I'm not sure I understand.
Are you saying if I create bitusd and keep it I will get a 1% yeild on it?
Zero interest rates are good enough in Japan,do not too greedy。
If you want to give Yield ,you can donation 。
Interest come from business not from dilution .
Where do interest rates come from? (http://www.linkedin.com/pulse/where-do-interest-rates-come-from-sara-early)
I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying if I create bitusd and keep it I will get a 1% yeild on it?
What this seems to create though is a higher premium on the BitAssets and shorts once again have less incentives? I guess people could "Go long and short the BitAsset, so your BTS position stays the same but you get the yield"? I'm not sure about this but it's what I've read a few times already about this.
I think that 2% is more than enough. I would suggest a 4-5% APR to whoever qualifies depending on what BM and the community say. I liked BM's proposal and I could go with it. If we suppose that they get 4-5% per year, with 25% of the bitshares are traded on the DEX and with 50% of the traders qualifying for the rewards (i.e based on BM's proposal), the dilution would be 0.5%-0.625% per year.
The numbers are a rough estimate, but let's be honest. Not more than 25% of the shares are going to be traded constantly and not more than half of them are going to qualify for the rewards. We would need 50% and 100% respectively to go above the 2-2.5% per year.
I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying if I create bitusd and keep it I will get a 1% yeild on it?i'd also like to know this answer, though it looks like the proposal is something like a 4% yield for borrowing bitUSD short?
What exactly do we mean by dilution anyway? I thought the blockchain specks set BTS supply up front and that can't be changed? I'm uncomfortable with thinking that anyone can vote on changing the supply. Why not recycle fees from the USD-BTS market into some sort of yield instead of diluting?
Zero interest rates are good enough in Japan,do not too greedy。
If you want to give Yield ,you can donation 。
Interest come from business not from dilution .
Where do interest rates come from? (http://www.linkedin.com/pulse/where-do-interest-rates-come-from-sara-early)
If BTS is money ,dilution will damage BTS.
If BTS is shares, dilution is bluff.
does bank ‘s Yield come from dilution？？？？？？？？？？？
NO！！！！！！！！！！！！！！
who lend the money support the Yield ！！！！！！！！！
What about yield harvesting?
Every time I say I support a proposal like this, Stan comes
along and says remember what we learned about yield harvesting and everyone says "oh yeah" and the thread dies
Who exactly is the target of this proposal?
At a high level people with BTS on exchanges want to trade BTS along with other crypto. One minute they hold BTS, the next something else they think will rise. A few % may not be enough for them to be motivated to move their bts onto the internal exchange.
What would stop 3rd party exchanges from taking advantage of this?
Who exactly is the target of this proposal?
What would stop 3rd party exchanges from taking advantage of this?
I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying if I create bitusd and keep it I will get a 1% yeild on it?i'd also like to know this answer, though it looks like the proposal is something like a 4% yield for borrowing bitUSD short?
What exactly do we mean by dilution anyway? I thought the blockchain specks set BTS supply up front and that can't be changed? I'm uncomfortable with thinking that anyone can vote on changing the supply. Why not recycle fees from the USD-BTS market into some sort of yield instead of diluting?
BTS shareholders can currently vote for dilution up to 5BTS/sec under the current specs https://bitshares.org/technology/stakeholder-approved-project-funding/
I'm personally against most forms of dilution however this one wouldn't effect me or you if you 'yield harvest', go long BitUSD with half your stake and short BitUSD with the other half. The yield you received on your BitUSD half would be equal too or overcompensate you for the amount BTS was being diluted. However the benefits of incentivizing all of us to remove our BTS from the centralized exchanges and become holders of BitUSD and use the DEX are very large as described in the OP.
If a bank had 10 million shares and then they created 200 000 shares but gave it back to shareholders who opened an account at the bank then every shareholder who opened a bank account would have at least 1.02 per 1 share and only people who didn't open an account would lose. However the bank would have turned all their shareholders into account holders.
I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying if I create bitusd and keep it I will get a 1% yeild on it?i'd also like to know this answer, though it looks like the proposal is something like a 4% yield for borrowing bitUSD short?
What exactly do we mean by dilution anyway? I thought the blockchain specks set BTS supply up front and that can't be changed? I'm uncomfortable with thinking that anyone can vote on changing the supply. Why not recycle fees from the USD-BTS market into some sort of yield instead of diluting?
BTS shareholders can currently vote for dilution up to 5BTS/sec under the current specs https://bitshares.org/technology/stakeholder-approved-project-funding/
I'm personally against most forms of dilution however this one wouldn't effect me or you if you 'yield harvest', go long BitUSD with half your stake and short BitUSD with the other half. The yield you received on your BitUSD half would be equal too or overcompensate you for the amount BTS was being diluted. However the benefits of incentivizing all of us to remove our BTS from the centralized exchanges and become holders of BitUSD and use the DEX are very large as described in the OP.
I'd really really really like to people stop talking about dilution. If I understand your proposal right, you essentially mean that there would be a worker that distributes BTS for bitUSD-owners.
So the question isn't that should we dilute or not dilute, because we have 5 BTS/s to be used for workers anyway. The real question is about prioritizing. Is this proposal good when compared to other worker proposals? Is this really a profitable way of using development funds (aka reserve pool)?
Yield decentivizes liquidity. So if we have yield, we need more incentives on liquidity. Do we have enough fund from the reserve pool to support both?
Assuming we implement this feature in the BTS / USD market and voters approve workers funding this at a rate of 2.5 BTS / sec (50% of allowed dilution) and the internal exchange had $100,000 of daily volume then users trading on the internal exchange would see a 1% more than they would get by trading off chain. If daily volume was $50,000 then they would see a 2% profit over doing the same trades off-chain.
Your quoted text is either outdated or just an assumption/proposal. Final numbers would be decided by the committee (read: stake holders) at last. As a result, it's nonsense to compare the proposed cost between your proposal and the proposal in you link/quoted text. Instead, we need to analyse WHAT cost these proposals really need.Yield decentivizes liquidity. So if we have yield, we need more incentives on liquidity. Do we have enough fund from the reserve pool to support both?
In our case it may make liquidity cheaper.
The current liquidity proposal is suggesting spending about $1000 a day on liquidity https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21544.0.htmlQuoteAssuming we implement this feature in the BTS / USD market and voters approve workers funding this at a rate of 2.5 BTS / sec (50% of allowed dilution) and the internal exchange had $100,000 of daily volume then users trading on the internal exchange would see a 1% more than they would get by trading off chain. If daily volume was $50,000 then they would see a 2% profit over doing the same trades off-chain.
However once we have incentivized the creation of millions of BitUSD with yield we may be able to incentivize that BitUSD to take part in liquidity operations very cheaply...MAY be able to? Just assumption, or any evidence and/or logical reasoning?
In fact we may be able to get BitUSD trading in close to a 1% spread around the peg with $100 000 of liquidity a day for < $200.
There may be something I've misunderstood but if you have NuBits you can earn circa 0.25% per day participating in their liquidity pools.I don't want to speak much about NBT. True it has more liquidity right now. But IMO they act like a ponzi schema so we can't just copy their ways to provide liquidity.
The NuBits liquidity you see on Poloniex is achieved for an avg. of $100 a day https://nupool.net/index.php/Current_rates
The liquidity you see on Bittrex is achieved for an avg. of $25 a day https://nupool.net/index.php/Current_rates
The liquidity you see on bter (NBT/CNY and NBT/BTC) is achieved for an avg. of $40 a day http://nupond.net/
The liquidity you see on CCDEK is achieved for an avg. of $30 a day http://cybnate.github.io/index-liquidbits.html
This would be great as we would be the market leader with millions of USD, thousands of holders and lots of liquidity for less than the current liquidity proposal is suggesting using just for liquidity.
More importantly the money wouldn't just be going to professional market makers but mostly back to shareholders through yield harvesting and the little we spent on liquidity would go back to shareholders who wanted to participate in the liquidity pool.
Your quoted text is either outdated or just an assumption/proposal. Final numbers would be decided by the committee (read: stake holders) at last. As a result, it's nonsense to compare the proposed cost between your proposal and the proposal in you link/quoted text. Instead, we need to analyse WHAT cost these proposals really need.Yield decentivizes liquidity. So if we have yield, we need more incentives on liquidity. Do we have enough fund from the reserve pool to support both?
In our case it may make liquidity cheaper.
The current liquidity proposal is suggesting spending about $1000 a day on liquidity https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21544.0.htmlQuoteAssuming we implement this feature in the BTS / USD market and voters approve workers funding this at a rate of 2.5 BTS / sec (50% of allowed dilution) and the internal exchange had $100,000 of daily volume then users trading on the internal exchange would see a 1% more than they would get by trading off chain. If daily volume was $50,000 then they would see a 2% profit over doing the same trades off-chain.
However once we have incentivized the creation of millions of BitUSD with yield we may be able to incentivize that BitUSD to take part in liquidity operations very cheaply...MAY be able to? Just assumption, or any evidence and/or logical reasoning?
In fact we may be able to get BitUSD trading in close to a 1% spread around the peg with $100 000 of liquidity a day for < $200.
While we're incentivizing liquidity, there will be more bitUSD created to support the liquidity. But if we incentivize creation of bitUSD only, it's not sure that we'll get more liquidity, it's my logic.
There may be something I've misunderstood but if you have NuBits you can earn circa 0.25% per day participating in their liquidity pools.I don't want to speak much about NBT. True it has more liquidity right now. But IMO they act like a ponzi schema so we can't just copy their ways to provide liquidity.
The NuBits liquidity you see on Poloniex is achieved for an avg. of $100 a day https://nupool.net/index.php/Current_rates
The liquidity you see on Bittrex is achieved for an avg. of $25 a day https://nupool.net/index.php/Current_rates
The liquidity you see on bter (NBT/CNY and NBT/BTC) is achieved for an avg. of $40 a day http://nupond.net/
The liquidity you see on CCDEK is achieved for an avg. of $30 a day http://cybnate.github.io/index-liquidbits.html
I gave it a second thought and I am pro liquidity at the moment. Only liquidity. I am on abit's side.
I would agree with the yield, only in periods of crisis i.e big swings in currency markets and BTS. For example, NuShares holders can create park rates depending on market conditions (if any needed). Park rates = interest rates, where funds get locked for a certain period and the user can't use them. When it comes to interest rates, all we need is to have the delegates able to vote for specific interest rates, like the FED. Having fixed rates and people distributing the yield isn't good at all.
People that keep saying that dilution for the sake of BitAssets is bad, should think again. We keep refering to BitShares as Shares, but we don't actually have a viable product. So what is the point? As I said in my previous reply to this thread only one 1% is needed to achieve a 5%+ for BitAssets.
Yield decentivizes liquidity. So if we have yield, we need more incentives on liquidity. Do we have enough fund from the reserve pool to support both?
no enough active users
no real liquidity！！！！！！！！！！！
Yield decentivizes liquidity. So if we have yield, we need more incentives on liquidity. Do we have enough fund from the reserve pool to support both?
Don't experiment on bitUSD. Create testAsset or use testnet for such experiments.
You can't test that on a test net or with a test asset.
QuoteYou can't test that on a test net or with a test asset.
Not sure about test net, but you definitely can test it on test asset. If it outcompetes bitUSD, go ahead and apply same rules to all other assets.
Edit: In fact, you can do this experiment without asking nobody. Create you private asset, peg it to usd, pay holders yield out of your pocket, and see if it works as you expect.
Yield decentivizes liquidity. So if we have yield, we need more incentives on liquidity. Do we have enough fund from the reserve pool to support both?
Your argument against this extremely beneficial and timely proposal hinges on this statement. So please explain how offering a small yield will decentivize liquidity. Thanks.
Yield decentivizes liquidity. So if we have yield, we need more incentives on liquidity. Do we have enough fund from the reserve pool to support both?
Your argument against this extremely beneficial and timely proposal hinges on this statement. So please explain how offering a small yield will decentivize liquidity. Thanks.
I'm no financial wizard, but that is easy even for me to answer: yield encourages people to buy and HOLD, which is the very opposite of liquidity, which is NOT holding but rather trading.
While I'm commenting, lets get one thing straight for the record. I also think you should amend the OP based on the answer to this:
By "dilution" do you mean to alter the hard cap of 3.7B BTS, or fund yield from the reserve pool?
I think it's a big mistake to not be clear on that point, and from what I've seen from various threads and my own reading of the OP of THIS thread I don't think the answer is well known.
QuoteYou can't test that on a test net or with a test asset.
Not sure about test net, but you definitely can test it on test asset. If it outcompetes bitUSD, go ahead and apply same rules to all other assets.
Edit: In fact, you can do this experiment without asking nobody. Create you private asset, peg it to usd, pay holders yield out of your pocket, and see if it works as you expect.
Imagine a bank wanting to offer its shareholders an incentive to open accounts with them. Would they create test accounts to see if shareholders will open them? No, they will set a budget and a time frame, offer the incentive, and see if the shareholders will open real accounts. If it works, they may continue it and even ratchet it up. If not, they will discontinue it and perhaps try something else.
The kind of testing you're talking about would be fine to test any modifications to the mechanics of the backend system and the GUI before putting it into production. But you don't test behavior like that.
Yield decentivizes liquidity. So if we have yield, we need more incentives on liquidity. Do we have enough fund from the reserve pool to support both?
Your argument against this extremely beneficial and timely proposal hinges on this statement. So please explain how offering a small yield will decentivize liquidity. Thanks.
I'm no financial wizard, but that is easy even for me to answer: yield encourages people to buy and HOLD, which is the very opposite of liquidity, which is NOT holding but rather trading.
While I'm commenting, lets get one thing straight for the record. I also think you should amend the OP based on the answer to this:
By "dilution" do you mean to alter the hard cap of 3.7B BTS, or fund yield from the reserve pool?
I think it's a big mistake to not be clear on that point, and from what I've seen from various threads and my own reading of the OP of THIS thread I don't think the answer is well known.
QuoteYou can't test that on a test net or with a test asset.
Not sure about test net, but you definitely can test it on test asset. If it outcompetes bitUSD, go ahead and apply same rules to all other assets.
Edit: In fact, you can do this experiment without asking nobody. Create you private asset, peg it to usd, pay holders yield out of your pocket, and see if it works as you expect.
Imagine a bank wanting to offer its shareholders an incentive to open accounts with them. Would they create test accounts to see if shareholders will open them? No, they will set a budget and a time frame, offer the incentive, and see if the shareholders will open real accounts. If it works, they may continue it and even ratchet it up. If not, they will discontinue it and perhaps try something else.
The kind of testing you're talking about would be fine to test any modifications to the mechanics of the backend system and the GUI before putting it into production. But you don't test behavior like that.
You are not a bank, and you don't manage accounts. If you want to play with different derivatives, create your own and play with it.
QuoteYou can't test that on a test net or with a test asset.
Not sure about test net, but you definitely can test it on test asset. If it outcompetes bitUSD, go ahead and apply same rules to all other assets.
Edit: In fact, you can do this experiment without asking nobody. Create you private asset, peg it to usd, pay holders yield out of your pocket, and see if it works as you expect.
Imagine a bank wanting to offer its shareholders an incentive to open accounts with them. Would they create test accounts to see if shareholders will open them? No, they will set a budget and a time frame, offer the incentive, and see if the shareholders will open real accounts. If it works, they may continue it and even ratchet it up. If not, they will discontinue it and perhaps try something else.
The kind of testing you're talking about would be fine to test any modifications to the mechanics of the backend system and the GUI before putting it into production. But you don't test behavior like that.
You are not a bank, and you don't manage accounts. If you want to play with different derivatives, create your own and play with it.
Anyone that just mentions alteration to the hard cap of 3.7B bts should be shot on sight! EDIT==> You and me included!Questions, especially those asking for clarification, should always be welcome and not ostracized. Whenever the term "Dilution" is used it triggers this reaction. That's why I called for the OP to be revised to be VERY CLEAR about this.
I'm no financial wizard, but that is easy even for me to answer: yield encourages people to buy and HOLD, which is the very opposite of liquidity, which is NOT holding but rather trading.
While I'm commenting, lets get one thing straight for the record. I also think you should amend the OP based on the answer to this:
By "dilution" do you mean to alter the hard cap of 3.7B BTS, or fund yield from the reserve pool?
I think it's a big mistake to not be clear on that point, and from what I've seen from various threads and my own reading of the OP of THIS thread I don't think the answer is well known.
The OP is not mine. But no, @Empirical1.2 is absolutely NOT talking about altering the 3.7B cap. He is talking about funding the proposal out of the reserve pool.
As for yield decentivizing liquidity, I think you are oversimplifying and overgeneralizing it. Think about it. If I have a bunch of BTS sitting on an exchange, even a small yield would entice me to move my BTS to the DEX and harvest that yield. Now my BTS goes into my own Bitshares account and out of circulation, which is a good thing on multiple levels.
As far as the BitUSD I now hold, of course I'm not going to go and spend a large % of it...just like I wasn't going to spend a large % of the BTS I was holding on the exchange.
But I WILL spend some of it if there are places for me to spend it (thanks @kenCode!), and 2%, 3% or even 10% yield will not stop me from doing so. As for the rest of the BitUSD I hold (or at least a good chunk of it) I would be eager to earn additional return by putting it into a liquidity pool, which of course will add major liquidity and tighten the peg. So I think this idea that that yield will decentivie liquidity has no merit here. But maybe @Empirical1.2 or someone else can explain it better than I can.
I like both ideas (liquidity and yield), however liquidity is the one that has to come first. We can't experiment as much at the moment. We are even struggling to pay workers.
In the case of the assets, liquidity will stay in the BitAssets if we incentivise people to hold them. However, nothing flows to other assets like Obits. We need liquidity there too. Once people get on the DEX, the volume won't stay only on BitAssets because they have incentives. People will also check out other opportunities and help the asset exchange grow.
By "dilution" do you mean to alter the hard cap of 3.7B BTS, or fund yield from the reserve pool? [/b][/center]
I think it's a big mistake to not be clear on that point, and from what I've seen from various threads and my own reading of the OP of THIS thread I don't think the answer is well known.
By "dilution" do you mean to alter the hard cap of 3.7B BTS, or fund yield from the reserve pool? [/b][/center]
I think it's a big mistake to not be clear on that point, and from what I've seen from various threads and my own reading of the OP of THIS thread I don't think the answer is well known.
Apologies if I wasn't clear, yeah I was suggesting using a worker proposal for 6 months that would NOT alter the hard cap but would use a portion of the current maximum 5BTS/sec rate.
On the subject of liquidity, I don't think liquidity is all that is required to bootstrap BitUSD when you look at exchange based crypto USD products, providing some liquidity, mostly only creates temporary crypto demand.
Personally I mostly look to use those USD products as a hedge when BTC is trending downwards. I think many people approach them the same way. So demand for BitUSD if you only provided liquidity may be temporary and transient beyond a certain point. It also may be easier for people to use existing exchange based options for those short periods than BitUSD on the DEX.
By providing an incentive to hold BitUSD you are creating new demand for BitUSD in all market conditions. So people would have buy orders on the books regardless of the BTC/crypto general trending direction. (If you put some of the yield to the short side, which is an optional variation in the OP, suggested by tonyk, yield harvesting would remain the same but you would also create new shorting demand.) This would increase liquidity by increasing demand and do so in all market conditions.
Similar to when you have an interest bearing savings account at a bank you may still use it to make and receive payments as well as buy various products and services. This would be getting people to start using BitUSD in the same way. When businesses see thousands of potential customers with lots of price stable BitUSD in their account they can buy anything with in a few seconds then they will be attracted by that potential market and utility will increase.
A good example of this is BTC. a 2014 study showed that >70% of all BTC had not moved for >6 months.
http://www.ofnumbers.com/2014/11/22/approximately-70-of-all-bitcoins-have-not-moved-in-6-or-more-months/
So the majority of BTC was being hoarded and sat on but yet because it was a large market with thousands of holders, over 100 000 merchants were attracted to that potential market and offered products and services in exchange for BTC which increased BTC utility thereby liquidity.
Anyone that just mentions alteration to the hard cap of 3.7B bts should be shot on sight! EDIT==> You and me included!Questions, especially those asking for clarification, should always be welcome and not ostracized. Whenever the term "Dilution" is used it triggers this reaction. That's why I called for the OP to be revised to be VERY CLEAR about this.I'm no financial wizard, but that is easy even for me to answer: yield encourages people to buy and HOLD, which is the very opposite of liquidity, which is NOT holding but rather trading.
While I'm commenting, lets get one thing straight for the record. I also think you should amend the OP based on the answer to this:
By "dilution" do you mean to alter the hard cap of 3.7B BTS, or fund yield from the reserve pool?
I think it's a big mistake to not be clear on that point, and from what I've seen from various threads and my own reading of the OP of THIS thread I don't think the answer is well known.
The OP is not mine. But no, @Empirical1.2 is absolutely NOT talking about altering the 3.7B cap. He is talking about funding the proposal out of the reserve pool.
As for yield decentivizing liquidity, I think you are oversimplifying and overgeneralizing it. Think about it. If I have a bunch of BTS sitting on an exchange, even a small yield would entice me to move my BTS to the DEX and harvest that yield. Now my BTS goes into my own Bitshares account and out of circulation, which is a good thing on multiple levels.
Perhaps it is a simple view, and I have thought about it. You said it, "out of circulation". Your assumption that people will opt to invest a significant portion of the BitUSD elsewhere to stimulate liquidity is not certain. They may prefer to maximize yield and not split it up as you think may happen.
I was referring to getting BTS off the exchanges and out of circulation, which is obviously a good thing. As for what people will do with their BitUSD, if they want to maximize their yield, then they will want to earn the additional returns from participating in the yield pool. You actually made my point for me, thanks.As far as the BitUSD I now hold, of course I'm not going to go and spend a large % of it...just like I wasn't going to spend a large % of the BTS I was holding on the exchange.
Why do you assume that those who hold BTS on an exchange aren't going to spend much of it? Perhaps that's WHY it's on an exchange in the first place!
Thom, please rethink this statement. You're using circular logic. We're talking about whether yield will cause people to hoard BitUSD. Someone looking to sell their BTS is not part of this equation because they are not going to get into BitUSD, let alone hoard it. Actually, if someone like that decides not to sell because now they can get yield, then you just took some BTS out of circulation and now who cares what they do with the BitUSD? Not to mention, if they like the yield so much, why wouldn't they earn additional returns by participating in the liquidity pool? As for hoarding BitUSD to maximize yield, that's not going to stop people from spending a small fraction of their finds (assuming there's a place to spend them - thanks for POS @kenCode!), which is all we should expect. How many people spend their entire holdings?But I WILL spend some of it if there are places for me to spend it (thanks @kenCode!), and 2%, 3% or even 10% yield will not stop me from doing so. As for the rest of the BitUSD I hold (or at least a good chunk of it) I would be eager to earn additional return by putting it into a liquidity pool, which of course will add major liquidity and tighten the peg. So I think this idea that that yield will decentivie liquidity has no merit here. But maybe @Empirical1.2 or someone else can explain it better than I can.
Thanks tbone for your reply to my concerns & "simplistic" view, but I am still not convinced. There appear to be several assumptions in your analysis I think need to be addressed. You may be right, but I'm not seeing the hard evidence to convince me.
Well, if you agree your OP wasn't clear about the source of dilution why not go back and edit it?
Also, BM & Stan explained (https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21549.msg280648.html#msg280648) why they thought "yield harvesting" doesn't work, but in all of this discussion I don't see a strong case made for why their take is wrong. If anyone could explain that clearly and concisely or point to such an explanation that would be great.
In 1.0, I believe BM was right that yield harvesting was bad, because shorts would offer yield to entice longs which went into a large pool but then BTS shareholders would yield harvest, thereby reducing the average yield and discouraging genuine longs.
In this example where we send dilution to the yield, yield harvesting is a great thing because it means shareholders aren't diluted as long as they yield harvest. However it acts as a behaviour incentive to get BTS holders to remove their BTS from the centralized exchanges (which is a big positive) and support Smartcoins.
Well, if you agree your OP wasn't clear about the source of dilution why not go back and edit it?
Also, BM & Stan explained (https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21549.msg280648.html#msg280648) why they thought "yield harvesting" doesn't work, but in all of this discussion I don't see a strong case made for why their take is wrong. If anyone could explain that clearly and concisely or point to such an explanation that would be great.
If it was just a topic I would but I'm personally not a fan of changing anything in a poll, once people have started voting on principal.
We've yet to hear BM & Stan's take on this but personally I think they were right that yield harvesting was a negative in 1.0 because of the way yield was derived (from shorts hoping to incentivize longs) I'm hoping they will see the merits of this approach in 2.0In 1.0, I believe BM was right that yield harvesting was bad, because shorts would offer yield to entice longs which went into a large pool but then BTS shareholders would yield harvest, thereby reducing the average yield and discouraging genuine longs.
In this example where we send dilution to the yield, yield harvesting is a great thing because it means shareholders aren't diluted as long as they yield harvest. However it acts as a behaviour incentive to get BTS holders to remove their BTS from the centralized exchanges (which is a big positive) and support Smartcoins.
Hard evidence? There's no such thing as hard evidence. You have to use common sense and do it on a trial basis. Worst case scenario, people don't respond to the incentive and we stop it after 6 months or whatever the trial period is. Best case scenario is we bootstrap the crap out of our BitAssets, create liquidity, and turn the DEX into a happening place. This is a good proposal with tremendous upside and little downside. Let's not sit on our hands. We're running out of time. Inaction is doom. Mark my words.
However, it's looking like the community is evenly split over whether to move forward on this idea or rather wait to see how other proposals will affect liquidity.
Having too many choices and too many levers to pull is not a good way to run an experiment. So how do we determine the best one to try first? We need a decision matrix with the pros & cons of each proposal that targets improving liquidity.
Well, if you agree your OP wasn't clear about the source of dilution why not go back and edit it?
Also, BM & Stan explained (https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21549.msg280648.html#msg280648) why they thought "yield harvesting" doesn't work, but in all of this discussion I don't see a strong case made for why their take is wrong. If anyone could explain that clearly and concisely or point to such an explanation that would be great.
If it was just a topic I would but I'm personally not a fan of changing anything in a poll, once people have started voting on principle.
We've yet to hear BM & Stan's take on this but personally I think they were right that yield harvesting was a negative in 1.0 because of the way yield was derived (from shorts hoping to incentivize longs) I'm hoping they will see the merits of this approach in 2.0In 1.0, I believe BM was right that yield harvesting was bad, because shorts would offer yield to entice longs which went into a large pool but then BTS shareholders would yield harvest, thereby reducing the average yield and discouraging genuine longs.
In this example where we send dilution to the yield, yield harvesting is a great thing because it means shareholders aren't diluted as long as they yield harvest. However it acts as a behaviour incentive to get BTS holders to remove their BTS from the centralized exchanges (which is a big positive) and support Smartcoins.
I think this is a terrible idea that does nothing but steal value from BTS bulls (people who hold BTS), and give it to BTS bears (people who hold bitUSD instead of BTS).
This will not achieve the goals you want of encouraging bitasset adoption, rather it will reduce the incentive to hold BTS, reduce the value of BTS, take money away from bulls and give it to bears.
I'm tired of this endless arguments. Nobody can make sure that a not-did thing can be done, or not.
Just create a worker proposal and see WHETHER you can get enough votes.
I think this is a terrible idea that does nothing but steal value from BTS bulls (people who hold BTS), and give it to BTS bears (people who hold bitUSD instead of BTS).
This will not achieve the goals you want of encouraging bitasset adoption, rather it will reduce the incentive to hold BTS, reduce the value of BTS, take money away from bulls and give it to bears.
You can still maintain your current BTS position by yield harvesting. Being long BitUSD and short BitUSD at the same time.
So it doesn't take any value from BTS holders provided they yield harvest. However this would remove BTS from the centralized exchanges and make most shareholders owners of BitAssets while still maintaining their current overall BTS positons.
(Provided total BitAssets in circulation < 1/2 of BTS market capitalization, then directing funds to yield can be mitigated by yield harvesting as far as I understand.)
So you are forced to take a bunch of margin positions that are opposite each other in order to avoid having your money stolen from you?I think this is a terrible idea that does nothing but steal value from BTS bulls (people who hold BTS), and give it to BTS bears (people who hold bitUSD instead of BTS).
This will not achieve the goals you want of encouraging bitasset adoption, rather it will reduce the incentive to hold BTS, reduce the value of BTS, take money away from bulls and give it to bears.
You can still maintain your current BTS position by yield harvesting. Being long BitUSD and short BitUSD at the same time.
So it doesn't take any value from BTS holders provided they yield harvest. However this would remove BTS from the centralized exchanges and make most shareholders owners of BitAssets while still maintaining their current overall BTS positons.
(Provided total BitAssets in circulation < 1/2 of BTS market capitalization, then directing funds to yield can be mitigated by yield harvesting as far as I understand.)
How is that the free market? What happens if the price moves a bunch in one direction and one of your positions gets margin called, then it moves back where it started?
Build real utility that makes people want to use bitAssets, rather than introducing a tyrannical rule system that forces them to.
If you implement this, the people you are trying to force to buy bitAssets will not buy bitAssets, they will sell all their BTS and leave the project.
Under BitShares the BitAsset holders receive a yield simply by holding BitUSD. This yield was between 1% and 5% APR on average. Unfortunately, yield harvesting can happen at any time by someone shorting to themselves to gain a very low risk return and undermining goal of encouraging people to buy and hold BitUSD.
What we need is to create a bond/margin trading market, and then allow people to loan BTS/bitAssets to others for margin trading purposes, like you can do at poloniex. Then rather than the yield being a theft from one party to another, it is deriving from legitimate use and its rate is set by the free market. This would increase the value and usefulness and liquidity of BTS and nitAssets, rather than reduce it.
Do you think DASH Masternodes or PPC minting rewards are anti-free market? Most POS alts these days offer various rewards which can be mitigated by holders if they engage in the network positive behaviour the reward is attempting to incentivize.
I think this is a terrible idea that does nothing but steal value from BTS bulls (people who hold BTS), and give it to BTS bears (people who hold bitUSD instead of BTS).
This will not achieve the goals you want of encouraging bitasset adoption, rather it will reduce the incentive to hold BTS, reduce the value of BTS, take money away from bulls and give it to bears.
You can still maintain your current BTS position by yield harvesting. Being long BitUSD and short BitUSD at the same time.
So it doesn't take any value from BTS holders provided they yield harvest. However this would remove BTS from the centralized exchanges and make most shareholders owners of BitAssets while still maintaining their current overall BTS positons.
(Provided total BitAssets in circulation < 1/2 of BTS market capitalization, then directing funds to yield can be mitigated by yield harvesting as far as I understand.)
So you are forced to take a bunch of margin positions that are opposite each other in order to avoid having your money stolen from you?
How is that the free market? What happens if the price moves a bunch in one direction and one of your positions gets margin called, then it moves back where it started?
Build real utility that makes people want to use bitAssets, rather than introducing a tyrannical rule system that forces them to.
If you implement this, the people you are trying to force to buy bitAssets will not buy bitAssets, they will sell all their BTS and leave the project.
+5% +5% +5%
Do you think DASH Masternodes or PPC minting rewards are anti-free market? Most POS alts these days offer various rewards which can be mitigated by holders if they engage in the network positive behaviour the reward is attempting to incentivize.
Well, DASH specifically is a scam. :P
Regarding most PoS coins providing interest to forgers, this has a purpose of encouraging people to support the network.
But BTS is DPoS so it doesnt need that.
This proposed inflation would encourage people to hold equal long and short positions in the DEX simultaneously in order to avoid dilution. That doesnt sound like making bitAssets useful, it sounds like forcing BTS holders to take on risk and needlessly manage some positions just in order to not lose value.
so this would be a "temporary" feature that would last only until the bond market was ready?
When compared to the high cost BTS shareholders are paying in other areas that they can't recoup, create direct selling pressure & isn't likely to increase product demand, I think this is very lucrative to at least attempt on a trial basis
When compared to the high cost BTS shareholders are paying in other areas that they can't recoup, create direct selling pressure & isn't likely to increase product demand, I think this is very lucrative to at least attempt on a trial basis
Just because its not as big of a mistake as the merger dilution doesn't make it good.
so this would be a "temporary" feature that would last only until the bond market was ready?
It could even be removed before then if it was not producing positive results.
so this would be a "temporary" feature that would last only until the bond market was ready?
It could even be removed before then if it was not producing positive results.
How will you know, that "positive" results (if you will have them) were produced by this feature?
Do you think DASH Masternodes or PPC minting rewards are anti-free market? Most POS alts these days offer various rewards which can be mitigated by holders if they engage in the network positive behaviour the reward is attempting to incentivize.
Well, DASH specifically is a scam. :P
Regarding most PoS coins providing interest to forgers, this has a purpose of encouraging people to support the network.
But BTS is DPoS so it doesnt need that.
This proposed inflation would encourage people to hold equal long and short positions in the DEX simultaneously in order to avoid dilution. That doesnt sound like making bitAssets useful, it sounds like forcing BTS holders to take on risk and needlessly manage some positions just in order to not lose value.
Do you think DASH Masternodes or PPC minting rewards are anti-free market? Most POS alts these days offer various rewards which can be mitigated by holders if they engage in the network positive behaviour the reward is attempting to incentivize.
so this would be a "temporary" feature that would last only until the bond market was ready?
It could even be removed before then if it was not producing positive results.
This proposed inflation would encourage people to hold equal long and short positions in the DEX simultaneously in order to avoid dilution. That doesnt sound like making bitAssets useful, it sounds like forcing BTS holders to take on risk and needlessly manage some positions just in order to not lose value.
Do you think DASH Masternodes or PPC minting rewards are anti-free market? Most POS alts these days offer various rewards which can be mitigated by holders if they engage in the network positive behaviour the reward is attempting to incentivize.
I think this is one of the only potentially valid points you have made against the proposal. @Empirical1.2, can you speak to the risk of having the simultaneously long and short positions advocated by your proposal?
Under BitShares the BitAsset holders receive a yield simply by holding BitUSD. This yield was between 1% and 5% APR on average. Unfortunately, yield harvesting can happen at any time by someone shorting to themselves to gain a very low risk return...
so this would be a "temporary" feature that would last only until the bond market was ready?
It could even be removed before then if it was not producing positive results.
@Empirical1.2: How the yield harvesting fits in with a bond market is another good question and one that should be discussed further. And I don't mean if the yield harvesting isn't working. I mean if it IS working. Do we continue it when the bond market is finally ready? Do they complement each other? Do they conflict? Please walk me through that.
If there is no good reason to have both, then I would only be interested in the yield harvesting if it can be implemented a lot more quickly than a bond market (for instance, if it would take 1-2 months to implement yield harvesting, but 6+ months to implement bond market).
Yip, it's a worker that distributes BTS for BitUSD owners which BTS owners can mitigate via yield harvesting.
I appreciate your POV, however personally I refer to any expansion of the current supply as dilution. (While you can argue the current supply includes the reserve pool, it's the act of bringing that supply to market which dilutes shareholders today in practical terms & often much more than the headline figure due to fairly thin speculative demand supporting current price levels.)
I agree though the question is whether it will increase revenue/profit/users/BTS demand enough to justify the cost and hopefully I've made a strong enough case in this thread why that will be the case. (Like many POS minting type rewards the majority of the cost is fairly neutral/circular and goes back to existing shareholders so is unlikely to create large sell pressure, while at the same time increasing new demand for BitUSD which creates net new demand for BTS as well as removing BTS from centralized exchanges, making BitUSD the market leader by CAP and holders and possibly making BitAsset liquidity operations cheaper, which should all be valuation positive for BTS.)
how many normal people would like to use bitUSD ……？？？？？？？？？Why don't you ask @alt, it seems he has a plan to fix everything by not having further development of the frontend.
is the mobile wallet easy enough？？
is there more and more forum use bitUSD？
This proposed inflation would encourage people to hold equal long and short positions in the DEX simultaneously in order to avoid dilution. That doesnt sound like making bitAssets useful, it sounds like forcing BTS holders to take on risk and needlessly manage some positions just in order to not lose value.
Do you think DASH Masternodes or PPC minting rewards are anti-free market? Most POS alts these days offer various rewards which can be mitigated by holders if they engage in the network positive behaviour the reward is attempting to incentivize.
I think this is one of the only potentially valid points you have made against the proposal. @Empirical1.2, can you speak to the risk of having the simultaneously long and short positions advocated by your proposal?
Ander is right that if BTS declines you can be margin called or force settled. This would mean you either have to
A) Manage your overall position in a significant BTS decline
If you failed to do this and were force settled/margin called you'd have to sell some BitUSD and then re-short to rebalance your position. This process would add to liquidity though.
B) Short with more than 100% collateral. This is the lazy option, it reduces the effective yield you are getting but it makes it less likely you'll have to manage it. (However provided total BitUSD in circulation < 1/3 of BTS value, you could short with 200% collateral and not be affected by the yield worker proposal.)
This is a positive as BitAssets would become more collateralised/safe.
C) You could also apply tonyk's suggestion listed in the OP of giving some of the yield to shorts, so that shorting with more collateral incurs less of a loss and yield harvesting is made easier. This would also create some new shorting demand which adds to liquidity.
I'd be interested how risky others view it and how hard they feel it would be to manage that risk. Bytemaster for example describes yield harvesting as very low risk.
so this would be a "temporary" feature that would last only until the bond market was ready?
It could even be removed before then if it was not producing positive results.
@Empirical1.2: How the yield harvesting fits in with a bond market is another good question and one that should be discussed further. And I don't mean if the yield harvesting isn't working. I mean if it IS working. Do we continue it when the bond market is finally ready? Do they complement each other? Do they conflict? Please walk me through that.
If there is no good reason to have both, then I would only be interested in the yield harvesting if it can be implemented a lot more quickly than a bond market (for instance, if it would take 1-2 months to implement yield harvesting, but 6+ months to implement bond market).
The bond market would work similarly to lending at Poloniex I believe. So if you had BitUSD you may make a loan offer to someone who wanted gain BitUSD leverage. So this is how you could generate free market interest on your BitUSD.
So this would incentivise BitUSD demand (because people want interest) without any yield worker proposal.
Personally I still see a lot of value in having a little yield on BitAssets through the method stated in the OP so BitUSD still has an advertisable USP (Yield) for less sophisticated BitUSD holders for a fairly neutral cost to shareholders. (However we could see by the market reaction to doing it how valuable it was/wasn't to BTS value in practice.)
Also yes I imagine this proposal could be implemented within 30 days of being approved (not that I know anything about coding) whereas the bond market is not currently under development AFAIK and is surely 6+ months away.
Empirical regardless of merits this will never be tried. It takes 40% of the dev fund. And it cannot be stopped at 6 mo. if it is seen as working. cause the bootstrapping phase will have just begun. It will take years. I know you took one number from a post of bm's as an argument, but in fact the other (market maker) liquidity measure can run on much much less than that number. You took it at face value and run with it.
So, working or not this is untestable,imo.
Empirical regardless of merits this will never be tried. It takes 40% of the dev fund. And it cannot be stopped at 6 mo. if it is seen as working. cause the bootstrapping phase will have just begun. It will take years. I know you took one number from a post of bm's as an argument, but in fact the other (market maker) liquidity measure can run on much much less than that number. You took it at face value and run with it.
So, working or not this is untestable,imo.
Empirical regardless of merits this will never be tried. It takes 40% of the dev fund. And it cannot be stopped at 6 mo. if it is seen as working. cause the bootstrapping phase will have just begun. It will take years. I know you took one number from a post of bm's as an argument, but in fact the other (market maker) liquidity measure can run on much much less than that number. You took it at face value and run with it.
So, working or not this is untestable,imo.
This can also be done for less. But you just took the one number at face value and ran with it. Also, I love how you argue against this proposal because if it works, we won't stop it. That's brilliant, tony.
Empirical regardless of merits this will never be tried. It takes 40% of the dev fund. And it cannot be stopped at 6 mo. if it is seen as working. cause the bootstrapping phase will have just begun. It will take years. I know you took one number from a post of bm's as an argument, but in fact the other (market maker) liquidity measure can run on much much less than that number. You took it at face value and run with it.
So, working or not this is untestable,imo.
This can also be done for less. But you just took the one number at face value and ran with it. Also, I love how you argue against this proposal because if it works, we won't stop it. That's brilliant, tony.
Are you gonna stop putting words in my mouth...like ever?
Where did you see me arguing against the proposal?
After the bitcoin halving in July when the bitcoin price triples, and Ethereum's market cap hits $30 billion
If we were to implement this, I think yield harvesting should be made very easy for anyone to participate. So it should not be necessary to explicitly go through the steps of borrowing BitUSD and shorting it to themselves. It should be as easy as clicking a button. Although in that case perhaps extra collateral should be required in order to avoid having to manage it. And then if anyone wants to get more yield than is available via the "yield for dummies" way, they can do it the current way by actually going through the steps and then having to manage the position. Although perhaps there can be alerts to warn users if they have a position that is getting close to becoming undercollateralized. Does this make sense?
If we were to implement this, I think yield harvesting should be made very easy for anyone to participate. So it should not be necessary to explicitly go through the steps of borrowing BitUSD and shorting it to themselves. It should be as easy as clicking a button. Although in that case perhaps extra collateral should be required in order to avoid having to manage it. And then if anyone wants to get more yield than is available via the "yield for dummies" way, they can do it the current way by actually going through the steps and then having to manage the position. Although perhaps there can be alerts to warn users if they have a position that is getting close to becoming undercollateralized. Does this make sense?
I agree, it would be good if the process could me made as simple as possible.
There is also some value in having shareholders go through the steps so that they become active/knowledgable vs. passive users of the DEX but I guess the incentive to do that would be the higher yield you could get with a more actively managed, lower collateral position.
If I'm bad guy, and I have 1 million USD. I want BTS price keep falling down.
What I need to do is, change all my money to BITUSD, Then wait the monthly expire of short order. I'll hold all my BITUSD until we have no enough shorter, the expired short order have to get the BITUSD to cover. Shorter need to sell BTS to get BITUSD, while all the BITUSD is hold by me.This will keep the price falling.
As a bad guy, I'll lose nothing, while earn some interesting.
I think the rule need be changed. The one hold BITUSD should pay people short for them.
In an bank I borrow money, and I can use the money to do more meaningful things, and I have to pay interesting.
In BTS, I short BTS and create BITUSD, but I can not use the BITUSD, other people get my BITUSD, and use BITUSD, and I have to pay the interesting to him. What a fuck???
BITUSD is for trade, not for people to hold. I'd like suggest people who short, set interesting to 0.
People who hold bitUSD can use the bitUSD to trade, to buy stuff, to hire people to work for them in the Internet, and can invest with bitUSD. bitUSD is like the money in your pocket. Any bank pay u interest while the money is in your pocket?
As a Shorter, yes, we can get more BTS. BUT, the BTS is locked, we can not use the BTS do any thing but hoping the BTS price goes up.
This is not how the world run!!
We need is real economist. Don't tell me BM is a economist..
We have already identified this problem and also the solution:
1) No interest on BitUSD
2) No expiration on Shorts unless USD request force settlement at a discount (profit to the short)
3) Bond market which locks up BitUSD like a CD and pays interest.
Any bank pay you interest for the money in your pocket?
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,15888.0.html
i voted YES purely on the condition that this is a LIMITED TRIAL with perpetuation of the policy contingent on results.
I would recommend against this. I actually proposed something similar myself more than a year ago, but I have since then learned a lot more about economics.
I would recommend against this. I actually proposed something similar myself more than a year ago, but I have since then learned a lot more about economics.
i voted YES purely on the condition that this is a LIMITED TRIAL with perpetuation of the policy contingent on results.
i voted YES purely on the condition that this is a LIMITED TRIAL with perpetuation of the policy contingent on results.
I, too, am in favor of limiting this to a 6-month trial. I propose targeting it 75% to BitUSD, 20% BitCNY and 5% BitEur, with a goal of creating the equivalent of at least $1M in total BitAssets. Also, to receive yield, perhaps it should be required to lock up funds for a month at a time. So yield would be paid every month starting 1 month after lock-up (on an account by account basis), and early withdrawal means yield is forfeited.
So we get people to move funds onto the DEX, they become more frequent users of the DEX, and create BitAssets propelling us to worldwide fiat-pegged leaders, which will garner greater overall attention for Bitshares in general and our smartcoins in particular. Not to mention new users that might be attracted by the yield to buy and hold smartcoins.
On the liquidity front, we can launch this in conjunction with liquidity pools that any of these new users and new BitAsset creators/holders can voluntarily participate in. This can be incentivized by the Nasdaq-style market maker liquidity rewards program (to be developed separately, discussed on another thread), which of course any liquidity provider can participate in (and which UIA issuers can use with their own funds to incentivize liquidity in the markets for their own assets).
If we require generation of more liquidity, the rewards can be increased as necessary. Conversely, as liquidity grows, the rewards can be diminished and directed to other BitAsset markets such as BitGOLD, BitSILVER, BitOIL, BitAAPL, etc.
These are just some suggestions and starting points for further discussion, including how some of the pieces of the puzzle might fit together. Thoughts @Empirical1.2, @cylonmaker2053? Anyone else with constructive input?
i voted YES purely on the condition that this is a LIMITED TRIAL with perpetuation of the policy contingent on results.
I, too, am in favor of limiting this to a 6-month trial. I propose targeting it 75% to BitUSD, 20% BitCNY and 5% BitEur, with a goal of creating the equivalent of at least $1M in total BitAssets. Also, to receive yield, perhaps it should be required to lock up funds for a month at a time. So yield would be paid every month starting 1 month after lock-up (on an account by account basis), and early withdrawal means yield is forfeited.
So we get people to move funds onto the DEX, they become more frequent users of the DEX, and create BitAssets propelling us to worldwide fiat-pegged leaders, which will garner greater overall attention for Bitshares in general and our smartcoins in particular. Not to mention new users that might be attracted by the yield to buy and hold smartcoins.
On the liquidity front, we can launch this in conjunction with liquidity pools that any of these new users and new BitAsset creators/holders can voluntarily participate in. This can be incentivized by the Nasdaq-style market maker liquidity rewards program (to be developed separately, discussed on another thread), which of course any liquidity provider can participate in (and which UIA issuers can use with their own funds to incentivize liquidity in the markets for their own assets).
If we require generation of more liquidity, the rewards can be increased as necessary. Conversely, as liquidity grows, the rewards can be diminished and directed to other BitAsset markets such as BitGOLD, BitSILVER, BitOIL, BitAAPL, etc.
These are just some suggestions and starting points for further discussion, including how some of the pieces of the puzzle might fit together. Thoughts @Empirical1.2, @cylonmaker2053? Anyone else with constructive input?
Also, to receive yield, perhaps it should be required to lock up funds for a month at a time. So yield would be paid every month starting 1 month after lock-up (on an account by account basis), and early withdrawal means yield is forfeited.
I would recommend against this. I actually proposed something similar myself more than a year ago, but I have since then learned a lot more about economics.
what about economics makes you recommend against this experiment? i'm personally about indifferent on this hypothesis, but usually ere on the side of experimentation.
Also, to receive yield, perhaps it should be required to lock up funds for a month at a time. So yield would be paid every month starting 1 month after lock-up (on an account by account basis), and early withdrawal means yield is forfeited.
I personally like this idea more & could be in favour of it. This would make the advertisable variable yield higher. In terms of liquidity, you want to increase Makers at key times but also reduce liquidity takers at those key times. This may incentivise those who would probably be liquidity takers to not suck liquidity out of the market as much at key times. (Buying BitUSD when BTC/BTS is rapidly falling & selling BitUSD when BTC/BTS is rapidly rising) So besides all the other benefits of yield, this would be a way of using yield to improve liquidity imo.
Edit: At the same time once we have merchants accepting BitUSD this might be a negative in terms of getting the good liquidity in terms of people easily spending their BitUSD & creating the Pool to customer to merchant back to pool liquidity cycle.
I would recommend against this. I actually proposed something similar myself more than a year ago, but I have since then learned a lot more about economics.
what about economics makes you recommend against this experiment? i'm personally about indifferent on this hypothesis, but usually ere on the side of experimentation.
This is in essence a bet against the market by a public agent. I don't think it can possibly be profitable in the long run.
I'm also just speculating, macroeconomics are mostly guesswork. I don't think there's anything wrong with experimenting but I wouldn't do that on the main bitshares blockchain.
I would recommend against this. I actually proposed something similar myself more than a year ago, but I have since then learned a lot more about economics.
what about economics makes you recommend against this experiment? i'm personally about indifferent on this hypothesis, but usually ere on the side of experimentation.
This is in essence a bet against the market by a public agent. I don't think it can possibly be profitable in the long run.
I'm also just speculating, macroeconomics are mostly guesswork. I don't think there's anything wrong with experimenting but I wouldn't do that on the main bitshares blockchain.
I see this more like a kickstart project than a longterm solution. I'm also quite sure that this wouldn't be profitable in the long run, but this might be a good way to get liquid markets kickstarted. Although I'm still inclined to think that best way to pay yield is to pay it only for smartcoins that are in the orderbook.
If the largest banks can achieve deposits of over $1 trillion dollars with no meaningful interest, how many deposits could BitShares attract and what would that mean for the value of the bank?
Yes, it does appear that this "yield harvesting" is no different than what DASH has successfully done with its "Masternode" incentive to lock up value on the blockchain creating scarcity on the open market and raising its share price.
And since DASH has an enviable market cap from our perspective (one that would speed up our development funding), then I am on board. Because after all, the one thing we need in order to achieve our dreams here is dev funding. Imagine what we could do, and how fast we could do it if our market cap was around 30 million like DASH.
What happens when the trial ends? Won't people be disappointed? However, if we keep it going, what if there's a point where we can't dilute any more? People won't care about it any more
What happens when the trial ends? Won't people be disappointed? However, if we keep it going, what if there's a point where we can't dilute any more? People won't care about it any more
What happens when the trial ends? Won't people be disappointed? However, if we keep it going, what if there's a point where we can't dilute any more? People won't care about it any more
it'd be an experiment with the expectation of continuing if successful. i agree with @Empirical1.2 in that it shouldn't be advertised as a yield promotion event, but rather as a trial permanent feature. those who want it to remain a fixed feature have more incentive to participate up front.
The immediate overnight impact of a temporary yield promotion would be a rapid expansion of the BitUSD supply. Becoming the crypto USD, Smartcoin market leader will significantly impact the perception of the DEX and it's future potential at a time when we have received a lot of positive momentum and attention.+5%
What we've seen though is the amount of BTS on Polo increasing, if we want all those people who are suddenly interested in BTS to move their BTS off the exchanges, learn about Smartcoins and participate in the DEX then we need to give them a reason/incentive and the yield promotion is a great way to do that.
The immediate overnight impact of a temporary yield promotion would be a rapid expansion of the BitUSD supply. Becoming the crypto USD, Smartcoin market leader will significantly impact the perception of the DEX and it's future potential at a time when we have received a lot of positive momentum and attention.
What we've seen though is the amount of BTS on Polo increasing, if we want all those people who are suddenly interested in BTS to move their BTS off the exchanges, learn about Smartcoins and participate in the DEX then we need to give them a reason/incentive and the yield promotion is a great way to do that.
+5%The immediate overnight impact of a temporary yield promotion would be a rapid expansion of the BitUSD supply. Becoming the crypto USD, Smartcoin market leader will significantly impact the perception of the DEX and it's future potential at a time when we have received a lot of positive momentum and attention.
What we've seen though is the amount of BTS on Polo increasing, if we want all those people who are suddenly interested in BTS to move their BTS off the exchanges, learn about Smartcoins and participate in the DEX then we need to give them a reason/incentive and the yield promotion is a great way to do that.
Now is definitely the time to do this. Why don't you write up a draft proposal and start getting final inputs before putting it to a vote?
+5%The immediate overnight impact of a temporary yield promotion would be a rapid expansion of the BitUSD supply. Becoming the crypto USD, Smartcoin market leader will significantly impact the perception of the DEX and it's future potential at a time when we have received a lot of positive momentum and attention.
What we've seen though is the amount of BTS on Polo increasing, if we want all those people who are suddenly interested in BTS to move their BTS off the exchanges, learn about Smartcoins and participate in the DEX then we need to give them a reason/incentive and the yield promotion is a great way to do that.
Now is definitely the time to do this. Why don't you write up a draft proposal and start getting final inputs before putting it to a vote?
If the largest banks can achieve deposits of over $1 trillion dollars with no meaningful interest, how many deposits could BitShares attract and what would that mean for the value of the bank?
3.78 million savers over the past five years had money in accounts paying attractive short-term bonuses, but failed to move their cash once the deal ended.
Work in progress...
I looked at the BSIP outline https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0001.md
Here is some stuff I have written for one, if anyone wants to turn it into a proper BSIP or suggest changes or create their own variation cool. My main goal is that BTS trials using some of the worker budget for SmartCoin yield in one form or another.
---------------------------
BitUSD Yield Promotion BSIP
100 000 BTS per day, 23% of BTS Worker Budget, for 6 months directed to a BitUSD yield promotion. (75% to going to BitUSD Yield and 25% going to BitUSD shorts)
Lower BitUSD forced settlement to 0.95
Work in progress...
I looked at the BSIP outline https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0001.md
Here is some stuff I have written for one, if anyone wants to turn it into a proper BSIP or suggest changes or create their own variation cool. My main goal is that BTS trials using some of the worker budget for SmartCoin yield in one form or another.
---------------------------
BitUSD Yield Promotion BSIP
100 000 BTS per day, 23% of BTS Worker Budget, for 6 months directed to a BitUSD yield promotion. (75% to going to BitUSD Yield and 25% going to BitUSD shorts)
Lower BitUSD forced settlement to 0.95
good cut at this experiment. i'd recommend flipping the split and making it 75% to shorts and 25% to yield on holding the asset. from my experience, those who borrow our smartcoins into existence are the real heroes. they're tying up a ton of collateral and our markets wouldn't exist without them. those who buy and hold the assets still do some good, but incentivizing buy-and-hold over shorting would likely reduce market liquidity by drying up the order book.
also, diverting 20% of worker funds for just bitUSD seems excessive. what happens if it is a success? we have no slack to start subsidizing other markets without changing the rules of the game for new investors/traders who bought in with those lavish conditions. personally, i think 20% of worker fund diversion for overall systemic trading support is great, but that'd include all subsidies to all smartcoins, not just one test case. we have to consider the impact of reducing dev/worker budget on our long term system health. personally, i'd start with something like 5%.
Work in progress...
I looked at the BSIP outline https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0001.md
Here is some stuff I have written for one, if anyone wants to turn it into a proper BSIP or suggest changes or create their own variation cool. My main goal is that BTS trials using some of the worker budget for SmartCoin yield in one form or another.
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BitUSD Yield Promotion BSIP
100 000 BTS per day, 23% of BTS Worker Budget, for 6 months directed to a BitUSD yield promotion. (75% to going to BitUSD Yield and 25% going to BitUSD shorts)
Lower BitUSD forced settlement to 0.95
good cut at this experiment. i'd recommend flipping the split and making it 75% to shorts and 25% to yield on holding the asset. from my experience, those who borrow our smartcoins into existence are the real heroes. they're tying up a ton of collateral and our markets wouldn't exist without them. those who buy and hold the assets still do some good, but incentivizing buy-and-hold over shorting would likely reduce market liquidity by drying up the order book.
also, diverting 20% of worker funds for just bitUSD seems excessive. what happens if it is a success? we have no slack to start subsidizing other markets without changing the rules of the game for new investors/traders who bought in with those lavish conditions. personally, i think 20% of worker fund diversion for overall systemic trading support is great, but that'd include all subsidies to all smartcoins, not just one test case. we have to consider the impact of reducing dev/worker budget on our long term system health. personally, i'd start with something like 5%.
Regards the 20% of worker funds with 75% to longs, that's because it will be the equivalent of +5% p.a. on 500 million BTS worth of BitUSD and tie up 1 Billion BTS. That's the kind of amount that will remove supply from the market, remove BTS from centralised exchanges & create BTS (For BitUSD demand) & so be extremely positive.
As it's just a 6 month promotion you can remove/curtail/mix it after among other SmartCoins without effecting the market too much.
Whereas using 5% with 75% going to Shorts would provide +5% p.a interest on just 45 million BTS. This amount could easily be met with BTS already on the DEX. So it would have very low/no impact on removing supply, BTS from exchanges and generating new BTS (For BitUSD) demand.
Work in progress...
I looked at the BSIP outline https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0001.md
Here is some stuff I have written for one, if anyone wants to turn it into a proper BSIP or suggest changes or create their own variation cool. My main goal is that BTS trials using some of the worker budget for SmartCoin yield in one form or another.
---------------------------
BitUSD Yield Promotion BSIP
100 000 BTS per day, 23% of BTS Worker Budget, for 6 months directed to a BitUSD yield promotion. (75% to going to BitUSD Yield and 25% going to BitUSD shorts)
Lower BitUSD forced settlement to 0.95
good cut at this experiment. i'd recommend flipping the split and making it 75% to shorts and 25% to yield on holding the asset. from my experience, those who borrow our smartcoins into existence are the real heroes. they're tying up a ton of collateral and our markets wouldn't exist without them. those who buy and hold the assets still do some good, but incentivizing buy-and-hold over shorting would likely reduce market liquidity by drying up the order book.
also, diverting 20% of worker funds for just bitUSD seems excessive. what happens if it is a success? we have no slack to start subsidizing other markets without changing the rules of the game for new investors/traders who bought in with those lavish conditions. personally, i think 20% of worker fund diversion for overall systemic trading support is great, but that'd include all subsidies to all smartcoins, not just one test case. we have to consider the impact of reducing dev/worker budget on our long term system health. personally, i'd start with something like 5%.
Regards the 20% of worker funds with 75% to longs, that's because it will be the equivalent of +5% p.a. on 500 million BTS worth of BitUSD and tie up 1 Billion BTS. That's the kind of amount that will remove supply from the market, remove BTS from centralised exchanges & create BTS (For BitUSD demand) & so be extremely positive.
As it's just a 6 month promotion you can remove/curtail/mix it after among other SmartCoins without effecting the market too much.
Whereas using 5% with 75% going to Shorts would provide +5% p.a interest on just 45 million BTS. This amount could easily be met with BTS already on the DEX. So it would have very low/no impact on removing supply, BTS from exchanges and generating new BTS (For BitUSD) demand.
@Empirical1.2, what about leaving it at 75/25% for longs vs. shorts, but use only 8-10% of worker funds? This way it's more politically palatable and doesn't crowd out development, but still ties up upwards of half a Billion BTS. Also, you are assuming 5% APR will be required, but isn't it very possible that it might require a lower APR to achieve the same effect, therefore fewer funds utilized may still tie up the desired amount of BTS?