs to be introduced, it is evident that the peg is not working even with the short restriction.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: jsidhu on September 18, 2014, 07:34:56 pm
In todays market there is something called a SWAP which pays an interest rate to the bank (or whoever you borrow from) which can be negative based on the currency you borrow vs the one you lend. ie holding long GBP/JPY pays positive interest because you buy GBP at a higher interest rate and sell JPY at a lower interest rate, making the difference. Could something be applied analogous to lending mechanisms today in the world of bitshares?

 +5%

This swap could be derived from the market inefficiencies.

What if you adjust the swap based on how far from the median price the order executed?

Lets' say someone shorts 20% below median price of BitUSD. Then they just entered a contract, in which the shorter pays 20% interest to the holder of the BitUSD. Of course trouble with this is that you can't have different classes of BitUSD floating around (i.e. earning different interest). Perhaps interest is only paid if the buyer is still holding.

Either way, some sort of incentive needs to be introduced, it is evident that the peg is not working even with the short restriction.

I think that is the idea of the interest rate I have been talking about.. so essentially the interest rate is working as a SWAP in this case... and something that BM et all don't agree that is necessary seemingly. This difference from the median would essentially be the premium one side pays from bitUSD of 1... to keep a peg, but you're example is to have a premium based on the median price derived from the price feed? hmm not sure why not just use 1 and negate the use of price feeds?

Anyways what I was thinking about was the use of multiple rates based on the asset somehow, and borrowing one against the other one comes to a known conclusion of how much they will earn or have to pay over time to hold the trade. THe way SWAP works is that there is a daily turnover and you pay or collect interest at a set GMT time... so we can essentially transfer premiums or swaps or interest or whatever each day based on the interest rate (per day) .. this would be different then the long term interest somehow, to motivate people to hold long term?

It might mean that we would have multiple prediction markets for each asset, or asset class that would set the willing interest rates of the participants... but personally for peg reasons I thought to just tie it into the peg of 1 for now... but a more thoughtout mechanism may use a prediction market somehow to arrive to a conclusion what the premiums should be.
Title: Re: A New Proposal of Interest for BitUSD Holders
Post by: liondani on September 18, 2014, 09:52:32 pm
liondani, a quick look at my post history would show I'm on the side of a free ..................

Sorry my posted answer was for bytemaster's thread  :P