BitShares Forum
Main => General Discussion => Topic started by: bytemaster on November 11, 2014, 09:56:38 pm
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My preferred solution for delegates:
1) They are trusted and able to maintain the network
2) They publish a budget on who they plan to fund and generally don't do work themselves.
3) They coordinate with other delegates.
If the role of delegates is to manage up to 1% of the spendable budget then we can hire many delegates. Lets keep it really simple, if you don't know how to run a node ask for funding from a delegate that does run a node. If the delegate thinks it is worth while and won't cause him to lose his spot then he can support you.
Thus at the end of the day you only have to trust that a delegate can make wise evaluations about the performance of the real workers while maintaining a node.
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My preferred solution for delegates:
1) They are trusted and able to maintain the network
2) They publish a budget on who they plan to fund and generally don't do work themselves.
3) They coordinate with other delegates.
If the role of delegates is to manage up to 1% of the spendable budget then we can hire many delegates. Lets keep it really simple, if you don't know how to run a node ask for funding from a delegate that does run a node. If the delegate thinks it is worth while and won't cause him to lose his spot then he can support you.
Thus at the end of the day you only have to trust that a delegate can make wise evaluations about the performance of the real workers while maintaining a node.
BM, you could probably post this to a new thread so others can find it.
[Edit: Thanks for moving]
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I too have some concerns about block signing delegates and employees being one and the same thing. Perhaps I need to take more time to understand the proposal.
But as it stands it seems that we are proposing to have only 101 employees or employee representatives and this seems arbitrary and limiting. I get that it is probably a high enough number if we're just talking about block signing delegates securing the network. But for employees?
If BitShares hits the market cap of Bitcoin what would be the maximum that each delegate could earn? My guess based on the $2,500 month that is being bandied about on the current BitShares valuation is that we'd be looking at something like $325,000 per month. Can anyone confirm?
Presumably when we get to this stage there's going to need to be more than one person working for each delegate/employee position otherwise things will starts to look very top heavy in terms of who is being recompensed for work. What does that look like? Can we move towards something that will allow for transparency and is built in to the codebase? Don't we think this is important? Perhaps not - perhaps it's fine that we just have 101 delegates who effectively become 'Directors/Managers' of various employee divisions within the BitShares ecosystem. We then just trust them with our votes to employ the right people. But this just doesn't seem granular enough to me and means that the codebase will unnecessarily require the promotion of teams/fiefdoms for every bit of work that is done to build BitShares up going forwar. It means there's no room for the little guy to work alone and be paid directly by the network.
Why don't we just separate out employees and allow for more granularity? Otherwise people not inside the 101 delegate positions who do not want to join an existing team may have to rely on handouts or bounties. Sounds like a precarious position to put yourself in even if you're a dyed in the wool supporter and want to grow the ecosystem. Rockstar employees/leaders such as BM will of course end up leading teams that consist of more than one person, but for others is the requirement strictly necessary?
If we're going to stick with the creation of this chimera of the two things then the only way I can see it working is to have some form of transparent nesting. So I can join one of the 101 'Teams', but everyone can see what what slice of the teams budget I am being allocated for my role within that team. There is some merit in this in that it provides an incentive for smaller guys to get on board with a 'Team' in order to be under the protective wing of one of the 101 trusted delegates/team managers.
It does make me ponder whether this all relies too much on individuals. When whole networks of people come to rely on their income from the 101 delegate positions and the figure-heads who represent those 101 positions can we be sure that everyone will be voting or campaigning for the good of the network or is it more likely to act through self interest. If the two were separate I'd have no problem with them acting in their own self interest, but when it starts to interfere with block signing then it becomes a different matter. Perhaps I'm wrong and that the self interest part is a recognized necessity and this is why the current proposal is what is being suggested.
Am I missing something obvious here? Please feel free to explain if I've missed something fundamental.
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My preferred solution for delegates:
1) They are trusted and able to maintain the network
2) They publish a budget on who they plan to fund and generally don't do work themselves.
3) They coordinate with other delegates.
If the role of delegates is to manage up to 1% of the spendable budget then we can hire many delegates. Lets keep it really simple, if you don't know how to run a node ask for funding from a delegate that does run a node. If the delegate thinks it is worth while and won't cause him to lose his spot then he can support you.
Thus at the end of the day you only have to trust that a delegate can make wise evaluations about the performance of the real workers while maintaining a node.
BM, you could probably post this to a new thread so others can find it.
I agree. This is a very significant posting, but it's buried here in this thread.
Edit: Thanks for moving it to this thread. For what it's worth, I agree with your ideas. There are other things I will be looking for also in delegates, but the criteria on your list are very good.
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Bytemaster hijacked my thread with something important. :P
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Bytemaster hijacked my thread with something important. :P
By popular demand and to return your thread to its owner. :)
Enjoy.
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If I understand this correctly than this is a scenario you'd like to see:
I run a node at 100% pay but only keep enough of it for a bit of income for myself, expenses to run the node, and the rest I pay out the people that would provide non technical work like Vato and MeTHoDx. This would save them from the chore of having to run a node and it would save me doing a crappy job at what they are good at. We'd agree on a percentage cut of the node, or as things grow a salary.
There isn't any reason such a person couldn't work for multiple nodes. Or, put another way, I could coordinate with say Xeroc and GaltReport to fund MeTHoDx.
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If I understand this correctly than this is a scenario you'd like to see:
I run a node at 100% pay but only keep enough of it for a bit of income for myself, expenses to run the node, and the rest I pay out the people that would provide non technical work like Vato and MeTHoDx. This would save them from the chore of having to run a node and it would save me doing a crappy job at what they are good at. We'd agree on a percentage cut of the node, or as things grow a salary.
There isn't any reason such a person couldn't work for multiple nodes. Or, put another way, I could coordinate with say Xeroc and GaltReport to fund MeTHoDx.
I'm down for that if BM approves.
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I've been thinking about this. I have been running a 10% delegate node at a loss since launch, and want to wait to see how the new payment systems pans out in practice.
This time of year is very busy for me professionally, and I haven't had time to read everything on the forums. I am making a few assumptions and would love confirmation or clarification.
I assume the new pay system will take over on block 991700 when version 0.4.24 forks.
I believe all delegates will be reset to a 3% pay rate.
I assume that pay rate will still not be able to be raised.
If this is the case my current plan is to place all funds beyond those required to pay for servers (currently about $50 a month) in a separate account that I can use to pay individuals willing to do jobs. At this point I do not plan on keeping anything beyond what it costs to run the servers, as I do not plan on doing much beyond picking those best able to contribute and funding them. I do not expect 3% to net me much beyond operating costs, so these will probably be small jobs, but I would be willing to team up with other delegates to fund larger jobs if needed.
If you have any great ideas that need funding please feel free to PM me. Alternately if you are not worried about keeping your ideas private feel free to post them. I am guessing we will shortly have an area of the forum set up for exactly that purpose.
In the long run I would love nothing more than for this to take off to the point where I could quit my day job and do for BitShares what I currently do. Manage the performance of a team.
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Dude, you nailed it. Especially the part about a section of the forum where people can not just campaign as delegates but campaign their ideas that require funding from a delegate.
If a delegate continually makes bad funding decisions they'll be out on their ear.
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Makes sense. My plan is to keep a 3% delegate and see how things go, use the money to pay for the hardware and for working on the new "official" linux binaries with DSL (see github for the discussion on that)
Eventually I could be merged in with a team of delegates, but for now there seems to be < 110 teams so no market force to consolidate yet. As things consolidate, then the new teams will merge until they get up to 100%.
I like bytemaster's long term plan, it's fluid and allows for market forces (my main concern from the previous). Everyone will take 100% eventually, the question is which teams give you the best value for their 100%. The market will be to optimize value for a fixed cost.
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I am liking this more with every passing second, now that Riverhead, maqifrnswa and puppies have clarified it for me.
So there will be 2 ways how this thing works:
-Somebody is getting paid and he hires people for the technical stuff (if he can not do it him/her self).
-People with technical skills run delegates and distribute funds to projects/people they find worthy/ bringing the most value to the system
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Don't get me wrong, I think this is innovative - but it is also difficult to pull off since it relies on some serious organizers. Those people that are best qualified will require a lot of money in order for it to be worth their time. $2500/month won't be enough money for serious entrepreneurs to do anything yet. At this point, it's basically paying smallish projects and development. We just need equity to increase at a rate greater than is being paid out. That's the hard part, don't know if this new system will pull it off - but it is innovative.
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Don't get me wrong, I think this is innovative - but it is also difficult to pull off since it relies on some serious organizers. Those people that are best qualified will require a lot of money in order for it to be worth their time. $2500/month won't be enough money for serious entrepreneurs to do anything yet. At this point, it's basically paying smallish projects and development. We just need equity to increase at a rate greater than is being paid out. That's the hard part, don't know if this new system will pull it off - but it is innovative.
Yes I foresee several [maybe even 10] delegates to unite to fund a single project/idea, at the early stages. As the market cap grows, we will gradually move to the other choice - one delegate paying for a project employing more than one person.
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Don't get me wrong, I think this is innovative - but it is also difficult to pull off since it relies on some serious organizers. Those people that are best qualified will require a lot of money in order for it to be worth their time. $2500/month won't be enough money for serious entrepreneurs to do anything yet. At this point, it's basically paying smallish projects and development. We just need equity to increase at a rate greater than is being paid out. That's the hard part, don't know if this new system will pull it off - but it is innovative.
I imagine it will be mostly volunteers for the next year or so. People who are dedicated and passionate.
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at current market cap, a 100% delegate should get about $25k per year.
So the questions are.
1) what is an acceptable rate of return for that $25000 investement?
I would suggest at least a 2-1 ratio. So $25000 spent out should result in a market cap growth of at least $50000.
2) How do we measure this?
Do we take unique users into account? Do we look at businesses integrating BitUSD? Specifically how do we measure an individual delegate teams results?
3) What ideas do we currently have worth funding?
I recall someone posting about renting billboards. Perhaps as a delegate team we could get together and divide the country into different sections. Each of us would be responsible for renting billboards in a certain locale. We could collaborate on message and design.
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Don't get me wrong, I think this is innovative - but it is also difficult to pull off since it relies on some serious organizers. Those people that are best qualified will require a lot of money in order for it to be worth their time. $2500/month won't be enough money for serious entrepreneurs to do anything yet. At this point, it's basically paying smallish projects and development. We just need equity to increase at a rate greater than is being paid out. That's the hard part, don't know if this new system will pull it off - but it is innovative.
I imagine it will be mostly volunteers for the next year or so. People who are dedicated and passionate.
...and wise. Those volunteers who are prudently able to save their part time pay for the first year may find they actually drew more than full-time pay when they see what its worth next year. :)
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My preferred solution for delegates:
1) They are trusted and able to maintain the network
2) They publish a budget on who they plan to fund and generally don't do work themselves.
3) They coordinate with other delegates.
If the role of delegates is to manage up to 1% of the spendable budget then we can hire many delegates. Lets keep it really simple, if you don't know how to run a node ask for funding from a delegate that does run a node. If the delegate thinks it is worth while and won't cause him to lose his spot then he can support you.
Thus at the end of the day you only have to trust that a delegate can make wise evaluations about the performance of the real workers while maintaining a node.
I agree with this. though...
I think this begs for variable pay rates or perhaps multi-sig delegate pay over 3%? Or do you see delegates just haveing multiple sub accounts. 100%/80%/50%/25%/3% ... or just a 100% and a 3% and a promise to burn. Or just a 100% and a promise to burn.
What i fear is a delegate gets 100% pay for some project. Its completed, but the pay remains. Rather than lose his spot, the delegate feverishly searches for somewhere else to spend the cash. Fills up his project board with candidates etc. (Its surely easier to keep 100% pay once you've got it, and usually leads to waste/inefficiencies) Or do you campaign again to have your 3% delegate re-elected. ... or promise to burn the 97%(multisig could force burn)
voter apathy should default to base 3% pay, not full 100% pay based on prior projects.
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...and wise. Those volunteers who are prudently able to save their part time pay for the first year may find they actually drew more than full-time pay when they see what its worth next year. :)
That will be the line to walk. The shareholders will see you earning an income and sitting on it while others are posting grand plans in their campaigns.
An interesting web you folks have woven.
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I am a fan of variable pay rates. I propose that raising of your pay rate requires a fee equal to the increased pay for an entire month. And that it causes all votes for you to decay after three weeks time if not rebroadcast.
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I am a fan of variable pay rates. I propose that raising of your pay rate requires a fee equal to the increased pay for an entire month. And that it causes all votes for you to decay after three weeks time if not rebroadcast.
I like that idea but I think it'd be pretty expensive once transaction counts per block start to rise.
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What is the argument against separation of delegates and employees?
BM mentioned once about some scaling issues, never heard anything more concrete. I feel keeping the roles separate is better for the long run.
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I am a fan of variable pay rates. I propose that raising of your pay rate requires a fee equal to the increased pay for an entire month. And that it causes all votes for you to decay after three weeks time if not rebroadcast.
I like that idea but I think it'd be pretty expensive once transaction counts per block start to rise.
I'm not sure what you mean? My understanding of the new pay structure is that all fees are burned and delegate pay at a certain pay rate is pre determined as measured in bts. What am I missing.
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What is the argument against separation of delegates and employees?
BM mentioned once about some scaling issues, never heard anything more concrete. I feel keeping the roles separate is better for the long run.
I like to think of it as everyone is an employee of the shareholders, especially the delegates. There's a saying in sports, "Owners don't fire players. Owners fire coaches". I feel that works well for the relationship between a delegate and the shareholders.
To that end I can see the forum moving from discussing allocations, bugs, etc. to discussing projects, funding, and pay rates. It wouldn't be one delegate going it alone trying to field a team. It would be a community where someone posts up an idea and everyone posts up about the proposed budget and the delegates can voice their thoughts on their ability to pay for the project and as a community the work is given the green light once support and funding are in place.
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I am a fan of variable pay rates. I propose that raising of your pay rate requires a fee equal to the increased pay for an entire month. And that it causes all votes for you to decay after three weeks time if not rebroadcast.
I like that idea but I think it'd be pretty expensive once transaction counts per block start to rise.
I'm not sure what you mean? My understanding of the new pay structure is that all fees are burned and delegate pay at a certain pay rate is pre determined as measured in bts. What am I missing.
Think of it like a turn based strategy game and each block is when the game changes state. The more rules that are baked into the system the more computations each transaction requires. There is a window to release a block before it will be rejected by the network. With 10 second blocks that window is fairly small. So as the number and complexity of rules increase the hardware required to produce a timely block increases.
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What is the argument against separation of delegates and employees?
BM mentioned once about some scaling issues, never heard anything more concrete. I feel keeping the roles separate is better for the long run.
I like to think of it as everyone is an employee of the shareholders, especially the delegates. There's a saying in sports, "Owners don't fire players. Owners fire coaches". I feel that works well for the relationship between a delegate and the shareholders.
To that end I can see the forum moving from discussing allocations, bugs, etc. to discussing projects, funding, and pay rates. It wouldn't be one delegate going it alone trying to field a team. It would be a community where someone posts up an idea and everyone posts up about the proposed budget and the delegates can voice their thoughts on their ability to pay for the project and as a community the work is given the green light once support and funding are in place.
I think we need an on blockchain means for delegates to communicate and collaborate. Like an irc board that only active delegates can see.
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I am a fan of variable pay rates. I propose that raising of your pay rate requires a fee equal to the increased pay for an entire month. And that it causes all votes for you to decay after three weeks time if not rebroadcast.
I like that idea but I think it'd be pretty expensive once transaction counts per block start to rise.
I'm not sure what you mean? My understanding of the new pay structure is that all fees are burned and delegate pay at a certain pay rate is pre determined as measured in bts. What am I missing.
Think of it like a turn based strategy game and each block is when the game changes state. The more rules that are baked into the system the more computations each transaction requires. There is a window to release a block before it will be rejected by the network. With 10 second blocks that window is fairly small. So as the number and complexity of rules increase the hardware required to produce a timely block increases.
understood. You're talking about the cost to the blockchain as born by the delegates to secure that blockchain. I can imagine the degrading vote might be costly. I'm not exactly sure how to enact that. The variable fee would be pretty cheap and straight forward though.
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This is where the expertise of BM, toast, Nathan, Vikram, etc. come in. They know very well what is costly and what isn't from a blockchain perspective.
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This is where the expertise of BM, toast, Nathan, Vikram, etc. come in. They know very well what is costly and what isn't from a blockchain perspective.
I would love to hear if my proposal is possible, and if so how costly it would be. I believe that a variable pay rate would save delegates numerous headaches and fees in the long run.
Imagine two scenarios. One with the current system.
I have a 3% delegate. I have found something that I feel should be funded at a higher rate than I and my fellow delegates can fund. I must start a new delegate. put up a months worth of funding for that pay rate and convince shareholders to vote for it. with no guarantee of any funds to offset my initial outlay.
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I have a 3% delegate. I have found something that I feel should be funded at a higher rate than I and my fellow delegates can fund. I raise my delegate pay rate from 3% to lets say 50%. I still pay a hefty fee. I am however able to collect at the new pay rate (unless I am voted out) for 3/4 of the first months. At the end of that 3 weeks I need to have been able to convince enough of my voters to rebroadcast to keep me in office. Otherwise I am a net loser.
Outside of the blockchain requirements it is a question of how much capital should be thrown at growing the system and which proportion of expended capital should be recovered by the expending party.
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I too have some concerns about block signing delegates and employees being one and the same thing. Perhaps I need to take more time to understand the proposal.
But as it stands it seems that we are proposing to have only 101 employees or employee representatives and this seems arbitrary and limiting. I get that it is probably a high enough number if we're just talking about block signing delegates securing the network. But for employees?
If BitShares hits the market cap of Bitcoin what would be the maximum that each delegate could earn? My guess based on the $2,500 month that is being bandied about on the current BitShares valuation is that we'd be looking at something like $325,000 per month. Can anyone confirm?
Presumably when we get to this stage there's going to need to be more than one person working for each delegate/employee position otherwise things will starts to look very top heavy in terms of who is being recompensed for work. What does that look like? Can we move towards something that will allow for transparency and is built in to the codebase? Don't we think this is important? Perhaps not - perhaps it's fine that we just have 101 delegates who effectively become 'Directors/Managers' of various employee divisions within the BitShares ecosystem. We then just trust them with our votes to employ the right people. But this just doesn't seem granular enough to me and means that the codebase will unnecessarily require the promotion of teams/fiefdoms for every bit of work that is done to build BitShares up going forwar. It means there's no room for the little guy to work alone and be paid directly by the network.
Why don't we just separate out employees and allow for more granularity? Otherwise people not inside the 101 delegate positions who do not want to join an existing team may have to rely on handouts or bounties. Sounds like a precarious position to put yourself in even if you're a dyed in the wool supporter and want to grow the ecosystem. Rockstar employees/leaders such as BM will of course end up leading teams that consist of more than one person, but for others is the requirement strictly necessary?
If we're going to stick with the creation of this chimera of the two things then the only way I can see it working is to have some form of transparent nesting. So I can join one of the 101 'Teams', but everyone can see what what slice of the teams budget I am being allocated for my role within that team. There is some merit in this in that it provides an incentive for smaller guys to get on board with a 'Team' in order to be under the protective wing of one of the 101 trusted delegates/team managers.
It does make me ponder whether this all relies too much on individuals. When whole networks of people come to rely on their income from the 101 delegate positions and the figure-heads who represent those 101 positions can we be sure that everyone will be voting or campaigning for the good of the network or is it more likely to act through self interest. If the two were separate I'd have no problem with them acting in their own self interest, but when it starts to interfere with block signing then it becomes a different matter. Perhaps I'm wrong and that the self interest part is a recognized necessity and this is why the current proposal is what is being suggested.
Am I missing something obvious here? Please feel free to explain if I've missed something fundamental.
This is why I advocate forming a cooperative. Employees can be members of the cooperative. Cooperatives can get funding from any source they want whether private or public. It would rely on the traditional legal structures to form a cooperative but I don't see why a cooperative can't be used for these purposes since credit unions are basically financial cooperatives.
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What is the argument against separation of delegates and employees?
BM mentioned once about some scaling issues, never heard anything more concrete. I feel keeping the roles separate is better for the long run.
I think every shareholder is a potential employee. Honestly if you want to work for Bitshares then form a legal Bitshares cooperative, then accept donations, then hire traditional employees that way.
I think you can do employees as delegates only if you have cooperative delegates.
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Employee or big contributors really don't need to maintain the delegate themselves, because bitsuperlab provides such hosting service.
Besides, I support the opinion that we should set a variable payrate/block reward for delegate, according to the market cap.
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Employee or big contributors really don't need to maintain the delegate themselves, because bitsuperlab provides such hosting service.
Besides, I support the opinion that we should set a variable payrate/block reward for delegate, according to the market cap.
Thats centralizing. We want the block producers to have a low barrier of entry and spread pout so that the network survives in case of problems.
Block producing is essential for the network. Providing value improves it but is not essential for survival - the two things are different.
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I ranted or "went off half-cocked" the other day. This was in opposition to the delegate fee being the same as 2 weeks average income. My thought at the time was that if you had 100% payrate on, then you had to pay the average for 2 weeks 100%. Is this true or is the fee the same regardless of your payrate?
Before I rant again, I would like to see this clarified.
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I ranted or "went off half-cocked" the other day. This was in opposition to the delegate fee being the same as 2 weeks average income. My thought at the time was that if you had 100% payrate on, then you had to pay the average for 2 weeks 100%. Is this true or is the fee the same regardless of your payrate?
Before I rant again, I would like to see this clarified.
I think it is just as you said. I think this is a waste. I believe the funds vested by the delegate initial registration should be stored instead of burned and these funds should be used to reward delegates.
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Employee or big contributors really don't need to maintain the delegate themselves, because bitsuperlab provides such hosting service.
Besides, I support the opinion that we should set a variable payrate/block reward for delegate, according to the market cap.
+5%
Why not just pay bitUSD instead of BTS? It's more stable.
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Employee or big contributors really don't need to maintain the delegate themselves, because bitsuperlab provides such hosting service.
Besides, I support the opinion that we should set a variable payrate/block reward for delegate, according to the market cap.
+5%
but we need to ensure that we have > 30 (prefereably alot more) businesses running the delegates as a service.
else this will lead back to centralization ..
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I ranted or "went off half-cocked" the other day. This was in opposition to the delegate fee being the same as 2 weeks average income. My thought at the time was that if you had 100% payrate on, then you had to pay the average for 2 weeks 100%. Is this true or is the fee the same regardless of your payrate?
Before I rant again, I would like to see this clarified.
I think it is just as you said. I think this is a waste. I believe the funds vested by the delegate initial registration should be stored instead of burned and these funds should be used to reward delegates.
The logic here seems similar to the logic of burning donations.
Is it even necessary to have this big fee as some sort of incentive to not be a fraudster? You're also dissencentiving (is that a word?) people who don't want to put up $1250 (and growing) to hope their platform is voted in for 2 weeks so they break even.
I suppose this is a policy meant for when the amounts become truly significant? This is actually works ok with centralized voting power. ::)
Maybe this is good, maybe it is bad. Not very happy.
In my view of the world, I would be able to say "I'll work on X,Y, or Z for 20 hours a week. Shareholders - decide" .. or some similar proposition. Then people vote me in. I for sure am not going to put up $1200 (and growing) over the judgement of people then take 2 weeks to break even.
Maybe it is a psychological thing and my bias to attach to the negative aspect of things misleads me.
So shoot me !
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The main problem here is that while you are preventing fraudsters from showing up and telling people what they want to hear, you're also making legitimate people have to make a judgement of "Is this worth the gamble on me being voted in and remaining for greater than 2 weeks". That is a huge roadblock for so many people.
What happens when the policy is changed?
For example - I say "ok.. I'll give it a shot, here is my $1200." 3 weeks later devs come to their senses. Refunds anyone?
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The preferred solution in the OP faces the chicken and egg problem. If you want a delegate to just be someone who hires other devs to complete jobs, how does this delegate get elected in the first place? He would have to already have found a selection of devs *with* project plans in order to begin his election campaign.
IMO it is more natural to have the delegates be devs initially and then to transition into mini companies who hire employees to complete jobs which are voted in by the community.
That way you have a pool of wish list tasks/jobs that the community wants to see done and a bunch of mini companies who are ready to take on new work as it presents itself.
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Employee or big contributors really don't need to maintain the delegate themselves, because bitsuperlab provides such hosting service.
Besides, I support the opinion that we should set a variable payrate/block reward for delegate, according to the market cap.
but we need to ensure that we have > 30 (prefereably alot more) businesses running the delegates as a service.
else this will lead back to centralization ..
I agree with you that we need to consider decentralization..
However maintaining a delegate is not too hard from a technical point of view. Bitsuperlab can provide such service, others could also provide likely service. Just an example.
By the way I think the voter-delegate-contributor model make the system too complex, and maybe financial inefficient. How can we measure the amount of contribution of a delegate, or say why he deserve the payrate? When the marketcap changes, does all the delegates still deserve their payrate?
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My preferred solution for delegates:
1) They are trusted and able to maintain the network
2) They publish a budget on who they plan to fund and generally don't do work themselves.
3) They coordinate with other delegates.
If the role of delegates is to manage up to 1% of the spendable budget then we can hire many delegates. Lets keep it really simple, if you don't know how to run a node ask for funding from a delegate that does run a node. If the delegate thinks it is worth while and won't cause him to lose his spot then he can support you.
Thus at the end of the day you only have to trust that a delegate can make wise evaluations about the performance of the real workers while maintaining a node.
I agree with this. though...
I think this begs for variable pay rates or perhaps multi-sig delegate pay over 3%? Or do you see delegates just haveing multiple sub accounts. 100%/80%/50%/25%/3% ... or just a 100% and a 3% and a promise to burn. Or just a 100% and a promise to burn.
What i fear is a delegate gets 100% pay for some project. Its completed, but the pay remains. Rather than lose his spot, the delegate feverishly searches for somewhere else to spend the cash. Fills up his project board with candidates etc. (Its surely easier to keep 100% pay once you've got it, and usually leads to waste/inefficiencies) Or do you campaign again to have your 3% delegate re-elected. ... or promise to burn the 97%(multisig could force burn)
voter apathy should default to base 3% pay, not full 100% pay based on prior projects.
This make sense. +5%
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Employee or big contributors really don't need to maintain the delegate themselves, because bitsuperlab provides such hosting service.
Besides, I support the opinion that we should set a variable payrate/block reward for delegate, according to the market cap.
but we need to ensure that we have > 30 (prefereably alot more) businesses running the delegates as a service.
else this will lead back to centralization ..
I agree with you that we need to consider decentralization..
However maintaining a delegate is not too hard from a technical point of view. Bitsuperlab can provide such service, others could also provide likely service. Just an example.
Agreed .. we should set some rules for those service providers.. such as "they have to reveal their costumers i.e. running delegates"
or .. each delegate should have a public field (much like the version field) that states the service provider, if not run on it's own machine
By the way I think the voter-delegate-contributor model make the system too complex, and maybe financial inefficient. How can we measure the amount of contribution of a delegate, or say why he deserve the payrate? When the marketcap changes, does all the delegates still deserve their payrate?
I already recommended somewhere that the payrate could be set by a DAPP .. in bitUSD .. the dapp exchanges the BTS pay into bitUSD accordingly at the market and burns the rest automatically ..
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What we need is a script that will burn fees daily that we can verify.
I feel like I asked this question before but... can we verify burned funds yet ?
This still has problems, the main one being there are not enough people willing to watch everyone.. but the verifiable burning ability needs to be in place first.
This way I could #1 create a delegate at 100%. #2 when elected I just burn all funds or maybe 99%. Whatever. #3 When we know what has most value, I can stop burning and provide accountability towards that goal (instead of accountability of burning).
1,2,3.... what am I missing. Too many control freaks though. Too many managers with expectations too high.
Bad idea? Good idea?
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All these outsourcing to Bitsuperlabs reeks of Bitcoin mining centralisation. Block producing should be made easy and encouraged to be as spread out as possible. The one person one delegate rule should also be implemented, even if it may not be enforceable.
Currently, lets say I come with some plan which would boost Bitshares popularity. I need some money to implement it, and I also need to get paid. So what do I do?
1. Start learning how to produce blocks reliably, or go hunting for a producer. If I care for the network I will avois stuff like Bitsuperlab and will have to spend time and effort looking for an individual.
2. I put forward my proposal.
3. I try raising money to register the delegate.
4. After elected I do my job as well as monitor my producer. If I do my task well but the producer doesn't then I get fired.
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What we need is a script that will burn fees daily that we can verify.
I feel like I asked this question before but... can we verify burned funds yet ?
This still has problems, the main one being there are not enough people willing to watch everyone.. but the verifiable burning ability needs to be in place first.
This way I could #1 create a delegate at 100%. #2 when elected I just burn all funds or maybe 99%. Whatever. #3 When we know what has most value, I can stop burning and provide accountability towards that goal (instead of accountability of burning).
1,2,3.... what am I missing. Too many control freaks though. Too many managers with expectations too high.
Bad idea? Good idea?
Burn operations are visible as such on the blockchain, and there's a message field that's publicly visible unlike the memo messages, so they're definitely verifiable.
An example:
http://bitsharesblocks.com/blocks/block?id=555294
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What we need is a script that will burn fees daily that we can verify.
I feel like I asked this question before but... can we verify burned funds yet ?
This still has problems, the main one being there are not enough people willing to watch everyone.. but the verifiable burning ability needs to be in place first.
This way I could #1 create a delegate at 100%. #2 when elected I just burn all funds or maybe 99%. Whatever. #3 When we know what has most value, I can stop burning and provide accountability towards that goal (instead of accountability of burning).
1,2,3.... what am I missing. Too many control freaks though. Too many managers with expectations too high.
Bad idea? Good idea?
Burn operations are visible as such on the blockchain, and there's a message field that's publicly visible unlike the memo messages, so they're definitely verifiable.
An example:
http://bitsharesblocks.com/blocks/block?id=555294
Ok so someone makes a script to diff burn rates day 2 day and post them in a thread ?
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All these outsourcing to Bitsuperlabs reeks of Bitcoin mining centralisation. Block producing should be made easy and encouraged to be as spread out as possible. The one person one delegate rule should also be implemented, even if it may not be enforceable.
Currently, lets say I come with some plan which would boost Bitshares popularity. I need some money to implement it, and I also need to get paid. So what do I do?
1. Start learning how to produce blocks reliably, or go hunting for a producer. If I care for the network I will avois stuff like Bitsuperlab and will have to spend time and effort looking for an individual.
2. I put forward my proposal.
3. I try raising money to register the delegate.
4. After elected I do my job as well as monitor my producer. If I do my task well but the producer doesn't then I get fired.
Also I agree about this reeking of centralization.
I started out volunteering to help non-technical people be delegates after Stan pushed it. I even talked to Agent86 about it via skype... he asked me if I had met anyone in an effort to vet me.. fair enough, had to worry about his rep.. can't blame him there.. don't want to hurt rep of yourself, absolutely no doubt about that.
I ended up doing it for no one. I also had no appreciation for the number of hardforks. I was more interested in scaling the process in some regard. However scaling in this manner leads to centralization and a huge source of FUD.
Wow how things have changed in past few months!
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What we need is a script that will burn fees daily that we can verify.
I feel like I asked this question before but... can we verify burned funds yet ?
This still has problems, the main one being there are not enough people willing to watch everyone.. but the verifiable burning ability needs to be in place first.
This way I could #1 create a delegate at 100%. #2 when elected I just burn all funds or maybe 99%. Whatever. #3 When we know what has most value, I can stop burning and provide accountability towards that goal (instead of accountability of burning).
1,2,3.... what am I missing. Too many control freaks though. Too many managers with expectations too high.
Bad idea? Good idea?
To be honest if one hasn't prove himself yet, I won't vote on him..
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What we need is a script that will burn fees daily that we can verify.
I feel like I asked this question before but... can we verify burned funds yet ?
This still has problems, the main one being there are not enough people willing to watch everyone.. but the verifiable burning ability needs to be in place first.
This way I could #1 create a delegate at 100%. #2 when elected I just burn all funds or maybe 99%. Whatever. #3 When we know what has most value, I can stop burning and provide accountability towards that goal (instead of accountability of burning).
1,2,3.... what am I missing. Too many control freaks though. Too many managers with expectations too high.
Bad idea? Good idea?
To be honest if one hasn't prove himself yet, I won't vote on him..
I am curious.
I have a question... a bit wordy but hopefully a bit clear too..
Why do you think a talented person would give their time to prove themselves so that they are confident in the gamble of 2 weeks wages where they have to work free for 2 weeks to break even?
Is that making good use of inflation ... ?
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Why do you think a talented person would give their time to prove themselves so that they are confident in the gamble of 2 weeks wages where they have to work free for 2 weeks to break even?
Is that making good use of inflation ... ?
To be honest, its a huge risk. The only way to mitigate it is through crowd-funding the fee, so you drum up support for the voting process as well as distributing the risk among your supporters.
For me it wasn't even an option to front the cost myself, as I don't have a grand and a bit lying around spare.
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What if delegates become trusted with dilution after a certain amount of time in the top 101. No fee, just a 'time fee'.
E.g. After 3 months or 6 months in the top 101 a delegate can increase their pay to 100%.
Once they reach that threshold they become a "trusted" delegate, trusted with dilution, due to not being voted out for so long.
Employees can ask a trusted delegate to fund them. The trusted delegate has to decide whether to increase their pay to fund the employee and risk the wrath of the voters or not. They would consult the community on what to do. They don't have to do anything, but funding a good employee could strengthen their position.
Multiple delegates could choose to fund the same employee or employee team.
There could be a link/alert in the client to the employee's info from the trusted delegate's listing so voters don't just vote down the trusted delegate due to the pay rise without thinking.
A trusted delegate could have a colour band (green) added to their listing in the client.
Trusted delegates don't automatically get 100% pay, but they can choose to add it at their own risk.
It could even be done in stages, e.g. after 3 months they have dilution ability of 50%, after 6 months, 100%.
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I am still worried about voter apathy a bit. It could make getting good delegate teams in, and bad ones out, difficult. Corporations handle this by making the default vote, "vote with the board of directors." Otherwise it may be difficult to execute buybacks/mergers/acquisitions if a vocal minority can dominate the cast ballots.
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I am still worried about voter apathy a bit. It could make getting good delegate teams in, and bad ones out, difficult. Corporations handle this by making the default vote, "vote with the board of directors." Otherwise it may be difficult to execute buybacks/mergers/acquisitions if a vocal minority can dominate the cast ballots.
I have long said that if you are willing to download a wallet from someone then you trust them with your money. To that end wallet developers should select a default delegate slate to follow.
This has the effect of "centralizing" effective control over delegate selection to the dev team unless users opt to vote on their own. So the dev team can be fired, but only by intentional mutiny.
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I am curious.
I have a question... a bit wordy but hopefully a bit clear too..
Why do you think a talented person would give their time to prove themselves so that they are confident in the gamble of 2 weeks wages where they have to work free for 2 weeks to break even?
Is that making good use of inflation ... ?
⇈ This
All these outsourcing to Bitsuperlabs reeks of Bitcoin mining centralisation. Block producing should be made easy and encouraged to be as spread out as possible. The one person one delegate rule should also be implemented, even if it may not be enforceable.
Currently, lets say I come with some plan which would boost Bitshares popularity. I need some money to implement it, and I also need to get paid. So what do I do?
1. Start learning how to produce blocks reliably, or go hunting for a producer. If I care for the network I will avois stuff like Bitsuperlab and will have to spend time and effort looking for an individual.
2. I put forward my proposal.
3. I try raising money to register the delegate.
4. After elected I do my job as well as monitor my producer. If I do my task well but the producer doesn't then I get fired.
⇈ and this
I also can't help but feel that we are tending towards unnecessary centralization as I posted in my wall of text earlier in this thread. My gut tells me that early adopters and potential developers, unfamiliar with BitShares but familair with Bitcoin, will want to see a system that is easier to explain, simpler and more transparent for the basic function of securing blocks. Not a system that will become entangled in politics, community, renumeration concerns and the opinions of the most vocal. Why should block signing have anything to do with who you can convince to support you in your idea for value creation? I mean look at how this has already become a somewhat divisive topic even between those who get Bitshares.
I fear that your average potential blockchain developer or wanabee DAC employee will just understand Ethereum's math based approach, perhaps they'll even be more attracted to it on first blush. I suspect that most won't really be aware of or get the POWaste argument yet and think that there's nothing wrong with POW. We might lose them due to the complexity of how we are proposing BitShares blocks gets signed.
I know I suggested some form of nested transparency earlier on in this thread for employees/workers withing the 101 delegates/teams if we follow the proposed route, but the more I think about the more I think the two things should be separate.
Perhaps I'm just not seeing the big picture, but nobody has effectively explained to me why we need to create this chimera of two entirely separate functions within one delegate entity. Read my earlier post in this thread to perhaps unpick why I'm yet to 'see the light' on this. I want to be a convert, but I'm just not seeing it yet. I'm suspecting some will answer - well this is how you implement a system for free market value creation on the blockchain. Market forces and all that. If that's the answer then I still don't get why the two things can't be separate?
I have no idea of the practicalities of how a separation of delegates would be implemented. Can we not just define two different types of paid delegates? Block Signing Delegates (101) and Value Producing Delegates (Unlimited). Simples :)
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The term delegate is already bound to refer to the consensus model because we are trying to sell DPOS vs POW. This means "value-producing delegates" should be called" workers" with "proposals", as has been discussed at length. I think it will happen eventually.
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The term delegate is already bound to refer to the consensus model because we are trying to sell DPOS vs POW. This means "value-producing delegates" should be called" workers" with "proposals", as has been discussed at length. I think it will happen eventually.
Couldn't agree more.
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I am still worried about voter apathy a bit. It could make getting good delegate teams in, and bad ones out, difficult. Corporations handle this by making the default vote, "vote with the board of directors." Otherwise it may be difficult to execute buybacks/mergers/acquisitions if a vocal minority can dominate the cast ballots.
I have long said that if you are willing to download a wallet from someone then you trust them with your money. To that end wallet developers should select a default delegate slate to follow.
This has the effect of "centralizing" effective control over delegate selection to the dev team unless users opt to vote on their own. So the dev team can be fired, but only by intentional mutiny.
Yes, that makes sense - could such an interface be built into the reference wallet? Like "delegates.json" which can be edited by whomever is doing the distribution? Then you choose who represents you buy who you download the client from.
This prevents people hacking the code and can make who is in the default slate more transparent. I can hack it, but I think it would be better if everyone used the same base (so it's easier for SEGs to verify) but with a transparent tweak.