Quote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2015, 01:56:32 PMOne of the best sentences I read on this forum +5%
99% of people are AFRAID of what would happen if they respond in love rather than violence and control.
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Show posts MenuQuote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2015, 01:56:32 PMOne of the best sentences I read on this forum +5%
99% of people are AFRAID of what would happen if they respond in love rather than violence and control.
Quote from: bytemaster on September 29, 2015, 03:40:18 PMI have written a blog post with pretty much the same type of arguments regarding POW vs DPOS security in a more structured form.
The cost to attack POW is not the cost they advertize ($414K per day for BTC). The cost to attack any system is to attack at its weakest link, not its strongest. For $18,000 per day in transaction fees you could completely cripple the bitcoin network until all of the wallets out there raised fees. Then once they raise fees you pull off your attack until the wallet providers lower fees... then attack again. For $18,000 per day you could easily make competing mining pools unprofitable.
So the argument that it costs X times less to attack it is wrong on its face. What does it cost to "attack" a swiss bank and get them to change their policy to censor/limit transfers?
You must compare COST to ATTACK vs VALUE of DAMAGE. VALUE of DAMAGE is measured by how long the attack can be sustained and how costly it is to recover.
The COST to ATTACK BTC may be $18,000 per day, but the attack can continue indefinitely. As the attack progresses the value of BTC will fall which will make the attack cheaper to maintain.
In DPOS the COST of a DIRECT attack is much higher $1.5M dollars for BitShares 0.9 to gain control of all delegates via "frontal attack" compared with going after 51% of BTC.
In DPOS2 the COST of a DIRECT attack is even higher due to proxy voting and collateral voting raising the barrier
The cost to attack BTS2 is the cost of getting a TRUSTED community member to TURN on the community. While some men/women are easily bought, other men/women have integrity that cannot be bought.
The cost to attack BTC is the cost of getting a TRUSTED mining pool operator to TURN.
If we assume that the cost of getting a mining pool to turn is similar to getting a witness to turn, then the fact that we have more witnesses means it costs more to get 50%
We know that many mining pools charge 0% while others charge 1%. At 1% with 20% of BTC the mining pool has INCOME of $50K per month, but also has expenses.
What we can conclude from this is that if witnesses had a combined income equal to that of the mining pools, then the cost to corrupt them would be the same.
If we keep witness pay at 50,000 BTS per month (as proposed) and had 17 witnesses (as proposed) and BTS grew to be the size of BTC then they would each earn over $70K per month with far lower expenses.
From this I can conclude that the security of DPOS is greater while the cost is LESS which makes if much more efficient.
Quote from: xeroc on July 02, 2015, 01:51:38 PMThanks xeroc!
I know that blog .. well written articles that stick to the facts .. thanks for writing and publishing them
Quote from: Carpet Ride on March 14, 2015, 03:09:18 PM
Imo the important piece is Blockchain based reputations for supporting commerce - ala gets rid of need for contracts and lawyers. Blockchain voting will show how governments are disenfranchised from their people, however, the people will not be able to shift away from Gov'ts until Blockchain reputations are ubiquitous.
Good luck with your paper. Keep us posted!
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Quote from: Ander on January 07, 2015, 04:33:55 PMIt is definitely a million :) Thanks. Corrected.
Thanks, its great to see people recognizing the potential of Bitshares!
In the footnotes, #3, you said that Bitstamp makes almost a billion dollars a month. Did you mean a million?
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