* 1.10.57202 - to increase the force-settlement fee from 2.4 BTS to 1000 BTS (400x)
* 1.10.57236 - to increase the force-settlement fee from 2.4 BTS to 9.6 BTS (4x)
This is a logical fallacy called "false dilemma".
"Either we 4X or we make it stupid large 400X", therefore 4X must be reasonable!
The proposition seems silly, just on that front.
Wouldn't you think after 6 years we'd have reached a point where fees were somewhat near appropriate and we should be moving them if anything up or down maybe 10%, rather changing the rules of the game entirely by radically altering them 400% or 40,000%?
Secondly... any flat rate tax on trading activity invariably leads to "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer"
If market activity is to be taxed it should be taxed relative to its value.
In the real world when you buy a cheap hammer, the tax is 5% of its value; variable rate - not flat. If you buy an expensive hydraulic jack hammer the tax is still 5% of its value. A $10 hammer might have a $0.50 tax... whereas a $2000 jackhammer might have $100 tax.
If you applied the same $100 flat tax to $10 hammers as you do to jackhammers... nobody would buy hammers. What you essentially do is price the product out of the market; choosing winners and losers in the economy. It becomes a state command economy rather than a market economy.
Likewise, the same will occur in margin markets; you create a huge flat tax on margin lending the result will be only whales will take margin loans and only entrenched high volume MPA's will ever be loaned into existence. Flat taxes are effectively regulatory capture abetting incumbent markets and wealthy traders.
Flat taxes on the blockchain should be reserved to prevent blockchain clutter of dust transactions, to reserve asset names and account names, to discourage the sending of bulk scam proposals, etc. They should not be used to discourage legitimate market activity of smaller borrowers.
It is my suggestion that if you wish to raise revenue from defaulted loans, the rate should be percent based and effect all equally relative to their respective investment... just as market trading fees do. Then, when massive loans default... surely the chain will profit without adversely discouraging other market activity along the way.
Likewise... if it can be accomplished that each individual UIA and MPA on the chain can have a percent based market fee. Why can we not raise revenue for the chain itself by applying percent based market fees which benefit the public coffers on all market matched limit orders?
In short:
Flat fees, on a per item basis, should only be implemented to prevent blockchain clutter.
Variable rate fees, relative to transaction value, should be the taxation method of choice to raise revenue.