BitShares Forum
Main => General Discussion => Topic started by: xeroc on September 09, 2014, 05:38:12 pm
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I wanted to quickly sketch sth, that shows the fee flow and bitAsset yield so we can have a graphic to use when convincing people.
Here's my second quick sketch:
(http://i.imgur.com/JBpzzcj.png)
I am sure I am missing some things ... or have some misunderstanding ..
sources (inkscape,svg): https://tmp.xeroc.org/feeflow.svg
V2: http://i.imgur.com/a6mOGWl.png
V3: http://i.imgur.com/iBNbCqS.png
V4: http://i.imgur.com/ORb1t3M.png
V5: http://i.imgur.com/PxwAgRa.png
V6: http://i.imgur.com/mrNPgXc.png
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Show bid ask overlap going to rainy day fund
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Is the 5% fee on margin calls on BTSX or is it extracted as the BitAsset? Also, wouldn't the transaction fees on the market orders be sometimes BTSX and sometimes BitAsset? Finally, is the bid ask overlap always extracted as a BitAsset and never as BTSX?
Really it seems like there is no reason the network couldn't exchange between BTSX fees and BitAsset fees as desired. After all there is a decentralized exchange right there. So I guess my question is how much of the potential value available should be given to BitAsset holders vs BTSX holders?
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Is the 5% fee on margin calls on BTSX or is it extracted as the BitAsset? Also, wouldn't the transaction fees on the market orders be sometimes BTSX and sometimes BitAsset? Finally, is the bid ask overlap always extracted as a BitAsset and never as BTSX?
Really it seems like there is no reason the network couldn't exchange between BTSX fees and BitAsset fees as desired. After all there is a decentralized exchange right there. So I guess my question is how much of the potential value available should be given to BitAsset holders vs BTSX holders?
Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
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Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
I get that but shouldn't BTSX stakeholders have a way of defining how much interest they want to give to each particular BitAsset? Interest given to a BitAsset is money not given to the stakeholders. For some BitAssets this makes a lot of sense in the initial stages. I am perfectly fine giving up to 5% interest to BitUSD for example (anything more than that I feel would be more useful given back to the stakeholders). However, I don't care much about giving high interest on BitBTC for example. The reason is because making BitUSD more attractive can help marketing to new users and thus increase adoption of BitShares X and thus increase value in BTSX. Providing additional value to BitBTC on the other hand seems counterproductive to our interests.
So basically, I would like to see what I proposed in the second paragraph of this post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8396.msg109865#msg109865.
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
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Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
I get that but shouldn't BTSX stakeholders have a way of defining how much interest they want to give to each particular BitAsset? Interest given to a BitAsset is money not given to the stakeholders. For some BitAssets this makes a lot of sense in the initial stages. I am perfectly fine giving up to 5% interest to BitUSD for example (anything more than that I feel would be more useful given back to the stakeholders). However, I don't care much about giving high interest on BitBTC for example. The reason is because making BitUSD more attractive can help marketing to new users and thus increase adoption of BitShares X and thus increase value in BTSX. Providing additional value to BitBTC on the other hand seems counterproductive to our interests.
So basically, I would like to see what I proposed in the second paragraph of this post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8396.msg109865#msg109865.
I dont really understand yet .. How is the btsx shareholder supposed to pay 'interest' for the bitAsset holder? have I missed sth?
please enlighten me!
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
*confirmed*
"rainy day fund" sucks ..
but I am unaware of a community consensus about the new name
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
*confirmed*
"rainy day fund" sucks ..
but I am unaware of a community consensus about the new name
Rewards Fund is good.
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rainy day funds - is gone!
this funds are paid as yield/interest in advance to the bitAsset holders.
with the trading pattern from the last days bytemaster expects till 10% a year. so it will be a game changer, because now you can hold bitUSD and get paid a interest a year. it will be implemented tomorrow.
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8520.0
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Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
I get that but shouldn't BTSX stakeholders have a way of defining how much interest they want to give to each particular BitAsset? Interest given to a BitAsset is money not given to the stakeholders. For some BitAssets this makes a lot of sense in the initial stages. I am perfectly fine giving up to 5% interest to BitUSD for example (anything more than that I feel would be more useful given back to the stakeholders). However, I don't care much about giving high interest on BitBTC for example. The reason is because making BitUSD more attractive can help marketing to new users and thus increase adoption of BitShares X and thus increase value in BTSX. Providing additional value to BitBTC on the other hand seems counterproductive to our interests.
So basically, I would like to see what I proposed in the second paragraph of this post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8396.msg109865#msg109865.
I dont really understand yet .. How is the btsx shareholder supposed to pay 'interest' for the bitAsset holder? have I missed sth?
please enlighten me!
The yield on BitAssets is coming from the various fees the network collects. This is a value transfer from the participants paying the fees to the network (it doesn't really matter what it is denominated in). This value has three places it can go: the BitAsset holders, the BTSX holders, and the delegates. I am saying that we would be better off if we (the shareholders) could define how much value goes to which.
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Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
*fixed*
Show bid ask overlap going to rainy day fund
*fixed*
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The yield on BitAssets is coming from the various fees the network collects. This is a value transfer from the participants paying the fees to the network (it doesn't really matter what it is denominated in). This value has three places it can go: the BitAsset holders, the BTSX holders, and the delegates. I am saying that we would be better off if we (the shareholders) could define how much value goes to which.
ok .. got it .. thx
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If my understanding is correct, paying fees other than short fees out as interest should break the peg. In an uncertain market in which demand due assets matches demand to short, the peg should work. If everyone wants to short, that breaks the peg, which is why we had to use the price feeds. Allowing the shorts to pay the longs interest should recreate the balanced/uncertain market in which the peg works, but providing additional interest from other fees to asset holders would then break the peg again by increasing demand for assets.
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Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
*fixed*
You still have the 5% fee on short orders (I assume you mean to say 5% fee on margin calls) going to the rewards fund. According to bytemaster's response, it should be going to the delegate's box instead.
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If my understanding is correct, paying fees other than short fees out as interest should break the peg. In an uncertain market in which demand due assets matches demand to short, the peg should work. If everyone wants to short, that breaks the peg, which is why we had to use the price feeds. Allowing the shorts to pay the longs interest should recreate the balanced/uncertain market in which the peg works, but providing additional interest from other fees to asset holders would then break the peg again by increasing demand for assets.
The question is whether demand for bit assets is greater than the demand to short. Considering demand for BitAssets increases demand for BTSX 2x... short demand should be in very high supply. The game theory on the peg still holds. Also, it doesn't matter *as much* if it breaks the peg to the upside (because a BitUSD will remain >= $1) which means people can accept it at face value with confidence.
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I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.
--> Rewards Fund
--> Burn
--> Delegate Income
The shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.
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I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.
--> Rewards Fund
--> Burn
--> Delegate Income
The shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.
This sounds like a reasonable... I think "burn" is probably the least effective option on the list. The more BitAsset users/holders there are BTSX gets a 2x advantage. Thus in my estimation driving demand for BitAssets is #1.
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You still have the 5% fee on short orders (I assume you mean to say 5% fee on margin calls) going to the rewards fund. According to bytemaster's response, it should be going to the delegate's box instead.
you are totally right ... *fixed*
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I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.
--> Rewards Fund
--> Burn
--> Delegate Income
The shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.
This sounds like a reasonable... I think "burn" is probably the least effective option on the list. The more BitAsset users/holders there are BTSX gets a 2x advantage. Thus in my estimation driving demand for BitAssets is #1.
+5%
Personally, I would only vote for delegates who allocate 100% to interest.
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If my understanding is correct, paying fees other than short fees out as interest should break the peg. In an uncertain market in which demand due assets matches demand to short, the peg should work. If everyone wants to short, that breaks the peg, which is why we had to use the price feeds. Allowing the shorts to pay the longs interest should recreate the balanced/uncertain market in which the peg works, but providing additional interest from other fees to asset holders would then break the peg again by increasing demand for assets.
The question is whether demand for bit assets is greater than the demand to short. Considering demand for BitAssets increases demand for BTSX 2x... short demand should be in very high supply. The game theory on the peg still holds. Also, it doesn't matter *as much* if it breaks the peg to the upside (because a BitUSD will remain >= $1) which means people can accept it at face value with confidence.
I guess since the short fees are still floating they would just decrease to account for the subsidies to long positions. Effectively both longs and shorts would then be subsidised by the delegates who are expected to process their transactions for free. The hope being that this would pay for itself in marketing value. Is this correct?
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Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
You still have not told me how you do that trick?
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one side of the market is still paying their fees in BTSX.
margin calls are still in BTSX
transfer fees are still in BTSX
This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.
If delegates need more compensation they can raise rates.
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I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.
--> Rewards Fund
--> Burn
--> Delegate Income
The shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.
I would prefer if the delegates didn't actually get the money and then were expected to distribute it out to the appropriate funds (although that could be an acceptable compromise until a better system was built). I would like the network to do the distribution so that everyone can be guaranteed it will happen and they do not need to put additional trust in the delegates.
In particular, I would love to see a system where the delegates can make proposals that tweak the network rules which only become active if enough shareholders ratify it. Any active delegate would create a new proposal. If the majority of active delegates voted with approval, the proposal would be put up for consideration. Only one proposal can be up for consideration at a time. If the majority of delegates decide to do so, they can discard a proposal at any time. If more than a certain percentage of the stake votes in favor of the proposal up for consideration, then it is ratified and its rules become active in the next round. Perhaps in addition, if more than another percentage of the stake vetoes the proposal, it would immediately be discarded as well. Therefore transactions would only need a small addition to acknowledge the active proposal with a yea or nay.
These proposals could have parameters that define things like delegate pay rate (perhaps denominated in BitUSD), pay rates to different accounts (both mandatory and discretionary incomes) so they can use the funds for productive purposes (like development and marketing), interest rate caps on each BitAsset, prioritization of paying BitAsset interest, etc.
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Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
You still have not told me how you do that trick?
Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit".
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This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.
The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents. I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.
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Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
You still have not told me how you do that trick?
Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit".
Ok I bid 51 BTS/ bitUSD and trying to buy 2 bitUSD ;the best ask (more likely short) is asking for 47 BTSX for each bitUSD. The 2 are matched.
The seller gets his 94 BTSX, I get my 2 bitUSD and I pay 102 BTSX.
Now the system has 8 BTSX... how those 8 BTSX get converts into bitUSD?
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Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
You still have not told me how you do that trick?
Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit".
Ok I bid 51 BTS/ bitUSD and trying to buy 2 bitUSD ;the best ask (more likely short) is asking for 47 BTSX for each bitUSD. The 2 are matched.
The seller gets his 94 BTSX, I get my 2 bitUSD and I pay 102 BTSX.
Now the system has 8 BTSX... how those 8 BTSX get converts into bitUSD?
You could view that same market the other way around... you bid $0.04 they ask $0.03 for 100 BTSX. Bid pays $4 and gets 100 BTSX. Ask receives $3 for their 100 BTSX. Network is left with $1.
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The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents. I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.
That depends on how quickly we reach VISA level .. then machines/power/and bandwidth will probably get more expensive
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[updates] .. to the look and feel of the snapshot graphic .. hope you like it .. and hope it is accurate
one question: when I pay transaction fees with bitUSD .. how sets the amount? I just chose an arbitrary number of 0.1 bitUSD
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This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.
The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents. I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.
With this system for interest, that seems true. But we'll never be a serious payment system rivalling Visa's TPS rates with that approach.
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Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.
You still have not told me how you do that trick?
Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit".
Ok I bid 51 BTS/ bitUSD and trying to buy 2 bitUSD ;the best ask (more likely short) is asking for 47 BTSX for each bitUSD. The 2 are matched.
The seller gets his 94 BTSX, I get my 2 bitUSD and I pay 102 BTSX.
Now the system has 8 BTSX... how those 8 BTSX get converts into bitUSD?
You could view that same market the other way around... you bid $0.04 they ask $0.03 for 100 BTSX. Bid pays $4 and gets 100 BTSX. Ask receives $3 for their 100 BTSX. Network is left with $1.
Yes but the shorting competition goes only in the direction described by me... you cannot short BTSX ...not yet.
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This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.
The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents. I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.
With this system for interest, that seems true. But we'll never be a serious payment system rivalling Visa's TPS rates with that approach.
That's a good point. Powerful computers will eventually be required and cost a significant amount. Perhaps a more accurate statement would be "the end game for delegates will always be delegates breaking even".
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
Reserve fund.
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Perhaps a more accurate statement would be "the end game for delegates will always be delegates breaking even".
All occupations eventually revert to the same average rate of return given the risks and free competition.
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Perhaps a more accurate statement would be "the end game for delegates will always be delegates breaking even".
All occupations eventually revert to the same average rate of return given the risks and free competition.
It remains to be seen whether delegates earn enough in transaction fees to scale the network with usage. In the short-term delegates can increase fees and take 100% pay. If it becomes obvious that delegates will need a cut of market operations then that can be added.
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how are delegates supposed to 'increase fees'?
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how are delegates supposed to 'increase fees'?
Register a new delegate.
Like in:
117.delegate.xeroc
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how are delegates supposed to 'increase fees'?
Register a new delegate.
Like in:
117.delegate.xeroc
There is no "hard coded min fee"... delegates can set higher fees for being included in their block.
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
Reserve fund.
I agree. I would also like to bring up an earlier point regarding the supposed lack of a need for an insurance fund. I don't think the yields replace the need for an insurance fund. If a black swan event occurs and the BitUSD issued is partially collateralized by the BTSX held as collateral in the short position, this might hurt the peg. As the BitUSD that was collected for yield is instead destroyed until BitUSD is fully backed, the peg should return to normal. However, that may take some time. On the other hand if there was enough BitUSD held in the reserve fund, the necessary amount of BitUSD could be immediately destroyed to give BitUSD holders immediate confidence that their BitUSD is fully backed. They do not have to assume the network will be able to collect BitUSD in the future to balance things; they will know it immediately.
In fact can't there be a possibility in which the network will not be able to collect enough BitUSD to again fully back the remaining BitUSD with the BTSX held in collateral? If everyone tries to convert their BitUSD into BTSX, couldn't it be possible that some slow movers will have BitUSD without any short position to back it. In such a scenario, the network was too eager in providing BitUSD holders high yields. All the quick movers were able to cash out their BitUSD with high yields into BTSX. The slow movers got stuck with worthless BitUSD.
I think there should be a minimum limit on the BitAsset reserve fund. This minimum limit should be proportional to the amount of the BitAsset issued. If the reserve fund is below the minimum limit, the BitAssets collected as fees should first be used to fill up the fund to above the limit. As the fund grows well above the limit, the network should determine an appropriate yield rate to pay to the issued BitUSD that will not reduce the fund levels below the minimum limit. It should also consider the history of incoming fees in order to pick a yield rate that is fairly consistent (not too volatile) but still high enough to not grow the reserve fund without bound. If a black swan event occurs, the network should immediately destroy as much of the BitAssets in the reserve as necessary and possible to make the BitAssets fully backed.
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Register a new delegate.
Like in:
117.delegate.xeroc
I can go higher with payrate .. sure
There is no "hard coded min fee"... delegates can set higher fees for being included in their block.
Ok so I guess there is no RPC call where I can set the minum fee required for a tx to be incldued in a block that my delegate builds?
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Ok so I guess there is no RPC call where I can set the minum fee required for a tx to be incldued in a block that my delegate builds?
Ok but aren't you getting the average of all (delegates) anyway?
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Ok so I guess there is no RPC call where I can set the minum fee required for a tx to be incldued in a block that my delegate builds?
Ok but aren't you getting the average of all (delegates) anyway?
Yes... the fees are averaged out... so one delegate increasing their fee requirement will only delay the transaction.
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ok .. got it!
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
Reserve fund.
I agree. I would also like to bring up an earlier point regarding the supposed lack of a need for an insurance fund. I don't think the yields replace the need for an insurance fund. If a black swan event occurs and the BitUSD issued is partially collateralized by the BTSX held as collateral in the short position, this might hurt the peg. As the BitUSD that was collected for yield is instead destroyed until BitUSD is fully backed, the peg should return to normal. However, that may take some time. On the other hand if there was enough BitUSD held in the reserve fund, the necessary amount of BitUSD could be immediately destroyed to give BitUSD holders immediate confidence that their BitUSD is fully backed. They do not have to assume the network will be able to collect BitUSD in the future to balance things; they will know it immediately.
In fact can't there be a possibility in which the network will not be able to collect enough BitUSD to again fully back the remaining BitUSD with the BTSX held in collateral? If everyone tries to convert their BitUSD into BTSX, couldn't it be possible that some slow movers will have BitUSD without any short position to back it. In such a scenario, the network was too eager in providing BitUSD holders high yields. All the quick movers were able to cash out their BitUSD with high yields into BTSX. The slow movers got stuck with worthless BitUSD.
I think there should be a minimum limit on the BitAsset reserve fund. This minimum limit should be proportional to the amount of the BitAsset issued. If the reserve fund is below the minimum limit, the BitAssets collected as fees should first be used to fill up the fund to above the limit. As the fund grows well above the limit, the network should determine an appropriate yield rate to pay to the issued BitUSD that will not reduce the fund levels below the minimum limit. It should also consider the history of incoming fees in order to pick a yield rate that is fairly consistent (not too volatile) but still high enough to not grow the reserve fund without bound. If a black swan event occurs, the network should immediately destroy as much of the BitAssets in the reserve as necessary and possible to make the BitAssets fully backed.
This merits consideration by the devs.
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
Reserve fund.
I agree. I would also like to bring up an earlier point regarding the supposed lack of a need for an insurance fund. I don't think the yields replace the need for an insurance fund. If a black swan event occurs and the BitUSD issued is partially collateralized by the BTSX held as collateral in the short position, this might hurt the peg. As the BitUSD that was collected for yield is instead destroyed until BitUSD is fully backed, the peg should return to normal. However, that may take some time. On the other hand if there was enough BitUSD held in the reserve fund, the necessary amount of BitUSD could be immediately destroyed to give BitUSD holders immediate confidence that their BitUSD is fully backed. They do not have to assume the network will be able to collect BitUSD in the future to balance things; they will know it immediately.
In fact can't there be a possibility in which the network will not be able to collect enough BitUSD to again fully back the remaining BitUSD with the BTSX held in collateral? If everyone tries to convert their BitUSD into BTSX, couldn't it be possible that some slow movers will have BitUSD without any short position to back it. In such a scenario, the network was too eager in providing BitUSD holders high yields. All the quick movers were able to cash out their BitUSD with high yields into BTSX. The slow movers got stuck with worthless BitUSD.
I think there should be a minimum limit on the BitAsset reserve fund. This minimum limit should be proportional to the amount of the BitAsset issued. If the reserve fund is below the minimum limit, the BitAssets collected as fees should first be used to fill up the fund to above the limit. As the fund grows well above the limit, the network should determine an appropriate yield rate to pay to the issued BitUSD that will not reduce the fund levels below the minimum limit. It should also consider the history of incoming fees in order to pick a yield rate that is fairly consistent (not too volatile) but still high enough to not grow the reserve fund without bound. If a black swan event occurs, the network should immediately destroy as much of the BitAssets in the reserve as necessary and possible to make the BitAssets fully backed.
This merits consideration by the devs.
The reserve fund will average the fees collected by the network over 1 year because it takes 1 year to pay them out. Thus the reserve fund will continue to grow and be available to handle issues.
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Very nice!
The default fee is now 0.5 BTSX for transactions. Should it be updated in the Infographic?
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Very nice!
The default fee is now 0.5 BTSX for transactions. Should it be updated in the Infographic?
the tx fees in btsx are denoted with "tx fees" (upper block)
the fees in bitAsset (not yet implemented in the software) are just arbitrary numbers .. ie 0.1 bitUSD
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I believe this image shows where market fees come from:
(http://v3.bitshares.org/assets/img/marketmaker.png)
If fees are paid in USD only (no BTSX) then the wallet will default to 3x the value of the BTSX fee and the delegates running default code will require there be at least 2x the value. This puts USD only transactions at $0.05 right now.
BitAsset fees are higher because of market risks and to encourage people to pay BTSX and fund delegates.
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Very nice!
The default fee is now 0.5 BTSX for transactions. Should it be updated in the Infographic?
the tx fees in btsx are denoted with "tx fees" (upper block)
the fees in bitAsset (not yet implemented in the software) are just arbitrary numbers .. ie 0.1 bitUSD
Gotcha, my bad.
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
Reserve fund.
I agree. I would also like to bring up an earlier point regarding the supposed lack of a need for an insurance fund. I don't think the yields replace the need for an insurance fund. If a black swan event occurs and the BitUSD issued is partially collateralized by the BTSX held as collateral in the short position, this might hurt the peg. As the BitUSD that was collected for yield is instead destroyed until BitUSD is fully backed, the peg should return to normal. However, that may take some time. On the other hand if there was enough BitUSD held in the reserve fund, the necessary amount of BitUSD could be immediately destroyed to give BitUSD holders immediate confidence that their BitUSD is fully backed. They do not have to assume the network will be able to collect BitUSD in the future to balance things; they will know it immediately.
In fact can't there be a possibility in which the network will not be able to collect enough BitUSD to again fully back the remaining BitUSD with the BTSX held in collateral? If everyone tries to convert their BitUSD into BTSX, couldn't it be possible that some slow movers will have BitUSD without any short position to back it. In such a scenario, the network was too eager in providing BitUSD holders high yields. All the quick movers were able to cash out their BitUSD with high yields into BTSX. The slow movers got stuck with worthless BitUSD.
I think there should be a minimum limit on the BitAsset reserve fund. This minimum limit should be proportional to the amount of the BitAsset issued. If the reserve fund is below the minimum limit, the BitAssets collected as fees should first be used to fill up the fund to above the limit. As the fund grows well above the limit, the network should determine an appropriate yield rate to pay to the issued BitUSD that will not reduce the fund levels below the minimum limit. It should also consider the history of incoming fees in order to pick a yield rate that is fairly consistent (not too volatile) but still high enough to not grow the reserve fund without bound. If a black swan event occurs, the network should immediately destroy as much of the BitAssets in the reserve as necessary and possible to make the BitAssets fully backed.
This merits consideration by the devs.
The reserve fund will average the fees collected by the network over 1 year because it takes 1 year to pay them out. Thus the reserve fund will continue to grow and be available to handle issues.
It would be advantageous to make reserve ratios and related information prominent or at least easily accessible in the UI.
Reserves will play an increasingly important role as adoption accelerates - the marketing folks should leverage the heck out of this feature.
A decentralized bank/exchange with transparent/provable/hard-coded reserves is the holy grail of crypto finance.
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*agreed*
Gonna update the infographics zo account for reserves tomorrows
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*agreed*
Gonna update the infographics zo account for reserves tomorrows
Good effort xeroc but I think only us users are going to understand that infographic as it is right now.
Maybe put some titles or text other than a flow chart.
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would be nice if the graphic would be bigger. Maybe my eyesight is going bad, but it is not readable.
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Great work xeroc! +5%
agree that the text gets a little small in some places.
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gonna work more on this the evening!
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Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?
*confirmed*
"rainy day fund" sucks ..
but I am unaware of a community consensus about the new name
Rewards Fund is good.
I'd prefer "Dividends Fund" ..... to me "Rewards" gives the connotation of a cheep marketing trick (used by many credit cards) as opposed to benefits generated from solid business results.
(( though I would still vote for calling the receiving side of the dividends, "Interest". It is much better for marketing. ))
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- Dividends Fund
- Reserve Fund
pick one! I cannot decide :-)
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I updated it .. once again .. is the content still accurate?
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I updated it .. once again .. is the content still accurate?
Selling BTSX, Shorting BitUSD, and Canceling the same orders result in BTSX transaction fee.
I would call the BTSX fund "Accumulated Fees" and show it going 2 places... delegates and burn.
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Selling BTSX, Shorting BitUSD, and Canceling the same orders result in BTSX transaction fee.
I would call the BTSX fund "Accumulated Fees" and show it going 2 places... delegates and burn.
fixed
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(http://www.bitshares.org/infogfx/feeflow/btsx-feeflow.png)
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+5% ... much nicer and cleaner ... +5%
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Presentation is excellent, very clean aesthetic.
Unfortunately I had trouble figuring out the message being conveyed.
I think the point is to show the relationship between revenues and distributions.
It looks like revenues are being directed down and left while distributions are moving up and right. This is a bit confusing... where are they going? And why opposite directions?
I would suggest:
- Revenues depicted as moving in to the "Accumulated Fees/Reserve Fund" containers
- Distributions depicted as moving out of the "Accumulated Fees/Reserve Fund" and in to the pockets of happy, shiny share/asset holders
- Rotating the stacks 90 degrees and layering horizontally: BTSX -> Revenues -> Accumulated Fees -> Shareholders
- 1st layer BTSX, 2nd layer bitUSD, 3rd layer UIA
- Remove the asterisk on the pegged assets. Not necessary to provide that information for this type of info graphic
Not that I'm picky or anything. ;D
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Nice and clear +5%
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I think having the arrows point up and down is misleading. It makes is like something is being lost. The arrows should just be left/right which denotes more of an in/out vs up/down process.
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I think having the arrows point up and down is misleading. It makes is like something is being lost. The arrows should just be left/right which denotes more of an in/out vs up/down process.
Yes, this.
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seems difficult for an artist to please everyone :-)
cass is doing a hell of a good job though
keep the constructive critiques coming!
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(http://bitshares.org/infogfx/feeflow/btsx-feeflow-zn.png)
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I think having the arrows point up and down is misleading. It makes is like something is being lost. The arrows should just be left/right which denotes more of an in/out vs up/down process.
Yes, this.
Yeah graphic is quality but message conveyed is unclear maybe no arrows but have description under title...
BTSX
Directly profit from fees less delegate pay, paid via burning.
(Then list fees)
BITUSD
Directly profit from fees, paid as yield.
(Then list fees)
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i like the style, but i don't get the message and that is bad!
you wanted to show the fee flow? who is getting which fees?
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I think when it come to flows of anything, people tend to think in horizontal terms. Also, the directions of the arrows should be the in the same orientation horizontally to convey the flow. I just took one of the images posted here and modified it to illustrate what I mean:
(http://i.imgur.com/x6cfZcm.png)
I think it is easier to grasp what is trying to be conveyed (although I can't read Chinese, lol.)
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Why it's so difficult to understand that green arrows are income and orange arrows are outcome?
Problem IMO is, if we wanna discuss this again and again ... it will be a endless task ... my 2 cents ..
Its just simple GFX:
green arrows --> income for BTSX | orange arrows --> payments for delegate & burn
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@cass .. the gfx needs an update .. BTSX -> BTS!
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@cass .. the gfx needs an update .. BTSX -> BTS!
is content here up to date!?
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(http://bitshares.org/infogfx/money/wdmcf_v1.png)
? Fb appreciated...
Money IN / Money OUT fields are placeholder... maybe a short intro for each section ...?
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hmm .. some of the transaction fees are burn .. IIRC all BTS transaction fees are burnd ... though bitasset tx fees are paid as yield ..
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ha :) ok toast asked me to change current Fee Flow GFX ... but guess this will creat a complete new discussion :) have created a post on nullstreet also ..
But currently i don't have time to go more into detail on this task ... have to finish others before... so guess best way is to collect infos etc. on nullstreet and when content
ready .. i can put all together...
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How much is the yield on bitUSD?