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Messages - binggo

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241
General Discussion / Re: Liquidity Mining(main thread)
« on: August 02, 2020, 12:11:38 am »
一个很简单的规则就是把每次成交的market fee分一半给这次成交的maker。
看看yjl20170630这个ID,半个月来一次都没成交过还获得了不少奖励。当前这种规则根本不合理,不是为真正的maker准备的。
交易费分一半给maker,实际上等效于 maker 把单子往后移动一半同时交易费率减半。
我不觉得这个等效,成交价还是挂单的位置,不存在后移。相反,盘口会有大量的挂单,有利于成交。
taker出的市场交易费还是一样,并没有减半,只是把交易费分成两份,一份交给系统,另外一份奖励给maker。
这样子系统是自带盈利的,公平的,应该不回有人出来反对说理事们从公共账号偷钱。
系统自带盈利,而且还鼓励了做市场,而且(无论是原理还是实现)还特别简单,何乐不为?
而且这种方式应该可以直接在区块链里实现吧。
最终决定点差 (或者说买卖盘口差价,spread) 的,是实际费率 + 做市商愿意承受的风险比例

收1%然后返0.5%,等于实际费率就是0.5% ,同样的市场竞争条件下,交易双方最终成交价格(到手价)是一样的。有返点的时候,做市商会把单子往前挂一点,导致盘口差价看起来小一点,但吃单手续费提高了,结果是一样的,只是数字游戏。

返点的功能从技术实现来说没有问题,问题是有没有必要做、花多少成本去做。

话说回来,控制支出小于收入当然可以盈利,但如果成交量达不到一定规模,只是百分比好看,意义并不大。比如日成交只有1万的时候,手续费10块,即使拿90%出来运营发奖,也只有9块,做不了什么事,对参与者没有多少吸引力。如果日成交一千万,手续费1万块,拿10%出来也有1千块了,多少还是有点吸引力的。所以这里有个矛盾,成交量越低的时候,越需要从别的地方拿钱来补贴运营、把成交量做大;当成交量大到一定程度,反而不需要补贴了,做市商靠盘口点差都能活的不错。


做市商都是靠手续费返点与盘口差活的,没有一个交易所会把自己的营收去补贴成交量低的交易对,导致最后严重入不敷出,除非脑子有坑,上一些优质热门项目,开发一些更有吸引力的合约杠杆期权借贷产品,吸引来的流量远比补贴一个镜花水月的成交对远远划算的多。

成交量低是交易所自身没有营销,信誉度不够,没有特色,并且自己不先做市场增加深度与流动性同时手续费返点吸引做市商,说得就是GDEX,没有大赛的时候,就躺尸什么也不做,有了大赛就屁颠的对刷起流量来了,大家要点脸面好不好?!

现在市面上这些奖励代币的DeFi 项目之所以这么大方,是因为这些都是没有任何成本印出来的代币,这些代币所获大家都是零成本,薅多薅少,项目方不心疼,参与方不心疼,谁也不心疼。

像Uniswap不发代币,但是手续费全是流回池子里的,本身的机制设计与手续费回流已经给流动性提供方有很大的套利空间。


像BTS的网关成交量低,这是bts本身的原因吗?难道还需要bts去营销这些网关项目?即使每日的奖励量顶到天花板也无法弥补支出大于收入的黑洞窟窿,而且这些奖励量绝大部分被薅羊毛,流到了某些直接利益相关者的口袋中。任何的交易大赛奖励与流动性补贴,无论怎么设计,最终都只是薅羊毛大赛而已,羊毛薅完,全做鸟兽散。这就跟拉斯维加斯一样,某些团伙投钱在沙漠里凭空建城市想靠正经生意的流量回本,鬼都知道这是在痴心妄想。

就跟上一次MM薅羊毛那么爽,成交量带来的收入能够弥补支出的黑洞吗?何况这些收入基本是喂价解锁后bitcny/bts区带来的收入,系统整体还有更大的支出黑洞。

像bitcny/bts,bitusd/bts这几个大赛交易对,谁会脑子有坑到把这两个锁喂价的交易对放到交易大赛里?为什么没有成交量心里都不清楚吗?一群CN-VOTE天天屁颠屁颠的爽的要死,这是大赛的目的所在?

然后回过头去看biteur/bts交易对,为什么没有人愿意去biteur抵押?强清补偿1%这么低,上浮的价格空间完全被强清锁死,任何位置的抵押都会被清,换成你,你去抵押吗?你会去放心交易吗?抵押量不够还要什么成交量?!

EOS上的defi项目已经被科学家薅的躺尸了,白印的都被薅的躺尸,bts现在是谁也感觉不到心疼是吧?!

242
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: August 01, 2020, 06:58:14 am »
I would claim that majority of bitshares users have no idea how to use cli wallet based on my personal experience.

This means they have already a disadvantage in the voting system against the few who use it.

Maybe need to fund UI?

but i think who didn‘t have locked forever positions can support the wittness then he gets the full normal VP may be more better and easy, one wittness one vote.


简易中文cli_wallet教程,没有电脑动手能力及时间的话,只看看就好:
https://github.com/shulthz/BTS-/issues/1

243
有一说一,整个见证体系早就死气沉沉

244
大概率是15天,不是60天 :),因为这个仓位一开始直接建立的就是永久仓位,所以完全激活状态应该是15天。

如果一开始建立的是一个180天的仓位,升级到永久仓位应该是不能越级升,而只能逐级的升,这样的话才应该是需要60天。

而且我猜,大概一个正式永久仓位正式生效后,其它账户的只要建立一个在激活状态的永久仓位就有投票权,而不是再等15天,15天只是一个权重满额的时间。

第一个正式永久仓位生效只是一个激活条件而已。

从代码看来应该是60天。也是按照 liquid > lock_180_days  > lock_360_days  > lock_720_days > lock_forever  顺序升级。

等正式解释吧

因为如果锁1年,就要浪费15天的时间,如果锁两年,就要浪费30天,这不科学。

而且这样如果一个大锁定票仓要作恶,其它票仓要蛋疼的等45天才能升级到大权重,黄花菜都凉了,而且永久锁票仓180天就要降权,60天的时间要浪费在升权上,如果是这样的话要多蛋疼就有多蛋疼

245
大概率是15天,不是60天 :),因为这个仓位一开始直接建立的就是永久仓位,所以完全激活状态应该是15天。

如果一开始建立的是一个180天的仓位,升级到永久仓位应该是不能越级升,而只能逐级的升,这样的话才应该是需要60天。

而且我猜,大概一个正式永久仓位正式生效后,其它账户的只要建立一个在激活状态的永久仓位就有投票权,而不是再等15天,15天只是一个权重满额的时间。

第一个正式永久仓位生效只是一个激活条件而已。

246
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 10:27:49 am »
偏题的话:
任何投票机制都不能够阻止大票仓的行为,这是DPOS机制中致命性的缺陷,随着筹码的财阀化及利用人贪便宜的心思用各种空投来取得大票仓,最终都会导致DPOS越来越趋向中心化控制,想要摆脱这种缺陷,只能是重新设计一套合理的见证机制,足够多的见证人数量,足够高的抗攻击操控成本,让见证人尽量摆脱票仓控制,让见证人投票来决定系统的一切方向。当然这只是我个人的想法。


像这个投票机制最大的作用是将BTS从滑向抵押票权的深渊中拉了回来,至于锁仓时间获得的票权越多是否合适,这要看锁仓所消耗的时间成本设计是否能够抵挡人性中的贪婪。

关键是找出锁仓人最可能的作恶时间点在什么时候?

这种锁仓时间获取倍数越多我感觉并不是太好,很容易会形成一个大票仓锁了横行的局面,导致一言堂,其它自由投票人失去投票积极性,投票有效性大幅降低。而且并不是锁定越多越好,锁的太多会严重影响流动性...

247
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 09:41:29 am »
Big holders like beos or alt can lock for 360 days 100million bts which is not an issue and get 400 million votes.Who is going to oppose them ?Where do you find on the other side 100 million bts willing to lock ?
Such a system favours big holders giving them the opportunity to get even more stronger if there is such a will from their side.


Also BTS was created as utlity token with the funcionality to be used as collateral.This voting system is in deny with that functionality as you can't participate in the ecosystem creating bitassets and getting more votes to participate in bitshares progress.


A general question.

Is a BTS holder who doesn't use his BTS better than somebody who uses his BTS in bitshares ecosystem for which it was constructed ?
The simple holder non active member gets a benefit of up to 8 times VP from his BTS where the active member who is using his BTS activly on bitshares dex gets punished for it?

A non active member should have the possibility to have up to 8 times more voting power than an active member ?


Collateral and participate ecosystem is trading behaviour not governance behaviors, the trading system and collateral system is part functions of BTS,

It's just like professional standard of the SEC staff,they can't trade in stocks,so the governance should be separated, shouldn't be effected by the trading behaviour,if the governance behaviors was effected by trading behaviour,what will happened i think we all clear about that.
Governance behaviors is not inactive, it is a very important avtive for system.

No one can stop BEOS and alt even they didn't lock to get VP, but still no one can stop the more and more vote of collateral when the price rise, then you will find there is not 36X for vote of collateral,the vote of collateral will become 100X in a very short time,then they will control everything.


I think the divergence is long locked time to get more VP, 2x/4x/8x voting power, the potential threat,if we just locked to get full VP not times VP, if it's more better?

248
General Discussion / Re: So, who can tell me what happend in voting?
« on: July 31, 2020, 08:54:18 am »
Quote

    For newly registered accounts, the user's voting power (VP) is zero.  VP only apply after you begin voting.


That's it

If an old account never have any voting operations , its voting power (VP) is zero too,VP only apply after you begin voting.

One committee one vote,if you support many committees,so every your supporting committees will get the total VP you have/the numbers of your supporting committees

Locked bts you will have more VP;

Locked 180 days, you will get 2X VP;

Locked 360 days, you will get 4X VP;

Locked 720 days,you will get 8X VP;

Locekd forever,you will lose these bts,but you will get 8X VP if your account have equal available amount bts,and these VP will decay 2X every 180 days.


There have four levels above, they need to update to next level, the VP will become full as the time,15 days will get full VP;

You can cancle the update in 15 days,but the fund will be vesting in 7 days.

Every account can creat many separate locked positions,these locked positions can be splited but can't be merged.

Every locked positions can change in the process  of updating to a Locekd forever positions, if a locked position become a true formal Locekd forever positions already,then can't be changed.

4.  If a true formal Locekd forever position appears on the chain, then:

The acccount which didn' have Locekd forever[/b] position will didn't have any VP;

The margin position and orders book will didn't have any VP.

249
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 08:46:38 am »
当然我可能理解这种机制是为了给bts持有量少者利用锁仓时间倍数来获取更大的声音,但是大象的腿即使瘦三圈还是比蚂蚁粗,这是任何机制都无法避开的,但可能会好过没有声音

250
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 08:36:08 am »
The whole voting system is weak.Has so many dangerous features which can be exploited to death by wealthy holders.
Take control over committee with x32 and you take control over bitassets income.
Get 11 witnesses voted in and you control the chain.

People are going to monitor and pay with their own investments to protect bitshares from these attacks ?


Personly i'm positive for voting changes but discussed within the community to not have these risky wholes and without destroying confidence that bitshares can't be controled by a single person.

This voting system mainly benefits BEOS and makes the reserve pool wide open to them to get the funding for their so desired gateway integration.

Who is going to pay millions of BTS to retort beos attempt getting funding ?
They can win ten's of millions of BTS what is the guy winning who is going to protect the reserve pool ?
Only a loss.Who is going to do that ?

This is the potential threat.

But want to get pay from the reserve pool is not a cost-effective operation,take control over bitassets income is a good way.
It is dangerous for this account to get 32X VP,if he want to picked up sesame and lost watermelon?

But it is still better than the old system, use vote of the margin position to rebalance the big vote like BEOS is another dangerous behavior,very easy lost control.

About control 11 witnesses, this the design problem of DPOS witneess, the DPOS witneess design is a disaster,let's learn the EHT2.0 and VSYS to improve it.

No design can stop the vote type like BEOS,as he control the bts in wallet directly, he is a exchange and rainfall again and again, the people love these too much...

So what i think is only locked position will have full VP,unfreeze time is more less, may be 7 days,let they go to support wittness get dividend, one witness one vote,let 21 witness to instead of committee.

251
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 06:01:35 am »
这个规则本来就是老外社区提出来的,老外肯定支持啊
BTS已经没救了,Abit一个人可以敌得过整个BTS社区和全部理事会,Abit一个人敌得过30亿BTS票权,还有什么好投票的?理事会全是渣渣了,干不过一个Abit。Abit一人即是天下。

我看到国外社区基本对这个规则意见不大啊😂,国内部分社区也没意见啊😹

至于规矩嘛,不是早就坏了嘛,MM投票换仓作弊,用未被社区投票激活的BAIP做规则不也是溜的不行嘛😹

所以不要激动😅

No the foreigner doesn't support anything which has not being implemented according to protocol.
Don't call Digital Lucifer/BEOS foreigners

We have lost rules long time ago,  the process may be not right, but the things looks not so bad, the big
affected party is cn-vote, more and more bigger vote of margin position is a more serious problem than this in the further, and we will can't do anything with it.
i don't support this process, but i support this change, maybe the change is not so good, will make beos or baozi become big vote,maybe not so good as we think in the further, but if it is more worse than now? Let's hope this process doesn't happen again.




252
Did have any new update for new version?
The UI worker proposal was not activated, so no funding has been committed to further UI development to the benefit of hackers. Why would you think it's in development without funding?

Seems cn-vote control the fund,but they can get money with other way… the income of wittness and MM.

253
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 05:15:02 am »
BTS已经没救了,Abit一个人可以敌得过整个BTS社区和全部理事会,Abit一个人敌得过30亿BTS票权,还有什么好投票的?理事会全是渣渣了,干不过一个Abit。Abit一人即是天下。

我看到国外社区基本对这个规则意见不大啊😂,国内部分社区也没意见啊😹

至于规矩嘛,不是早就坏了嘛,MM投票换仓作弊,用未被社区投票激活的BAIP做规则不也是溜的不行嘛😹

所以不要激动😅

不破不立,力挺✊

254
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 05:01:51 am »
见证人不是一票一投??  那配合锁仓  直接把见证人全部接管了,以后喂价想喂多少都行?

见证人倒是必须要改,一票多投本身就存在严重的贿选问题,像eos大家基本是心照不宣的你投我我投你。

见证人质押,一票一投,投票阈值激活。

锁仓控制见证人获利看似可行,实则难行。

255
中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 04:46:07 am »

永久锁仓,则这部分 BTS 失去投票权,但帐户剩余的等量 BTS 获得 8 倍权重加成


如果账户有100万个bts,永久锁仓1个bts,账户剩下的99余万个BTS就获得了8倍权重加成?

等量,锁1个只有1个bts有八倍票权。

剩下的那些是正常票权大概。

所以我感觉没啥大问题,大家最后基本会都锁一个意思意思,用正常票权投票,一些铁杆子可能会锁个半年一年的,当然这些铁杆子里如果有千万级别的大户就有点恐怖。


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