BitShares Forum
Main => Stakeholder Proposals => Topic started by: pluswave on March 15, 2018, 03:03:16 am
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Hello,
MagicWallet team is ready for new api source for price feed. As you know , we have the faitCNY/bitCNY deposit/withdraw gateway (p2p), so can provide some data to witnesses now. But this data is not for public. As a witness, if you are interesting to use this source, please use one of the following methods to apply your api key:
1 . reply this topic, comment your email address and your witness account
2. send a mail to pluswave@magicwallet.io
the provided data is a array of accumulated deposit/withdraw transactions:
{ depositBitCNY: '0.0000',
depositFiatCNY: '0.0000',
depositCount: 0,
withdrawBitCNY: '0.0000',
withdrawFiatCNY: '0.0000',
withdrawCount: 0,
startdate: '2018-03-15T02:50:00.000Z',
datelength: 1,
datatype: '1m'
},
the data is updated every minutes. you can get most recent data for:
1min
5min
15min
30min
1h
2h
4h
6h
12h
24h
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witness: blckchnd
mail: admin@blckchnd.com
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A reference usage of this data is here: https://github.com/sunchao123456/btsprice .
The idea is , the recharge/withdraw price is compensated to the original BTS price through a user defined factor （0-1). For example, now magicwallet.witness set the factor to 0.4, While you can use 1.1 FaitCNY to get 1 bitCNY, it will compute:
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (1 + (1.1 - 1)*0.4)
if you can use 0.9 FaitCNY to get 1 bitCNY, it will compute:
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (1 + (0.9 - 1)*0.4)
The original BTS price is from a fork of alt's btsprice (crazybit's one).
-
A reference usage of this data is here: https://github.com/sunchao123456/btsprice .
The idea is , the recharge/withdraw price is compensated to the original BTS price through a user defined factor （0-1). For example, now magicwallet.witness set the factor to 0.4, While you can use 1.1 FaitCNY to get 1 bitCNY, it will compute:
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (1 + (1.1 - 1)*0.4)
if you can use 0.9 FaitCNY to get 1 bitCNY, it will compute:
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (1 + (0.9 - 1)*0.4)
The original BTS price is from a fork of alt's btsprice (crazybit's one).
Excellent work!
Witness: rnglab
admin@rnglab.org
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Witness: elmato
matias[dot]romeo[at]diventi.com.ar
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Witness: xeldal
xeldal [at] cryptolab [dot] net
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Witness: xeldal
xeldal [at] cryptolab [dot] net
voted.
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A reference usage of this data is here: https://github.com/sunchao123456/btsprice .
The idea is , the recharge/withdraw price is compensated to the original BTS price through a user defined factor （0-1). For example, now magicwallet.witness set the factor to 0.4, While you can use 1.1 FaitCNY to get 1 bitCNY, it will compute:
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (1 + (1.1 - 1)*0.4)
if you can use 0.9 FaitCNY to get 1 bitCNY, it will compute:
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (1 + (0.9 - 1)*0.4)
The original BTS price is from a fork of alt's btsprice (crazybit's one).
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (bitcny/cny+0.02)^3
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Witness: elmato
matias[dot]romeo[at]diventi.com.ar
Let's discuss the more radical algorithm for reference.
Exemplification of formula effect, loose target negative 2%, acceleration factor N=3
When the premium is negative 0.02 (discount 2%), the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1-0.02+0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1. Conclusion: The target is in an ideal state without adjustment.
When the premium is negative 0.01 (discount 1%), the acceleration factor is 3. Ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1-0.01+0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.01 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.030301, conclusion: the market price increases by 3%, close to the ideal target.
When the premium is 0, the acceleration factor is 3. Ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.02 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.0612, conclusion: the market price increase of about 6%, very satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.01, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.01 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.03 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.092727. Conclusion: The market price increases about 9.2%, satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.02, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.02 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.04 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.125. Conclusion: The market price increases about 12%, satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.03, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.03 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.05 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.157. Conclusion: The increase of market price is about 15%, satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.04, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.04 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.06 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.191. Conclusion: The market price increases about 19%, satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.05, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.05 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.07 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.225, conclusion: the market price increases about 22%, the risk is still controllable.
We can see that with the constant increase of the premium parameters, the market price increases show a linear decline slowing down model.
In fact, if M = 0.02, that is, the easing index is 2%, the accelerating factor N = 3, such a formula, the premium is very difficult to exceed 1%. Because when the premium reaches 1%, the feed price rises by about 9.27% relative to the market price, which is equivalent to the MSSR of "0". That is to say, the explosive warehouse receipt no longer has a "suppressive" effect on the price of the internal market, at this time the internal market is fully motivated and the external market to maintain a "consistent" price. If the internal and external prices tend to be flat, the premium will disappear.
Conclusion: If the easing index M = 0.02, that is, the easing target 2%, the accelerating factor N = 3, then the theoretical premium will not exceed 2%.
再来讨论下更加激进的算法，供见证人参考。
举例论证公式效果，宽松目标负2%，加速因子N=3
当溢价负0.02时（折扣2%），加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1-0.02+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1^3=BTS市场价 *1,结论：目标达到理想状态，无需调整。
当溢价负0.01时（折扣1%），加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1-0.01+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.01^3=BTS市场价 *1.030301,结论：市场价提高3%，接近理想目标。
当溢价0时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.02^3=BTS市场价 *1.0612,结论：市场价提高约6%，很满意，也很安全。
当溢价0.01时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.01+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.03^3=BTS市场价 *1.092727,结论：市场价提高约9.2%，满意，也很安全。
当溢价0.02时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.02+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.04^3=BTS市场价 *1.125,结论：市场价提高约12%，满意，也安全。
当溢价0.03时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.03+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.05^3=BTS市场价 *1.157,结论：市场价提高约15%，满意，也安全。
当溢价0.04时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.04+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.06^3=BTS市场价 *1.191,结论：市场价提高约19%，满意，安全。
当溢价0.05时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.05+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.07^3=BTS市场价 *1.225,结论：市场价提高约22%，风险依然可控。
我们可以看到，随着溢价参数的不断变大，市场价提高呈现线性下降趋缓模式。
实际上如果采用M=0.02，即宽松指标为2%，加速因子N=3，这样的公式后，溢价很难超过1%。因为当溢价达到1%时，喂价相对市场价提高了约9.27%，这个时候相当于MSSR为”0“了。也就是说爆仓单对内盘的价格不再有”压制“作用了，此时的内盘完全有动力和外盘保持价格”一致“。如果内外盘趋于价格持平，就是溢价消失的过程。
结论：如果采用宽松指数M=0.02，即宽松目标2%，加速因子N=3，那么理论上溢价不会超过2%。
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witness: blckchnd
mail: admin@blckchnd.com
再来讨论下更加激进的算法，供见证人参考。
举例论证公式效果，宽松目标负2%，加速因子N=3
当溢价负0.02时（折扣2%），加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1-0.02+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1^3=BTS市场价 *1,结论：目标达到理想状态，无需调整。
当溢价负0.01时（折扣1%），加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1-0.01+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.01^3=BTS市场价 *1.030301,结论：市场价提高3%，接近理想目标。
当溢价0时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.02^3=BTS市场价 *1.0612,结论：市场价提高约6%，很满意，也很安全。
当溢价0.01时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.01+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.03^3=BTS市场价 *1.092727,结论：市场价提高约9.2%，满意，也很安全。
当溢价0.02时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.02+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.04^3=BTS市场价 *1.125,结论：市场价提高约12%，满意，也安全。
当溢价0.03时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.03+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.05^3=BTS市场价 *1.157,结论：市场价提高约15%，满意，也安全。
当溢价0.04时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.04+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.06^3=BTS市场价 *1.191,结论：市场价提高约19%，满意，安全。
当溢价0.05时，加速因子喂3。理想喂价 = BTS市场价 * (1.05+0.02)^3=BTS市场价 *1.07^3=BTS市场价 *1.225,结论：市场价提高约22%，风险依然可控。
我们可以看到，随着溢价参数的不断变大，市场价提高呈现线性下降趋缓模式。
实际上如果采用M=0.02，即宽松指标为2%，加速因子N=3，这样的公式后，溢价很难超过1%。因为当溢价达到1%时，喂价相对市场价提高了约9.27%，这个时候相当于MSSR为”0“了。也就是说爆仓单对内盘的价格不再有”压制“作用了，此时的内盘完全有动力和外盘保持价格”一致“。如果内外盘趋于价格持平，就是溢价消失的过程。
结论：如果采用宽松指数M=0.02，即宽松目标2%，加速因子N=3，那么理论上溢价不会超过2%。
Let's discuss the more radical algorithm for reference.
Exemplification of formula effect, loose target negative 2%, acceleration factor N=3
When the premium is negative 0.02 (discount 2%), the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1-0.02+0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1. Conclusion: The target is in an ideal state without adjustment.
When the premium is negative 0.01 (discount 1%), the acceleration factor is 3. Ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1-0.01+0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.01 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.030301, conclusion: the market price increases by 3%, close to the ideal target.
When the premium is 0, the acceleration factor is 3. Ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.02 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.0612, conclusion: the market price increase of about 6%, very satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.01, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.01 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.03 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.092727. Conclusion: The market price increases about 9.2%, satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.02, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.02 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.04 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.125. Conclusion: The market price increases about 12%, satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.03, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.03 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.05 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.157. Conclusion: The increase of market price is about 15%, satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.04, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.04 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.06 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.191. Conclusion: The market price increases about 19%, satisfactory and safe.
When the premium is 0.05, the acceleration factor is 3. The ideal feeding price = BTS market price * 1.05 + 0.02) ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.07 ^ 3 = BTS market price * 1.225, conclusion: the market price increases about 22%, the risk is still controllable.
We can see that with the constant increase of the premium parameters, the market price increases show a linear decline slowing down model.
In fact, if M = 0.02, that is, the easing index is 2%, the accelerating factor N = 3, such a formula, the premium is very difficult to exceed 1%. Because when the premium reaches 1%, the feed price rises by about 9.27% relative to the market price, which is equivalent to the MSSR of "0". That is to say, the explosive warehouse receipt no longer has a "suppressive" effect on the price of the internal market, at this time the internal market is fully motivated and the external market to maintain a "consistent" price. If the internal and external prices tend to be flat, the premium will disappear.
Conclusion: If the easing index M = 0.02, that is, the easing target 2%, the accelerating factor N = 3, then the theoretical premium will not exceed 2%.
-
A reference usage of this data is here: https://github.com/sunchao123456/btsprice .
The idea is , the recharge/withdraw price is compensated to the original BTS price through a user defined factor （0-1). For example, now magicwallet.witness set the factor to 0.4, While you can use 1.1 FaitCNY to get 1 bitCNY, it will compute:
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (1 + (1.1 - 1)*0.4)
if you can use 0.9 FaitCNY to get 1 bitCNY, it will compute:
compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (1 + (0.9 - 1)*0.4)
The original BTS price is from a fork of alt's btsprice (crazybit's one).
Excellent work!
Witness: rnglab
admin@rnglab.org
voted, compensated BTS Price = original BTS Price * (bitcny/cny+0.02)^3
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Excellent work!
Witness: btspp-witness
mail：cheer@btsplusplus.com